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Examining Canada and Britain from 1990 to 2004, the thesis explores how the 
surge in minority nationalist agitation that occurred in Quebec and Scotland changed 
the political environment in Canada (outside Quebec) and England allowing regional 
elites to advance political agendas which mobilized regional and national identities. 
The thesis considers the role of democratic institutions at the regional level in shaping 
political demands through a comparative study of regional and national identity 
mobilization in Nova Scotia and the North East of England.  
The analysis contends that the relationship between minority and majority 
nations is dialectical; nationalism stems from fundamentally different interpretations 
of the state and is not the ‘fault’ of either nation.  Using this claim as the basis for 
analyzing elite debate at the centre and in the regions, the dissertation systematically 
examines regionalism within the majority nation by investigating debates at the 
national and regional level.  The work looks at parliamentary debates, campaign 
material, newspaper accounts and elite interviews; and as identity mobilization and 
political debates are targeted at the electorate, survey analysis is undertaken to see 
whether elite debate resonated with the masses. 
The thesis demonstrates that regionalism is a component of the ongoing 
(re)conception of nation within the majority nation, and that during periods of strong 
minority nationalist agitation, a political environment is created which allows elites in 
the majority nation to mobilize national and regional identities.  Regional identity 
mobilization is shown to be part of the nationalism of the majority nation; as the 
dominant conception of the state within the majority encompasses the minority 
nations as co-nationals and equal citizens, regional elites are able to use the minority 
nations as examples of successful agitation without subscribing to their 
interpretations of the state.  Regional levels of democracy did not alter the nature of 
regionalism in either state and though the demands issued may have been different, 
the underlying concerns were the same: a lack of voice and efficacy.
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October 31st, 1995, was a day etched into the minds of many Canadians as the 
day the Canadian federation nearly dissolved (Choudry 2007: 627).  Canadians from 
coast to coast watched the results of the Quebec referendum on ‘sovereignty,’ or 
‘independence,’ depending on how one interpreted the question.  Quebecois were 
asked to decide the fate of their province.  Yet they not only attempted to determine 
the fate of the Quebecois nation, whether they realized it or not they were also 
determining the fate of Canada.  Though the Quebecois narrowly voted in favour of 
remaining in Canada, this was not to be the end of the story, as nationalism in Quebec 
has remained one of the defining aspects of Canadian politics (Rotstein 1995: 372).
In every day usage, the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are often seen as 
synonymous, yet they refer to two very different concepts.  In the modern world 
states may be national, bi-national, multi-national or, theoretically, they may not 
correspond to any nation.  Conversely, nations may form sovereign states or regions 
within states; they may spread over multiple states, or they may be dispersed.  The 
aim of this work is to provide insight into the relationship between majority 
nationalism in Canada, and regionalism within Canada’s majority nation.  Canada is 
an example of a state in which one nation holds dominance over the others because it 
contains the majority of the population of the state.  This is what O’Leary refers to as 
the ‘staatsvolk’ (2001): the dominant group upon which the state is based.  In addition 
to a clear staatsvolk, Canada possesses a minority nation, Quebec, which enjoys a 
strong and vibrant culture and active nationalist movements.
Secessionist sub-state nationalism, as seen in Quebec, is not limited to 
Canada.  While Quebecois nationalists were active in Quebec, their Scottish 
counterparts were doing the same across the Atlantic.  Although the Scots, even with 
the victory of the Scottish National Party in the 2007 Scottish elections, have yet to 
challenge the British state in a manner similar to the Quebecois in Canada, the nature 
of the British state was problematized in much the same way.  Because of this, 
Quebec and Scotland have long proved useful comparisons for the study of sub-state 
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nationalism in the present (see McEwen 2002, Coates and Henderson 2005) and in 
the past (Kennedy 2007).  Consequently one might assume that the comparison of 
England and ‘English Canada’ would prove popular for the study of majority 
nationalism or regionalism as distinct from minority nationalism.  However, this has 
not been the case.  While notable works explore majority nationalism in either 
Canada or Britain (Resnick 1995, 1994, McRoberts 1997, 1995, Hazell 2006a and b, 
Colls 2002, Kumar 2006, 2003), and regionalism within one of the two (Tomblin 
2004b, 1995, Henderson 2004, Tomaney 2002a, 2001, 2000, Bond and McCrone 
2004), the comparison of Canada and Britain does not appear to have been 
undertaken.  In Canada and Britain the nationalism of the majority nation is not the 
proverbial ‘squeaky wheel’ that draws attention.  It is often what Billig refers to as 
‘banal nationalism’ (1996): the hidden nationalism of coins, national flags, and 
weather maps, which constantly reinforce the dominant view of the state within the 
majority nation.  This is not to say that members of the minority community would 
interpret it as ‘banal’, rather it is to say that members of the majority nation are not 
consciously expressing nationalist sentiments.  Understanding majority and state-led 
nationalism as an overlooked ‘background noise’ helps to explain this lack of 
academic inquiry, but it does not excuse it.  This work attempts to begin bridging the 
gap in the wider understanding of regionalism and nationalism in Canada and Britain 
by examining the relationship between minority nationalism and regionalism and 
nationalism in the majority community, as well as the role of regional democracy on 
how regional identities are mobilized. 
Comparative studies have many strengths, two of which are of particular 
importance to this project.  Firstly, although two case comparisons cannot reveal 
universal truths, they can produce information which can be tested against other cases 
to build towards said truth.  Secondly, by exploring one case in comparison with 
another, information is revealed that would otherwise have remained hidden, such as 
the role of English Canadian provinces in shaping national identity.  Lipset (1991) 
argues that the only way to properly understand one’s own society (in his case, the 
USA), is to compare it to another.  In Continental Divide Canada was used as the 
comparison to better understand the unique political culture of the United States. 
Following Lipset’s logic, this thesis attempts to gain knowledge of Canada by
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comparing Canada and Britain between 1990 and 2004, when both states were 
experiencing strong sub-state nationalist agitation, which allowed identity to be 
politicized in all parts of the state.  To understand regionalism within majority 
nations, Nova Scotia, a province in so-called ‘English Canada,’ and the North East of 
England, an English Government Office Region (GOR), were examined through 
extensive fieldwork combined with in-depth study of elite debate and public opinion. 
While Canada and Britain are alike in many ways, the state structures are 
fundamentally different: Canada is a multinational federation whereas Britain is a 
unitary state.  Britain is referred to as a ‘union state’ to identify that each of the 
constituent elements is governed differently from the centre (Bogdanor 1999: 14-15). 
Although a great deal of administration is conducted at the regional level in England, 
it lacks regional democratic legitimacy.  This is a key difference between Canada and 
Britain.  Following Przeworski and Teune’s logic (1979), the Most Similar Systems 
Design (MSSD) method of conducting a comparison allows for the exploration of the 
role of regional level democracy in both regionalism and majority nationalism.1  In 
particular, it allows the following to be addressed:
Hypothesis: Within multinational democracies, which have experienced a 
recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the 
majority nation which allows regional elites to promote political agendas that 
mobilize regional and national identity, and in so doing the presence or 
absence of regional democratic institutions will shape the demands and the 
manner in which they are made.
1.2 Researching Regionalism and Majority Nationalism: Goals and Research 
Questions
This work is not an analysis of identity; it is an analysis of territorial identity 
mobilization, and the role of democratic institutions within that mobilization.  It does
1 Note that this study examines Britain, and not the United Kingdom.  Britain best 
describes the main island of the British Isles, upon which is found England, Wales 
and Scotland, while the United Kingdom includes the province of Northern Ireland. 
The politics of national identity and the state are more complicated in the United 
Kingdom than they are in Britain.  This research focuses on Britain, and accordingly 
the term Britain is used throughout this work with the express exclusion of Northern 
Ireland.
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not explore the causes of regionalism; it examines how regional actors attempt to 
mobilize regional identity for political purposes.  The goal of this research is to test 
the hypothesis to shed light on the manifestation of regional identity in hegemonic 
nations, determining its impact on the political process.  Regionalism is understood in 
the project as part of the larger process of majority and state-led nationalism.  During 
the 1990s Canada and Britain experienced increased nationalist agitation culminating 
in the respective referendums on independence in Quebec and devolution in Scotland. 
While these two events captured public attention at home and abroad, interest was 
drawn to sub-state nationalism from other avenues as well.  In Canada this occurred 
through political and legal activities such as the Clarity Act, the Regional Veto Act 
and the Supreme Court Reference re Quebec Secession.  In Britain it came about 
through talks on elected regional assemblies in North East England, the Good Friday 
Accords and the devolution oriented Labour campaign of 1997.  In both states, 
attempts at constitutional change were generally in response to perceived challenges 
of minority nationalists. 
Stating that powerful nationalist movements existed in both Britain and 
Canada can be confusing as ‘nationalist’ may mean different things to different 
people.  In Canada the Bloc/Parti Québécois are seen as nationalist, but the Liberal 
Party of Quebec also works in the interest of the Quebec nation and advocates 
increased devolution from the centre to Quebec (Meadwell 1993: 203-4).  As 
nationalist may not be synonymous with independence, this work treats all who 
advance the status of a single sub-state nation as nationalist, and, in this sense, all the 
major parties in Scotland and at the provincial level in Quebec are deemed 
nationalist, even the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (whose members may 
bristle at the label) is distinctly Scottish and works in the best interests of the Scottish 
nation.
Both majority and minority nationalism contributed to the political 
environment in which regional elites found themselves.  Minority nationalism in 
Quebec and Scotland was part of a dialectical relationship with ‘English Canada’ and 
England.  In this relationship neither the minority or majority nations initiated the 
tensions inherent in multinational states, rather both advanced their interpretations of 
the state.  In turn, regional actors in the majority nation advanced their own 
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interpretation of the state.  This was part of the on-going (re)creation and 
(re)negotiation inherent in any nation.  It is hypothesized that regional institutions had 
an impact on how regionalism manifested itself, in turn impacting majority 
nationalism.  For this research regionalism is defined as:
The mobilization of regional identity by political elites as a vehicle for their 
desired political outcomes.   
Regional institutions, such as the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, offered Nova 
Scotian political elites something that regional elites in the North East lacked: a 
platform to express their voice.  Regional elites in the North East could only express 
themselves in their local councils and the Westminster Parliament, neither of which 
have a regional mandate.  To fully examine the hypothesis as stated above, the 
following research questions will be addressed:
RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of 
regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?
RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as 
a single unified people?  Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre 
and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?
RQc.     Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the 
majority nation or the regions?  If so, what role do the minority nations play?
RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it 
politicized?  How it is politicized?  What do regional elites demand?
RQe. What role do regional levels of democracy play in regional identity 
mobalization?
RQf. Does elite debate resonate with the masses?
1.3 The Staatsvolk in Canada and Britain
Much reference is made above of majority communities, and on the surface 
these may seem easy to define.  ‘English Canada’ and England are clearly the 
dominant groups in their respective societies… or are they?  Counter-intuitively, 
defining the majority community is difficult because of their dominant position 
within their respective states.  O’Leary (2001) refers to groups with such dominance 
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as the Staatsvolk, the people whom the state is structured around.  Accordingly, both 
‘English Canadians’ and the English have historically had difficulties separating 
concepts of Canada and Britain from ‘English Canada’ and England.  As Resnick 
notes  “In their heart of hearts” English Canadians think of themselves only as 
Canadian, without any qualifications as to what kind of Canadian they are (1995: 85). 
Indeed, ‘English Canada’ is a problematic term; much ink has been spilt debating its 
utility.  Some argue the term is a valid description of the Canadian provinces outside 
Quebec; others argue that given the linguistic and cultural diversity outside of 
Quebec, this term does not reflect reality.  Moreover, some are concerned that the 
‘British’ overtones of the term ‘English Canada’ alienate those of non-British 
extraction.2  
It is widely accepted that the major political cleavage in Canada is based 
around language yet this does not mean that language is a causal variable.  If so-
called ‘English Canadians’ see all of Canada as their national grouping and Quebec 
sees ‘English Canada’ as part of their ‘other,’ it is not surprising that this led to 
tension within the political order, and although it may manifest itself along the 
language divide, it is not caused by it.  ‘English Canadians’ do not differentiate 
between English speaking and French speaking Canadians when controlling the state 
apparatus.  As a result, the Canadian government engaged in a process of nation-
building which denied the distinctiveness of Quebec within the proclaimed cultural 
diversity of Canada, relegating the Quebecois to just another minority (Seymour 
2000: 250), not recognizing Quebec as a sub-state nation and holder of democratic 
legitimacy in its own right.  Language was not the problem, but it became a clear 
marker of the distinction denied to Quebec as the sole majority French speaking 
jurisdiction in North America.  Accordingly, ‘English Canada’ as a culturally defined 
entity does not sit well with Quebec as a territorially defined entity (McRoberts 1995: 
10); ‘English Canada’ exists within, and ‘French Canada’ beyond, Quebec.  
2 In a similar manner, when this author explained his research to a Scottish National 
Party Member of the Scottish Parliament, the MSP objected to the use of the term 
‘English Canada’ in that he felt the term denied recognition of the role of the Scottish 
in shaping and building Canada.
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The competing terms ‘Rest of Canada’ (and its variants) and ‘English Canada’ 
each contain different assumptions about the fundamental divisions in Canada 
(McRoberts 1995 7-8).  This author, after reflection, concluded that there are too 
many francophones outside of Quebec to fairly call Canada outside of Quebec 
‘English Canada.’  Indeed, later chapters demonstrate ‘English Canada’ is used by 
nationalists in Quebec to advocate a worldview that does not exist: that Quebec is 
French speaking and the other provinces are English speaking.  As this thesis 
explores territorial identities, a territorial identity marker will be used: Canada 
(outside Quebec).  As Canadians (outside Quebec) only conceive of themselves as 
being Canadian, ‘outside Quebec’ is placed in brackets to emphasize that Canada is 
not only the primary, but the sole, national loyalty for the Canadian staatsvolk.
In comparison, Britain’s staatsvolk, the English, would seem to be easier to 
identify, yet more than three hundred years of British history has blurred the 
distinction between England and Britain.  While England is easily defined on a map, 
‘Englishness’ is entwined with ‘Britishness’–so much so that some English people 
have trouble divorcing the two concepts (Condor 2000, McCrone and Kiely 2000, 
Barnett 1997, Crick 1991, Kearny 1991).  Colls (2002) argues that Britain is England 
writ large, and England is so dominant that it is difficult to identify non-British 
markers of English identity (Marquand 1995, Kumer 2003).  
In both Canada and Britain, then, the staatsvolk were not just a clear majority 
of the population, they had become one with the state in many regards.  O’Learly 
notes a staatsvolk’s dominance is such that it cannot be easily challenged by the 
minority nation.  This dominance, though, provides room for accommodating national 
minorities, as accommodation cannot challenge the hegemony of the staatsvolk. 
Within Canada and Britain there was a clearly dominant staatsvolk, and elites from 
both appeared content to accommodate minority nations.  With regard to the English, 
that even meant allowing their national identity to be consumed within a larger 
British one (Kumar 2006).  Accordingly, when national identities were being debated 
and renegotiated within the dominant groups, the minority sub-state nations played a 
key role.  They were seen as an important part of the state, with the majority nation 
willing to accommodate them.  Yet they were more than simply ‘regions,’ as nations 
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in their own right they were bearers of popular sovereignty and holders of political 
legitimacy (see Mann 1995, 1993 and Poggi 1990, 1978).
Though not nations in their own right, regions are a territorially defined unit, 
and regional identity is an emotional attachment to that unit.  As stated by Tomblin 
(2004a), the term ‘region’ has many different meanings, but in this thesis it refers to 
the territorially defined space between the state and local level.  This definition, 
however, is still imprecise, as more than one level may exist.  As such, this work 
examines regions with corresponding government structures to address the research 
questions introduced above.
In Canada there are ten provinces and depending on how one interprets the 
state, anywhere from four to eleven regions.  In Britain the term province appears to 
be restricted to descriptions of Northern Ireland.  England, one of the four nations of 
Britain, and the one that this study focuses on, is divided into nine GORs for the 
purposes of administration.  Within these regions are the Government Offices (GOs), 
which represent central government departments, and Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) mandated to develop the regional economies.  In addition, there are 
Regional Assemblies (RAs) (which will be abolished in 2010) whose members are 
appointed.3  As government administration is key to this project’s definition of 
‘region,’ a Canadian province and an English region will be compared.  Both will be 
termed ‘regions’ for simplicity’s sake, although the term ‘region’ is not usually 
applied to Canadian provinces.
1.4 Contribution of Thesis
As Watts notes, while multinational states may be difficult to manage, there 
are examples of long lived multinational federations (Watts 2007: 229).  While the 
British North America Act (1867) did not create an independent state in a manner that 
would be understood today, it did create something more than a British colony.4 
3 London, a city-region, will maintain its elected level of government.
4  The Canadian Constitution is legally called the Constitution Act (1867), but prior to 
1982 it was known as the British North America Act (1867).  This work will use the 
term British North America Act when referring to events that took place in 1867, as 
would referring to what happened in 1867 as the Constitution Act would be 
misleading and not convey that it was not an independent state that the framers of 
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When Britain was formed it did not erase the national sentiments of its 
member nations.  Nationalism, in a political sense, is a movement based on the best 
interests of a nation, not its independence or autonomy.  In this case, the Treaty of 
Union of 1707, which created the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and the various 
treaties that have culminated in the European Union may have limited the sovereignty 
of states in that membership places limits on state actions, but it could be argued that 
this was done in the interest of member nations.  This is seen in the Scottish National 
Party’s (SNP) current program for independence in Europe; the SNP simply does not 
see the European Union as a threat to the Scottish nation and the state-building 
project it advances.  Yet it appears that since the vast majority of nationalist 
movements have linked the independence of their nations with achieving political 
independence and membership in the international community that nationalism and 
independence have become conflated.  This helps explain why majority/state-led 
nationalism is such an under-researched phenomenon.  There does not appear to be 
any reason why a nationalist movement cannot be integrationist as long as its national 
interests are being met and its national distinctiveness is secure.  However, it is true 
that ‘the squeaky wheel gets the grease’ and in this sense it is often the more 
romantic, contentious, or violent nationalisms that receive the majority of academic 
attention.
According to Seymour, because there is no singly accepted concept of nation, 
researchers will opt to choose one definition and ignore the rest (2000: 228).  For 
almost all objective criteria that one tries to use to define nations there are cases 
which disprove it.  The only criteria of nationhood that seems to escape this is 
Gellner’s point that nations exist only when co-nationals recognize each other as such 
(1983).  In fact, Seymour argues that nations cannot be scientifically investigated the 
way one investigates atoms or other such phenomena as by definition the nation is 
subjective (2000: 237), yet nations are not subjective in the minds of their members. 
A cursory glance over 20th Century history  reveals that nationalism and the pursuit of 
national interest has been one, if not the, driving forces behind world history.
Confederation had in mind in 1867.
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An important distinction for this work is to think of nationalism not as 
devolutionist/secessionist nationalism, what Billig (1995) calls ‘hot nationalism,’ but 
as majority and minority nationalism.  Both minority and majority nationalism have 
the same underlying concept, namely the advancement of the interests of the nation. 
Where the two differ is in the corresponding indicators of the concept, which should 
come as no surprise as majority and minority nationalism occur in fundamentally 
different contexts.  
Equating minority nationalism with nationalism in general is erroneous.  It 
assumes that the best interests of the nation can be found in some sort of autonomy, 
and overemphasizes the relationship between state and nation.  It ignores the fluid 
and contextual nature of national identity, and that national identities may be layered 
in multinational states such as Canada and Britain.  The assumption is made that in 
order to defend the interests of the nation one must align it with a state and increase 
the power of the state.  This confuses the methods of obtaining a goal (the creation 
and maintenance of a state that corresponds to a nation) and the actual goal itself 
(preservation and advancement of the interests of the nation).  
Given the interest in nationalism and the politics of identity within the 
academic community, one would assume that substantial investigation had been made 
into regionalism and regional identity from a political perspective.  This, however, 
does not appear to be the case.  While much work has been done on individual 
regions within states, there does not appear to be a large body of theoretical research 
on regions, especially theoretical reflection on regionalism within multinational 
states, a gap which this work attempts to bridge.  In this sense, Gellner (1983) and the 
fictional Ruritarians provide an interesting framework for the study of centre-
periphery relations in regard to regional identity, but he sees the outcome as the 
creation of a nation, not a region.  Likewise Careless’s (1989) work examines how 
the Canadian political system developed through continuous expansion creating a 
hierarchical series of metropolises and hinterlands.  
Regional identity appears to have developed in much the same way as national 
identity.  For instance, McKay (1994) shows how the formation of regional identity in 
Nova Scotia followed patterns that scholars in nationalism identified in the creation 
of nations.  He explicitly compares the processes to Anderson (1983) in the 
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oft-cited Imagined Community.  Moreover, there are similarities between the cultural 
‘neo-nationalism,’ as he refers to it, of Nova Scotia, and the cultural nationalism that 
Hutchinson (1999, 1987) identifies as being at work in Ireland.  The regional identity 
of the North East of England seems to have formed in a similar way to Ruritarian 
national identity in Gellner (1983).  Namely, there is a centre and periphery, 
economic disparity, and even differences in dialect and accent between the North East 
and the Home Counties of the South East of England. 
This work suggests there is not a clear divide between regionalism and 
nationalism, rather the two are intrinsically linked as regionalism is a fundamental 
component of the continued re-negotiation of ‘nation.’  In this sense, regionalism in 
Nova Scotia and the North East of England is not opposed to Canada or Britain in the 
way that some strains of nationalism in Quebec and Scotland are.  Rather, people 
residing in Nova Scotia and the North East simply interpreted their nation differently 
than those from other parts of Canada (outside Quebec) and England, with 
regionalism being part of larger processes of national (re)definition and nationalism 
within the majority nation.
1.5 Outline of Thesis
This thesis explores regionalism within the majority nation as part of the process of 
nationalism.  Chapter Two introduces the concepts that this work operationalizes; 
building upon theoretical literature on nations and states, addressing why ‘regions’ 
are fundamentally different from minority sub-state nations.  It shows that regions, 
while possessing distinct identities, are embedded within the nations in such a way 
that regional and national identity do not compete with each other; regions are both 
embedded within and indivisible from larger nations.  While minority nations may be 
embedded within larger nations, as the bearers of popular sovereignty they are not 
indivisible from them.  Regionalism is part of the continual process of (re)negotiation 
of national identity.  With regard to majority nationalism, Chapter Two introduces the 
concept of ‘unionist’ and ‘pan-nationalist’ interpretations of the state, showing that 
while nationalism is often seen as being a function of minority nations, in reality it is 
expressed by both the majority and minority nations.  Nationalism and conflict 
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between the majority and minority in liberal states is shown to be the fault of neither, 
rather conflict stems from the opposing interpretation of the state held by actors 
within the majority and minority nations.
Chapter Three details the methods and methodology employed.  This chapter 
introduces the logic of the comparative study, demonstrating how the research builds 
upon the strengths of the comparative design while utilizing strategies to overcome 
the weaknesses of comparison.  This chapter shows how the logic of the Most Similar 
Systems Design is used in the comparison between Canada, a multinational 
federation, and Britain, a union state which only recently devolved democratic 
institutions to the minority sub-state nations.  The key variables under consideration 
are introduced, and how these variables are controlled by using the MSSD to compare 
Canada and Britain is explained.  Additionally, it introduces and explains the data 
sources used.
Chapter Four acts as a bridge between the theoretical and methodological 
chapters and the empirical chapters by expanding upon why Canada and Britain were 
used for comparison.  It details the histories of Canada and Britain, showing how 
economic, social and political variables are controlled.  Here it is shown that the 
political environment during the period under investigation, 1990-2004, was such that 
regional actors in Nova Scotia and the North East attempted to couple regional 
identity to political agendas.
Chapters Five and Six take very similar forms, but analyze the data from 
different perspectives.  Chapter Five analyzes elite debate at the centre to demonstrate 
how identities were mobilized and to determine which interpretation of the state was 
dominant within statewide political discourse.  This chapter utilizes an analysis of 
parliamentary debate and election manifestos to illustrate how elites at the centre set 
discursive boundaries for regional actors as they adhered to their interpretations of the 
state.  It demonstrates that in both states, while different political actors and parties 
may hold different views as to the nature of the state, state level interpretations of the 
state were broadly pan-nationalist.  This creates boundaries for debate within the 
regions of the majority nations while framing the minority sub-state nations as 
‘internal others;’ Quebec and Scotland became at once one of ‘us’ and an identifiable 
‘them.’
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Chapter Six shifts the focus of the research from the statewide to the regional 
level, using the challenge of the sub-state nation to reveal the conception of the state 
held by regional elites.  Using interview data, transcripts of legislative debates, 
regional campaign material and an analysis of regional media, this chapter 
investigates elite opinion in Nova Scotia and the North East.  It shows that debates at 
the centre created boundaries for debate within the regions, limiting how regional 
actors mobilized regional identity.  While regional elites attempted to use the 
examples of the minority sub-state nations, due to the regions being embedded 
within, and indivisible from, larger nations, regional elites did not have the same 
breadth of political tools as nationalist elites within the minority nations.  Instead, 
regional actors were able to utilize a different strategy; they were able to emphasize 
the ‘Canadian-ness’ and ‘British/English-ness’ of their regions.  These appeals to 
national solidarity emphasized that while the regions were distinct from other parts of 
their respective nations, this did not make them any less a co-national.  In both 
regions it is shown that elites felt their region lacked voice (using Hirschman’s 1970 
term).  This is especially interesting because the elected level of government in Nova 
Scotia means the province has an infinitely greater capacity for voice than the North 
East.  In both regions actors looked to the sub-state nations and saw effective use of 
voice, which encouraged them to use the sub-state nations as examples to emulate 
and allies in dealing with the centre.
Shifting focus to yet a different level of analysis, Chapter Seven examines survey 
data in Canada and Britain determining if debate at the regional and national level 
resonated with the masses.  The data presented indicates that while there was some 
sense of grievance in both Nova Scotia and the North East, that this did not correlate 
with a sense of regional identity—even though regional identities were strong in both 
regions, much more so than the Canadian (outside Quebec) and English average. 
This chapter substantiates the claim that regional identities are embedded within 
larger national ones, as neither the Nova Scotia or the North Eastern identity was 
found to compete with Canadian or English/British identities.  It highlights the 
problems that regional political elites encountered when attempting to link regional 
identities with a sense of political grievance; specifically that while people in the 
regions may have not been overwhelmingly supportive of the constitutional status 
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quo, no single option for change was overwhelmingly supported in either case.  In 
both regions, elites could not harness a clearly mobilized regional identity to connect 
to the policies that they were advancing.
Chapter Eight, the conclusion, synthesizes the information from the empirical 
chapters to show how they address the hypothesis and the research questions.  It 
highlights themes from each chapter that are common throughout the analysis, and in 
doing so demonstrates that the relationship between regional level democracy and 
identity mobilization is very complicated.  It indicates that regional democracy does 
not give the region voice per say, as regions in and of themselves do not have voice, 
actors do.  Regional level democracy instead allows actors who hold competing 
interpretations of the regional interest to use their voice.  It was shown that regional 
level democracy in and of itself did not increase political efficacy or perceived 
regional voice.  In both regions the demands by political elites were very similar and 
were based around a lack of both voice and efficacy within the governing structures 
of their states.  What was seen in both states is not a desire to lessen the ties with the 
rest of the nation, rather to strengthen them; integrationist regionalism.
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Chapter Two: Regionalism and Majority Nationalism
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss the relationship between region, nation and state in 
order to comprehend how identities based upon these can become politicized. 
Understanding the mobilization of identity requires understanding what identities are 
and how identities, which are inherently personal, intersect with society, coalesce 
around territorially defined units, and manifest politically.  This chapter introduces 
three key concepts used in this project.  The first is the bounded network, establishing 
who is one of ‘us’ and who is not.  This study examines political communication 
within these bounded networks.  The second is ‘nested identities,’ namely that 
regional identities are nested within national ones and indivisible from the nation. 
Regions are part of larger nations, and as such they belong to the bounded networks 
that create the nation.  Yet they also have their own series of bounded networks, and 
by understanding the relationship between these political debates in Canada and 
Britain can be understood vis-à-vis regional identity mobilization.  The final concept 
is that of opposing interpretations of the state, referred to as the ‘unionist’ and ‘pan-
nationalist’ interpretations.  It is through conflict between these two interpretations of 
the state that the political environment changes vis-à-vis regional political actors 
politicizing regional identity.  This chapter begins by discussing identity and the 
individual, showing how identities are overlapping and contextual.  It then explores 
the complex territorial aspects of identity with regard to regions, nations, and states. 
As regions, nations and states are the focus of this exploration, this chapter needs to 
develop a clear conceptual understanding of them that can be operationalized in later 
chapters.  Finally, it turns to how territorial identities become politicized.  It explores 
the role of nationalist discourse in Canada (outside Quebec) and England, and 
regionalism in Nova Scotia and the North East of England as a part of the identity 
mobilization of the ‘staatsvolk.’ 
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2.2 Identity
Identity is a complex phenomenon.  It is key to the articulation of ‘self,’ but 
all the markers of identity are made in relation to ‘others.’  Taylor (1989) argues that 
identity is what allows people to define themselves as individuals.  Yet identity is also 
social, as it is through social experiences that humans develop the identity markers 
that denote them as individuals (MacCormick 1999: 189).  Through identity 
individuals articulate what is important and what is not (Taylor 1989: 30).  Thus, 
while identity may be about defining the ‘self,’ it is constructed with regard to that 
which is outside of the individual.  The self exists only in relation to other selves
—‘self’ cannot be defined without reference to those who surround it (Taylor 1989: 
35).  Man is only relevant as an identity marker in relation to woman, working class 
in relation to middle class, white to black, straight to gay, minority to majority. 
Identities are meaningful only in relation to their contrasting identities and are 
inherently collective and relational.    
Individuals may only become aware of certain aspects of their identity when 
confronted by a contrasting identity, bringing their own identity into focus.  For 
example, a member of the Canadian nation need not use national identity as a marker 
to identify him- or herself in relation to fellow Canadians, but when removed from 
the national environment (for example, while conducting a PhD in Scotland), that 
individual may become very aware of his or her national identity and use this 
collective identity as a marker to define his or her individuality.  Beyond self-
categorization, identity markers serve as a medium for making sense of personal 
circumstances (Hearn 2007: 664).  They give people conceptual shortcuts, helping 
them make sense of the world.
While individuality presupposes social existence (MacCormick 1999: 192, 
Cohen 1996: 803), individuals are not simply products of society.  Society has a 
significant impact upon how people behave and identify; according to Knoke (1990: 
19-20) people acquire norms through social learning, initiation and pressure for 
conformity.  Though identity is the framework from which individuals determine 
where they stand on questions of good, worthwhile, or admirable (Taylor 1989: 27), 
the relationship is in fact dialectical.  Individuals, as members of collectives, 
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“interpretively construct” their identities through their unique experiences with them 
(Cohen 1996: 812).  Individuals are actors in their own right, making conscious 
decisions, which in turn have an impact upon society (Folts 1981: 40 see also Mann 
1993: 725).  Deutsch (1966a: 166) refers to this kind of process as a “feedback loop.” 
In essence, while society shapes individuals, individuals shape society and both grow 
and evolve.  Individual members of the nation establish communication networks 
through the transmission of common ideas, thoughts and beliefs, forming the basis of 
the coherence of societies and cultures (Deutsch 1966: 87).  
Identity, then, is personal and subjective, but it is also objective as it employs 
many markers, which can be uncovered through observation.  The first step in 
studying identity is to understand identities as the product of interaction, recognizing 
them as the construct of bounded networks of social communication.  
Bounded Networks
Deutsch (1966a) argues there is no universal human identity, as people’s 
identities are formed around lived experience.  It is necessary for a ‘them’ to exist, as 
any definition of a group is inherently exclusionary (Whitaker 1992: 198).  Given that 
identities do not include everyone, this indicates that these networks have borders and 
boundaries.  As Foltz (1981: 39) states: “Who studies systems studies boundaries.” 
Bashevkin (1991) argues that in order for there to be an ‘us’ we have to have an 
understanding of the ‘other.’  The ‘us’ needs ‘them’ in order to survive.  But in 
Britain and Canada, while England and so-called ‘English Canada’ may be important 
to Scottish and Quebecois conceptions of self, the converse may not be true in the 
majority nation.  The Canadian (outside Quebec) and English conception of the 
national community may include Quebec and Scotland (McRoberts 1997, Kymlicka 
2001, Kumar 2006).  
Physical distance plays a role in identity as the further away someone is from 
an individual, the less likely it will be for that person to identify with him or her 
simply due to there being less contact between them.  What contact there is would be 
overshadowed by greater contact with those closer.  As noted below, even new 
technologies allowing instant global communication may have only a limited ability 
to mitigate the role of geography.  Yet distance is not the only reason there is no 
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universal identity.  The problem with identifying with everyone is that it takes away 
from the uniqueness of the identity being recognized, depriving it of worth.  This is 
why sub-state national minorities either guard their special status when they have it, 
as in Spain’s historic communities (Giordano and Roller 2004: 2176), or seek special 
recognition and oppose uniformity, as in Quebec.  Yet, geography is malleable and 
helps link identity and territory (Kauffman 1998); shaping and bounding networks of 
social and political communication.  Billig (1995) argues geography helps define who 
is in the ‘in’ group and who is in the ‘out’ group as geography provides physical 
borders.
Borders are important as they shape internal communication lines, demarcate 
regulatory boundaries, and provide physical references to divide those on either side 
and create distinctive traditions and “local chauvinisms” over time (Stewart 1994: 23-
4).  Borders are “spatial and temporal records” of the bounded networks of human 
interaction (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 34).  While these borders may not always be 
clear, as cross border identities may mix, they provide markers as to who is and is not 
‘one of us.’  While Hobsbawm (1996: 262) argues that ‘they’ are recognizable as ‘not 
we’, usually by colour, language or physical characteristic, he may be looking at the 
wrong starting point of the process of ‘othering.’  These characteristics (especially 
language) often come after the networks are formed, not before.  Eugene Weber’s 
(1976) work on French nationalism in the late 19th Century exemplifies the 
importance of bounded networks and lines of communication in establishing a 
common frame of reference and shared identity.  
E. Weber (1976) shows how groups in France who were geographically 
isolated, not on the frontiers of France but simply outside the major lines of 
communication, had no real concept or understanding of the French nation; many did 
not even speak French.  Only after the lines of communication reached them (or, as 
the bounded networks expanded to include them) were they absorbed into the French 
nation.  This is very similar to the process that Careless (1989) identified in Canada, 
where the state expanded outward, not in the sense of expanding circles based around 
a core, rather by the state implanting itself and growing up around and between these 
implantations, building the geographic boundaries and physical infrastructure of the 
bounded networks.  These lines of communication are so significant that 
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E. Weber (1976: 208) argues roads and railways are more important to emancipation 
than any political revolution.
It may appear that bounded networks are what is commonly referred to as 
civil society; while they are related, a conceptual difference exists.  The concept of 
civil society refers to a level of society between the state and the individual which is 
independent of the state (Shills 1991).  Though a great deal of literature addresses 
how identity can be formed and mobilized through civil society (Morton 1999, 
Greenfeld 1990, 1987, Hutchinson 1987) the idea of bounded networks goes beyond 
civil society.  It includes the intertwining state and social structures which operate 
within the borders of the networks.  Accordingly, while civil society is an important 
component, so too are state structures such as the Nova Scotia Department of 
Education or the GO for the North East.  Despite the fact that these structures are not 
part of civil society, they interact with it, clearly marking the boundaries of the 
territorial networks 
Mann (1995: 45-46) demonstrates that these networks involve almost all 
manners in which humans interact.  He cites diverse channels of communication such 
as business contracts, government records, army manuals, and coffee house 
discussions, each of which transmit all sorts of information (such as values, customs, 
news, etc).  According to Deutsch (1966a), the basic building blocks of networks of 
social communication are individuals and the strength of these bounded networks is 
the relative efficiency of communication amongst individuals.  All human interaction 
requires communication, and the more complex the interaction, the greater the need 
for rich, varied, quick, accurate communication (Deutsch 1966a: 91).
Networks as Communication
The importance of communication within bounded networks is substantial. 
According to Keat and Urry (1982: 173-4) everyday understanding is possible due to 
the existence of a large variety of shared background assumptions and conventions 
between those communicating.  As communication requires understanding, the role 
of language in creating networks of social and political communication would 
intuitively seem paramount; communication occurs through language.  Anderson’s 
(1983) concept of print capitalism indicates that shared language, especially 
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vernacular as opposed to high language, is fundamental for the formation of a shared 
identity.  Only when symbols and references attain the status of “common currency,” 
becoming recognizable in everyday language, does shared identity become 
communicable (Cubbit 1998).  Taylor (1989) argues individuals are inducted into 
personhood through a language, a tool of the community.  In the 1960s, Deutsch 
(1966a: 43-44) argued language is preserved by special techniques and institutions, 
such as language structures, grammar, dictionaries, schools, print and radio. 
Challenging the borders of communication networks in the 1990s, Dahlgren (1993: 
17) argued that satellite TV may be creating international communities.  Nowadays 
people have immediate access to an endless range of  information through the 
internet, allowing for “reciprocal and fluid communication between the house or 
workplace and the multifaceted world” (Moreno 2002: 8).  
The creation of these international communities is most clearly seen through 
the internet and the rise of activities such as email, instant messaging, and social 
networking sites.  These allow people to communicate cheaply and quickly with 
people across the planet, and even engage in virtual games with them.  These 
technologies may appear to challenge the communication networks in a territory, 
giving people access to all sorts of data.  Hall argues these trends may not stand up to 
proper scrutiny and measurement (2000).  He notes that when measuring economic 
interactions the state is still the most dominant actor, a position of dominance that 
supranational institutions such as the European Union have not been able to 
challenge.  Individuals in the early 2000s may have access to information from 
around the world, but what has a greater impact upon creating and maintaining a 
shared identity is what impacts them most directly, such as local and national news. 
Even the internet may not be as divorced from territory as one may intuitively think. 
If one accepts the logic of Billig’s ‘banal nationalism,’ (1995) the internet may be 
seen as another means of transmitting nationalism.  Banal nationalism is the 
expression of national identity through day-to-day things, such as images on coins, 
flags in front of schools, weather maps, and the like.  This is not the ‘hot’ nationalism 
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that ‘others’ have,5  rather, when recognized, it is seen as patriotism.   According to 
Urminsky (2008), an individual’s ISP (Internet Service Provider) is identifiable, 
meaning that the state they are located in is available to advertisers who in turn use 
this information to target the individual, acting as a constant reminder of one’s 
physical location.6  The debates on globalization and the role of the state in the 
modern era are complex, but the point here is that the nation and the state have a very 
strong capacity to maintain their dominance in modern society.
Returning to shared language, while Anderson (1983) and Taylor (1989) focus 
on language, it would appear that these arguments should be expanded to include 
dialect or even common frames of reference, which can be shared by distinct 
communities.  The Irish and the Scottish are examples of nations which share a 
language with their neighbours, the English, while maintaining distinct national 
sentiments.  As Clark humourously notes, although Canadians seem 
“indistinguishable from the Americans the surest way of telling the two apart is to 
make the observation to a Canadian” (1965).  There are many Canadians whose 
mother tongue is French but who still share the same national sentiment as their 
English speaking co-nationals; as Cohen (1996) notes, national identity is interpreted 
by the individual.  Likewise, the distinctive accents found in the North East of 
England and the use of colloquialisms in Nova Scotia are part of the shared language 
in these two regions.  These examples indicate that shared language is not the sole 
factor in creating shared identities and bounded networks.  Instead it suggests that 
while language is part of the shared background assumptions outlined by Keat and 
Urry above, these conventions can transcend language or be shared by only some 
members of a language community.  As will be seen in Chapter Six, Nova Scotian 
elites see the French-speaking Acadian community in their province as being integral 
to their cultural understanding of the region.
In the establishment of bounded networks, the starting point is often seen as 
being language or shared symbolic discourse (see above as well as Kymlicka 2001,
5 By ‘hot’ it is meant the very visible nationalism generally associated with minority 
nationalism.
6 For example, when one types in the non-geographical www.google.com as a web 
address in the UK it is automatically redirected to www.google.co.uk.
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Kuper 1999, Cubbit 1998, Llobera 1998, Blommaert 1996, Simon 1996, Taylor 1989, 
and Elviken 1931).  In general, these authors see language as the common ‘glue’ that 
unites a society, as language is the means of communicating the common ideas and 
norms that form the basis for shared identity.  If a common language does not exist, 
then these norms and values cannot be transmitted (for example, McRoberts argues 
one of the failures of Trudeau was his lack of understanding the relationship between 
culture and language, 1997).  Others argue that civil society acts as a catalyst for 
shared identity (Yoshino 2001, Morton 1999, Faulk 1998, Hutchinson 1987).  As 
civil society is the level between the citizen and the state, it mediates the relationship 
between the state and the nation.  The common theme amongst these authors is that 
collective identities are built upon the interwoven networks formed by actors within 
civil society.  Still others emphasize the importance of common institutions to the 
understanding of bounded networks (Begin 2003, Nairn  2000, Favell 1998, Jewel 
1994 Greenfeld 1987).  Institutions in many ways combine elements of both language 
and civil society and give potential identity communities something to coalesce 
around.  As will be seen in later chapters, elites in the North East and Nova Scotia 
mobilized around institutions, or in the case of the North East the possibility of 
institutions, to create a focus for identity.
Each of the above group of authors identifies a key element in identity 
formation/mobilization, suggesting that there may not be one overarching variable. 
Authors such as Billig (1995) and Crick (1979) argue that there are no objective 
criteria as each nation is unique.  In this regard, Gellner’s (1983: 7) point that the only 
criterion for nationhood is that people within the nation recognize each other, 
exemplifies the ‘imagined’ nature of the community (to use the language of Anderson 
1983).  There is no one set of objective markers shared by each identity community in 
territorial identity formation and mobilization.  Even the geographic markers that 
form the basis of Deutsch’s (1966a) understanding of nation are of only limited value. 
Many countries share borders that have no obvious geographical feature, one of the 
most prominent being the so-called ‘longest undefended border’ in the world, the 
Canada-USA border.  Yet all of the above-mentioned authors identify groups of 
people who engage in discourse with each other, ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups with clearly 
delineated boundaries, both social and physical.  Deutsch (1966a ch2) argues that 
32
while the main networks of language, geography, economics and population may not 
perfectly overlap, as long as they overlap enough a territorial identity will emerge.  
All of the points raised are important components of territorial identity, but 
none of the individual elements are as important as “the mutually reinforcing and 
self-sustaining pattern of the whole” (Deutsch 1966a: 28).  It cannot be stressed 
enough that this ‘whole’ is not free floating; it is anchored to territory and territory 
becomes the bond that holds the other parts of the communication network together. 
By examining how these bounded networks intertwine, overlap and share borders, the 
next section links the personal-social dimension of identity to a territorial conception 
of identity.
 2.3 Regions, Nations, States 
Territorial identities are unique amongst people’s identities.  While all 
identities are attached to larger groups, territorial identities are further attached to a 
defined piece of land.  Deutsch (1996a) and Mann (1993) offer invaluable insight into 
the role of identity networks.  Both allude to the fact that there will be all sorts of 
networks that do not correspond to state borders.  In fact, in most states bounded 
networks are not neatly mapped onto state borders.  Furthermore, smaller bounded 
networks exist within states, bounded around smaller geographical units.  J. Smith 
(2002) notes each Atlantic Canadian province has it own set of provincial economic, 
social and political networks.  Based on the argument presented by Deutsch and 
Mann, these smaller bounded networks will harden over time to develop a clear sense 
of identity.  In the example of Atlantic Canada, each of the four provinces pre-dates 
Confederation (the creation of Canada) by generations.  Mann’s (1993) framework 
allows for the existence of networks within networks.  As such, they contribute to the 
make up of the state but do not compete with each other or the state.  Instead, these 
networks reinforce each other and over time help develop a sense of common identity 
in the state.  
This section discusses the three types of territorial unit under study; the state, 
the nation and the region.  To develop a theory of region and regionalism, this section 
begins by considering the difference between state and nation.  It is important to 
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clearly define these two concepts first, as in order to understand what regions are, one 
has to have a clear understanding of what they are not.  As the vast majority of states 
in the modern era are multinational (Hobsbawm 1996: 257), the discussion needs to 
address how states can deal with diverse populations, how territorial identities in 
states are mobilized, and the ways the state can deal with them.  By exploring the 
relationship between majority and minority nations, one sees how the political 
environment changes vis-à-vis regional actors within the majority nation.  Through 
examining the nature of nations this chapter highlights the key differences between 
sub-state nations and sub-national regions within the majority nation while addressing 
the place of the region within the nation.  
States and Nations I:  States
Of the three units of analysis (state, nation and region) states are the only one 
with a purely political definition in the strictest sense.  States are a historical 
phenomenon, the product of human interaction and not nature (McLennan et al. 1984: 
1).  States are not made or built, rather a “concrete historical process leading to the 
emergence of a state has typically been protracted, tentative and circuitous and have 
presented a wide discrepancy between understandings and outcomes” (Poggi 
1978:98-99).  While Mitchell (1991: 77) argues states are hard to define and are often 
defined in opposition to society, Mann (1993) is influenced by Weber’s (1974) 
definition of the state, namely it is the organization that possesses a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence within a given territory.  According to Mann, the state is a 
political organization which:
1. Has a differentiated set of institutions and personnel,
2. Embodies centrality in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a 
centre,
3. Has a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises power, and
4. Has some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some 
organized physical force (1993: 55).
Mann further argues that as states have defined territory, another set of political 
relations exists outside of the state; states inhabit a world of states (Mann 1993, see 
also Poggi 1990: 19-23).  Poggi claims the state is the highest level of power in 
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existence and that no power can override a state (Poggi 1990: 24).  While Mann 
alludes to this in his fourth point, the use of force and the coercive power of the state 
is an aspect of the state that Poggi does not shy away from.  He argues that the 
foundation of political power is coercion (Poggi 1990: 6, also 1978).  The concept of 
modern state is about power: “the state has many other functions, but fundamentally 
it is about rule” (McLennan et al. 1984: 14).  The power of the state includes the 
power to employ force to ensure conformity to its rules.  Force is not the only means 
of governing.  For example democratic states govern through the consent of the 
governed, yet force is something that even democratic states cannot renounce 
(McLennan et al. 1984: 15). 
Mann argues that states are of primary importance in the modern world, 
performing five functions that no other organization can attempt to do; 
1. Wage massive routine war, 
2. Provide communication infrastructure for both the military and capitalism, 
3. Be the site of political democracy,
4. Guarantee social citizenship rights encroaching into the private sphere, and 
5. Conduct macro-economic planning (Mann 1996: 314).
Put simply, the state is the “chief political instrument for getting things done” 
(Deutsch 1966a: 4), and it “reserves to itself the business of rule over a territorially 
bounded society” (Poggi 1978: 1).  In doing this, the state attends to the paramount 
social interest—preserving the collective’s very existence (Poggi 1978: 100).  
While this discussion makes it seem as if states are single actors speaking with 
a unified voice, the state is both an actor and a location (Mann 1993: 46): An actor in 
the sense that it operates with an institutional voice, and a location in that institutions 
and individuals operate within it.  Mann (1993: 75) further notes, “far from being 
singular and centralized, modern states are polymorphous power networks stretching 
between centre and territories.”  The state is not a single organization, it is a “vast, 
diverse, complex organizational environment” (Poggi 1990: 184).  The state is not a 
single power, it has many centres of authority, and can be thought of as a “chain or 
hierarchy of powers” (McLennan et al. 1984: 17).   While the chain or hierarchy may 
be clearer in some states, especially federal ones, they exist in all states.
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Different ministries within a state develop distinct administrative “styles, 
clienteles, policy traditions and biases in the relation and training of personnel,” in 
turn rivalries and policy differences develop between them, making coordination 
difficult (Poggi 1978: 94).  This was most clearly seen in the work of Stein and Lang 
(2007) who, in their discussion on the Canadian war effort in Afghanistan, 
demonstrate how the three government agencies charged with overseeing Canadian 
interests there (the Canadian Forces, the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, and the Canadian International Development Agency) were 
unable to work well together and coordinate their activities due to different 
bureaucratic cultures.  Chapter Six will show that not only do the federal government 
and the government of Nova Scotia have a difficult time working together, they 
actually compete with each other over the provision of services (and loyalty) in the 
province.
The state has not always been the large organization it is today. It only began 
undertaking major civilian functions in the 19th Century, sponsoring communications 
systems such as canals, roads, post offices, railways, telegraph systems and most 
significantly, schools (Mann 1993: 730). The modern state has massively enlarged its 
institutional infrastructure and has come to play a much greater role in society, 
enhancing all aspects of its power.  In presenting the huge increase in state 
expenditure between the Napoleonic War and the First World War, Mann (1993) 
demonstrates how states began to penetrate society more and more, engaging the 
people in both the public and private spheres in new ways.  Indeed, the example 
above from E. Weber (1976) shows that French state-building was completed only 
fairly recently.  Indeed, the development of the modern state has gone hand in hand 
with modernity (Poggi 1990: 35). 
States and Nations II: Nation
While the above discussion on the state is built upon widely accepted (yet not 
unproblematic) definitions, defining the nation is much more difficult (Gellner 1983: 
5).  If the state is a set of political institutions, what does that leave for the nation? 
According to Smith, the fundamental features of a nation are;
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1. Historic territory or homeland,
2. Common myths and historic memories,
3. Common mass public culture,
4. Common legal rights and duties for all members, and
5. Common economy with territorial mobility for members (1991: 14).
Smith argues that this definition of nation sets it apart from the state as the state refers 
to public institutions, while the nation signifies a cultural and political bond uniting a 
political community.  Yet points four and five bring the state into the definition.  This 
is especially true for the fourth point, as it is hard to imagine how legal rights would 
exist outside the framework provided by a state, as rights and duties imply coercion, 
the realm of the state.  Gellner (1983: 7), a modernist as opposed to Smith, an ethno-
symbolist, offers a definition of nation that is rather subjective and requires 
individuals to think of themselves as a part of the nation.  He argues nations exist 
when 1) people share the same culture, referring to a system of ideas, signs, 
associations and ways of behaving and communicating; and 2) members of a nation 
recognize each other as such.  Renan (1882: 4) states, “the essence of a nation is that 
individuals have many things in common, and that they have forgotten many things.” 
Accordingly Gellner’s two criteria and Smith’s first three, while coming from very 
different starting points, converge to form the basis that this project will use in its 
understanding of ‘nation’ as a distinct entity from ‘state.’  
Conceptually differentiating state and nation is especially important, for, as 
Cohen notes, there are differences between the way the state represents the nation and 
how individuals interpret it.  He argues that the power of national symbols lies in 
providing individuals with the means by which to think, rather than in compelling 
them to think in certain ways (Cohen 1996: 812).  This appears to suggest that 
national symbols set the boundaries of thought but not what is located within these 
boundaries.  This should come as no surprise, for if nations are flexible and able to 
change over time, the markers of a nation should be able to change over time, with 
the concept of ‘nation’ remaining static.  Much of Hutchinson’s work (2001b, 1999, 
1994a, 1987) demonstrates how Irish national identity was competed over, but the 
fact that Ireland was being redrawn was never brought into question.  Likewise, 
Igartua (2006) argues that in Canada (outside Quebec) there has been a fundamental 
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reorganization of the way Canadians interpret Canada.  It was always clear that while 
Canada was being discussed, it was national identity that was being debated.
That national identity is a product of human communication networks centred 
on individuals is clear.  As Hearn (2007: 671) emphasizes: 
National identity is reproduced along a series of relations as individuals reach 
out through the various forms of social organizations that frame their 
particular lives and circumstances, to draw on the larger cognitive category in 
ways that make it personally relevant.
In other words, individuals internalize the “rites” of the nation and make them their 
own (Cohen 1996: 807).  As indicated above, nations are influenced by actors’ 
interpretations of them through the reproduction of history and ideas within these 
networks.  This is a key difference between a nation and a state; one can conceive of a 
state without a history, because a state is a set of formal arrangements,7 but as 
Hobsbawm (1996: 255) notes, nations without pasts are contradictions, what makes a 
nation is its past.  Deutsch (1960) links the past to the future, arguing that a nation 
without a past would be directionless. 
Accordingly, histories and myths of national identity are neither static nor 
timeless, and are never left to their own devices; rather they are managed in the 
continual production of national identity (Cohen 1996: 806).  Indeed, it is not just 
remembering that is important: “Forgetting history, or even getting history wrong, is 
an essential factor in the formation of a nation” (Renan 1882).  Moreover, the 
interpretation of past events will be informed by the present (Cohen 1996: 807).  As 
such it is not simply about remembering or forgetting, but realizing that the present 
influences the past just as the past influences the present and the future.
Nations, however, are more than just histories, myths, and assumptions 
separate from the physical world and existing only in the minds of its members.  The 
nation links with territory differently than the state.  While states link to territory 
through their abilities to govern and coerce, a nation is more than the limits of the 
state, it is a “homeland” which is a “repository of historic memories and associations, 
the place where ‘our’ sages, saints and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought” 
7 This, of course, is a purely academic exercise as states are created through a long 
historical process in which the outcomes are not always matched by the intentions of 
actors (Poggi 1978:98-99).  
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making the homeland unique amongst all other homelands (Smith 1991: 9). Although 
Smith approaches this from an ethnonationalist perspective, it should be noted that 
from a modernist perspective the importance of territory is no less important as it is 
where ‘we’ live, it is ‘our’ home.  As stated earlier, the networks established in the 
modern era need to be ‘grounded’ in territory.
Nations bring together the people with a sense of equality that is not necessary 
for a state.  Nations allow people to present themselves as part of “one horizontally 
equal space without rank or privilege,” conferring sovereignty not on the institution 
of a state, but through a popular sovereignty conferred on the people; hence the 
people are the nation (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 1).  Smith once again brings the 
state back into the definition when he argues that “the nation has a community of 
laws and a single political will” and “there is a sense of legal equality amongst the 
citizens of the nation” (Smith 1991: 10).   Yet from this one can extrapolate an 
understanding that nations are based upon common sets of understandings and norms, 
uniting people within the framework of equality and a common political identity. 
Mann’s work (1993) is enlightening, as he argues progress comes not from classes 
that cut across national and state borders, but from nations working within the “cage” 
that is the state.  While Mann uses a nation-state model that does not account for a 
difference between nation and state, this does not detract from the soundness of his 
argument.
The creation of the nation is like the creation of identity in general; it is a 
multi-faceted and varied process taking many forms.  It can be top down, as 
Greenfeld (1990) demonstrates in Russia.  From the bottom up, as Gellner (1983) 
argues with the fictional Ruritarians. Or it can be lateral with impetus from other 
nations, as Keating (1998) contends.  It has been argued that England was the first 
modern example of a nation and that the ideology of nationalism diffused outward 
from England to other states (Colls 2002, Royle 1998, Hutchinson 1994b, Elton 1992, 
Greenfeld 1990, 1987).  All other nations developed as a reaction to England, or a 
reaction to other nations that reacted to England; a type of domino effect.  Newer 
nations had England’s example to follow, and as such England became the first 
‘them’ to the developing and differing ‘us’ of the modern era. This phenomenon 
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emphasizes the relational nature of identity, showing how national identity may only 
crystallize when confronted with another national identity.  
The Relationship between State and Nation
The distinction between nation and state is found in the types of networks they 
encompass, with the nation founded on social networks and the state on political 
networks.  While these networks overlap in reality, and in a pure ‘nation-state’ such 
as Germany they may be indistinguishable, recognizing them as different provides a 
starting point for this discussion.  How do these two sets of networks interface with 
each other?  The state requires legitimacy in order to govern, and legitimacy is 
granted through the nation as the repository of popular sovereignty.  State and nation 
are not synonymous, but they are intertwined in such a way that nation became the 
basis for state.  Understanding this relationship is fundamental to understanding how 
national and regional identities become politicized in modern states.  This in turn 
details what happens when the state and the nation do not map on to each other or 
when there is more than one nation within the state.  
The creation of states and nations was part of the process of transforming 
society from the pre-modern to the modern era.  As states grew, they needed to 
legitimize their rule, and as a result they were framed as the political expression of 
nations.  This is because ‘nation’ has several connotations making it a suitable 
collective identity for a state: 1) it “has a primordial ring to it,” and 2) it is based on 
other emotional bonds (Poggi 1990: 26).  Haas (1986: 708) argues that nationalism is 
intertwined with modernity, and Mann (1995: 62) argues that nationalism arose out of 
the democratization of the processes of modernization (see also Yack 1999: 115).  As 
nations became seen as rightful holders of popular sovereignty, states benefited from 
framing themselves as nations (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 12).  
According to Mann (1993: 251), people are trapped in a “cage” that is the 
state; movements for human progress can only operate within a state’s borders as this 
is the only way to mobilize for change (as mentioned earlier, Mann equates states and 
nations, but a careful reading of Mann shows that in this context he means nation in 
the sense that it is used here).  As people live in these ‘state-cages’ the drive to 
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improve the lives of the people within them creates the desire for democratization 
(Lecours and Nootens 2008: 1).  As Anderson pertinently asks, “where is the tomb of 
the unknown Marxist?” (1983).  According to Mann (1993), nationalism is not the 
wrong tactic adopted by the working class who should focus instead on class issues; it 
is the only way for people to improve their lives.  
States need nations as the successful transition to modernity happens when 
resources are found in the traditional culture upon which to anchor change and new 
practices, and modern democracy requires that laws result from collective decisions 
(Taylor 1998: 203-205).  This means that as long as a tie between statehood and 
nationhood persists, the advantage of a nation running its own state is substantial 
(Tilly 1994: 144), as the only way for people to achieve meaningful change in the 
organization of society is through the state.  The nation is seen as the state’s ultimate 
constituency—the nation is the holder of sovereignty (Poggi 1990: 61-2).  Hence, 
groups organize along national lines in order to achieve change, and the ‘nation’ 
becomes the locus of change within the state.  Even if there is no pre-existing nation, 
the state must go about creating one.  This point is illustrated by the famous quote 
about the unification of the Italian peninsula and the creation of Italy: “We have made 
Italy, now we have to make Italians” (Massimo d’Azeglio in Hobsbawm 1996: 257).  
Nation and state are two separate entities in theory.  However, for a state to 
achieve legitimacy in practice, especially democratic legitimacy, it must be seen as 
the expression of popular sovereignty.  It is the nation, not the state, which is the 
bearer of popular sovereignty, suggesting a political dynamic to nations. The 
following section on the constitutional organization of states begins to show how 
understanding the difference between ‘nation’ and ‘state’ is fundamental to 
understanding region, as constitutions are the basic ‘glue’ holding states and nations 
together, in turn defining the place of the regions.
Territorial Identities and the Organization of the State
According to Cheffins and Johnson (1993: 83), constitutions serve three 
purposes: 1) they allow for the creation of the basic organs and institutions of the 
state; 2) they detail the powers of the public institutions and their relations with each 
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other and with the public; and, 3) they provide the processes by which laws are made 
and the limitations on the power of public officials.  This interpretation of 
constitutions is founded on what Tierney (2007) would argue is a mistaken 
implication that there is a single ‘people’ for which the constitution applies. 
Accordingly, another attribute of constitutions must be; 4) they describe who the 
people(s) of a state are and in doing so provide the political mythology necessary for 
the smooth functioning of a state. 
Lijphart  (2004: 96-7) notes that experts on divided societies and 
constitutional engineering broadly agree that deep divisions pose a grave problem for 
democracy, that it is generally more difficult to establish and maintain democratic 
government in divided societies.  With regard to the accommodation of territorial 
difference, the most intuitive type of government system for this would be a federal 
system as the purpose of federalism is conflict management (Lecours and Nootens 
2008: 7).   If federalism cannot manage accommodation of multiple nations, it is 
difficult to imagine a system that could (Burgess 2006 in Lecours and Nootens 2008: 
7).  Lijphart  (2004: 104) agrees with this point, although he sees federalism as being 
part of an overall strategy of consociationalism within divided societies.
The foundation of consociational theory is that divided territories with 
antagonistic peoples are “effectively, prudently, and sometimes optimally, governed 
according to consociational principles” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006a: 43-44) which 
are:
1. Executive power sharing—each of the main communities share in executive 
power;
2. Autonomy or self-government—each community enjoys some measure of 
autonomy, particularly for cultural concerns;
3. Proportionality—each is represented proportionally in key public institutions 
and benefits proportionally from government expenditure; and, 
4. Veto-rights—each is able to prevent change that adversely affects their vital 
interest (McGarry and O’Leary 2006a: 46). 
As Studlar and Christensen note, due to its unique mix of institutions and 
practices, Canadian democracy is difficult to classify (2006: 837).  Lijphart (1999) 
classifies Canada as a majoritarian-federal democracy, the least common type.  On 
the surface Canadian democracy, a direct offshoot of the Westminster system, 
appears to be majoritarian, yet it is also a federal system, which possesses some 
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consociational elements.  These elements can be found in the formal and informal 
constitutional mechanisms of the Canadian state.  Formally, the federal system grants 
each province autonomy over certain policy spheres , and informally, through the 
official languages policies of the federal government, (which allow full French-
Canadian participation in the system), the regionally balanced cabinets, the fact that 
Quebec is granted three out of nine of the Supreme Court justices, and so forth. 
Lijphart  (2004: 103) argues collegial cabinets in parliamentary systems facilitate the 
formation of power-sharing executives, they do not by themselves guarantee that 
power sharing will be instituted.  In the Canadian case this ‘collegial’ system appears 
to have withstood the test of time.  In contrast, the British case has not only 
traditionally lacked a multi-level structure, it has also lacked meaningful 
consociational elements outside of the territorial Secretaries of State and their 
corresponding Offices.
For a multinational state to be successful, it must begin by recognizing what it 
means to be multinational.  As argued by Tierney (2007: 733), the very structure of 
traditional debates concerning the constitutional arrangements of democracy are 
based on the problematic “unitary demos thesis,” that the state constitutes a single 
people or nation.  Simeon (2006a) discusses the “federal ideal,” in which federalism 
manifests itself differently, partly based on the understanding of ‘federalism’ held by 
actors within the system.  This means that for federalism to be successful as a source 
of conflict regulation within a multinational federation, it needs to acknowledge from 
the beginning that it encompasses more than one demos or group of people that is 
democratically sovereign. 
According to Choudhry (2007: 612), constitutions can simultaneously serve 
two functions which at first glance may appear at odds, accommodation and 
integration.  He argues the terms accommodation and integration are potentially 
misleading as both have the same end-goal in mind, the territorial integrity of the 
state.  Federal systems allow constituent units to have sovereign power over certain 
state functions, allowing for the accommodation of difference.  This allows power to 
be divided vertically between the centre and the constituent components, but it also 
divides power horizontally within the central level.  While minority nations may have 
majority control over the policy spheres assigned to their level of government, the 
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state still needs to strike some sort of balance within central decision making.  Within 
federal systems there are still shared responsibilities which have an impact on the 
interests of the members of the constituent nations.  In order to influence the decision 
making process, members of these nations have to engage in the statewide political 
process, integrating elites from all sub-state nations into the common decision making 
process.  
Not only is a constitution an expression of the power relations in a society, it 
is an expression of the compromises that led to its creation (Boismenu 1996: 99).  As 
Cairns (1995) states, they are tools of recognition and the denial thereof. 
Constitutions, however, cannot detail every aspect of the state apparatus, and this can 
lead to constitutional grey areas and friction between the different levels of 
government (Cheffins and Johnson 1993: 84).  Simeon’s (2006a) ‘federal ideal’ refers 
to more than just the institutional arrangements in a society, it also refers to the way 
in which society expects its system to work.  He argues that the reason different 
federal systems, such as Canada, Australia, Germany and the United States, manifest 
federal relations so differently is not due solely to their institutional make up, but also 
to the different views held by people within these societies of how the federal system 
should operate.  Since constitutions cannot cover all aspects of institutional relations, 
if actors in the member nations can be flexible, these grey areas can be managed 
through negotiation.  Yet, in multinational states there may be more than one 
understanding of the nature of the constituent peoples of the state.  According to 
Choudhry (2007: 632), who uses the example of Quebec in Canada, this can manifest 
itself in two conflicting issues: whether there should be asymmetrical governance, 
and whether the minority sub-state nation should receive recognition and in what 
form.
Keating (1998) asks the question ‘What’s wrong with asymmetrical 
government?’, which he answers by explaining that asymmetrical governments can 
provide both the accommodation needed to satisfy minority nations, and the 
integration necessary for the state to operate effectively.  Keating, however, does not 
appear to take into account differing conceptions of the state.  Taylor (1991) argues 
that “deep diversity,” what Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) call “differentiated 
citizenship,” the recognition that there is more than one legitimate way of seeing the 
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state and that the protection of minority rights through a different relationship with 
the state is also legitimate, is required in multinational states in order to allow for this 
simultaneous accommodation and integration.  Still, it is not clear if “differentiated 
citizenship” can accommodate fundamentally different interpretations of the state. 
The call for ‘deep diversity’ may not take into account the difference between 
administrative asymmetry and symbolic symmetry, which may be important to actors 
within the majority nation who may not recognize that their state is multinational with 
multiple demos
This leads to the question of constitutional reform.  Whitaker (1992: 191) 
argues that in federations this process is more difficult due to the restrictions 
federalism places on constitutional reform and the fact that federations are inherently 
conservative in nature.  In a similar vein, Simeon (2006b: 34-6) argues that although 
federalism may inhibit/slow the growth of the welfare state, it can also slow its 
weakening.  Taken together, these points indicate that in divided societies rapid non-
consensual change is obstructed.  Indeed, this argument holds true of any system 
where the reform of the constitution is more difficult than passing regular legislation. 
While Whitaker recognizes that there are similar constraints on governments in 
unitary states, in a federation these are formalized in the constitution.  This is a very 
significant point, and the term ‘formalized’ may not actually present the difficulties in 
their truest form; instead the term ‘fossilized’ may more accurately reflect the 
constraints in constitutional reform.  Much like a fossil is an object of the past 
solidified in the present, so too is a constitution; it represents the end result of the 
bargaining processes that lead to its creation and the norms and values held by those 
bargaining at the time.  However, as society changes, the constitutional order may 
prove to be ineffective in dealing with the problems that these changes bring about. 
On the one hand constitutions limit the ability of the majority nation to implement 
major change without the consent of the minority.  On the other hand, given that 
identities are fluid and contextual, the inability of a constitutional order to be flexible 
in an inherently dynamic system of identities may increase the frustration of the 
majority or minority nations or both.
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States and Nations 3: Region
Finally, this section turns to a discussion of the ‘region.’  It comes last 
because in order to understand what a region is, one has to understand what a region 
is not so as to avoid confusing ‘region’ and ‘sub-state nation.’  What, then, is the 
difference between a regional and a national identity?  As both are subjective entities 
based around a series of bounded networks, the key difference is that of primary 
political loyalty and political legitimacy.  Nations essentially emerged as movements 
for democracy but were confronted with a choice, to democratize either the centre or 
the local regional seats of government (Mann 1993: 249-50).  While Mann’s work 
focuses on the different organizations that work at the centre of the state, his 
argument is also an important analytical tool for understanding regional identities. 
Deutsch, according to Rokkan (1981: 70), teaches researchers to look for centre-
building networks and to study the effect that the print media and educational 
institutions have on fashioning territory wide identities.  ‘Centre,’ however, need not 
mean capital, as states may have more than one centre (Foltz 1981: 31).  Regions can 
also have more than one centre; the regional centre and the national centre can both 
exist with diffuse networks surrounding them.  
‘Region’ is a territorial space, but ‘regional identity’ implies a common sense 
of community, system of interaction and communication, and network of 
interconnected state-society institutions (Tomblin 2004a: 11).  While regional identity 
may be difficult to define, there is evidence for an explosion of regionalism in Europe 
(Tomaney and Ward 2001: 8); in Canada regions are constitutionally enshrined as 
provinces.  Many of the markers used to identify a region are similar, if not the same, 
as those used to define a nation.  The extent to which a sense of regional identity 
takes root depends on a combination of internal and external factors (Tomblin 2004a: 
12).  Mann (1993: 79) refers to the state as an entity with “many mansions”: it is 
multifaceted and has many competing interests in it.  Yet these interests can coexist 
without competing or interacting with each other.  Different groups may wield great 
power in some clusters, but not in others (Deutsch 1966a: 76).  In this sense, there are 
clusters of national elites whose concerns are nationwide, but also clusters of elites 
whose concerns are regional in scope and interest.  
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As outlined in the previous section, state and nation may belong to separate 
analytical categories but they are bound together just as region is bound to nation in a 
different, yet similar, manner.  While nations may compete with states, regions do not 
compete with nations; they are one of the networks that make up the nation. Sub-state 
levels of government, such as Canadian provinces or English GORs are prime 
examples of regional networks.  They have clearly bounded networks of social and 
political communication, but operate within the borders of larger nations and states.
Regions are embedded in wider nations and encourage loyalty amongst their 
members.  Yet regional loyalty is embedded within the national loyalty and the 
national loyalty extends beyond the region.  Within both there are clear ‘us’ and 
‘them’ groups but with regard to the region, people from other parts of the nation can 
be both ‘us’ and ‘them’ at the same time.  According to Morril (1995) one should not 
be surprised that regional identities exist, as modern societies are large and complex. 
As discussed, states are massive institutions that need not have a single voice; “for the 
state to crystallize into a singular systemic system would require extraordinary 
organizing abilities and extraordinary political interest by civil society” (Mann 1993: 
80). 
Because regions are different (either subjectively or objectively) from each 
other, but embedded within the nation, it should come as no surprise that there will be 
regional differences in political demands which come from differing conceptions of 
what the nation or state is (Cheffins and Johnson 1993: 84, Marquand 1995: 278). 
Elkins and Simeon (1979: 130) argue that if you take people from the same social 
category but from different nations and they hold different assumptions, then national 
culture is the mitigating factor.  This argument would hold true across regions as 
well. One could argue that regional culture is the cause of differences (remembering 
that culture includes history, values, and norms based around a bounded network). 
To understand how regions differ from sub-state nations this section now turns to a 
discussion on where the primary political loyalty of regional actors can be found.
Primary Political Loyalty
The state is, to put it simply, the primary source of political action and 
coercion.  Yet its legitimacy to coerce is derived from it being the representative of 
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the nation, as the nation is the repository of political legitimacy through popular 
sovereignty.  Therefore, the region is not a political actor/institution, which is able to 
coerce.8  Nor is the region a holder of popular sovereignty—it is a part of the nation 
which holds that sovereignty.  The region may possess markers that make it distinct, 
and individuals in the region may interpret the nation differently than their co-
nationals in other parts of the nation (the personal nationalism of Cohen 1996 and 
Hearn 2007), but it is still part of the nation.  Meadwell notes the difference between 
regionalists and nationalists is that “regionalists want to improve their position within 
existing institutional arrangements… without losing completely those components of 
center-periphery relationships which they value” (1991: 402).  In this sense, that 
which has value is the nation itself—membership in the nation is a cultural good. 
The fact that the region is part of the nation is especially relevant with regard to 
differentiating it from a minority nation.  Returning to the earlier discussion on the 
relationship between nation and state, it was shown that national identity produced 
the solidarity that unites the population and allows the state to function.  If the state 
was linked to the population through something other than the nation and its 
corresponding cultural bonds, say through some sort of classical patriotism, then the 
relationship between region and state would be very different.  
At the risk of oversimplifying the term patriotism, an abridged version of the 
concept of patriotism outlined by Taylor (1998: 201) will be used.  He argues that 
patriotism can have the same meaning it had for the ‘ancients;’ a love of fatherland 
and what fatherland represents, a love based upon law.  Patriotism unites people not 
founded upon a common culture, but out of their common love for a political system 
granting them their freedom and respecting their dignity.  Taylor (1998) argues that 
the modern democratic state needs a healthy degree of patriotism, a strong sense of 
identification with the polity and a willingness to give oneself for it.  According to 
Viroli (1997), patriotism contradicts nationalism as patriotism is outward looking 
while nationalism is inward looking.  He agrees with Taylor that nationalism has 
become the “most ready motor of patriotism” (1998: 202) and has left patriotism at 
the margins of modern political thought (Viroli 1997: 160).  Though it may be at the 
8 Although in devolved/federal systems a regional tier of government may hold some 
power of coercion, this power still stems from the centre, the constitution.
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margin of political thought, it suggests the possibility of a loyalty to the state divorced 
from national sentiment. 
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If states in the modern era did have patriotism in the sense of loyalty to 
institutions, as opposed to the cultural and collective underpinnings of national 
identity, then the region would still be embedded in, though no longer indivisible 
from, the nation.  It would be conceivable for a region to separate and create even 
better structures for its citizens.  Yet as patriotism is a form of civic nationalism, there 
are shared and unifying cultural norms, which unite citizens across regions, ensuring 
that secession is not an option for the region.  While Mann (1993) demonstrates how 
a series of bounded networks can be formed at a regional level, because individuals 
residing in the region engage in a wider national norms, histories and myth-building, 
regional identity is an ‘embedded identity.’  In other words, the individual lives in 
both the region and the nation simultaneously.  As it is the nation, not the state, that is 
the bearer of popular sovereignty, the region is part of a larger national sovereignty, 
and it is to the nation, not the state or region, that individuals give their primary 
political loyalty.  
Yack (1999) advances a similar argument to Mann (1993), and brings the 
concepts of nationalism and patriotism together.  He argues that as people are bound 
within the confines of the nation, the plea for “constitutional patriotism” only makes 
sense if it is grounded within cultural horizons of the nation (Yack 1999: 108, also 
Kymlicka 2003).  Billig (1995) identifies patriotism as the day-to-day expression of 
national sentiment, which he terms ‘banal nationalism.’  Nationalism in established 
states becomes background noise, and when it is consciously acknowledged it is 
termed patriotism.  Nationalism is not what ‘we’ have, it is limited to the fringes, to 
the ‘others’, what ‘we’ have is patriotism (Billig 1995: 55).   In this sense the ‘greater 
good,’ or ‘love of country,’ patriots appeal to, is formed by the communication 
networks that make up the nation upon which functioning states are based.  
Lecours and Nootens (2008: 1) argue nationalism is implicit when concealed 
by the label of patriotism.  Indeed, the greatest challenge against the concept of 
patriotism may not even come from political theory, but from anthropology and the 
study of culture.  Kuper (1999) points out that it is national culture that shapes a 
state’s policies and the outcomes of these policies.  The section dealing with 
constitutional management in multinational states demonstrated that majorities often 
see their outlook as ‘value neutral’ and based on a purely universal-liberal definition 
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of ‘good’ which underpins state institutions, yet this does not hold up to direct 
scrutiny.  Within modern democratic states one could not find systems as different 
from each other as those of the USA, Britain or France, yet all three are democracies. 
Each of these democracies is different and these differences are in large part a result 
of culturally distinct attitudes of how the state should be organized.  If the liberal state 
were neutral with regard to issues of ‘good,’ and ‘good’ could be divorced from 
culture, it would seem to follow that one would find a convergence of democratic 
practice and structures amongst western democracies.  As there is no convergence, 
liberal democratic states may present themselves as not being based upon cultural 
understandings, but this is done “by pretending to be a neutral locus of relationships 
between citizens” (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 2, my italics).  Building upon Yack’s 
(1999) logic, patriotism may be seen to be possible if one sees the world as a 
collection of nation-states when in reality these are extremely rare.  It is by 
understanding that even when disguised as constitutional patriotism, loyalty to the 
state is actually loyalty to the nation upon which the state is founded.
Accordingly, the difference between a region and a sub-state nation is that 
members of a region conceive of themselves as belonging to a larger nation, and that 
nation is the primary political loyalty.  In the case of a sub-state nation, it may belong 
to a larger state, but it may or may not necessarily belong to a larger nation, and the 
sub-state nation is the primary political loyalty.  So, while regionalism and 
nationalism can manifest themselves in a similar manner, a region will not seek 
independence because regional actors see themselves as a part of the larger nation. In 
fact, territorial movements centred on regional identity may actually seek greater 
integration into the national community.  The Maritime Rights movement of the1920s 
was about integration into the Canadian economy (Savoie 2006: 36) and the original 
slogan of the Western based Reform Party of Canada was ‘The West Wants In.’ 
Although one commonly thinks of regionalism as being about a demand for more 
power, it can manifest itself in other ways.  Working ‘for’ one’s region, can work 
‘against’ another region, stopping another region from gaining a comparative 
advantage (Tomaney 1999: 76).  As will be seen in later chapters, in both Nova 
Scotia and the North East, regional movements seemed divided on whether they 
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should seek autonomy or integration (although as Choudhry (2007) above notes, both 
are possible within the same constitutional framework). 
Tomblin (2004b: 82) claims local, sub-state and state communities do not 
voluntarily give up control of the policy process except under conditions of complete 
failure, where there is no incentive to defend the status quo.  Yet just because political 
actors are loath to give up power does not mean that the units they represent are 
bearers of popular sovereignty.  As politicians are power maximizers, (Hopkins 
1996), disputes between levels of government are not necessarily based on the 
politics of identity. 
The locus of primary political loyalty is the difference between the nation and 
other territorialized political loyalties.  Regional actors recognize the sovereignty of 
the wider nation over them.  The region is both embedded in the nation, and 
indivisible from it.  Hirschmann’s (1970) ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ helps 
conceptualize the key differences between nations and regions, especially between a 
sub-state minority nation and a region.  His logic suggests minority nations have a 
potential political strategy that a sub-state region lacks, the exit option.  While one can 
conceive of an independent Nova Scotia or North East England from a purely 
intellectual point of view, the regions are clearly embedded in a greater sovereignty, 
and attempts to increase ‘voice’ at the regional or state level is limited by their 
loyalty.
If the region were divisible from the nation it would be a manifestation of 
popular sovereignty, which, as has been argued, would make it a nation. 
Accordingly, if a regional movement advocates for political sovereignty, it may have 
attained a form of ‘national consciousness.’  Determining whether regions can evolve 
into nations is, however, beyond the scope of this project.  Cohen (1996) argues each 
person interprets the nation differently, therefore regional actors would be seen as 
interpreting the nation from a regional point of view, though they still belong to the 
same national networks.  Regional actors essentially inhabit two different sets of 
bounded networks, one for the nation and one for the region.  This point is extremely 
useful to the upcoming discussion on the politicization of territorial identity and 
majority nationalism.  People who subscribe to the regional identity will also 
subscribe to the national one; they will not be able to conceive of them separately.  As 
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national identity is politicized, so too is regional identity, as any debate on the nation 
automatically includes the place of the region within it, highlighting regional 
understandings of the nation.
2.4 The Politicisation of Territorial Identity: Nationalism and Regionalism
To further understand the region as a part of the larger nation, this section 
explores how territorial identity mobilizes and the place of the region within the 
process of territorial mobilization.  Given that a) ‘universal norms’ are articulated in a 
culturally understood and mitigated environment, b) nations and states rarely 
correspond fully, and c) it is the nation, not the state, upon which popular sovereignty 
and political legitimacy rest, one can see the genesis of conflict along territorial lines 
in states. 
 In vernacular English, the term ‘nation-state’ is often used, but as an 
analytical term it is dangerously misleading.  Regionalism is a part of the process of 
identity mobilization within the state.  By understanding how identity is mobilized 
along national lines one gains understanding of how identity is mobilized along 
regional lines; ‘region’ is a component of the identity mobilized within the majority 
community.  As majority identity is mobilized vis-à-vis the minority, understanding 
regional identity mobilization in a multinational state requires examining how friction 
occurs between the different nations within the state.9  This friction shapes the 
political environment in such a way as to allow regional actors to advocate for 
regional concerns, as it is through the process of national identity politicization in the 
majority nation that regional identity is politicized.
The discussion begins by examining how regional actors use the political 
environment to harness regional identity.  This is followed by discussing ‘majority 
nationalism,’ an oft overlooked phenomenon.   Finally, the discussion introduces 
9 This logic is presented in relation to a multinational state, yet within a nation-state 
such as Germany which may lack the majority-minority nation dynamic, identity does 
not remain static over time.  All national identities change and evolve, and regional 
actors interpret the nation through the lens of the region.  No state is completely 
uniform, as such territorial identity mobilization has the potential to emerge in nation-
states as well. 
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opposing interpretations of the state in multinational states which manifest in two 
competing discourses; unionism and pan-nationalism. This expands upon the network 
framework presented earlier as debate around the state will privilege one or the other, 
giving regional political actors the opportunity to articulate a viewpoint based upon 
their embedded place within the nation.  
Identity Mobilization
By exploring the relationship between majority and minority nations, one may 
be able to tease out why the problematization of territorial identity occurs and how 
regional and national identities can be mobilized.  When the political environment 
changes, the ability of political actors to act changes.  Mobilization does not happen 
spontaneously, an incentive has to emerge to encourage it, or a disincentive has to be 
removed that was constraining it.  The politics of identity are about persistent 
grievances, inequalities and past wrongs (Hutchinson 1999: 399), but these are not 
necessarily objective.  They are based on the abstract notion of legitimate rule 
(Chaterjee 1993: 203, Fidler 1991: 6-7), and do not necessarily occur only in 
economically disadvantaged parts of the state, but also in developed parts of the state 
where a sense of identity has been maintained (Keating 1988: 235).  Yet this does not 
address the question of what makes a certain time period ‘ripe’ for mobilization? 
This section explores the importance of the political environment in understanding 
regionalism, creating a framework for analysing elite debate.  
Territorial identity mobilization is a process whereby political elites advance 
their policy goals by linking them to people’s attachments to their particular territory
—be it locality, region or nation.  It occurs alongside a breakdown in prevailing 
arrangements of “territorial management” (Keating 1988: 11).  Territorial 
management here means the balancing of the demands and competing interests of 
different nations within multinational states as well as competing regional demands 
within the different nations.  Territorial management is not static; it is linked to the 
evolution of the state through time and changes in the wider society will have an 
impact upon it.  For instance, Choudhry (2007: 632) points out that a challenge facing 
Canada is that society has changed fundamentally since the original division of 
powers in 1867.  While historically the state did not involve itself in the day-to-day 
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operation of society, as Canadian society changed some of the most expensive policy 
spheres of the state fell into provincial jurisdiction while the required revenue 
generating powers fell within the jurisdiction of the federal government.  This created 
a situation in which both orders of government competed with each other, and this 
competition did not take place along national lines.  Provinces whose elites felt they 
lost out in this process may have begun to feel aggrieved, but debate between 
different orders of government is healthy (Simeon 2006b: 40), as different orders of 
government can “keep each other honest” (Weinstock 2006). Grievance and identity 
alone are not sufficient to provoke mobilization, but they are tools that regional actors 
can use (Lanigan 2001: 104).  Analysts of social movements argue that mobilization 
depends on the networks in which participants are embedded; movements “operate 
within frames set by a historical accumulation of shared understandings” (Tilly 1998: 
455).  Accordingly, actors located in regional networks may have different 
interpretations as to the nature of the state than actors in either the minority nation or 
different parts of the majority.
According to Tarrow (1998: 2-6), contentious politics is triggered when 
changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for political actors 
to tap into “deep rooted feelings of solidarity or identity.”  Collective action requires 
solidarity (Meadwell 1989:140), and “social mobilization” is the term used to 
describe the process of change when countries move from traditional to modern 
societies; a process Deutsch (1961: 493-4) argues increases impersonal contact as 
well as exposure to mass media, changes in residence, and political participation (also 
Anderson 1983).  While there is an emotional component to this, it is not solely an 
emotional response; there is no emotional-rational dichotomy.  The feelings of 
solidarity within movements of territorial mobilization are not irrational as emotions 
create goals by reinforcing the actors’ worldview (Amizade and McAdams 2001).  To 
better understand how the changing political environment influences regionalism, this 
section briefly discusses the literature surrounding ‘political opportunity structure.’  
Changing Political Environment
Wahlstrom and Peterson (2006) note ‘political opportunity structure’ is a 
concept first introduced by Eisinger in 1973 but it has been heavily influenced by 
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McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1994).  According to McAdam et al. (1996), the 
analysis of political opportunity is an attempt to analyze “the political circumstances 
that have an effect on the emergence, structure, scope and success of social 
movements.”  Essentially it is a study of the changing constraints and incentives 
experienced by political actors.  
McAdam (1996)  (in Wahlstrom and Peterson 2006: 364) argues there are 
four basic factors that have an impact on political opportunity; 
1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, 
2) The stability of the broad set of elite alignments that underpin a polity,
3) The presence of elite allies, and
4) The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (p 27). 
The first point deals with the ability of social movements to enter the system.  As 
both Nova Scotia and the North East are part of democratic societies, their elites are 
already within the system, and these elites are able to use democratic means to 
harness regional identity to advance their political objectives.  The second point 
addresses the stability of institutional power structures and whether the major 
constituent groups within the state are in agreement on fundamental issues.  That both 
Canada and Britain are home to powerful sub-state nationalist movements 
challenging the state indicates that elite alignment is fluid in both states.  The third 
factor, elite allies, is particularly interesting as later chapters demonstrate that the 
minority nations were often seen as allies for advancing regional concerns. 
Repression, the fourth point, may not seem to apply to liberal democratic states, yet 
one should not dismiss the ability of governments to use their resources to advance 
their agendas and constrain those who hold opposing views, especially with regard to 
movements challenging the legitimacy of the state.  While this is not repression in an 
authoritarian sense, democracies can create constraints through a variety of means. 
This can be done through the organization of state structures and practices, such as 
when Labour adopted an Additional Member System of electing Members of the 
Scottish Parliament for the purpose of keeping the Scottish National Party out of 
power (see Chapter Four).  It may also occur through the staatsvolk controlling the 
dominant discourse surrounding the nature of the state, framing the state along their 
interpretations.  McAdam’s four points allow one to extrapolate how the political 
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environment may change for regional actors in the majority nation; in particular, as 
identity becomes politicized due to friction between the majority and minority 
nations, debate of what the state is and what its underpinning values are are 
introduced to the statewide political discourse.
The key to understanding how the political environment relates to regional 
movements is in understanding that political environments are not static; if identity is 
an ongoing process (Hall 1996), then the political environment vis-à-vis identity is 
fluid and evolving as well.  However the basic organizational structure of a state is 
much less fluid.  As argued above, constitutional orders are based on past 
compromise, and may not be reflective of the current social dynamics.  While 
constitutional arrangements may help constrain the political environment for minority 
national actors, this assumes two things: 1) constitutional arrangements will 
accommodate minorities while integrating the minority and majority nations at the 
state level, and 2) both the minority and majority nations can reach agreement on who 
or what the constituent elements of the state are.  However, a temporal dynamic 
intersects the above two points, namely that societies change over time.  Just because 
agreement is reached on these issues in the year X, in the year X + N this may no 
longer be viable, especially if during the N period there are major changes in the way 
the state and society interact.  This is especially important given that many of the 
multinational states of the modern era were created in the 19th Century or earlier. 
When one takes into account major changes that have occurred since then, especially 
since the end of the Second World War and the rise of the welfare state, the success 
of multinational states may not be found in their constitutional arrangements, but 
rather in the ability of the elites of constituent nations to regulate the inevitable 
conflicts that arise.  
Majority Nationalism 
As regions are embedded within, and indivisible from, larger nations; 
regionalism should be understood as part of the nationalism of the nation.  Simeon’s 
(2006b) argument that national standards are derived through debate between 
different orders of government is useful here.  As national identities are the result of 
constant debate between the different parts of the nation, regionalism is part and 
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parcel of the process of nationalism.  It is fundamentally different from minority 
nationalism in that it is a part of the continual renegotiation of national identity.  To 
understand regionalism this section examines how identity within the majority nation 
becomes politicized.
Hechter (2000) outlines four ways in which nationalism manifests.  State-
building nationalism is the state attempting to assimilate culturally diverse territories. 
Peripheral nationalism is resistance to state-building nationalism.  Irredentist  
nationalism is when a state attempts to expand its boundaries to incorporate co-
nationals.  Unification nationalism is the merger of culturally homogenous but 
politically divided territory into a single state.  He also mentions patriotism, which he 
does not classify as nationalism although he recognizes it as a movement centred on 
the greatness of the nation (Hechter 2000: 15-17).  According to Tilly nationalism 
takes two forms, state-led and state-seeking (1998: 475-6, 1994: 133).  State-led 
nationalism includes the creation and imposition of a dominant language, origin 
myth, symbols, rituals, memberships, education routines, and obligations.  State-
seeking nationalism occurs when representatives of a population group claim 
autonomy or independence as “distinct coherent cultural identity” (1998: 476).  Mann 
(1995: 46) argues that there are three types of nationalism: 1) state reinforcing, in 
which the state and the nation match up, 2) state subverting in which the state is 
bigger than the nation, and 3) state creating in which the state is smaller than the 
nation (Mann 1995: 46).  
Patriotism, state-building/ -led /-reinforcing nationalism are all cases in which 
the dominant nation use its position within the state to impose its culture on the state 
as a whole.  This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the state is actively 
engaging in a cultural-ethnic genocide.   It is not even to say that it is actively 
illiberal, rather that it is imposing the majority nation’s liberalism on the territory of 
the state.
That majority nationalism is overlooked in the wider literature on nationalism 
is seen in the following quote:
State-led nationalism has been rare in human history; over the roughly 10,000 
years that states have existed somewhere in the world, most rulers have settled 
for assigning priority within their domains to their own cultural definitions 
and reading of their own interests, but coexisting more or less comfortably 
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with composite subject populations having distinctive charters, cultures, and 
social routines (Tilly 1998: 476).  
The first point that needs to be addressed is that how the state was ‘governed’ 
historically is irrelevant to an understanding of states and nations in the modern era. 
Ten thousand years ago when rulers ruled by divine right over illiterate and immobile 
peasantry, issues of popular sovereignty and political legitimacy were immaterial. 
The discussion on the relationship between state and nation demonstrated that while 
the state maintains control through its ability to coerce, its legitimacy to coerce stems 
from it representing the nation, the bearer of popular sovereignty.  What may have 
been immaterial historically is now universal and fundamental.  
Dominant groups in a multinational state, the staatsvolk, may not express their 
nationalism consciously.  Billig (1995) refers to this process as ‘banal nationalism.’ 
Yet as Deutsch (1966b: 6) notes, governments must obtain the compliance or active 
support of the largest groups in a territory and the majority of the population in order 
to maintain the legitimacy of the state.  Accordingly, as the state and the largest 
groups become intertwined the majority community will express its understanding of 
the way society should be organized (with corresponding interpretations of ‘good’ 
and just’) through the state.  
“Dominant nationalism” usually entails the transfer of the staatsvolk’s (or its 
elites’) interpretations of self onto the state, turning the state into the expression of 
their nation (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 3).  The state becomes the medium by which 
the majority community’s identity is transmitted.  As indicated above, even so-called 
universalistic liberal norms are culturally dependant.  As the majority community 
expresses its culturally based understandings of liberal values through the state, the 
minority community could interpret that as state-building majority nationalism. 
Individuals can only be truly free in an environment in which their culture and their 
values are respected, and while most modern states would argue that they rule 
according to universalistic norms, minority groups may argue against this (Kuper 
1999).
Majority nationalism is especially dangerous for political cohesion in a state if 
the minority group begins to feel that a) their way of seeing things is different from 
the majority, b) that this is generally not understood or recognized by the majority, 
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and c) the majority is not willing to alter forms of debate to accommodate this 
difference, leaving the minority systematically unheard, its voice unable to penetrate 
public debate (Taylor 1998: 204).  Returning to Billig (1995), what legitimizes the 
nationalism of the majority community is that it is the dominant nationalism in the 
state, and as such it reinforces the state.  This is the opposite of minority nationalism, 
which challenges the state.  Considering nationalism as a minority phenomenon 
makes its relationship with the state mainly antagonistic (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 
4).  It ignores the dialectical relationship between the majority and minority nation as 
they react to each other.  To understand how this challenges the state, this section will 
address how citizens give consent to be governed.
Consent of the Governed
The survival of political institutions is directly related to people’s perceptions 
of their legitimacy (Anderson and Mendes 2005: 92): the governed must give their 
consent.  In a democratic state, the first key component of legitimacy is rule of the 
people through fair, regular, and free elections.  A key second component is the 
consent of the loser.  For a democratic state to be legitimate, the simple concept of 
majority rule is not sufficient.  The perceived effectiveness of institutions is equally 
important to institutional arrangements in managing relations between national 
groupings.  As Barry (1975b: 485) notes:
The crucial point is that the institution of collective decision making by a 
simple majority of the popular vote is in itself the antithesis of ‘amicable 
agreement’ as ‘amicable agreements’ must be negotiated among people who 
either trust one another or do not need to because they can apply sanctions 
against defaulters.
In a stable liberal democracy elections are designed to produce winners and losers, 
and the losers must see the outcome as legitimate (Anderson and Mendes 2005, 
Nadeau et al. 2000, Nadeau and Blais 1993). 
Through the electoral process all democracies are designed to create political 
inequalities among citizens and political elites at regular intervals (Anderson and 
Mendes 2005: 93).  Liberal democracies have three basic premises that help mitigate 
some of the problems that may arise from this: 1) democratic equality, all citizens are 
entitled to one vote; 2) people will not always be in the minority, people will win in 
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some decisions and lose in others; and 3) belonging to a shared national community 
mitigates being the loser, as belonging to the nation unites citizens at a deeper level 
(Lecours and Nootens 2008: 12).  Support of the loser is a less obvious part of 
democratic systems, requiring people to support the outcome of decisions 
unfavourable to them.  But the viability of the political system rests on the support of 
substantial numbers of people who are displeased with the outcome of an election 
(Nadeau and Blais 1993: 553).  
In majoritarian multinational states, the consent of the loser can be interpreted 
to mean the consent of the minority nations to be governed through state structures 
which will have to be responsive to a majority population residing in another nation.10 
As Taylor (1998: 204) notes “if it appears that in some systemic way, there are 
obstacles to certain sections of the population being heard, then the legitimacy of 
democratic rule in that society is under challenge.” Dominance is neither positive nor 
negative, it just is, but it can have positive or negative consequences (Careless 1989: 
52).  Accordingly, state institutions need to be sympathetic to the aspirations of 
national minorities, and be interpreted by both national minorities and majorities to be 
fair and equitable.  As discussed in the earlier section on constitutions, this is a 
complex and difficult process.
Being part of the majority or minority after an election may impact attitudes 
about the general workings of democracy (Nadeau et al. 2000: 10).  If the majority of 
the population in a minority nation is constantly on the losing side in the democratic 
decision making process this may bring the legitimacy of the state into question. 
Winning and losing matters because the stability and the functioning of the system 
“depend on actors’ incentives for institutional change” (Anderson and Tverdova 
2001: 323).  Being deprived of voice and being in a minority position creates that 
incentive. Accordingly, the winning and losing that is a fundamental component of 
democratic politics may have the result of framing the minority nation as a perpetual 
‘loser’ in the system.  For example, Scotland could be seen in this light during the 
Thatcher/Major era.  Chapter Four discusses how a so-called Doomsday Scenario 
10 This, of course, can be mitigated through the introduction of consociational 
elements in the constitution, but this requires the staatsvolk to accept that the state is 
actually multinational.
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emerged during this time, when Scotland was subjected to a government in 
Westminster that lacked substantial Scottish representation.  In this light, it is difficult 
to see how actors within the minority nation would not interpret the working of the 
state as state-/nation-building nationalism of the majority.
Indeed, the reaction to majority nationalism may be interpreted as minority 
nationalism when, instead, it is a defence of the status quo against changes being 
made by the other nation (see Greer 2007).  Yet instead of this being an example of 
state-subverting nationalism (sub-state minority nationalism in its traditional sense), it 
should be seen in the light of the perspective of actors in the minority nation who 
view the intrusion of the state as a threat to their identity.  By challenging the 
assumptions held by actors in the staatsvolk, minority nationalism forces elites to 
address fundamental questions as to the nature of the state.  From the perspective of 
the majority nation, this would appear as an orthodox manifestation of minority 
nationalism.  Actors in the majority nation may not recognize their role in the 
politicization of identity.  Rather than minority nationalism bringing the nature of the 
state into question, it is the dialectical relationship between majority and minority 
nations, which does this.  
Building upon the dialectical relationship, this discussion now highlights the 
need for a sense of balance amongst the constituent units in multi-national states.  A 
lack of balance may lead to divergent aims as conflicting interpretations of the state 
come to a head.  This section concentrates on the importance of understanding the 
different interpretations of the state, examining the potential problems created by the 
conflation of nation and state: 1) the Tyranny of the Majority, and 2) a Divergence of 
Aims, both of which are exacerbated by 3) Assumed Homogeneity in the state. This 
section suggests that concepts of nation and state become intertwined in multinational 
states and this is where the identity ‘fault line’ lies.  When this fault line becomes 
active, changing the political environment of the state, opportunity presents itself to 
regional elites creating the opportunity within the political environment to harness 
regional identity for political ends.  To understand this, the following synthesizes the 
arguments presented above and leads to the two distinct interpretations of the 
multinational state.
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Tyranny of the Majority
As stated above, democracies are not solely defined by majority rule.  The 
consent of the loser is fundamental to a functioning democracy.  In order to be 
interpreted by national minorities and majorities to be fair and equitable, state 
institutions need to be sympathetic to the aspirations of national minorities who are 
faced with a political system in which they can never form a majority of the 
population.  The perceived effectiveness of institutions is equally important to 
institutional arrangements in managing relations between national groupings.  
Yet saying that institutional arrangements need to be perceived a certain way 
and designing those institutions is easier said than done.  Earlier the difficulties in 
developing workable constitutional arrangements in multinational states were 
demonstrated.  This is exacerbated by the need to ensure that ‘voice’ is maintained by 
the minority nation within the democratic process.  The accommodation/integration 
of the minority nation is a complex process in which it is relatively easy for the 
majority nation to inadvertently impose its will on the minority nation.  
Divergence of Aims
Balance is central to understanding that multinational states need to 
accommodate different norms and values, and the eventual outcomes (or aims) of 
these societies.  Creating winners and losers in multinational states can be of 
particular concern to the minority nation(s), especially if they continually find 
themselves on the losing side of interpretations of ‘good’ or ‘just.’  It was argued that 
liberalism and what is ‘good’ is interpreted through a cultural lens. Accordingly 
within multinational states, the people of the different nations may hold different 
interpretations of what constitutes ‘good.’  Both may articulate conceptions of good 
within a liberal-democratic discourse, but they could have different outcomes as they 
could be based on different assumptions.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, one sees how this could result 
in situations where elites in the majority and minority nations simply desire different 
outcomes from the state or desire the same outcomes but disagree on the means.  If 
actors in the majority nation do not recognize the multi-national character of the state, 
the reaction within the minority nation may be regarded as a form of nationalism and 
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a danger to the state.  Majority actors will not take the role of the staatsvolk 
(themselves) into account in this process of identity mobilization.  Balancing 
distinctive aims within a single state may require what was referred to as ‘deep 
diversity’ or ‘differentiated citizenship;’ that there is more than one legitimate way of 
interpreting the state and that groups can have different yet equally legitimate 
relationships with the state.  Yet for this to be successful the staatsvolk would need to 
recognize that there is more than one legitimate ‘demos’ within the state.
Assumed Homogeneity 
Recognizing the existence of multiple demos in a single state is no simple 
feat.  As mentioned earlier, states become the agent of the staatsvolk, and much of the 
literature indicates that staatsvolk do not see their distinctive positions as being based 
on cultural norms.  As dominant nations take control of the state, state institutions 
assume a homogeneous sense of nation superimposed upon the state.  Modern states 
derive their legitimacy from being the political voice of the nation.  If a state does not 
recognize the multi-demos aspect of multinationalism, the state becomes the voice of 
the majority nation, rather than the sum of the majority and minority nations working 
in concert.  Returning to balance, if elites treat the state in a way that does not 
adequately allow its constituent nations to flourish, then the state itself may become a 
source of political conflict.  
This discussion has shown that national identity mobilization is not just a 
minority nation phenomena, it is a majority one as well.  The ‘friction’ between the 
majority and minority is not the  ‘fault’ of either.  The perspectives of both the 
minority and majority may be equally valid; they simply have different basic 
assumptions as to the nature of the state.  As the first section argued, identities are 
fluid and contextual, and territorial identities are often contested.  Accordingly 
identities are contested within nations as well as between nations within the state.  As 
a part of the contestation of national identity, regional elites can use the questioning 
of ‘identity’ and ‘the state’ to mobilize regional identity for political purposes.  
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Unionism and Pan-Nationalism
Competing interpretations of the state, exacerbated by the position of the 
staatsvolk, may cause conflict as the state may act in a manner inconsistent with the 
interpretation of the state held by the minority nation(s); in turn leading to the start of 
the process of territorial identity mobilization.  This is not the minority nation’s 
‘fault’ and it should not be viewed as a strategy to extract resources from the state, 
what Dion (2001) (as a government Minister), termed “separatist blackmail.”  It 
comes from competing interpretations of the state and the consent of the minority 
nation to be governed by a state structure dominated by the majority, and the ability 
of the state to balance the interpretations. 
This section examines the impact these changes have on how elites articulate 
their worldview, in particular how elites frame concepts of state. In the above, one 
can see the roots of two overlapping interpretations of the state.  This chapter has 
argued that within the different nations there may exist different interpretations of the 
state and the place of the nation(s) within it.  From this two opposing ‘pure types’ 
interpretations of the state emerge; unionist11 and a pan-nationalist.  While in reality, 
these may exist as two poles along a continuum; here they will be developed as two 
separate concepts, allowing later chapters to demonstrate how parties and actors may 
encompass elements of both.  
Unionist interpretations privilege the concept of the partnership (compact, 
union, etc.) between the constituent nations of the state.  This interpretation of the 
state recognizes the existence of multiple demos within the multinational state and the 
multiple sources of legitimacy this implies.  It sees the state as being formed by its 
constituent elements, where sovereignty lies.  This is similar to Hechter’s unification 
model of nationalism in which the nation and state are created from the bottom up as 
members come together (2000).  The difference is that the constituent nations keep 
their national identities and loyalty to the state is mediated through membership in a 
constituent nation.  This most proximates the idea of classical/constitutional 
patriotism presented above.  It is not founded upon a common culture; rather 
members of the constituent nations hold their loyalty to the state as the protector of 
11 Unionist in this case should not be thought of along the same lines as the term used 
in British political discourse, i.e. support for the Union.
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their personal freedom and dignity.  Unionism departs from classical patriotism as it 
recognizes that the community of the state is not built around a common national 
identity, but that a citizen’s relationship with the state is mediated through 
membership in a constituent nation.  The state need not be culturally neutral, rather it 
incorporates multiple cultures.  By respecting its individual citizen’s dignity, it 
ensures the member nations’ dignity is respected as well.
Similar to theories of state-building nationalism, pan-nationalist discourse 
envisages the union that creates the states as the creation of both a new unified 
national whole and a single demotic people.  It encourages loyalty and allegiance to 
the centre, along the lines of the model of civic-nationalism outlined by Yack above. 
State-building nationalism is a top down process whereby the state and nation expand 
outward from the centre.  It focuses on overarching and statewide objectives and 
identities.  While a unionist interpretation of the state sees sovereignty divided 
amongst its component nations, pan-nationalist interpretations see the state as the 
representative of a single unified demos, representing a single source of democratic 
legitimacy.  
As the nation is always being redefined and redrawn (Resnick 1994: 71, Hall 
1996: 2)12 current interpretations of ‘the nation’ are the interpretations of the 
segments of the nation holding power, controlling the national discourse and the 
manner in which the nation is defined.  Not every member of majority or minority 
nations will hold a unionist or pan-nationalist interpretation of the state.  Instead these 
two interpretations compete against each other in elite debate.  In this context, 
Hazell’s (2006a, 2006b) work with regard to the English Question is enlightening. 
He argues that one’s understanding of the ‘English Question’ (the place of England 
within a devolved Britain) is dependent upon the questioner’s understanding of the 
nature of the problem.  This provides a very clear example of how different 
interpretations of the nation and state influence not just the answers to questions on 
the nature of the state, but the questions themselves.  As these competing views are 
about the fundamental nature of the state, when they enter political debate they 
provide the opportunity for regional actors within the majority to express their 
12 For examples of the nation being redrawn see Hutchinson 2001a, Greenfeld 1990, 
Cairns 1993, Nevitte 1996 and Brodie and Nevitte 1993.
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interpretations of the state.  These debates do not only shape the political environment 
for regional elites to mobilize territorial identities, they set up and ‘frame’ how 
mobilization will be structured.  While creating opportunity, these debates constrain 
how this opportunity can manifest itself.
Unionist and pan-nationalist discourses are a result of the dialectical 
relationship between not only the constituent members of the state, but the constituent 
members and the state.  The key difference between sub-state nationalism and 
regionalism within the majority community is that the sub-state nationalists can bring 
an independence discourse to bear on the debates.  This forces the statewide discourse 
in a direction that regionalism, which stems from debates internal to the staatsvolk, 
cannot.
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced three key concepts that will be operationalized 
throughout the study; 1) bounded networks, 2) nested identities and primary political 
community, and 3) competing interpretations of the state: unionist and pan-
nationalist.  Bounded networks are the starting point of this research, as it is through 
examination of the bounded networks that make up the province of Nova Scotia and 
the North East of England GOR, regions nested within Canada (outside Quebec) and 
England, that the research questions will be addressed.  As will be shown in the 
following chapters, Nova Scotia and the North East encompass many of the criteria 
laid out for the existence of bounded networks: regionally based government 
structures and academic institutions, regional print cultures and economic and social 
histories, distinctive geographic features, and most importantly, an accepted 
understanding amongst the members that they form some sort of community.  
Yet these regional networks exist within larger networks of the both the 
staatsvolk and the state.  They do not only exist within these networks, they are an 
essential part of them.  The regions are, to use the terms outlined above, nested and 
indivisible.  They are a part of a larger nation, and the nation, not the region, is their 
primary political community, the ‘demos’ from which democratic legitimacy springs. 
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It is the intersection of these bounded identity networks in statewide discourse that 
this thesis investigates.
Finally, the above discussion outlined three ways in which the concept of 
nation and state become conflated, introducing the ‘unionist’ and ‘pan-nationalist’ 
interpretations of the state.  These are central to understanding how debates 
surrounding the nature of the state in Britain and Canada developed and how these 
debates altered the political environment vis-à-vis regional political actors, allowing 
them to attempt to mobilize regional identity.  
While this chapter may have presented a long, and at times complex, 
explanation of the state and nation within a multinational state, this was necessary, as 
regions do not exist outside of a national framework.  While it may be possible to 
attempt to work out an understanding of the region divorced from the concepts 
introduced above, it would be decontextualized and would ignore the political 
environment regional actors find themselves in.  Indeed, given that the basic 
framework for understanding state, nation and region presented in this chapter is used 
throughout this thesis, it would have been remiss not to give such a detailed 
explanation of the concepts.
 The political environment relating to territorial identity mobilization is highly 
complex in multinational states.  This complexity must be addressed to understand 
that while regions are arenas of political and social communication, regional identity 
mobilization cannot manifest itself in the same way as sub-state national identity, 
since members of a region think of themselves as belonging to a larger demotic 
people, the nation.  Accordingly, the next chapter details how these regional 
communication networks can be investigated.
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Chapter Three: Researching Regions and Majority Nations 
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified the key theoretical themes operationalized in 
this exploration of national and regional identity mobilization.  This chapter describes 
how these areas were analyzed, focusing on: 1) how the comparative approach 
strengthened this work; and, 2) how the analysis of regional identity mobilization 
within the majority nation was conducted.  This comparative project examines 
regional and national identity mobilization through analysis of elite debates, 
interviews and survey data.  This chapter explains how these methods and 
methodologies enabled the hypothesis and research questions to be examined. 
Hypothesis and Research Questions
As there are few states in which ‘state’ and ‘nation’ perfectly overlap, friction 
occurs between the constituent members of the state as the majority and minority 
nations express differing views of the nature of the state.  This causes change to occur 
in the political environment, giving regional political actors in the majority nation the 
opportunity to mobilize regional and national identity.  This is not to say that 
regionalism needs minority nationalism in order to manifest itself, rather that 
minority nationalism provides an opportunity for regional political actors to mobilize 
regional identity as well as potentially influencing the manner in which it manifests. 
This work does not examine regionalism per se.  Rather, building upon the 
understanding that a region is part of a larger nation, it seeks to understand the 
relationship between majority and minority nationalism, regionalism as a part of 
majority nationalism, and the role played by regional level democratic institutions.
Concepts of regionalism in general seem overly influenced by concepts of 
nationalism (or even conflated, as in Greer 2007).  The previous chapter established 
that regions are part of a larger demos and that regionalism has different political 
constraints than nationalism.  Regionalism is part of a larger debate within the nation 
as to what the nation is.  Accordingly, to help further understand majority 
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nationalism, regionalism, and the role of regional democracy in identity mobilization, 
this thesis must first address the following research questions.
RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of 
regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?
RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as 
a single unified people?  Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre 
and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?
While the first part of RQa may seem obvious, it is the building block of this work 
and must be addressed directly.  The sum total of RQa and RQb allows this research 
to build an understanding of how the elites and masses at the centre and in the regions 
interpret their respective states.  This is key in addressing the central hypothesis;
Hypothesis: Within multinational democracies which have experienced a 
recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the 
majority nation which allows regional elites to promote political agendas that 
mobilize regional and national identity, and in so doing the presence or 
absence of regional democratic institutions will shape the demands and the 
manner in which they are made.
This is not to say that elites consciously engage in either regionalism or 
majority nationalism.  It is possible that appeals to identity are so engrained in regular 
political discourse that they are ‘banal’ (Billig 1995).  Regardless, to test the 
hypothesis, a focused comparison of Canada and Britain between 1990 and 2004 was 
conducted. During this period strong nationalist agitation was emanating from the 
minority nations as well as strong regional agitation from within segments of the 
staatsvolk.  In the following discussion and in Chapter Four it will be shown that 
Nova Scotia and the North East are extremely well placed to address this hypothesis. 
This is due to a variety of factors designed to maximize the potential of the 
comparative design (see below on the Most Similar Systems Design), most notably 1) 
the strength of nationalism in Quebec and Scotland during the period under study, 2) 
the nature of regional level administration within England and Canada—English 
regions being administratively decentralized while lacking regional democratic 




The above hypothesis suggests certain outcomes;
1. Minority nationalism will politicise regional and national identity in the 
majority nation,
2. Politicized identity in the majority nation will create a political environment 
favourable to regional identity mobilization
3. Regional democratic institutions will provide greater voice for both the 
regions themselves as well as actors within the regions
These expectations in turn guide the following research questions; 
RQc.     Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the 
majority nation or the regions?  If so, what role do the minority nations play?
RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it 
politicized?  How it is politicized?  What do regional elites demand?
RQe What role do regional levels of democracy play in regional identity 
mobalization?
In addition to the above hypothesis, expectations and research questions, a final 
avenue that must be explored is the relationship between elites and the masses. 
Within liberal democracies it is reasonable to assume that pubic action taken by 
political elites is a part of the contestation for power, that public debate is the nexus 
between the elites and the masses.  Therefore, a final research question needs to be 
addressed.
RQf. Does elite debate resonate with the masses?
The final research question is particularly important; this research is not merely 
investigating the competition for power amongst elites; it examines a particular 
manner in which power is competed for; through the mobilization of identity.  An 
examination of any attempt at mobilization inherently demands an investigation of 
those who elites are attempting to mobilize.  Given that political elites engage in the 
political process to achieve power, one would expect elite debate to resonate with the 
masses.
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Operationalizing the Research Questions – Research Design
Research design is “an action plan for getting from here to there” (Yin 1994: 
19).  As Oppenheim (1992: 5-6) notes, the need for appropriate research design arises 
when one wants to generalize from one’s findings as opposed to merely describing 
events and is concerned with making problems researchable by setting up the study to 
“produce specific answers to specific questions.”  As Chapter Two suggests, 
identities are built around communication networks.  Accordingly, to operationalize 
the research questions, this project employs research strategies designed to examine 
elite political communication triangulated through an analysis of survey data to 
determine if, and how, elite debate resonates with the masses.
The research questions and hypothesis indicates a complex relationship 
between the majority and minority nations, a relationship that in turn impacts regions 
within the majority nations.  Addressing the hypothesis and research questions 
demands; 1) multinational democracies which have experienced a recent surge in 
minority nationalism, and 2) a comparative study of regionalism in which all but the 
independent variable (regional democracy) are held constant.  A single case study 
could have been used to examine national and regional identity mobilization, but as 
this project investigates the role of regional democracy, a two case comparative 
approach was required to test the hypothesis along the lines of an experimental 
model.  The discussion on the comparative design below outlines in detail why a two 
case approach was deemed best.  To explain the research design, this chapter is 
divided into two sections.  First it makes the case for choosing a comparative study, 
demonstrating how a two-case comparison enabled an exploration of different aspects 
of nationalism and regionalism as well as regional level democracy while providing 
an in-depth analysis of the peculiarities of each case. Second, it introduces the choices 
of data and explains how it was analyzed.  
3.2 Comparative Design
 A comparative study allows the researcher to examine how a phenomenon 
manifests itself in different cases and assess which variables influence the 
phenomenon under study – regionalism as a component of majority nationalism and 
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the role of regional level democracy.  This section is divided into two subsections to 
demonstrate how the comparative approach allows the research questions to be 
addressed.  It begins by presenting an overview of the comparative method before 
examining the variables themselves: the dependent, independent, and control 
variables, demonstrating how the variables manifest in the cases and why they are 
excellent choices to address the hypothesis. 
Comparative Design
Why Nova Scotia and the North East?  This is a valid question given that the 
North East of England may have a reputation for regional identity mobilization, but 
Nova Scotia is generally not considered a hotbed of regionalism in Canada.  Beyond 
why Nova Scotia and the North East, why two cases?  To better understand the case 
selection, the specific cases and why a two case study was undertaken, and how this 
comparison was conducted, this sub-section discusses the Most Similar System 
Design, highlighting the challenges of comparative studies and revealing how these 
challenges were addressed in this particular study.  
The Most Similar Systems Design
This work is not an analysis of identity; it is an analysis of territorial identity 
mobilization, and the role of democratic institutions within that mobilization.  It is not 
about the causes of regionalism, rather it examines how regional actors attempt to 
mobilize regional identity for political purposes.  As Lijphart (1971: 683) notes, the 
comparative method is a method of “discovering empirical relationships among 
variables, not as a method of measurement.”  While examining regionalism within 
majority nationalism requires only one case, assessing the role of democratic 
institutions demands a comparative study and a two case comparison was undertaken 
to allow an approximation of experimentation through the logic of the Most Similar 
Systems Design (MSSD).   
Skocpol (1995: 376) argues that analytical studies will inherently lead to 
comparative studies, as comparison enables researchers to tease out data.  She 
demonstrates that by analyzing differences and similarities one can examine the 
phenomenon under study.  By looking at dissimilar cases which share the 
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phenomenon, one can deduce that the cause of the phenomenon lies in the similarities 
(Skocpol 1995: 377-378).  Conversely, the MSSD logic is that if one takes two very 
similar cases and finds differences between them with regard to the phenomenon 
being studied, the explanation can be found in the differences (Przeworski and Teune 
1979: 32).  To understand how the MSSD was applied to this project, the logic of the 
MSSD as presented by Przeworski and Teune (1979) is discussed.  
The focus of the MSSD is system level analysis; variations in the 
phenomenon are explained in terms of systemic factors.  Similarities between the 
cases are control variables and differences, such as elected regional government, are 
explanatory variables (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 33).  In determining the cases, the 
number of common characteristics sought is maximized and differences minimized 
(Przeworski and Teune 1979: 33).  Accordingly, if differences are found in the 
phenomenon, the following implications can be ascertained;
1. Common factors are irrelevant in determining the difference in 
outcome, and
2. Any sort of difference corresponding to observed behaviour can be 
considered as an explanation for the behaviour (Przeworski and Teune 
1979: 34).
So while the logic of the MSSD (approximating experimentation) directs 
those who apply it to a two case comparison, does this mean that a two case study is 
best?  In this case, not only do the research questions and hypothesis strongly favour 
two cases to approximate an experiment, the data to be analyzed is extremely varied 
and complex.  Adding other cases would reduce the analytic strength of this study by 
diverting resources away from the two cases.  As will be seen, the two regions under 
study are extremely similar; adding another case would increase the probability of 
non-control variables being inadvertently introduced, reducing the explanatory power 
of this work.
74
Although comparison is an “imperfect substitute” for experimentation 
(Lijphart 1971: 684-5), creating an experiment to address the hypothesis is not 
possible.  Instead, the MSSD was the best alternative in addressing the research 
questions.  Accordingly, the decision was made to use a Canadian province and an 
English GOR.  The purpose of the MSSD is to approximate an experiment, with one 
case acting as the control group for the other.  Here, Nova Scotia, is exposed to the 
stimulus of regional democracy, while the other, the North East, is not.  Chapter Four 
explains GORs and provinces in greater detail, but the key difference is that while 
both are a way of governing at a regional level, GORs having no regional democratic 
institutions, lack the legitimacy and authority found at the provincial level in Canada. 
Using the typologies developed by Swenden (2006), they are weakly decentralized 
levels of administration in a unitary state.
Bonnell (1980: 165) argues that there are essentially two types of 
comparisons, illustrative and analytical.  Analytical comparison involves comparison 
between similar units, while illustrative comparison entails comparison between two 
similar groups and a theory. This study analyzed regions and states with the goal of 
developing a theory of regionalism and majority nationalism while contributing to a 
greater understanding of how politics is territorialized. Comparative studies link 
historically anchored observations with theoretical statements, allowing general 
theories to be constructed with explicit reference to factors operating at a system wide 
level (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 17).  Yet comparison does more than develop 
theory; it can be used to “translate exercises that involve the transmission of meaning 
structure” (Bynner and Chisholm 1998: 138).  By conducting a comparative study, 
political scientists gain understanding of not only what political actors are doing, but 
the reasons why they are doing it, allowing researchers to investigate the intended 
meaning of actions from the perspective of the actors themselves.  
Challenges of Comparison
The problem with the comparative method, according to Lijphart, is that there 
are “many variables, small number of cases.” (Lijphart 1971: 685)  He argues that the 
comparative method can be seen as a weaker form of analysis than statistical analysis 
because it deviates too far from an experimental model.  Regardless of the fact that 
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comparisons can be statistical and that the MSSD is as close as one can get to an 
experimental model while exploring system wide factors, issues of comparing 
statistics across cases can be just as problematic as comparing anything else (see 
Bynner and Chisholm 1998: 132, Walker 1983).
Bynner and Chisholm (1998: 135-7) argue that when a comparison is done 
across states, it assumes certain universalities: that concepts in one of the cases exist 
in the other.  The difficulty in this project was determining which indicators related to 
which concepts, and determining if the same indicators represented the same concepts 
in both cases.  Bynner and Chisholm note that there are problems doing comparison 
across states, yet states themselves are diverse; these problems will occur within  
states as well.  As will be seen, some of the demands articulated by elites in Nova 
Scotia and the North East appeared very similar to ones emanating from Quebec and 
Scotland.  Yet actors in Nova Scotia and the North East possess a fundamentally 
different understanding of the state than actors in Quebec and Scotland, and the 
intended consequences of the demands reflect that difference.  Not understanding the 
difference between sub-state nations such as Quebec and Scotland and regions such 
as Nova Scotia or the North East, could lead researchers to mistakenly apply the same 
conceptual framework to both minority nations and sub-national regions.
Expanding upon the challenges of comparison, Hammel (1980: 148) identifies 
the following areas as having the potential to be problematic in comparative 
methodology: 1) the identification and classification of the items to be compared; 2) 
the scope of the comparison in time and space; 3) the aims of the comparison; and 4) 
the design of the comparison.  While the challenges posed by Hammel are significant, 
this research has taken the necessary steps to minimize the problems and maximize 
the strengths of this methodology.  The most efficient way for this chapter to 
demonstrate how it meets Hammel’s challenges is to first overview the variables, and 
then addresses each of the objections in turn.
Dependent Variable 
Regionalism is part of the nationalism of the majority nation.  On the surface 
they may be seen as different, yet closer examination reveals that this is not the case. 
Majority nationalism is a product of the continual (re)production of national identity 
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and regionalism is a component of that (re)production.  It is a part of the discussion 
on the nature of the nation.  Accordingly, in the context of the hypothesis and 
research questions the dependent variable is territorial identity mobilization in the 
majority nation.  As stated earlier ‘region’ has a variety of meanings, but here it is 
used to identify the level of government situated below the state and above the local. 
In Britain the devolved administrations and English GORs fit this classification of 
regions, as do Canadian provinces.  In the North East and Nova Scotia regional 
identity corresponds to these levels of governance allowing investigation into the role 
of democracy, ensuring that both regions are controlled for in terms of regional 
administration.  As Bond and McCrone contend, regional institutions without 
democracy are still able to harness identity markers (2004).  As regional democracy 
will invariably encompass other regional institutions, GORs are examples of regions 
that have regional institutions without regional democracy.  But what is ‘territorial 
identity mobilization? How does one test for it?  At a regional level, is it a demand 
for more power or devolution, or the existence of friction between different orders of 
government?  The evidence indicates that the answer to both questions is no. 
Hopkins (1996) argues the main source of conflict in a multi-level system is 
governments wanting to maximize power, which is not identity politics.  As defined 
in Chapter One, regionalism is: 
The mobilization of regional identity by political elites as a vehicle for their 
desired political outcomes.   
Accordingly, testing for regionalism requires more than seeking out evidence of 
conflict between different orders of government or demands for autonomy.  It 
demands an in depth study of regional elite to determine if and how elites use 
regional identity as vehicles for their political objectives, in essence advancing a 
regional agenda.
A ‘regional agenda’ may be found in any of the following: 1) political and or 
constitutional change to increase regional autonomy, 2) greater integration into 
central decision making, or 3) greater resources from the state.  When former Deputy 
Prime Minister John Prescott, for example, pushed for regional devolution across 
England, this could be interpreted as a modernization or efficiency drive on behalf of 
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the British government.  When Joyce Quinn MP13 advocated for the same thing in her 
region, it was an expression of a regional agenda.  Therefore, the three indicators 
above, need to be coupled with 4) an appeal to a collective regional identity. 
Regional democracy allows for regional autonomy by providing political voice 
(however one wants to interpret voice).  Consequently one may assume that regions 
possessing democracy would be further integrated into decision making as they 
possess a vehicle for the articulation of provincial voice.  
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is the ‘stimulus,’ which has an impact on if, and 
how, the dependent variable manifests.  As the hypothesis is complex, the different 
components of it each have a different independent variable.  In examining the role of 
regional democracy, regional democracy itself is the variable.  With regard to the role 
of minority nationalism influencing regionalism and nationalism in the majority 
nation, the variable is the existence of strong minority nationalist movements.
Examining the relationship between minority nationalism and regionalism and 
nationalism within the majority nation requires only one case to investigate linkages 
between the two; evidence that elites at the regional or national level in the majority 
are mobilizing identity in reaction to the minority.  In this sense, this study could be 
interpreted as two parallel examinations looking for evidence of this linkage in 
Canada and Britain, with one case reinforcing the findings from the other if 
consistent.
While Nova Scotia and the North East both have strong regional identities, 
Nova Scotia has an elected, and in many ways sovereign, level of government.  The 
North East has an unelected and weakly powered RA, drawn up of local councillors 
and elements of civil society.  The Nova Scotia House of Assembly is a key 
institution within the social and political networks that make up Nova Scotia. 
Political competition at the provincial level focuses on it, and parties and civil society 
13 Baroness Quin of Gateshead in the County of Tyne and Wear was the Member of 
Parliament for Gateshead East between 1987 and 1997 and Gateshead East and 
Washington West from 1997 –2005.  A constant advocate for regional devolution she 
even resigned her seat in Westminster to run for the Assembly.
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are oriented towards the competition of power within it.  In the North East there is no 
regional level competition for power, the closest to this being the 2004 Regional 
Assembly referendum.  In this sense, Nova Scotia has a clear ‘target’ of political 
debate which forms the heart of Nova Scotian political networks.  The North East, 
however, is fractured.  It has weak regional institutions and only recently has civil 
society begun organizing at a regional level, which may have more to do with the 
RDA than the RA.  For example, Dixon (2006: 180) notes that “until relatively 
recently there has been little representation of business interests by private sector 
associations in regional government and governance.”  Using business as an example, 
she notes that civil society has generally been organized around the centre and the 
local lacking a capacity for regional interaction.
Control Variables  
In order to ensure that the logic of the MSSD was followed, cases were 
required in which all variables but regional democracy were isolated and controlled 
for.  Deutsch (1966a) identifies four key areas around which networks (here territorial 
identity communities) crystallize: 1) economy, 2) population, 3) geography, and 4) 
language.  As this study looks at regions and majority nations it required both states 
and the regions within them to match along these points.  At the regional level it 
required that the cases be economically similar; have relatively stable populations 
with similar patterns of immigration and emigration; be geographically distant from 
the national centre, and physically proximate to the minority nations (recognizing 
distance in Canada and Britain may mean different things); and share a common 
language with the rest of the majority nation.  In addition, in keeping with the logic of 
the experimental design, regions with administrative institutions were required, with 
one possessing and one lacking democratic legitimacy. With regard to the majority 
nation, liberal democratic multinational states were required that contained active 
minority nations.  
Chapter Two outlined how the political environment in multinational states 
changes due to the relationship between the majority and minority nations.  One can 
see this in any overview of the recent past in Britain and Canada.  Both states 
experienced periods of introspection into ‘who we are’ in the 1990s and beyond, yet 
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this may have been more pronounced in Canada as Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada 
faced the prospect of being isolated from the rest of Canada if Quebec seceded.  Yet 
the North East shares a border with Scotland and these issues appeared more salient 
there than in the rest of England (at least at an elite level), as elites were very aware 
that their region was isolated from the centre (Curtice 2006).  
While regionalism and regional identity are difficult to define and measure 
(Tomaney and Ward 2001: 8-9), in Canada regional identity may be easier to 
recognize as the regions exist in tandem with existing power structures: the provinces 
(Preston 1985: 5).  In England, while regions lack democratic institutions, regional 
identities exist, which may act as triggers for regionalism (Lanigan 2001: 104-5). 
Both regions under study have similar economic histories and, with the creation of 
the RDAs in England, institutions charged with addressing the regional economy.  In 
addition to the economic similarities, both have relatively stable populations with 
relatively low levels of immigration but a fair amount of economic emigration to 
richer parts of the state.  Both are distant from central decision making, and although 
Nova Scotia would be cut off from Canada by Quebec seceding, the North East’s 
position as a periphery of England would be exacerbated if Scotland separated. 
Finally, in both cases there is a common language, English, which not only functions 
as a common means of communication, but each region has a unique dialect and way 
of life.  While Chapter Four examines this changing political environment in greater 
detail, it is important to note that Canada and Britain, and Nova Scotia and the North 
East within them, were chosen due to their similarities based on Deutsch’s (1966) 
four points mentioned above.  
Deutsch’s (1996a) four points outlined above enabled the project to isolate 
and control for all but the role of democracy at the regional level.  This meant that a 
two case comparison in general, and Nova Scotia and the North East of England in 
particular, are suitable candidates for comparison according to the MSSD.  This sub-
section will now address each of Hammel’s challenges and demonstrate how they 
were overcome. To recap, Hammel (1980: 148) identified the following as potentially 
problematic: 1) the identification and classification of the items to be compared; 2) 
the scope of the comparison in time and space; 3) the aims of the comparison; and 4) 
the design of the comparison.  
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The Identification and Classification of the Items to Be Compared
Problems of comparison do not merely exist in qualitative comparisons. 
Walker (1983) demonstrates that there are problems associated with any comparison, 
even ones based on statistical evidence.  For instance, if the methods used in 
collecting data are different, the numbers produced will not be directly comparable. 
In Walker’s example, different police jurisdictions used different methods for 
measuring crime (the concept); while the indicators of the concept appeared 
comparable, in reality they were not.  As Walker notes: 
variation in the demographic characteristics of different police force areas 
over the country and in the policy of different chief constables means that the 
statistics of offences, clear-up rates, offenders and sentencing from different 
areas are not comparable in many ways.  (Walker 1983: 292)  
Accordingly, while interpretive research methodologies may be easy targets for those 
who reject subjective research, most research has subjective elements to it. 
Shankman argues that human interaction is by its very nature guided by interpretation 
(1984: 262).  Human beings make their decisions for action based upon their 
interpretations of the world around them (Cohen 1996 and Hearn 2007).  Different 
individuals are more than capable of seeing the same event and coming to different 
conclusions about its meaning and significance.  The interpretive and subjective 
nature of human action is a factor of the human condition, and is not in and of itself 
either negative or positive, it just is.  Problems that arise in comparing evidence are 
not limited to qualitative evidence or emotional, empathetic or motivational 
understanding.  Walker shows that this can apply equally to linguistic and technical 
understanding.  It is by ensuring that one’s variables are correctly identified and 
controlled that one is able to overcome the challenges identified by Lijphart above 
(1971), and in doing so approximate scientific experimentation.
As this project examines questions of what and how, as well as why, an 
attempt to understand motivation is important.  For example, in arguing that 
secessionists in Quebec are using “separatist blackmail” Dion (2001), (as Minister of 
Intergovernmental Affairs), fails to understand the root cause of nationalist sentiment 
in Quebec.  By failing to address the why, Dion (2001) draws the wrong conclusions 
about secessionist demands.  Minority nationalist demands are more than attempts to 
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extract greater resources from the state, as their demands stem from a fundamentally 
different conception of who the demotic people of the state are (returning to Tierney’s 
(2007) term).  Similarly, in this analysis the what and the how (as in what is 
happening and how is it manifesting itself) is subsumed by the why (as in why is this 
happening).  By attempting to tease out the perspectives of elites, this work seeks to 
move beyond merely describing regionalism to explaining why it manifests itself in 
the way it does.
Does it mean the same thing for an English speaking Canadian to indicate that 
he is Canadian and not Nova Scotian, as it does for someone from the North East to 
identify as British and not North Eastern?  On the surface, crime statistics seem easily 
comparable, yet when Walker (1983) looked into the meaning of the statistics, they 
reflected different underlying concepts.  What had appeared to be strong indicators of 
one concept instead became indicators of different concepts of crime.  If this is a 
problem encountered within a culture, it follows that it would be as prevalent, if not 
more so, between cultures.  As will be shown in Chapter Seven, both Nova Scotia and 
the North East have stronger regional sentiments than their co-nationals in Canada 
(outside Quebec) and England, but this tells the researcher only the relative strength 
of regional identity in Nova Scotia in relation to Canada (outside Quebec) and the 
North East in relation to England.  It says nothing about the relative strength of Nova 
Scotian identity vis-à-vis North Eastern identity.  
The risk of taking a concept and applying it to all cases regardless of fit, and 
then altering the concept to make it fit, is identified by Sartori as “conceptual 
stretching” in which ideas and concepts are stretched to fit all cases, and in doing so 
concepts are reduced to “vague amorphous conceptualisations” (1970:1034).  He 
argues:
Thus far the discipline has largely followed the line of least resistance, namely 
“conceptual stretching.” In order to obtain a world-wide applicability the 
extension of our concepts has been broadened by obfuscating their 
connotation.  As a result the very purpose of comparing—control—is 
defeated, and we are left to swim in a sea of empirical and theoretical 
messiness. (Sartori 1970: 1053)
Collier and Mahon (1993: 845) argue that the merit of Sartori’s approach is that it 
encourages the researcher to be attentive to the context, without abandoning 
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comparison.  Accordingly, as the hypothesis is complex, this project has been clear in 
outlining the different variables in order to minimize problems and meet Hammel’s 
first challenge.  It overcomes the limits of subjectivity through a robust and varied 
selection of data, incorporating the principle of triangulation, as well as developing a 
sound understanding of the particular contexts of the separate cases.
The Scope of the Comparison in Time and Space
Good comparative designs are compromises as case selection is refined and 
groups reconsidered (Bechhofer 2000: 52).  For practical reasons, the selection of 
countries is rarely random.  As cross national studies are quasi-experimental, tactical 
choices are made with regard to the best combination of countries given the 
researcher’s resource limitations (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 32).  This research 
required states that had two key criteria: 1) vocal minority nationalist movements, 
and; 2) regions with strong regional identities.  While the choice of cases is not self-
evident (Bechhofer 2000: 44), this work seeks to better understand Canada, requiring 
a state to compare Canada against and Britain was a logical choice.  
Sartori’s (1970: 1040) advice in regard to conceptual stretching during the 
initial round of concept formation was met through a careful process of case 
selection.  Canada (outside Quebec) and England are both divided into nine 
regions/provinces, allowing for a total of 81 possible two case comparisons.  In 
Canada, Ontario was quickly discarded due to its large size and centrality, as was 
London (a city-region) and the South East of England for similar reasons: they form 
an English ‘core.’  The Western Provinces followed suit because of their distance 
from Quebec, the wealth in British Columbia and Alberta, and the large native 
populations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.  This left Atlantic Canada, and to control 
as many variables as possible, the North of England became the logical choice for 
comparison to an Atlantic Province.
Not all of England has strong regional identities as found in Canadian 
provinces (outside Quebec), yet this was not necessary.  Instead, some regions within 
England had to have strong regional identities mapping onto administrative divisions, 
such as the three northern GORs, particularly the North East.  Labour had intended to 
hold referenda in all three Northern GORs, but they were called off in the North West 
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and Yorkshire and the Humber ostensibly due to problems encountered with postal 
voting, leaving the North East as the remaining option for study.  Unofficially, 
speculation is they were called off because polling indicated a lesser chance of 
success in these two regions (Hazell 2006a: 9, Tickel, John and Musson 2005: 3).  As 
the North East was going to have the referendum and shares a border with Scotland, it 
became the obvious candidate.  Fortunately, the North East also appears to have the 
greatest amount of secondary literature of the three northern GORs.
In Atlantic Canada, Prince Edward Island was quickly discarded due to its 
small size, and New Brunswick due to its bilingualism.  This left Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia.  While Newfoundland and Labrador arguably has the strongest 
provincial identity in Canada outside Quebec, it was felt that ‘the Rock,’ as it is 
colloquially known by its inhabitants, may already be a sub-state nation in its own 
right.  Entering the Federation in 1949, it did not participate with the rest of Canada 
(outside Quebec) in some of the most important nation building events in Canada’s 
past.  While it did participate in the building of the health care system and the 
creation of the Canadian welfare state, which the logic of McEwen indicates would 
be very important to creating a shared identity (2002).  Newfoundland’s experiences 
in the First and Second World War were markedly different.  Participating alongside 
Canada as a co-equal British Dominion, its war history differed fundamentally from 
Canada’s (see Colley (1992: 323) on wartime experiences and identity): for example 
the slaughter of Newfoundland’s soldiers at Gallipoli compared to the success of the 
Canadian Corps at the Battle of Vimy Ridge.  This left Nova Scotia as the clear 
choice.
With regard to the temporal parameters of the study, the year 1990 was used 
as a start point and 2004 as an end point.  A limited number of primary sources after 
2004 were used as they help shed light on the understandings of prominent actors 
during the period under study.  With sub-state nationalism on the rise, constitutional 
change and negotiation taking place, important referenda being held and the overall 
challenging of traditional frameworks of the state, this period allowed for an analysis 
of the hypotheses and research questions as the political debates were clearly centred 
on issues of identity.  Hammel’s second challenge to comparative methodology was 
avoided through clearly demarcated physical and temporal parameters.
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The Aims of the Comparison
The aim of this comparison is to examine regionalism as a part of the majority 
nationalism within multinational states during periods of strong nationalist agitation, 
and what role regional democratic institutions have upon the trajectory of 
regionalism.  As stated above, this is not an examination of identity; it is an 
examination of identity mobilization.  As networks of communication form the basis 
of the markers used in territorial identity mobilization, this work studies political 
communication within regional networks.  As Chapter Two outlined, these markers 
create identity by placing individuals within a social context.  Individuals possess 
many types of identities and have a unique relationship with each of the markers that 
make up his or her identity (see Hearn 2007 and Cohen 1996).  As such, it is 
important to keep in mind the logic of McCrone (2000:306), who states, “we may 
choose to present ourselves in a particular way, but the signs we give off may be 
interpreted differently by others, and they in turn may choose to construct who we are 
in different ways again.” Individuals act in a manner consistent with the way they 
wish to be seen, but cannot control, only influence, how others see them.  If actions 
are not interpreted in a manner consistent with the intention of the original actor, the 
original actor becomes, from a socially constructed perspective, a different individual 
with a completely different set of motivations.  
A challenge to analyzing political debate within these networks stems from 
the state being made up of a variety of social and political networks (Mann 1993). 
While contributing to the makeup of the state, these networks lack overall consistency 
and many do not even interact with each other.  Accordingly, analyzing political 
communication requires a clear focus on what is being studied, and which of these 
networks of communication is being studied.   In this project, the issue was overcome 
by using a wide range of data sources and analyzing the competition for power within 
the regions in order to narrow the focus.  As Yin (1994: 80) states, a good study will 
attempt to use as many data sources as possible.
The challenges that McCrone identifies as implicit to this kind of research are 
met through the use of the triangulation of both methods and data sources.  Analyzing 
only communication or actors would reveal only part of the picture, but by analyzing 
political communication and conducting elite interviews, this research gains a fuller 
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understanding of how regional and national identity was mobilized.  As the region is 
an embedded and indivisible part of the majority nation, understanding the region 
requires understanding the nation it belongs to.  By studying elite discourse at the 
centre and in the region, this work is situated to research the relationship between the 
majority and minority nations and the role of regional democracy.  At the same time, 
it must be acknowledged that projections of identity are the interpretations of those 
who currently hold power within identity networks.  Accordingly, survey data was 
used to triangulate this work.  As the markers used to highlight identity may be 
contested, it is important not to study the markers brought forward in the identity 
debates, but rather the (perceived) power relations expressed within the debates. 
Hammel’s third challenge was tackled with a clear theoretical framework and 
research design.
The Design of the Comparison  
A strength of the interpretative approach is that one has the potential to 
recognize the subjective element and in doing so attempt to work around it to 
minimize problems.  In this sense, using the logic of the MSSD, this project studies a 
subjective phenomenon while minimizing the shortfalls and problems of subjectivity. 
Yet two case studies are not always seen as the best way of analysing a phenomenon. 
Lijphart (1971: 686-690) suggests expanding the number of cases.  Expansion, 
though, would reduce, not expand, the explanatory ability of this work, spreading 
resources further and devoting less attention to the specific cases.  Geertz 
(2003[1973]) refers to “thick description,” and while this project is not an 
anthropological study of the type discussed by Geertz, his point about immersing 
oneself in the culture of the case is extremely important.  This helps limit conceptual 
stretching and allows researchers to gain a nuanced understanding of the cases.  Here, 
expanding the number of cases would be counterproductive, as understanding the 
meaning and intentions of actors requires in-depth analysis.  The two-case 
comparison allows the researcher to simulate an experiment while keeping the cases 
contextually grounded.  As Skocpol recommends (1995: 360), by combining 
qualitative and quantitative approaches and triangulating between the two, this project 
becomes sensitive to the cases.  
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According to Bynner and Chisholm (1998: 132) comparisons across cultures 
require a “Weberian strategy” for researching social life in that “the need for societal 
understanding becomes a virtual pre-requisite for any proper scientific interpretations 
of findings.”  Keat and Urry (1982: 145) argue that the Weberian strategy attempts to 
“marry” naturalistic insistence upon causality and anti-naturalist demand for 
interpretive understanding of subjective meaning.  One cannot understand the current 
place of Nova Scotia or the North East within their respective nations and states 
without understanding, for example, the Maritime Rights Movement in Nova Scotia 
(Forbes 1979) or the North/South divide in England (Jewell 1994).  Accordingly, 
Chapter Four situates the cases within their historical contexts.  
Historical context is essential as it allows for interpretation, as opposed to 
pure description.  While describing what is being said is important, it is through 
historical context that the researcher is able to assess intentions.  Action devoid of 
intention is meaningless; the difference between explaining (what happened) and 
understanding (why it happened) lies in motives (Rosenberg 1988: 83).  Motives, 
however, are difficult to discern.  Although it is possible to simply ask political actors 
why they did something, the answer they give will be the answer they want the 
researcher to hear.  They may (intentionally or not) exclude information or exaggerate 
their importance (Berry 2002: 681).  To overcome this, one has to ensure that the 
research is placed within its proper historical and social context, as well as use 
different approaches to ensure a proper understanding of the issues.  Quantifiable data 
is not sufficient to explain motive.  In order to determine motive there must be a level 
of subjectivity and interpretation involved, which can be tested against the 
measurable data.
Keat and Urry (1982: 148) argue that a researcher’s ability to understand is 
limited and shaped by their personal history.  It was only after living, working, and 
teaching in Scotland for a number of years that this researcher began to fully 
appreciate the power of political socialization.  Concepts that Canadians may take for 
granted, such as multilevel governance and differences in rules, regulations, services 
and the like across sub-state borders appeared to be foreign concepts to many people 
in Britain.  In this sense, Simeon’s (2006a) point about federal ideals or cultures may 
have a counterpart in the British unitary system; a unitary ideal.  This stems from the 
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fact that all non-Westminster elections in Britain have historically been viewed as 
second order while in Canada they could be considered parallel first order elections. 
In the North East, people simply do not have a history of separating local from 
national, as all politics seem to stem from Westminster.  
As Merton (1972: 22) points out, people are both insiders and outsiders at the 
same time.  It is only in relation to the networks being explored that one can be 
classified as either.  Take for example, this researcher’s interview with Prof. John 
Tomaney, the leader of the ‘Yes’ campaign in the 2004 North East referendum. 
Although this researcher was not part of the regional networks, both the interviewer 
and interviewee are academics with similar research interests and on top of that, both 
are white, male, and speak English as a first language.  Though certain identity 
markers were not shared, others were, making this researcher an insider with regard 
to some markers, and an outsider with regard to others.  Returning to a point from 
Chapter Two, identities are contextual, and given some of the responses and non-
verbal cues received during the interview with Prof. Tomaney, it appeared that the 
interview was not simply between a regional ‘insider’ and non-regional ‘outsider,’ 
but between people who shared a common interest in regionalism, as well as the 
dynamic between an aspiring academic interviewing an established one.  The 
interaction of different identity networks, some shared, some not, within a single 
interview was clear.
Not being part of a group, though, does have its advantages.  Merton (1972: 
30) argues that people can be consumed within their group’s assumptions, unable to 
escape them.  Not being from Nova Scotia or the North East allowed this researcher 
to approach the regions with a view unbiased by regional understandings, myths or 
prejudice.  As Toqeville states with regard to the United States, “there are certain 
truths which Americans can only learn from strangers” (in Merton 1972:  33). 
Overall, the fact that this research was conducted mostly as an ‘outsider’ should be 
interpreted as a positive.  The researcher was free of assumptions about the world 
shared by ‘insiders’ in Nova Scotia and the North East, allowing for a questioning of 
local assumptions.  Yet being aware that these assumptions were not shared forced 
the researcher to ensure he had a thorough understanding of the region before 
conducting the interviews.
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Returning to the challenges raised by Hammel (1980), the above demonstrates 
(Chapter Four will go into greater detail) that the cases were chosen on solid 
comparative principles, addressing the need within the MSSD to find the Most 
Similar System.  This research design directly addresses the subjective nature of the 
work through a robust analysis of the context of the cases, allowing for a strong 
argument to be made that the identified dependent variable is indeed dependent, and 
that it was not another variable unknown to this research that was causal.  These cases 
were clearly bounded geographically and temporally.  Both regions have clear 
borders and in both cases the timeline is one in which there was much introspection 
as to the nature of the state.  The aim of the comparison is clear: to assess regionalism 
within majority nations as well as the role that elected regional levels of government 
have in the phenomenon’s manifestation.  Finally, the design of the comparison, as 
this chapter demonstrates, is intended to ensure that the research is as robust as 
possible.  By triangulating its data sources this work ensures that there is no 
‘misreading’ of data, as the triangulation inherently strengthens the analysis. 
Is it possible to draw universal lessons from a two case comparative study? 
The answer is, unfortunately, no.  That this kind of study lacks the ability to 
generalize does not make it any less important.  The logic of comparing what are in 
essence two case studies is highlighted by Mitchel, who argues, “we infer that the 
features present in the case study will be related in a wider population not because the 
case is representative but because our analysis is unassailable” (Mitchel 2000: 177). 
So while Elkins and Simeon (1979: 131) argue that one cannot assess the relative 
importance of cultural or structural explanations from one case or a single collective, 
this comparison helps create a framework for a theory on the relationship between 
minority nationalism, majority nationalism and regionalism, and the role of regional 
democracy in identity mobilization while ensuring the resources to conduct in-depth 
studies were available.  The comparative method is not perfect, but, by carefully 
selecting the cases and studiously applying the logic presented above, the analysis 
presented is sound from a theoretical and analytical perspective.
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3.3 Data
To properly examine the above variables, this project drew its evidence from 
two broad categories: 1) political debate and 2) public opinion.  These were chosen to 
gain a thorough overview of elites and public attitudes within the regions and their 
respective nations.  Political debate took the form of a) political documents, b) 
transcripts of political debates and the reporting thereof, and c) elite interviews.  In 
order to explain the strategies used in the collection and analysis of data, this section 
is divided into four sub-sections, each dealing with a specific data source.  Data 
alone, however, cannot answer research questions (Antaki et al. 2003: 5).  To ensure 
the accuracy of this research, it was essential for robust and scientifically sound 
analysis of the data.  Accordingly, each of the following sub-sections will introduce 
the data and discuss the techniques used in its analysis.  First, though, there will be an 
overview of the particular challenges surrounding the use of data in the social 
sciences in general, and this project in particular, detailing how they were overcome
Data Challenges 
To understand the challenges produced by different types of data, one must 
understand the forms data takes.  Blaikie (2000) identifies three sources of data for a 
social researcher: 1) primary data (the term self-collected primary data is used here) 
which researchers collect themselves; 2) secondary data (this researcher prefers to 
think of it as other-collected primary data), raw data collected by another researcher; 
and, 3) tertiary information (the term secondary will be used here), data that has 
already been analyzed by another researcher.  
Data collected and analyzed by the researcher is the least problematic 
(assuming a robust and thorough research design).  It is from the other two sources of 
data that problems outside of the researcher’s control may arise.  While this project 
had an abundance of data, there were many potential problems stemming from the 
fact that much of the data was collected or organized by others.  Blaikie notes three 
ways data collected by others may be problematic; 
1. Previous research was done with different research questions in mind,
2. Not all areas of interest may be covered, and
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3. Difficulty in judging the quality of data (2000:185).
The second point was particularly salient with regard to survey data.  The issues 
studied were not queried in surveys in the majority of years under study in Britain, 
and relative loyalty as examined in the “Moreno question” (see Moreno 2006, 
Henderson 2007) was not asked in Canada outside of Quebec. Consequently, this 
required a creative use of the data (see Chapter Seven).  
Webb et al. (1981: 163) demonstrate the challenges presented by data 
collected by others, stating that errors may be introduced through individual record 
keepers, the methods used, recording or filing mistakes, and historical or temporal 
changes.  Furthermore, differences in record keeping systems may make some data 
non-comparable (see Walker (1983) above).  The impact of the record keeping of 
others was extremely evident during this research.  In Nova Scotia the majority of 
documentary primary data was collected at the Nova Scotia House of Assembly 
Legislative Library.  In the North East, before the main newspapers began keeping 
on-line digital archives, the work was directed by the unseen hands of archivists 
working in the Tyne and Wear archives and the Local History Library in Newcastle. 
The research, especially with regard to the newspaper reports analyzed, was directed 
by the archivist’s cataloguing decisions.  This is important to note not only for this 
researcher’s gratitude to these institutions, but this researcher is painfully aware of the 
gatekeeper role played by them. As Macdonald notes, researchers are not always 
aware of the reasoning behind all of the decisions made (2002: 208), and one cannot 
help but wonder if different archivists, working with the same material, would have 
made different decisions.  
The use of secondary data is fundamental to any academic inquiry.  The logic 
of this research design encourages immersion in secondary literature.  It is 
unfortunate, especially with regard to Nova Scotia, that the regions have not received 
as much academic enquiry as their rich histories warrant.  Secondary data has not 
only helped shape the researcher’s understanding of the issues facing these regions, it 
has also highlighted gaps in the literature, which grounds this work in the wider 
academic discussions on these regions. 
An important aspect of secondary data is that in addition to the intended 
information, it provides information beyond what is being presented in the data.  
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Dibble (1963: 206) argues that there is an implicit assumption that documents are 
produced by individuals and not by social systems.  In this sense, research conducted 
by those within the regions themselves is inherently part of the region building 
process.  As stated earlier, ‘insiders’ have views that ‘outsiders’ do not.  Texts, even 
academic ones, may be influenced by these views.  This is not to say that the quality 
of academic research is weakened, rather these views may inform the questions and 
focus taken.  This is most notable with regard to the literature on regionalism in the 
North East, as one of the leading scholars investigating regionalism and devolution in 
the North East, Prof. John Tomaney from the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies 
at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, was also the chair of the ‘Yes’ campaign 
in the 2004 regional devolution referendum.  While this is a very visible example, in 
Nova Scotia and the North East academic and political networks frequently 
overlapped.  
To overcome the challenges of individual data sources, the principle of 
triangulation, in which the phenomenon is analyzed along two (or more) axes to 
ensure that the findings are consistent, was used.  The data sources were selected 
based on the principle that elite debate is part of the democratic competition for 
power.  MacDonald (2001: 208) identifies four types of triangulation: 1) data 
triangulation, 2) investigator triangulation, 3) theory triangulation, and 4) 
methodological triangulation.  He states that option (3) is next to impossible, (and 
given that this is work is a Ph.D. thesis conducted solely by one researcher with 
limited resources, option (2) was eliminated).  Accordingly, options (1) and (4) were 
used to guide the research.  
Data triangulation was achieved through the variety of information sources. 
Different types of documentary sources were used (see below), allowing investigation 
of identity mobilization from different perspectives within elite political discourse. 
This form of triangulation ensured a robust analysis of elite debate and a thorough 
understanding of elite viewpoints.  Data triangulation was reinforced by 
methodological triangulation in which the analysis of documents and elite interviews 
was triangulated with an analysis of survey data.  Researching elite opinion 
exclusively was one manner in which to approach the research questions, as elites are 
the ones who formulate ideas and then attempt to mobilize support.  Elite discourse, 
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by its very nature, is directed towards a wider audience and there is an implied 
dialogue between elites and masses.  It is important, therefore, to examine the masses 
as well As Connor (1990: 95) notes, territorial mobilization is not merely an elite, but 
rather a mass, phenomenon.  Modern democratic states gain their legitimacy as the 
embodiment of the people. 
By addressing the same questions from two different approaches, one of two 
outcomes was expected; the two methods would produce similar findings, or they 
would not, meaning that an explanation of the discrepancy would be necessary.  As 
later chapters will show, this is not a straightforward either/or scenario.  The results 
are very complex, some reinforcing each other and others leading to different 
(although not mutually exclusive) conclusions.
From the survey of the literature surrounding different types of data, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the data sources used have been highlighted, 
demonstrating an awareness of the problems associated with the choices made. 
Based on this literature it is apparent that the best approach to dealing with data 
challenges is openly acknowledging them, minimizing their impact and strengthening 
the conclusions.  This section will now move to a discussion of the individual data 
sources, the strategies used to analyze them, and how the problems identified here 
were overcome.
Party and Political Publications 
Both Canada and Britain are democracies, and one of the ways that 
democratic competition for power has evolved is for parties to produce 
manifestos/platforms to outline their plans for government.  The nature of democratic 
competition in federal Canada is different from unitary Britain.  During the period 
under study there were Nova Scotian provincial elections in 1993, 1998, 1999, and 
2003; federal elections in 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004 (followed shortly thereafter in 
2006); a Canada wide referendum in 1992; and a Nova Scotia referendum in 2004 (on 
Sunday shopping).  The North East was part of British wide General Elections in 
1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005, and the referendum of 2004.  With regard to party 
publications, Macdonald’s (2001: 207) point about the necessity of analyzing 
documents within their social context became very relevant, although it is the 
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political context that has to be kept in mind.  Pogorelis et al. (2005: 993-4) survey 
literature on manifesto research and outline several reasons why manifestos should be 
studied: the media focus on the pledges contained within them; they allow for greater 
objectivity than other methods of studying political party positions, such as interview 
and media accounts; they present a full picture of party stances; and they allow the 
researcher to study positions over time.  Party and political publications fall into three 
broad categories, outlined below.  Given that party and political publications and 
records of parliamentary debate and newspaper accounts were analyzed in the same 
manner, a discussion of their analysis will occur at the end of the description on 
political debates and newspaper accounts.
Statewide Party Manifestos
Statewide party manifestos are used by political elites to communicate with 
the whole of the state, yet they target specific parts of it as well.  It is a distinct 
possibility that they are not read by the vast majority of the population of Canada and 
Britain, being read instead by party activists and the media.  In saying this, they are 
still part of the debate at the elite level.  The platforms/manifestos were analyzed 
beginning with the 1992 British election and ending with the 2004 Canadian federal 
election.  In Britain, during this period, the party system was stable and the two major 
parties, Labour and the Conservatives, were studied.  In Canada, the Liberal Party of 
Canada was stable, but the other major party, the Canadian Alliance, and its 
predecessor the Reform Party of Canada, competed with the Progressive 
Conservative Party of Canada for the centre right vote from 1993 until they merged 
with the creation of the Conservative Party of Canada in 2004.  In Britain the 
researcher was fortunate enough to have access to an electronic archive of the party 
manifestos, but in Canada neither the parties nor the House of Commons Library 
were able to fill in some of the gaps.  
It should be noted that while these were presented as ‘statewide’ manifestos 
by the parties, in Canada the manifestos are produced in English and French, and only 
the English manifestos were studied.  While there is the possibility that the 
manifestos may be different in English and French, given that this project is 
interested in Canada (outside Quebec) the point raised by McRoberts (1997), that 
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French is increasingly concentrated in Quebec and English outside Quebec, this 
should not be problematic.  In Britain, ‘British’ manifestos were in fact targeted at 
England as each party produced separate manifestos in the minority nations.
Regional Campaign Material
Regional campaign material took a different focus in Nova Scotia than in the 
North East, with more material produced in Nova Scotia due to regular elections at 
the provincial level.  While political parties were somewhat organized at the regional 
level in England, there were no elections outside of general elections which were 
(ostensibly) all British campaigns.  While parties were active in local elections in 
Britain, local campaigns took on national significance as they appeared as true second 
order elections in a near “pure type” understanding of second order elections.  This 
leaves only one instance of what could truly be deemed a regionwide competition for 
power in the North East, the 2004 referendum, but even that appeared as a second 
order event.
Other Documents  
In addition to manifestos, other documents were consulted that, while difficult 
to classify, nevertheless were important to this research.  Examples are the Nova 
Scotia government’s “Campaign for Fairness” (http://www.gov.ns.ca/fairness/), the 
joint submission by all three Nova Scotia party leaders to the Special Joint Committee 
on a Renewed Canada (Cameron et al. 1992), and Gordon Brown’s speech on 
Britishness to the Fabian Society in 2006 (Brown 2006). These were discovered, then 
selected for inclusion during archival research as it became apparent that they 
allowed for a greater understanding of elite opinion while providing additional 
sources from which to judge the other sources.
Records of Parliamentary Debates and Newspaper Accounts 
For the Canadian and British Houses of Commons and the Nova Scotia House 
of Assembly, Hansard is available online and fully researchable from the early 1990s 
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(1996 in Nova Scotia).14  In this instance a challenge faced was information overload. 
Through a constantly refined search of both the Canadian and British Hansards, 
examining constitutional and quasi-constitutional issues, approximately 10, 000 pages 
of parliamentary debates in Britain and Canada were returned, which were then 
analyzed in light of the research questions.
In Britain these included the devolution Bills for Scotland and Wales, the Bills 
setting up Regional Assemblies and Development Agencies, a failed Conservative 
backbench Bill to hold a devolution referendum for England, and the Bills leading to 
the 2004 North East Assembly referendum.  In Canada, the Clarity Act and the 
Regional Veto Act were used.  It is a notable difference between Britain and Canada 
that much more was being debated in the British House of Commons than its 
Canadian counterpart due to the amount of political activity which took place at the 
provincial level in Canada. This was more notable in Quebec with regard to the 
referendum and the questioning of Quebec’s place within the Canadian federation, 
but each province was also home to a great deal of debate on the nature of the 
Canadian state.  To supplement the debates, questions to Ministers dealing with 
constitutional and identity issues were examined.  In the Nova Scotia House of 
Assembly there was little available with regard to provincial identity, the notable 
exception being the failed Provincial Sovereignty Bill and the transcripts of the Nova 
Scotia Select Committee on National Unity, a committee which toured the province 
in an attempt to engage the people of Nova Scotia in discussion of the Calgary 
Declaration.
With regard to the Nova Scotia Select Committee on National Unity, it must 
be noted that the provincial government did not translate the French submissions, and 
this researcher’s French was not of an acceptable level to interpret them for academic 
study.  Many Acadian submissions, though, were made in English for the benefit of 
non-French speakers taking part in the debates.  However, given 1) the small size of 
the Acadian population, 2) the fact that many Acadian presenters presented in 
English, and 3) the fact that many sources of data were built into the research design, 
14 Hansard is the record of parliamentary proceedings.  To differentiate between 
British and Canadian Hansard within the text, (Can) will follow HC.
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it was not felt that the language barrier would have any effect on the final analysis of 
debate in Nova Scotia.
Newspapers accounts were used as they present political debate, and in doing 
so provide two sources of information.  Firstly, as independent institutional actors, 
newspapers play an important role in the shaping of public opinion, both through how 
news is presented and what news is presented (the gatekeeper function).  Secondly, 
newspapers act as a conduit through which regional actors can make their appeals. 
Newspapers play a major role in the shaping of the bounded networks that make up a 
territorialized identity network (see Anderson 1983).  In both Nova Scotia and the 
North East regional level newspapers reached broad audiences and provided a 
substantial amount of information for this project. 
In the North East, three newspapers were analyzed; the Newcastle Journal, the 
Northern Echo and the Evening Chronicle.  Each of these papers covered the debates 
surrounding the North East Assembly and regional devolution, with the Journal 
taking on the role of political actor with the ‘Campaign for the North.’  After 2001 
each of the papers provided an online archive of their articles, enabling researchers to 
use a key word search in order to find relevant information.  The key words used in 
searching these archives were “north”, “east” and “assembly”.  These produced every 
article in which these words appeared, many of which were not relevant to this 
project.  These articles were then narrowed down to focus on debates surrounding the 
(elected and un-elected) North East Assembly.  The Local History archives at the 
Newcastle City Library were used to provide information prior to 2001.  These 
archives held a selection of articles dealing with the debates surrounding the 
establishment of the (un-elected) North East Assembly, and the referendum for an 
elected Assembly, the earliest dating from 1986.  
It is unfortunate that the two main Nova Scotia papers, the Chronicle Herald 
and the Daily News, did not have similar on-line accessibility, but the Librarian of the 
Nova Scotia House of Assembly Library granted complete access to all of the 
materials archived in the Library.  This included all of the articles from Nova Scotian 
newspapers collected under subject headings such as ‘Quebec Separatism,’ ‘The 
Constitution,’ ‘ACOA,’ and so forth.  As mentioned earlier, archivists act as 
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‘gatekeepers.’  However, given the abundance of clippings from both the major and 
minor papers of the regions, it was felt that the archivists kept comprehensive records. 
In both cases, newspaper articles were used to create a picture of how elites 
felt their region was situated within their nation and state, as well as to gain insight 
into the importance of identity issues for regional actors.  Macdonald (2001: 198-99) 
notes that newspapers as sources have three major drawbacks; 1) errors, 2) distortion, 
and 3) they are produced with audiences in mind. Macdonald claims errors may be 
either technical or factual.  Technical errors, such as missing parts of the original 
document were not encountered during this research, and the concern regarding 
factual errors was minimized due to the fact that the interest of this research is 
interpretation, not fact.  Distortion may stem from the preferences of writers or 
editors and is very relevant here, as much of the project relies on what and how 
newspaper reporters, journalists and editors chose to report.  For example, the 
Newcastle Journal’s ‘Campaign for the North’ indicated the newspaper was not 
neutral with regard to regional interests.  Tickell, John and Musson (2005) argue that 
in the North East the newspapers were fairly neutral during the referendum campaign. 
While this may be true, in the years leading up to the campaign the newspapers chose 
to make regional devolution an issue.  The regional newspapers decided to ‘run’ with 
stories on regional devolution and actively take part in the debates.  From this 
perspective the regional papers clearly lack neutrality.  This, though, is a problem 
only if one wishes to use newspapers for factual research.  As this research examines 
regional views, the biases found in newspapers can contribute to the political views 
that this work investigates.  This bias leads neatly to the third point raised by 
Macdonald: audience context.  Newspapers exist to make a profit, which may create 
either a conscious or sub-conscious desire to appeal to their worldviews.  While this 
bias may be problematic for those using newspapers for factual information, for this 
project it is a positive point.
Macdonald identifies the following problems a researcher encounters when 
using and analyzing documents: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
meaning (MacDonald 2001: 204).  As the sources of the documents are known, issues 
surrounding authenticity and credibility will be negligible.  Issues of meaning and 
representativeness were particularly relevant.  The majority of this research focused 
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on political elites, who draw upon mass support for legitimacy in democratic states 
and elites all claim, in some way or another, to be representative of the people.  
Silverman identifies four ways in which documents can by analyzed; content 
analysis, analysis of the narrative structure, ethnography, and ethnomethodology 
(2001: 122-3).  This work employs content analysis as it deals with what the 
documents state.  It is also influenced by ethnography, as how issues of identity were 
introduced were also examined.  The main goal in using content analysis is 
determining which themes are common throughout the regions, which are not, and 
which are found in one case and not the other.  In analyzing the content, the logic of 
the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) was examined, but after reflection, it was 
decided not to use this methodology as it was not felt to be compatible with the 
research questions and hypothesis.  
The logic of the CMP is that parties position themselves in a political space by 
taking ownership of particular issues as opposed to taking opposing positions on the 
same issues (Petry and Pennings 2006: 101).  At first glance this may appear a 
valuable tool here, as the CMP approach is “directly based on the salience theory, 
which makes it suitable for analysing the salience aspect of party campaigning” 
(Pogorelis et al. 2005: 995).  The strength of the CMP comes from analyzing issue 
strength of a party vis-à-vis other issues held by the party.  As such, it was felt that 
the CMP logic would be the wrong tool to use in this project.  In particular, Pogorelis 
et al. (2005: 1000) note that with regard to issues that are quite specific, the salience 
approach is not appropriate, and that generalities are better. Given that manifestos 
were tested for interpretations of state, nation and region, further weight is added to 
the decision not to adopt CMP methods.  These challenges were exacerbated by the 
fact that in Canada there are both French and English language manifestos and in 
Britain there is no British statewide manifesto.
In the end, it was decided the best way to analyze written texts was through 
immersion in the documents, extracting concepts and building an overall picture of 
elite opinion.  Each document/source was read in order to gain an overview of the 
issues and all the excerpts of how region and nation were presented were noted. 
These excerpts were then ‘bundled’ into similar themes and once all the ‘bundles’ of 
data from all the sources were gathered, they were examined to determine how 
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regional and national actors interpreted their states, nations, regions and the place of 
the minority nations.  This allowed the identification of common themes without 
sacrificing the contextual nature of them.
Elite Interviews
Yin argues that researchers should always attempt to gather information from 
the people involved in the events under scrutiny unless the researcher is studying the 
“dead past” (Yin 1994: 8).  As this study began during the period under study, and 
most of those involved are still alive (many are still politically active), attempts to 
conduct elite interviews were made.  Goldstein states that there are three main 
reasons for conducting elite interviews:
1. To gather information from a sample of officials in order to make 
generalizable claims,
2. To discover a particular piece of information or a particular document, 
3. To inform or guide work that uses other sources of data (Goldstein 
2002: 669).
As limited secondary literature exists with regard to either region, this research 
incorporated elite interviews to inform and guide the work, providing context and 
filling gaps in other data sources.  To guide the reader through the logic of employing 
elite interviews, this discussion addresses the purpose of the interviews, how subjects 
were selected, how the interviews were conducted, and how they were analyzed.  
While much research effort was focused on elite interviews, these interviews 
were, in the end, of limited utility to the study.  Rather, the data from parliamentary 
transcripts, manifestos and survey analysis contributed a great deal more than 
anticipated to the final research.  Accordingly, this section on interviews will outline 
the intended purpose of the interviews, then conclude with a brief discussion as to 
why the data collected from them is used relatively infrequently within the thesis.
Selection 
 The interviews in the North East took place in the 2005/2006 academic year. 
Regional political elites operating at the regional, state and European level were 
interviewed to gain insight into their perspective of the North East and its place in 
England.  The respondents were selected initially by their public involvement in the 
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devolution debates in the North East.  Enquiries were made to those active in the 
region, and to the head of the ESRC’s Devolution and Constitutional Change 
Program, Prof. Charlie Jeffery, in order to identify prominent and likely interviewees. 
The initial response was very positive amongst the ‘Yes’ campaign, the Liberal 
Democrats, and campaigners with academic backgrounds.  It was much more difficult 
to meet with either Labour politicians or ‘No’ campaigners.  Neil Herron, the chair of 
the unofficial ‘No’ campaign,15 was a very prominent exception.  It should be noted 
that many of the actors in the official ‘No’ campaign were from outside of the North 
East.  For example, the director and administrative support for the ‘No’ campaign was 
provided by the London based New Frontiers Foundation (Sandford and Hetherington 
2005: 96).  
In Nova Scotia, interviews were conducted during the summer of 2006.  The 
summer was chosen as both the federal and provincial legislatures would be in recess, 
and federal politicians would be working in the province, not Ottawa.  It was not 
possible to predict that the Nova Scotia Premier would call a snap election to be held 
three weeks prior to the researcher’s arrival.  This made arranging interviews with 
Nova Scotia Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) very difficult, but on the 
ground they were very accommodating.  In Nova Scotia, politicians from every party 
were more than willing to participate in this study, but due to the researcher being 
resident in Halifax, an NDP stronghold, interviewing NDP members was made easier. 
One particular day, for example, four NDP members were interviewed in Halifax, 
while interviewing a rural Conservative member required a full day trip.  As such, the 
NDP were over-represented in the interview sample, but this was in no way due to 
unwillingness to participate on the part of the provincial Conservatives or Liberals, or 
15 There were two ‘no’ campaigns in the North East, the official one headed by Sir 
John Elliot and the unofficial one headed by Neil Herron.  As Mr. Herron’s group 
was the longest running anti-devolution organization in the region, predating the 
referendum and the official ‘No’ campaign for years, many members of the yes side 
seemed to feel that he had more of an impact than the official ‘no’ side, putting a 
personable and local face to the campaign.
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Members of Parliament of the NDP or Conservative Party of Canada.  Liberal MPs, 
though, did seem unwilling to participate.16
In both regions academics were interviewed for two reasons.  Firstly, 
academics interested in the kinds of research questions being asked in this project will 
inevitably be involved in the political processes of the regions in some way. 
Secondly, interviewing academics increased the snowball effect, whereby they were 
able to direct me to other interviewees in their network and additional documentary 
data.  The Department of Political Science at Dalhousie University was most helpful 
in this research, from the number of individual members willing to speak on these 
issues, to the Department sponsoring the researcher during his time in Halifax and 
granting access to university resources.
The end result was an interview pool that reflected political and demographic 
diversity, as far as the small numbers of interviewees would allow with the Liberal 
Democrats in the North East and New Democratic Party in Nova Scotia being over-
represented.17  Figure 3.1 lists the types and numbers of respondents from each 
region. While this may be a small pool of regional political elites to draw upon 
(especially in the North East), as Goldstein notes, even if one is unable to get a 
representative sample of elites, those conducting elite interviews will still know a 
great deal about them and their views (Goldstein 2002: 671-672).  
Figure 3.1    
Type of respondent Nova Scotia North East
Category 1 3 1
Category 2 3 3
Category 3 8 3
Category 4 8 5
Total  22 12
Source: Author’s interview pool
16 The author suspects that this may have to do with the Liberals having lost the 
federal election in January of that year, ending 13 consecutive years of Liberal 
government in Canada.
17 These parties may have been more willing to participate as they  both experienced 
recent success in the regions, rely on student votes, and, as third parties, receive less 
academic attention than other parties.
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As shown in Figure 3.1, there were four categories of interviewees.  As the 
political structures in the regions were so different, direct comparisons of actors were 
not possible.  Instead, each of the four categories represents a similar ‘type’ of 
respondent.  Category 1 represents those with a ‘regional’ mandate.  In Nova Scotia 
they included current and former provincial Ministers and a former Speaker of the 
Nova Scotia House of Assembly, in the North East a local councillor who was a 
former deputy leader of the unelected Regional Assembly made up the category. 
Category 2 represents those with responsibilities that straddled the local and regional. 
This included MLAs in Nova Scotia, as they are responsible to both their constituents 
as well as the province as a whole; in the North East it included local 
councillors/council leaders who were active at a regional level or in the devolution 
campaign.  Category 3 represents MPs from Nova Scotia and the North East, as well 
as a North East Member of the European Parliament: representatives from the region 
but whose mandate stretched from the local to the state or beyond.  Category 4 
encompasses party activists, regional/political campaigners, academics, and a public 
servant in the Nova Scotia ministry of intergovernmental relations.  These were 
clustered together due to the sizable overlap between the academics and political 
activists in both regions.  A total of 36 semi-structured interviews were conducted, 
with Nova Scotians appearing more willing to participate in the interviews than those 
from the North East, resulting in nearly twice as many Nova Scotian interviews.  
Method 
 The semi-structured format of the interviews allowed respondents to discuss 
issues of importance to them.  As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 675) humorously 
state, “people find talking about themselves about as fascinating as any subject they 
know”.  This strategy allowed respondents to ‘open up’ and discuss the place of their 
region and nation in their own words.  It was determined that allowing respondents to 
discuss issues they felt comfortable with would encourage openness, and respondents 
would continue to speak freely when the questions became more directly relevant to 
the research.  Additionally, Oppenheim remarks that interviewers need to be prepared 
for the respondent to start to open up with more information once the interview is 
‘officially over’ (1992: 75).  This advice was heeded and some of the most 
103
enlightening information obtained occurred when one interviewee gave the researcher 
a tour of the council building after the interview.  
Being prepared means not only getting the most out of the interview, but also 
establishing credibility for future interviews (Goldstein 2002: 671).  This was 
extremely important with regard to the open-ended interviews conducted.  Engaging 
with the respondents required a high level of familiarity with the issues facing the 
North East and Nova Scotia.  The interviewer must neither intimidate the interviewee 
nor “appear dim” (Leech 2002: 665).  Also, as the interviews were also used to gain 
access to other respondents, it was clear that without a high degree of familiarity with 
the region, respondents would not forward the interviewer to other contacts.
As the respondents were well placed elites, all intimately knowledgeable 
about regional concerns, it was imperative that the researcher have as thorough a 
grounding in the politics of the region as possible to avoid the situation described 
below;
The danger here is that—especially when dealing with highly educated, highly 
placed respondents—they will feel that they are wasting their time with an 
idiot, or at least will dumb down their answers and subject the interviewer to a 
Politics 101 lecture. (Leech 2002: 665)
Leech also states, “what you already know is as important as what you want to 
know.” (2002: 665), which highlights the importance of a clear understanding of what 
questions needed to be asked (Oppenheim 1992: 100).  After conducting the 
secondary research and beginning the primary research, it quickly became clear that 
the interviews should be done in as open-ended a manner as possible to gain insight 
into the views of regional actors and improve the conceptualization of the work 
(Leech 2002: 665, Oppenheim 1992: 67-70).  
Analysis  
Antaki et al. (2003: 2-4) note that one cannot simply summarize elite 
interviews or compile interesting quotes; one has to actually analyze them and hold 
them to theory.  But deciding how to analyze the interviews depends upon the reasons 
for conducting them.  Much like the documentary sources were analyzed for the 
purpose of examining key themes, so too were elite interviews.  As elites were 
104
queried from the perspective of their own agendas to encourage maximum flow of 
information, it made direct comparisons between elites difficult.  Since these 
interviews were used to inform this work, they were analyzed with the aim of 
‘fleshing out’ the earlier examination of documents to build an impression of elite 
views and to gain insider knowledge of the political process.  This was done in a 
similar manner to the documentary analysis: the interviews were broken down into 
bundles and the bundles were then grouped together thematically to help build a 
picture of overall elite opinion within the region.  Yet in doing this, it was discovered 
that the data collected from interviewees was much less robust and filled in less gaps 
in the other literature than was hoped for.  While some of the findings were extremely 
interesting (especially the emphasis on Acadian culture in Nova Scotia), the majority 
of the data gleaned from the interviews reinforced data collected by other means, 
rather than contributing to the pool of data.  Of course, this was not surprising given 
point made by Goldstein (2002: 671-672), that much of elite opinion is already 
publicly available. 
Survey Data
As Henderson notes (2004: 602), individuals do not possess political culture, 
regional variants or sub-cultures, theypossess attitudes which “allow us to examine 
what the dominant political culture might look like.”  Accordingly, to test for 
territorial identities, survey data must be examined.  Survey data, by its very nature is 
quantitative while the other sources used are qualitative.  Though the statistics were 
compiled by the institutions conducting the surveys (each with their own agendas), 
they were ultimately generated by the masses as measures of public opinion.  
Initially six survey sets were used to collect data.  In Canada, the Canadian 
Election Studies (CES) (including the 1992 Referendum study), the quarterly 
Environics Focus Canada (EFC) survey, and the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) were 
used.  In Britain, the British Election Surveys (BES) and the annual British Social 
Attitudes Survey (BSA) and the one time Regional Referendum Study (2005) were 
employed.  While the British surveys and the CES and EFC were easily accessible, 
the EDS is a restricted Statistic Canada survey, and access to it required a peer 
reviewed application through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
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of Canada.  While confirming the high level of belonging Canadians feel for both 
Canada and their provinces, the EDS became unavailable for this project as Statistics 
Canada regulations state that one cannot use data if the unweighted data from a single 
cell is less than 10.  In recreating the Moreno table as per the logic of Henderson 
(2007), cells with no sense of belonging towards either Canada or the province fell 
below 10. For entirely different reasons, the BES was not used as the BSA, a yearly 
survey was deemed a better source to examine questions over time.
These surveys allowed a broad range of questions to be examined (far more 
than appear in this work), but presented unique challenges in overcoming the low 
number of respondents in Nova Scotia and the North East of England.  Where 
possible, the data has been presented over time, to demonstrate that the overall 
patterns are consistent, even if the numbers are low.  Otherwise, the different years 
have been grouped together to produce a larger ‘n’ value, the number of respondents, 
for the data.  Neither method is perfect, but both approximate a much larger ‘n’ value 
than what was available in the regions.  These methods, combined with the fact that 
the surveys were weighted differently and for issues that were not examined in this 
project, meant that it was determined that unweighted data would be used.  While this 
is not the norm in statistical analysis, it was felt that the benefits of using unweighted 
data outweighed the negative consequences. 
Chapter Seven analyzes the survey data, and as such discussion of the finer 
points used in the analysis of this data will be held in that chapter, merely overviewed 
here.  The two focuses of survey analysis in this thesis were 1) to gain an 
understanding of how the masses interpret their identities and place within the state; 
and, 2) triangulating against the analysis of elite debate to determine if and how elite 
discussion resonates with the masses.  These were achieved through simple cross 
tabulations and correlations to test the strength of regional identity against that of 
national identity in Nova Scotia and Canada (outside Quebec) and the North East and 
England/Britain.  This provided a starting point in understanding whether a difference 
in attitude exists between the regions and their co-nationals.  Once this was 
established, the data was used to examine constitutional preferences in the regions, 
levels of political efficacy, and overall faith in the system.  This was cross tabulated 
and correlated where possible to levels of regional identity and regional attachment.  
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It must be noted that relative strength of attachment is not comparable 
between regions in different states; it is only comparable with regard to co-nationals. 
The numbers only indicate that Nova Scotia has a higher degree of provincial 
attachment than the rest of Canada (outside Quebec).  This data is not sufficient to 
judge if Nova Scotians are more or less attached to the region than respondents in the 
North East.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the methodological focus of this study and the 
research design: a comparative qualitative examination of elite debate triangulated 
with an analysis of survey data designed to approximate scientific experimentation 
using the Most Similar Systems Design.  Within the qualitative examination three 
sources of data were used to triangulate the findings and elite interviews offered 
depth to the research while minimizing the problems associated with qualitative 
work.  This chapter has examined literature surrounding the comparative approach 
taken to highlight its strengths and demonstrate knowledge of and strategies for 
dealing with its weaknesses.
Building upon the examination of bounded networks, in order to test the 
hypotheses, this chapter demonstrated the logic of undertaking a two case 
comparative work.  By isolating and controlling as many variables as possible, this 
project is able to test the impact of regional democracy on regionalism.  The 
hypotheses and research questions imply a series of complex relationships between 
the state and the sub-state nations, amongst the sub-state nations (both minority and 
majority) and between the nations and the regions.  This chapter also discussed issues 
surrounding the data used outlining not only the data sources, but the challenges of 
each source and how these challenges were overcome.  By doing the above, this 
chapter demonstrated how regionalism in Nova Scotia and the North East can be 
tested and prepares the reader for the next chapter, which contextualizes the two 
cases.
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Chapter Four: Canada and Britain Compared
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two suggested a balance has to be achieved amongst the constituent 
elements in a multinational state in order to avoid friction.  Chapter Three outlined 
the need for a ‘Weberian’ strategy (Keat and Urry 1982: 145), which requires a 
thorough examination of the background of the cases.  This chapter examines how 
elites have historically attempted to achieve balance by delving into the history of 
Canada and Britain, beginning with an examination of the British North America Act 
(1867)18 and the Treaty of Union (1707).  These events represent a critical juncture in 
the development of the Canadian and British states.  The BNA Act and the Treaty of 
Union not only allowed for the creation of new states out of old ones, it set the 
trajectories of the constituent nations/colonies in markedly different directions than in 
the past.  Compromise and debate led to the creation, and guided the evolution, of 
both Canada and Britain, in turn allowing for differentiated citizenship within their 
constituent nations.  A discussion on Scottish and Quebecois nationalism shows how 
these minority nations responded to changes in the state structures.  This chapter 
rounds off with a discussion of regional politics in Canada and Britain.  It examines 
regional politics within Nova Scotia and North East England and highlights the 
regional identities that exist in England and Canada (outside Quebec), and their 
political outlets.  Canadian provinces are established political actors in their own 
right, while in Britain regions were the focus of constitutional discussion, as such 
‘region’ is entwined throughout Canadian debates but needs to be teased out much 
more than in Britain where regions are the focus of debate.
18 While the technical name of the Act is now (post 1982) the Constitution Act (1867) 
for the purposes of this thesis the term British North America Act (1867) will be used 
to demonstrate the mindset of the framers of the Act and the political elites in Canada 
at the time.
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4.2 The Changing State in Britain and Canada
Canada and Britain were created by the merger of pre-existing political units 
is apparent from any cursory examination of their histories, yet this is sometimes 
overlooked when examining these two states in the modern era.  In North America 
the British North America Act (1867) was the culmination of negotiations between, 
and the Confederation of, three British colonies: the United Province of Canada 
(which became the provinces of Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick, creating the Dominion of Canada.  This was shortly followed by the 
membership of Prince Edward Island and British Columbia (the remaining British 
Colony, Newfoundland, did not join until after the Second World War, after it had 
existed as a separate Dominion).  The prairie provinces and Alberta were created by 
Act of the federal parliament from land purchased by Canada from the Hudson’s Bay 
Company.  The United Kingdom of Great Britain was created through the Union of 
The Kingdoms of Scotland and England in the Treaty of Union (1707) and was 
preceded by over 100 years of sharing the same monarch.  As Canada and Britain 
were created as mergers, this section outlines their ability to be flexible with regard to 
their constituent units.  
In Canada it has always been unclear if the contractual pact exists between 
four colonies or two peoples (Vipond 1995: 98-99), or indeed, two people in four 
colonies.19  In Quebec, Confederation is seen as a compact between two different 
nations, the French Canadian (now the Quebecois) nation and the English Canadian 
nation, which was very British in orientation.  In other parts of Canada it is seen as a 
compact between provinces.  Thomas (1997) argues that differing views of Compact 
Theory are the result of an intentional misunderstanding in the BNA Act (1867).  He 
argues that the Fathers of Confederation tacitly agreed not to discuss fundamental 
19 Upper and Lower Canada existed as separate colonies until they were united to 
form the United Province of Canada in 1841, and in turn this colony was split in two 
to form the basis of Ontario and Quebec in 1867.  Accordingly, one could argue that 
three or four provinces formed Canada, depending on whether one views the province 
of Canada as one or two colonies.
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questions on the nature of the state for the sake of reaching agreement.  This 
sidestepping is apparent in that it was not until after Confederation that debates 
surrounding the nature of the state began (McRoberts 1997).  In addition, as 
Canadians were British in 1867, and as the BNA Act (1867) was an act of the British 
Parliament, such debate may have seemed illogical.
The BNA Act (1867) created a federal system in which political power was 
divided between the provinces and the federal government, ensuring the survival of 
mid-level or sub-state elites and their corresponding political networks.  The Treaty 
of Union (1707) did not divide power between levels of government in the newly 
created British state, but neither did it wipe out a complete level of elites in Scotland 
as it left many aspects of Scottish social life outside politics.  While allowing a 
Scottish (as opposed to British) civil society to flourish north of the border (Greer 
2007, Morton 1999), political sovereignty was to begin and end at the parliament in 
London.  The concept of parliamentary supremacy was an English, not Scottish, 
constitutional practice, and the maintenance of English constitutional practice in 
Britain has ensured that parliamentary supremacy cannot be challenged.  England has 
historically been governed through a centralized legislature, but with devolved 
administration to parish, borough and shire counties as well as the cities (Royle 1998: 
9).  Accordingly, not all political decisions are made in Westminster; decisions that 
most impact people’s lives in a visible manner (for example, garbage collection or the 
location of schools) are taken outside Parliament.  Regardless, the appearance of all 
politics beginning and ending at Westminster may have been a powerful force in 
socializing the English as to how Britain should be governed.
Mitchell (2002: 758) notes that by the late 20th Century, the administration of 
Britain was unusual in that it was largely divided along functional lines in England, 
but with a territorial aspect in the rest of Britain: the Scottish, Northern Ireland, and 
Welsh Offices.  In the 1960s and 1970s Labour introduced regional planning 
structures (Tomaney 2002: 1), yet the first substantive, perhaps even constitutional, 
change that occurred in England was in 1994 when the Conservatives added a 
territorial dimension to the administration of the state in England with the GORs. 
While designed to coordinate government activity at a regional level, this was part of 
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a process of regionalization across the whole of Britain that began in the 1880s with 
the development of the Scottish Office and suggests British elites have historically 
been willing to “view government matters by the differential impact on geographical 
areas rather than purely functionally” (Mitchell 2002: 758).  
The agreement reached in 1707 was not one of assimilation or nation 
formation (although a British nation did emerge), it was about accommodation and 
incorporation (Nairn 2000: 132, Denver et al. 1997:13).  While Scotland lost many 
aspects of statehood, it kept some that were, and are, very important to national 
identity: the Kirk (Church of Scotland), the universities and education system, and the 
legal system which would form the basis of the policy spheres of the Scottish 
Parliament (Greer 2007).  Similarly in Canada, the BNA Act (1867) allowed Quebec 
to keep the institutions that it needed in order to survive and protect the French fact in 
North America.  In 1707 and 1867 two multinational states were created (or a pseudo 
state in the case of Canada) and structured in such a way that the identities of their 
constituent nations could be maintained.
Choudhry (2007), notes that constitutions can serve both to accommodate and 
integrate, dividing power between different orders of government (or in the case of 
Britain, through institutional autonomy for Scotland) and strengthening the state by 
allowing territorial distinction, ensuring that the constitutional order will not break 
easily under stress.  Prior to the First World War, the Canadian and British 
governments did not become involved in the daily lives of the citizenry; this enabled 
the state to avoid fundamental issues of ‘who we are.’  But by the end of the Second 
World War central policy would leave little choice but to force these kinds of 
questions upon the citizenry.  Both the war effort and the state’s undertakings 
required appeals to national solidarity (Belanger and Lecours 2008).  The First and 
Second World Wars divided Canadians along linguistic lines while in Britain it united 
the nations of Britain (this work will not touch upon Ireland and the First World 
War).  Although the creation of the welfare state was successful in British state-
building, replacing the Empire as the uniting force after the Second World War, 
welfare state-building was an affront to provincial rights in Canada.  Accordingly, 
Quebec has opted out of many programs when given the opportunity to do so, most 
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notably the Canada Pension Plan (see Simeon 2006a), making Quebec the only sub-
state jurisdiction in the world to run its own universal pension plan (Greer 2007).  
As the state began making greater demands of the citizenry, elites within the 
constituent nations (majority and minority) began making more demands of the state. 
As argued earlier, a lack of balance opens identity ‘fault lines.’  By the 1990s, 
Scottish and Quebecois nationalism were powerful political forces, and regionalism 
in both countries was on the rise (especially in Western Canada).  Elites within the 
dominant nations advanced their agendas, running counter to the interpretations held 
by elites in the minority nations and threatening the balance in both states.  Yet 
somehow balance appears to have been maintained.  It is remarkable that both 
Canada and Britain have such flexible state structures while maintaining myths of 
uniformity (at least until devolution in Scotland).  This section now examines this 
flexibility in the Canadian and British contexts, to reveal how these states deal with 
their multination makeup.  
Canada: The Changing Nature of Federalism
Differentiated citizenship in Canada exists along different axes: a religious 
axis in Ontario with regard to the constitutional privileges of Roman Catholic 
education; ethno-cultural axis, such as the place of Aboriginals in Canada; or even 
historical-territorial axis, one of the most remarkable being the equality between 
Prince Edward Island and Ontario in certain constitutional and non constitutional 
milieus.  Differentiated citizenship does not only exist along territorial axes, but 
territorial lines provide the most visible differences in a citizen’s relationship with the 
state.  This section focuses on ways in which the Canadian state is able to adapt to 
meet the needs and aspirations of both Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec) and the 
limits of adaptation by focusing on three key events.
The first significant event is constitutional reform. In Canada, the 1990s began 
during a period of mega-constitutional negotiations (to use Russell’s (1993) term). 
While these negotiations were not successful, they suggest Canadian elites were 
willing to amend the basic framework of the Canadian state to balance different 
interpretations of the state.  The second is the 1995 referendum in Quebec, which 
showed how Canadians (outside Quebec) were actively involved in the referendum, 
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both as individuals and as a wider society.  It also addresses the consequences of such 
a narrow vote, which left Quebec’s place and the nature of Canada in question.  The 
third event is ‘Plan B,’ in which the government attempted to placate soft Quebecois 
nationalists while placing procedural roadblocks in front of Quebec secession.  It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to explain each of these events in detail, instead they 
are presented to illustrate the adaptability of the Canadian state and the interaction 
between Canada (outside Quebec) and Quebec in the changing the political 
environment.
Constitutional Reform
While constitutional reform has always been a major issue in Canadian 
politics (see Russell 1993), the 1980s was arguably the decade that witnessed the 
greatest debate around the Constitution.  The decade began with the patriation of the 
Constitution from Britain and included a Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  This was a 
major break in Canadian constitutional practice, moving Canada from a British style 
parliamentary system in which parliaments are sovereign in their jurisdictions to an 
American style system in which judicial overview is expanded from questions of 
division of power to a rights based redress.  This led to a rights-based conception of 
citizenship in Canada (outside Quebec) in which (English) Canadians felt a sense of 
ownership over the Constitution (McRoberts 1997, Cairns 1995, 1993).
Given that Quebec agreed to neither the amending formula nor the Charter, 
Quebecois elites felt the province was ‘left out’ of the Canadian Constitution.  Yet 
while constitutional negotiations during this period focused on Quebec’s place in the 
federation, new concepts of citizenship had evolved in Canada (outside Quebec). 
Whether due to the Charter itself (Cairns 1995, 1993, 1991, McRoberts 1997), or 
social trends that the Charter was a part of (Nevitte 1996, Brodie and Nevitte 1993), 
as debates unfolded ‘third force’ (non-British and non-French ancestored) Canadians 
asserted their status (Resnick 1994: 69).  Canada ceased to be a country in which 
‘French’ and ‘British’ were the sole constituent peoples; everyone, regardless of 
origin, was to be equally Canadian.  This ran counter to Quebec’s (perhaps self-
appointed) role as protector of the French fact in North America, and a series of 
constitutional negotiations ensued. 
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          The Meech Lake Accord was the initial constitutional settlement of these 
negotiations, and while agreed to by the Premiers of all ten provinces and the federal 
government, it failed to pass in all ten provincial legislatures.  This was soon 
followed by the Charlottetown Accord, which had near unanimous elite agreement 
but was defeated in the Referendum of 1992.  Whereas Meech Lake was an exercise 
in elite accommodation, the Charlottetown Accord attempted to bring Canadians into 
the process of constitutional reform through a national referendum.  While the 
essence of constitutional debates in Canada did not change, as attempting (and 
failing) to come to a constitutional consensus is a time honoured Canadian tradition, 
Charlottetown broke from traditional methods of constitutional reform in Canada. 
The debates were elite, but for the first time the people had a veto through a 
referendum
This opening of constitutional debates had two intertwined ramifications that 
need to be kept in mind.  First, by engaging the people it reaffirmed the sovereignty 
the people of Canada have over the Constitution.  The referendum was the genesis of 
laws in Alberta and Quebec prohibiting their governments from ratifying 
constitutional amendments without popular approval in a referendum.  Second, while 
legally the Constitution does not need to be approved by the people of Canada, it may 
not be possible to return to the practice of elite accommodation as the ‘political class’ 
in Canada ceded ownership of the Constitution to the people.  The referendum 
indicated a shift in the expectations of how democracy and constitutional change 
should take place; no longer would eleven white men drive constitutional change. 
Canada shifted from a representative and deliberative form of constitutional reform, 
in which elected Members act as the representatives of a sovereign people, to the 
sovereign people becoming directly involved in the process.  In doing so, it allowed 
different conceptions of the people to be brought forward.  This shift has meant that 
certain options for coming to constitutional agreement are no longer politically viable 
in Canada, further solidifying the constitutional regime and providing roadblocks to 
constitutional change.  This constitutional evolution in Canada may indicate that 
substantive formal constitutional change is highly unlikely (Stein 1997: 308), perhaps 
impossible outside of an extreme situation, such as a province seceding.
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Referendum of 1995
In October 1995, the people of Quebec were, for the second time in 15 years, 
asked if they wished to become independent.20  In 1980 there was a solid majority 
vote in favour of remaining in Canada, yet in 1995 the ‘non’ (pro-Canada) vote won 
by only the slightest of margins.  Though the referendum of 1995 was a Quebec 
initiative that did not change the constitutional order directly, it was a flash point in 
which identities in Canada were politicized and it had long term constitutional 
significance.
During the Quebec election of 1994, PQ leader Jacques Parizeau promised to 
have a referendum within the first year of his mandate and in the face of unfavourable 
polling he kept his promise (Clark and Kronberg 1996: 678).  As it appeared early on 
that the secessionists were trailing the ‘non’ vote, the Canadian government adopted a 
“strict silence” strategy, which appeared to have been accepted by the majority of the 
population of Canada (outside Quebec) (Walters 1999: 372, Clark and Kronberg 
1996: 677).  At the beginning of the referendum campaign, support for the ‘yes’ 
campaign was well below the 50% mark, but when popular leader of the Bloc 
Québecois, Lucien Bouchard, entered the campaign he raised the fortunes of the 
separatist campaign markedly (Clark and Kronberg 1996: 680).  The fact that 
Chrétien was a signatory to the 1982 Constitution meant that the Quebecois may not 
have trusted anything offered by him (Clark and Kronberg 1996: 677), as this was 
what Trudeau had done during the previous referendum which left Quebec’s elites 
feeling betrayed.  This left the defence of Canada to Quebecois federalists who 
emphasized economic, rather than emotional, philosophical, or moral reasons for 
Confederation.  In turn secessionists were able to portray Canada (outside Quebec) as 
materially driven, willing to cut a deal with a new and independent Quebec (Stairs 
1996: 6-7).  Support for the ‘yes’ vote began to rise. The mood in the federal 
government and Canada (outside Quebec) began to change as the reality of a 
secessionist victory drew closer.  This culminated with the image that many people 
20 It should be noted that while technically the wording of both referenda was not 
about separation, according to Whitaker (1995: 195) the Quebec referendum of 1980 
muddied the waters as to what the question was to the point that one has to assume 
that “yes” meant independence. A similar logic would apply to the equally complex 
referendum question in 1995.
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have of the Referendum, of 100 000 Canadians from across Canada flying a giant 
Canada flag and descending on Quebec to demonstrate their love of the province. 
While the effectiveness of the rally may be difficult to determine, it indicated the 
level of interest of Canadians (outside Quebec) and was accompanied by other such 
‘love ins’ throughout the federation.  And though a clear majority by either side may 
have ended the debate (or the Canadian state as it is currently constituted), the 
narrowness of the ‘non’ victory by the federalists, less than 51%, meant that the 
constitutional place of Quebec remained unresolved (Stein 1997: 309) and the 
constitutional order in Canada has remained politicized.  
It should be noted that a certain amount of confusion may have surrounded the 
demands of the those who supported ‘yes’ in 1995.  ‘Sovereignty’ appears to be an 
unclear concept in Quebec.  Numerous polls during the referendum showed that 20-
35% of Yes voters felt a sovereign Quebec would still be part of Canada (Dion 2001: 
4).  Polling in 1994 indicated that with regard to a sovereign Quebec, 27% of 
Quebecois thought they would continue to pay Canadian taxes, 27% thought that they 
would send MPs to Ottawa and 42% thought they would still be part of Canada 
(Howe 1998 in Fletcher 1998: 7).  
That the referendum of 1995 was the second referendum in a generation in 
Quebec may seem to trivialize the referendum process, with continual referendums 
being held until the desired result is achieved (Jaques 2001: 41).  However, the reality 
is much more complicated.  People in Quebec may have felt betrayed by the actions 
of the federal government after the 1981 referendum, as Trudeau promised 
Quebeckers that a new deal would be made if they chose Canada, but the deal he 
forced on Quebec completely undermined Quebec’s traditional position within the 
Canadian constitutional order.  Between the 1980 and 1995 referenda, Quebec 
experienced what many Quebecois thought of as the “illegitimate patriation of the 
constitution, the imposition of a new constitutional order, the failure of the Meech 
Lake Accord and the failure of the Charlottetown Accord” (Seymour 2000: 249). 
While Canada (outside Quebec) may not attempt to dominate Quebec, from Quebec’s 
perspective, the new constitutional regime could be seen as an expression of majority 
nationalism.  While a surface reading of the process leading to the 1995 referendum 
may appear to trivialize referendums by the sovereigntists continually holding them 
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until they win, 1995 can be interpreted as Quebec’s people having a say on the 
imposed constitutional order.  
Even though Quebec is the most powerful sub-state government in the world21 
(Dion 1996: 179), nationalist elites felt that the only way for the Quebec national 
project to succeed was through the creation of an independent state. Even though 
constitutions can balance integration and accommodation, it appears to many in 
Quebec that the failure of Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec) to reach a consensus 
on Quebec’s place within Canada meant the necessary balance could not be found.  
From the perspective of the Canadian state, the referendum tested Canada’s 
pluralism and tolerance, determining if Canada would be tolerant of the rejection of 
itself.  It appears that the answer was ‘yes’ (Stairs 1996: 9).  Instead of decrying the 
legitimacy of the event, Canadians (from outside Quebec) participated in it, giving 
implicit recognition of the right of Quebec to form its own independent country.  This 
right became a part of the Constitution when it was recognized by the Supreme Court 
in the 1998 Reference re Secession of Quebec and in turn given life in the federal 
Clarity Act.  In this sense, although the referendum did not alter the Constitution of 
Canada, it did lead to a clarification of the constitutional rights of provinces to leave 
the federation.
With regard to this study, the importance of the 1995 referendum was not the 
referendum itself, but rather how Quebec was able to influence statewide debate to 
bring about constitutional change.  It also demonstrated how the people of Canada 
(outside Quebec), who initially adopted the government’s strategy of silence, became 
engaged with the process.  This not only legitimized the referendum, it provided 
statewide and regional elites the opportunity to advance their interpretations of the 
state, as seen in ‘Plan B’ below.
21 While other sub-state jurisdictions may have more legislative power (for example, 
Scotland or American states), the power of the Quebec National Assembly is buoyed 
by its taxing powers, administrative powers, population size relative to the rest of 




Although the events that followed the 1995 referendum did not formally alter 
the Canadian Constitution they need to be considered in the context of a wider 
understanding of constitutions to understand their significance.  As outlined by Dyck 
(1993), the Canadian Constitution is not a single codified document, but the 
collection of a number of different laws, decrees and traditions. As stated by the 
Supreme Court in the Reference re Secession of Quebec: 
The Constitution is more than a written text.  It embraces the entire global 
system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional 
authority.  A superficial reading of selected provisions of the written 
constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading.  It is necessary to 
make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles animating 
the whole of the Constitution, including the principles of federalism, 
democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities.  
Those principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional 
rights and obligations that would come into play in the event that a clear 
majority of Quebecers votes on a clear question in favour of secession. 
(Supreme Court 1998).  
The Canadian Constitution includes the British North America Act (1867), now 
called the Constitution Act (1867), the amendments to that Act (including the 1982 
amendments and beyond) and the collection of British statues and orders-in-council 
that are of constitutional significance (for example, the orders-in-council that created 
the provinces of British Columbia. and Prince Edward Island and that added the 
North West Territories).  Dyck also includes Canadian statutes, such as the Manitoba 
Act of 1870 and the Saskatchewan and Alberta Acts of 1905, the Supreme Court Act 
and the Supreme Court rulings on the Constitution, as well as non-codified 
conventions (Dyck 1993: 331-332).  The Reference re Quebec Secession clearly falls 
into this understanding of the Constitution.  Accordingly, the reforms that were 
included in Plan B need to be understood in this wider constitutional context.  Three 
that are exceptionally pertinent for this study are the Reference itself, the Clarity Act, 
and the Regional Veto Act.  In addition, the province-led Calgary Declaration needs 
to be discussed.  
In 1998 the federal government asked the Supreme Court to rule on the 
legality of Quebec declaring its independence.  The reference was claimed as a 
victory by all sides.  It recognized that sovereignty rested in the people of both 
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Canada and the provinces, with neither being more legitimate than the other.  While 
provinces do not have an explicit legal right to leave Canada, if a province did clearly 
express the will to become an independent state, the other provinces would have an 
obligation to negotiate that province out of the federation.  The Court ensured that 
this would remain a political, as opposed to legal, issue by stating that what was a 
clear majority on a clear question was up to politicians, not the Court, to decide.
The federal government responded with the Clarity Act.  While not dictating 
the wording of the question, it stated the Government of Canada would only 
recognize a ‘yes’ result of a referendum in which a clear majority voted on a clear 
question of independence. 22  This set the bar higher than 50%+1 without stating what 
would be acceptable.  Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) argue that this Act is both 
undemocratic and misleading.  They believe that the referendum question of 1995 
was clearer than a ‘Do you want Quebec to be independent?’ question, as the latter 
(do you want Quebec to be independent) deals in the abstract while the former dealt 
with the situation on the ground.  Stairs (1996) notes the federal government 
represents all of Canada and cannot speak for any one group of provinces.  As such, 
the federal government can only negotiate a break on a clear question of complete 
independence, and does not have the authority or legitimacy to do anything else, as 
implied in 1995.
The Regional Veto Act established by Act what the Quebec government had 
failed to secure through constitutional amendment, a constitutional veto.  This Act 
gave each ‘region’ a veto over constitutional reform by prohibiting Cabinet Ministers 
from introducing constitutional amendments that did not have the approval of each of 
the five regions (B.C, the West, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada).  Yet as this 
was not constitutional, it lacked the symbolic force of constitutional ‘recognition’ that 
Quebec sought.  The Act created a hierarchy of provinces and although Quebec was 
treated as one of the top tier of provinces, it was treated as just another Canadian 
region.
22 The wording of the 1995 question was “Do you agree that Québec should become 
sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and 
political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and 
of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”
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          While the federal government was taking a combative approach to Quebecois 
nationalism, the provinces moved towards accommodating Quebec with the Calgary 
Declaration (Seymour 2000: 11).23  According to the Ontario Government Legislative 
Library; 
Disgruntled with the federal government’s strategy in the 1995 Quebec 
referendum, but wanting to demonstrate good will to Quebeckers on their own 
behalf, Canada’s premiers and territorial leaders—except for Quebec Premier 
Lucien Bouchard—met in Calgary on 13 September 1997 to set out some 
broad principles for constitutional reform. After a full day’s meeting, the 
Premiers and territorial leaders released the Framework for Discussion on 
Canadian Unity (Glenn 1998). 
While not part of the federal government’s strategy, the Calgary Declaration is 
important here as it may be the only time a clear Canada (outside Quebec) position 
has been articulated.  It demonstrates how constitutional debates surrounding 
Quebec’s place can ‘spill over’ into Canada (outside Quebec), allowing regional 
actors to articulate their views of the Canadian state.  The Calgary Declaration was 
about Quebec and the nature of the Canadian state; it was issued by the other nine 
provinces and passed in their legislatures, “often with considerable fanfare” 
(Courchene 2004: 10).  In Nova Scotia the Declaration led to the creation of the 
Special Select Committee on National Unity which criss-crossed the province, 
engaging the population.  The resulting motion supporting the principles of the 
Calgary Declaration in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly was passed unanimously 
(Nova Scotia: 9 June 1998). 
Constitutional negotiation, the Quebec Referendum of 1995 and ‘Plan B’ have 
all shown that the Canadian state, while based upon a constitutionally enshrined 
framework, is flexible and capable of adaptation.  The events outlined above suggest 
that the idea of ‘Canada’ is constantly up for debate and that during the 1990s the 
political environment was altered in such a manner that actors from regions within 
Canada (outside Quebec) could articulate their views on the nature of Canada.  While 
none of the above deals with the place of regions directly, given the fact that in 
Canadian federalism each of the provinces is a constitutional actor, as will be seen in 
23 The seven points of the Calgary Declaration can be found at 
www.exec.gov.nl.ca/currentevents/unity/unityr1.htm
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Chapters Five through Seven, these debates allowed regional actors with regional 
mandates the opportunity to advance their regions concerns
Britain: A Union in Transition
To understand Britain’s flexibility in dealing with challenges to the state three 
important political events will be examined.  The first is devolution in Scotland, 
where wholesale political decision making was ceded from Westminster to the 
Scottish Parliament.  The second is the creation of administrative structures at the 
regional level in England.  The central state vested a great deal of administrative 
capability in GORs, RDAs, and RC/RAs as part of the government’s attempt to find 
an answer to the so called ‘English Question.’  Lastly, the 2004 referendum in the 
North East is examined.  This was the final, and failed, attempt to alter the 
constitutional order vis-à-vis England in response to the ‘English Question.’  This 
examination provides an understanding of how the British state has changed over 
time to accommodate difference and how this has created problems in other parts of 
the state.  
Devolution in Scotland
The story of the referendums of 1997 will not be told here, for while they are 
major events in British and, more importantly, Scottish and Welsh history, it is what 
happened before and after them that is of importance here.  Historically, if Scotland 
and England produced similar electoral results political parties were able to govern 
without fundamental constitutional issues being a major concern. The regionalization 
and nationalization of politics has changed this.  McAllister (1997) demonstrates that 
by the end of the Conservative era, vote swings no longer followed statewide 
patterns.  Parties would simultaneously experience a rise in support in one area and a 
loss in another.  The Thatcher and Major era demonstrated how distinct Scottish 
politics had become from the rest of Britain (Kellas 1999: 221-3),24 and when 
24 This should not be interpreted, however, to mean that Scotland has historically 
shared a similar voting to pattern with England.  Scotland’s unique voting pattern vis-
à-vis the rest of Britain was evident as early as the 19th Century; the Conservatives 
won only eight out of 60 seats in 1870 and seven in 1880 (Kellas 1999: 227).  It was 
only with the splitting of the Unionists over the issue of Home Rule that Scotland 
developed a voting pattern more closely aligned to the British ‘norm.’ 
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Scotland began to consistently vote differently, the ‘doomsday scenario’ 
emerged.  This is when a governing party achieves a majority of seats in the House of 
Commons with little representation from Scotland (Denver et al. 2000:32-3).    
By the time Labour returned to power in 1997, the demand for some form of 
self-government in Scotland was too great to ignore, and Labour made it one of their 
election platforms.  Even the Scottish National Party, which had originally stayed out 
of the Scottish Constitutional Convention as it did not want “to be drawn into a 
devolutionist trap” (Mitchell 1996 in Greer 2007: 82-82), came onboard even though 
‘unionist’ defence mechanisms were built into the proposed system.25  While 
devolution had been promised without a referendum, Blair’s decision to hold the 
referendum ensured that there would be no question as to the legitimacy of the 
Scottish Parliament.  
While some argue that devolution was a fundamental change in the way the 
British state was governed (for example, Adams and Robinson 2002), Scottish 
distinctiveness has historically been catered to through machinery at both central and 
local levels with distinct policies (Denver et al. 2000: 13), as well as autonomy for 
distinct Scottish organizations (Greer 2007: Ch 3-4).  While these organizations were 
not democratic, Bond et al. (2003) demonstrate how unelected bodies are able to 
harness identity.  Greer (2007) argues that the drastic change was Thatcher’s 
challenge to the autonomy of Scottish institutions.  Accordingly, devolution was an 
attempt to reintroduce the stability and autonomy that the Conservatives had removed 
from Scotland.  Yet from a democratic and legitimizing viewpoint, it was radical in 
that the powers exercised at a territorial level in Scotland would be overseen and 
administered by people with a mandate solely for Scotland, and they would be visible 
in doing it, not cloaked by Westminster and Whitehall.
25 In 1997 Labour’s Scottish General Secretary and future First Minister of Scotland 
Jack McConnell stated that the German style Additional Member System was 
introduced to keep the SNP out of power (Bradbury and Mitchell 2001: 257).  There 
is a certain amount of irony that he in turn lost Scotland to the SNP in the 2007 
Scottish election.  
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Post devolution, a sense of disillusion gradually set in amongst the Scottish 
electorate as the parliament did not, indeed could not, live up to the extremely high 
expectations of the Scottish electorate (Denver 2003: 31).  A disconnect appeared 
between a liberal oriented Scottish establishment which assumed itself to be 
representative of Scottish opinion, and average Scots who voted predominantly for 
social democratic parties, but are actually conservative in orientation (Bradbury and 
Mitchel 2001: 269).  In addition, it is not clear if the new system is a first or second 
order system (see Jones 1999, McEwen 2003 and Paterson et al. 2001), calling into 
question whether politics is truly devolved in Scotland, or if British politics is merely 
being fought out at a Scottish level.  
The disillusionment with the Scottish Parliament is important as Scotland’s 
place within the Union and its relationship with Westminster has remained politicized 
instead of being resolved.  A term used to describe devolution is ‘settlement,’ which 
implies a static understanding of nation, state and constitution, yet these change and 
evolve over time.  Devolution not only failed to provide a definitive answer to the 
place of Scotland within the Union, the ‘Scottish Question,’ it opened up debate on 
the place of England within a devolved Britain—the English Question (Hazell 2006a 
and b).
Answering the English Question: Regional Institutions in England
For all the discussion and analysis of the impact that devolution had on 
Britain, as Curtice and Heath (2006: 1) note, devolution in Scotland and Wales only 
impacts 15% of the British population, making it easy to ignore in other parts of the 
British state (i.e. England).  This point is especially important here.  While Quebecois 
nationalism dominated Canadian politics, Scottish nationalism did not influence 
British politics in the same manner.  As Trench (2005) notes, the English Question is 
rarely asked and as Chapter Seven illustrates, the constitutional status quo is the 
preferred constitutional option in England.  Yet discussing England in this manner 
misses two key points.  First, while constitutional issues were of minor importance to 
English people in general, to some political elites they were fundamental.  Second, 
while constitutional issues may have been far from the minds of most English people, 
it appears that devolution in Scotland gained importance the further north one went in 
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England.  The relationship between geography and political preference is apparent. 
Curtice (2006: 123 see also Figure 7.15 in Chapter Seven ), shows that support for the 
status quo was slightly less in the North than in the South, but that while support for 
all-England devolution was on par with regional assemblies in the South East, support 
for regional assemblies was twice as high as all-England devolution in the North East. 
Indeed, the North as a whole favoured this option much more strongly than the South. 
The only divergence was the South West, home to Cornwall, and London, a city-
region where regional and civic identities may overlap.  As Curtice (2006) notes, the 
support for regional devolution in the North East, as opposed to some other sort of 
all-English solution, stems from the North East being isolated from the South East.  
In England devolution “is neither thought to be worthy of either emulation or 
envy” (Curtice and Heath 2006 4-7, Curtice 2006).  There is no indication that 
devolution leads to an urgent need for structural change in England (Sandford 2002: 
791).  While this may have led to elite discussion on the English Question, it was not 
something the electorate in England engaged with.  By the end of the Scottish 
Parliament’s second term in Holyrood, the Scottish Parliament (or more importantly 
the Labour dominated Executive) had yet to craft a set of politics that was 
substantively different from those of the British Parliament.  Perhaps it is not 
surprising that the reaction in England was not that strong or that British politics is 
still the dominant politics in Scotland.  This, however, does not mean that there was 
no reaction in England.  Devolution was not a stand-alone constitutional change; it 
was part of Labour’s larger package of constitutional reform, a package that included 
devolution to the English regions as well as to Scotland and Wales.  As such, 
devolution and constitutional change as a whole did impact upon the English.  
A problem associated with devolution in Scotland, and to a lesser extent 
Wales and Northern Ireland, has been the English Question.  According to Hazell 
(2006: 1), “the English Question is a portmanteau heading for a whole series of 
questions about the government of England.”  He argues that opinions vary about not 
only the answer to the question, but also the question itself.  The English Question, he 
claims, can be divided into the following groups of sub-questions: 
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1. England’s place within the Union.  Does England need to find its own 
separate political voice to rebalance the louder political voice accorded to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland?  Could this be supplied by an English 
parliament, English votes on English matters in the British Parliament, or 
independence for England?
2. Regional Devolution. Does England need devolution to break from 
dominance of Whitehall, either as an alternative or to supplement all-English 
devolution?  Should this come through elected regional assemblies, functional 
regionalism, stronger local government or elected mayors? 
3. The Status Quo.  Are English people happy with the current settlement, with 
no specific recognition and no share in devolution? (Hazell 2006a: 2, Hazell 
2006b: 38)
The first two points represent two different types of English Question.  The first deals 
with recognition of England in relation to devolution in Scotland and Wales.  The 
second builds upon recognition, but also deals with issues of governance, which 
would need to be dealt with regardless of devolution in the Celtic fringe (Hazell 
2006a: 4-8).  The third stems from the fact that the majority of English people may 
not be overly concerned with these constitutional issues.  It is interesting to note that 
the evidence presented by Curtice (2006, 2005) seems to point strongly towards the 
third option, yet this seems to have little resonance either politically or academically. 
Hazell (2006b: 41) outlines the support for the first and second questions. 
The first set of questions appears to be targeted by the Conservatives, the second by 
Labour.  The two major British political parties see the challenges of devolution 
along fundamentally different lines, corresponding to their competing interpretations 
of the state.  Labour has been in government for the duration of this question’s 
existence and pan-national solutions have been at the core of their constitutional 
changes.  They offered devolution to the Celtic fringe, but not to England as a whole. 
Devolution is offered to parts of England, as Britain is the primary political 
community.  Because Conservatives see the United Kingdom as a union of four 
nations, they advocate all English answers.  Yet while the Conservatives have not had 
an opportunity to implement their constitutional preferences, Hazell (2006 b) argues 
they are not likely to as devolution to all of England would unbalance the Union 
(Tomaney 2000: 119).  As a result, Labour has attempted to answer the English 
Question at the regional level.  Accordingly, this section will now outline Labour’s 
regional constitutional reforms.  
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The 1980s highlighted the need to improve management at the regional level 
in England (Mawson 1998 162).26  One North East academic, David Byrne (1992: 
35), likened the relationship between the North East and the central government 
under Thatcher as “semi-colonial.”  While there had been a decline of the concept of 
‘region’ in the corridors of power in London during the height of the Thatcher years, 
in the regions themselves the idea did not disappear, re-emerging in the 1990s 
(Sharpe 1997: 134-5).  The relationship between regionalism and Scottish and Welsh 
nationalist agitation during this time period is well documented.  It was argued that a 
revival of English regionalism was initiated by the debates surrounding the place of 
Scotland and Wales in Britain (Stewart 1997: 137-8, Mawson and Spencer 1997: 
160).  
Though Labour championed the English regional movement, it was the 
Conservatives who laid the foundation with the GORs.  This was a radical change in 
the nature of administration in Britain (Mawson and Spencer 1997: 174).  GORs in 
England created a territorial model of service coordination as opposed to a purely 
departmentalized system of administration. Their mission was and is “to achieve high 
and stable levels of growth and employment, and to build an inclusive and prosperous 
society that can develop in a sustainable way” (Tomaney 2002a: 228).  The history of 
the North/South divide has always been that the South is a ‘have’ and the North a 
‘have not’ region (Jewell 1994: 2-4).  The creation of RDAs was an attempt to 
overcome this divide and “transform England's regions through sustainable economic 
development.” (www.onenortheast.co.uk/page/onene/index.cfm).  The Regional 
Chambers came into being to scrutinize RDAs; they are made up of 70% councillors 
and 30% stakeholders (unions, businesses, etc.) and all now call themselves 
Assemblies (Tomaney and Hetherington 2003: 66).  Together RAs and RDAs were to 
coordinate strategic planning at a regional level. 
Tomaney (2001: 116) argued that by the turn of the century these new 
Chambers were beginning to assert themselves as political actors in their respective 
regions through: 1) holding RDAs to account, 2) representing regions in conflicts 
26 In addition, the role of the European Union cannot be ignored, as in order to receive 
EU structural funds, proposals had to be made within a regional context (Stewart 
1997: 140-1), one reason for the creation of the GORs.
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with central government, and 3) overseeing policy integration.  However, it is unclear 
whether they were creating any sort of institutional legitimacy.  While regional 
institutions may have a substantial impact upon the lives of the citizenry in the 
regions of England, the people appear unaware of the degree of regional 
administration that exists in England  (Parks and Elcock 2006: 12).  Accordingly, the 
institutional penetration of these organizations is questionable.  Returning to the 
theoretical framework, one can see the need for popular legitimacy in order for 
institutions of governance to be effective.  They do not need to be built around pre-
existing cultural units, but the governed need to accept them as legitimate and a 
relationship must exist between the institutions and those who are governed by them.
RDAs have given English regions institutional voice (Bond and McCrone 
2004: 4) but not a democratic voice.  At best, the RAs are indirectly elected, lacking 
the clear line of responsibility to a politically engaged electorate that, for example, the 
indirectly elected Cabinet and Prime Minister has.  The lack of clear lines of 
responsibility combined with a weak, and largely invisible, policy portfolio (not to 
mention the GOs operating independently of them), means that while administration  
may happen at a regional level, politics does not.  However, it should be noted that as 
of yet the regional penetration of these organizations may be weak, they have a clear 
mandate to work on behalf of the regions. 27
2004 Referendum 
Heath, Rothon and Jarvis (2003: 56) argue that part of the problem regional 
organizations in England have in gaining legitimacy is that their borders are not 
natural borders, with people generally not appearing to have a high degree of 
affiliation to them.  As such, regional institutions do not answer any of the questions 
raised by the asymmetrical nature of Labour’s constitutional reforms, most notably 
the West Lothian and English Questions.  To address issues raised by these questions, 
referenda were to be held in the North to see if the indirectly elected Assemblies 
should become directly elected.  While originally planning to hold referenda in all 
27 In July 2007 the Government announced it was planning to phase out the Regional 
Assemblies (HM Treasury 2007).  In the North East, though, the organic association 
of regional authorities would still exist.
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three of the Northern GORs, in the end the Government proceeded only in the North 
East, a region the Government felt was safe (Hazell 2006: 9, Tickel, John and Musson 
2005: 3).  
In the 1970s when Scottish and Welsh nationalism was at the forefront 
politically, English regions received very little attention and regional elites were 
willing to derail devolution to protect their region’s interests (Sharpe 1997: 121). 
Elites in regions such as the North East were concerned that their regional interests 
were overlooked as national policies were, and are, dominated by middle England, 
which (like Scotland and Wales) is better able to deal with Whitehall (John, Musson 
and Tickel 2002: 734).  It was hoped that the dynamic of the devolution process in the 
1990s would generate demands for devolution in regions which had been previously 
lukewarm to it (Bond and McCrone 2004: 22).  
It is unclear what impact the North East Constitutional Convention, modelled 
on the Scottish Constitutional Convention, had on the final devolution proposal 
presented by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM).  In Scotland, devolution had a champion in Donald Dewar, 
the Scottish Secretary who became Scotland’s first First Minister.  John Prescott, the 
Cabinet champion for devolution in England, did not have the luxury of a North East 
Office to democratize as Scotland had.  This meant that he had to go to his Cabinet 
colleagues and ask them to cede power to the proposed assemblies.  
While the powers to be vested in the elected assembly were minimal, 
Prescott’s ability to achieve what he did is remarkable given four mutually 
reinforcing factors working against him:
1. The Prime Minister was lukewarm to the idea of regional devolution (Parks 
and Elcock 2006: 9). If the Prime Minister had been strongly in favour of the 
concept, he could have used his authority to devolve power away from 
ministers and Whitehall.
2. Politicians are power maximizers.  As Hopkins (1996) notes, by maximizing 
the power of their offices politicians can increase their ability to forward their 
agenda.  The longer one has been in a particular office, the less likely one may 
be to cede power from it.  Labour had been in power for over seven years by 
the time of the referendum.  By this point in time, Labour was no longer an 
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‘outsider’ looking in on government, it was government.  While some
northern Members of Parliament wanted devolution to protect them from
future Conservative governments; with Labour in power the immediacy of
that need may have decreased.
3. The nature of the Labour Party.  Just over 25 years before this referendum, 
Labour was split over the question of devolution in Scotland, where public 
demand was much higher.  It must be noted that devolution as a policy is a 
challenge to the centralist socialist history of Labour in the post war period.  If 
one of Labour’s goals is (or was) the crafting of a socialist British state, then 
devolution of decision making can be seen as a challenge to some of the 
principles of uniformity and British wide standards that Labour historically 
endorsed.  Whereas devolution in 1997 can be interpreted as a strategic policy 
aimed at keeping the Union together (see Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 2002: 
123), there was no corresponding need with regard to the English regions.
4. There is no equivalent to the SNP in England.  The SNP challenges Labour 
electorally as well as the legitimacy of the British political system.  Prior to 
1997, Labour had historically relied upon Scotland to deliver its majority 
governments, and losing Scotland would mean Labour could be relegated to 
permanent opposition (Bogdanor 1999).  Devolution was adopted by Labour 
as a pragmatic way of dealing with the nationalists electorally, while 
buttressing the Union (Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 2002: 123).
While the proposals on offer for the referendum in 2004 were weak, it can be 
argued that if successful they would have been more radical than Scottish and Welsh 
devolution as they represented a more “fundamental challenge … to the dominance of 
Whitehall over all aspects of English life” (Tomaney and Hetherington 2003: 57). 
Opposition, though, was more than mere opposition to a certain style of multi-level 
governance or the powers on offer; it came into conflict with people’s interpretations 
of England and the British state.  Opposition spokespeople presented the proposals 
for elected regional assemblies as an attack on England’s ‘historic counties’ 
(Tomaney 2003: 55).  
If one were to write a thesis on how not to conduct a referendum, the 2004 
Referendum would provide an excellent case study.  This is not to say that either side 
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was particularly ineffective (although in hindsight the ‘yes’ side made a few strategic 
mistakes), rather that the government could not have chosen a worse time to conduct 
the referendum.  The results of the referendum were overwhelmingly against the 
proposals by a margin of nearly four to one.  Dion (1996: 272) notes voters behave 
conservatively during referenda, yet in the North East people with the most 
knowledge of the proposals were the most likely to vote against them (Bond and 
McCrone 2004 : 13).  This suggests that the outcome was a result of more than the 
conservativeness of voters as the ‘no’ vote was not merely from people opposed to 
regional devolution in England in principle (although many were).  People also voted 
‘no’ because they wanted regional devolution and felt that this was not it. 
Additionally a host of other issues were involved in people’s decision making, 
including a general dislike of politics and politicians, not enough powers for the 
assembly, a weak ‘yes’ campaign, concern about Tyneside dominance and the ability 
to give the government a ‘bloody nose’ (Shaw et al. 2006: 9-10).  Evidence pointed to 
a lack of economic dissatisfaction, bringing doubt to whether there would be much 
political dissatisfaction (Heath, Rothon and Jarvis 2003: 53).  
People appear more likely to support regional government in principle (Bond 
and McCrone 2004: 12), and in this sense the ‘Yes’ campaign failed to transfer this 
potential ‘yes’ vote into a real ‘yes’ vote.  As Donnan and Wilson (1999: 65) note, it 
is easy to ask someone about their identity but difficult to determine how their actions 
and identities are related.  On the surface it would seem that when given the 
opportunity to manifest themselves politically, strong regional identities in the North 
East did not take hold.  Yet translating enthusiasm amongst supporters for devolution 
into an effective political campaign was not an easy task and was made more difficult 
by the fact that it was difficult to address how the limited powers on offer would have 
an effective impact upon the region (Shaw et al. 2006 6). 
The ‘yes’ campaign made use of the strength of regional identity in the North 
East while the ‘no’ campaign had an effective and simple message—it was a waste of 
money (Shaw et al. 2006 10).  The North East has a vibrant and popular set of 
newspapers with strong relationships between regional political journalists and 
members of the ‘yes’ camp.  Though supportive of regional government in principle, 
The Journal was against the proposals and while The Northern Echo was supportive, 
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its coverage was balanced and reflected the agenda set by the campaign groups (Shaw 
et al. 2006 12).  This meant that the ‘yes’ campaign could not draw upon the media to 
add weight to its arguments.  The fact regional papers spent so much time reporting 
on regional devolution in the long lead up to the referendum is indicative of the 
papers’ support of regional devolution in principle and their role in helping shape the 
regional agenda.
The failure of the referendum eliminated the regional answer to the English 
Question by ‘killing off’ the demands for elected assemblies for the foreseeable 
future while leaving the place of England within the Union unaddressed.  While 
leaving the all-English option available, yet a federal or quasi-federal system based 
on the nations of Britain may not work because of the size of England (Tomaney 
2000: 119).  As Sandford (2002: 795) notes, devolution in Scotland and Wales was 
the answer to a specific desire from both nations which has no direct equivalent in 
England.  It is unclear if such a desire existed in England or if there was enough of a 
concept of ‘difference’ in the English regions, even in the North East, for devolution 
to have succeeded with better structural conditions.
Following the referendum, there were additional consequences in the North 
East, most notably a split between the North East Assembly and the Association of 
North East Councils (Shaw et al. 2006 18), and the legitimacy of the Assembly itself 
came into question.  After the 2004 referendum people in the region wanted to know 
why there was still an Assembly when the question had been voted down.  According 
to Cllr Ian Mearns of Gateshead Council and a member of the North East Assembly, 
the impact of the referendum on the Assembly was to paralyze it; it was “struggling 
to find its feet” (Interview 2006).  The referendum robbed the unelected Assembly of 
political legitimacy and forced it to retreat into its narrowly defined core functions. In 
this sense, the ‘no’ vote may have actually decreased what little effectiveness the RA 
had to act as a voice for the North East.  Hazell (2006) argues that the extreme 
centralization of the state in England may be such that regional movements would 
have evolved without any impetus from Scottish, and to a lesser extent Welsh, 
nationalism.  This, however, is immaterial as it did evolve in the shadow of these 
nationalist movements and there is an established link between the two, which cannot 
be ignored in discussions on regionalism in England.  
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The above suggests that the dialectical relationship between majority and 
minority nations outlined in Chapter Two keeps evolving.  GOs, RDAs and RAs were 
created to increase economic performance and streamline government services at a 
sub-national level in England.  In ‘carving up’ England, central government opened 
up discussions on what England was.  By opening up the possibility of democratic 
institutions at the regional level, the Government engaged citizens in the discussions. 
While the referendum failed and current government policy seeks to disband the 
Assemblies in the near future, it appears that even though the British state is very old, 
it is still, in many ways, a work in progress where the discussion of ‘who we are’ and 
‘what Britain is’ are yet to be resolved. 
Overall, this section has highlighted the impact of the changing and evolving 
nature of the nation upon the state, and shown that actions and change in one 
constituent nation in a multinational state has political spill-over in the others.  While 
the minority nations in Canada and Britain were demanding change, the context in 
which change was made was constantly shifting as perception of what the state is in 
Canada (outside Quebec) and England was constantly evolving.  Though many of the 
institutional arrangements in Canada are set out in the codified Constitution, it was 
still able to be flexible.  As the reader no doubt noticed, far more attention above 
focused on English regions than Canadian provinces.  This was due to the fact that in 
Britain, the English regions were part of the debates on change even though they 
lacked voice.  In Canada (outside Quebec), the provinces were not the focus of 
change.  Rather provinces are established actors in their own right, participating in the 
discussions.  It is interesting to note that the British constitution, which is not 
codified, may not be as flexible as the Canadian model due to a deeply engrained 
legitimizing parliamentary mythology in Britain.  This indicates not only that 
agreement between the constituent nations on how the state should be constituted is 
difficult to come by, but that it may actually be impossible.  Rather, accepted 
processes of dialogue and recognition between the constituent members playing a 
more powerful role in regard to the unity of the state than a legalized (and fossilized) 
constitutional order.
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4.3 Modern Nationalism in Scotland and Quebec
The above discussions dealt with the processes internal to the majority nations 
in Canada and Britain.  To understand an equally important reason why territorial 
identity was mobilized this section focuses on the minority partner in the dialectical 
relationship, Quebec and Scotland.  This section charts the history of the nationalist 
movements in these two nations from the 1960s, when these movements began to 
gain force, to the present, demonstrating a very similar trajectory in both. 
Additionally, it attempts to show that Quebec and Scotland should not be interpreted 
as ‘instigators’ in the dialectical relationship.  Rather, this section seeks to reveal how 
nationalism in these sub-state nations was a reaction to actions taken by the majority.
Prior to the nationalist upswing in Quebec in the 1960s, the Union Nationale 
was the major power in Quebec, reflecting an older, conservative, nationalism.  Anti-
liberal and communally-based, La Survivance, the traditional form of French 
Canadian nationalism, was dominant in Quebec provincial politics, with French 
Canadian life centred on the Catholic Church and the local parish (Gingras and 
Nevitte 1984: 5).  The defeat of the Union Nationale in 1960 opened the doors for one 
of the most dramatic changes in Quebecois and Canadian society: the Quiet 
Revolution – the complete overhaul, modernization and secularization of Quebecois 
society.  This radically modernized Quebec socially, economically, and politically.
The secessionist movement became prominent with the formation of the Parti 
Québécois (PQ) under former Quebec Liberal28 Cabinet Minster René Lévesque.  The 
PQ became the leading force in Quebec nationalism and secessionist politics, rising to 
power with 41% of the popular vote in 1976 (Dion 1993).  During the 1970s the PQ 
was a constant and strong factor in both federal and provincial politics.  Yet this did 
not mean that there was consistent support for Quebec independence, as support for 
the PQ is not the same as support for independence (Lammert 2001: 145). 
28 Note that the Liberal Party of Quebec is both a separate entity from the Liberal 
Party of Canada (Quebec) and a hard nationalist, yet notionally federalist, party.  The 
Quebec political axis falls broadly along a federalist (LPQ) and secessionist (PQ) axis 
and LPQs supporters are found amongst the ranks of both the federal Conservatives 
and Liberals.
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While the national status of Quebec has long been debated in Canada and 
acceptance of Canada as a multinational state is still debated, Britain’s history as a 
Union state meant the national status of Scotland was not challenged.  For three 
hundred years after Union, Scotland was what some called a stateless nation; 
possessing the characteristics of a nation, it was not a state, but a (junior) partner in 
Britain (Keating 2003).  Scottish nationalism had been on the political agenda in 
Scotland well before the 1960s with political parties in favour of home rule since the 
1920s (Bennie et al1997: 17, Lynch 2001:7).  The first electoral inroad came in the 
Hamilton constituency in 1967 when Winnie Ewing took the former Labour safe seat 
with 46% of the popular vote (Lynch 2002: 115-116), yet it was not until the electoral 
breakthrough of the SNP in 1974 that the major parties were forced to take notice and 
Labour adopted devolution as a strategy (Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 2002: 123). 
It was during this period that two main political forces in Scotland, class and nation, 
aligned themselves and allowed the nationalist cause to make its breakthrough. 
According to Bennie et al (1997: 9), it was the welfare state that cemented Scottish 
loyalty to the Union post Second World War, replacing the Imperial project.  The 
1970s, a period in which the welfare state and the relationship between state and 
society was being reconsidered and reconfigured across the western world, ended 
with the PQ and the SNP having made a considerable impact on Canada and Britain 
(Lammert 2001, Lynch 2002).
In Scotland, the 1980s began on the heels of the failed devolution referendum 
and the election of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher.  The devolution 
referendum in 1979 was both a failure and a success for Scottish nationalism.  It was 
a failure in that the referendum failed to garner enough votes to make it past the 
electoral threshold of 40% (although a majority of those voting did vote in favour of 
devolution),29 yet it established that sovereignty rested with the people of Scotland. 
While the sovereignty of the Scottish people is part of the Scottish constitutional 
tradition, the British state implicitly recognized it by engaging the Scots in such a 
fundamental question.  This important stepping-stone for the Scottish nationalist 
movement was followed by the victory of the Conservatives under Margaret 
29 In order for the referendum to pass 40% of the overall electorate had to vote in 
favour of it; not voting was tantamount to a ‘no’ vote.
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Thatcher.  Thatcher challenged the post-war consensus and in doing so 
challenged the consensus upon which Scottish loyalty to the Union was based 
(although whether or not she initiated the challenge can be debated, Kavanagh 1990: 
279).  As British multinationalism has no constitutional mechanism for balance, the 
system works best when the parties are ‘national,’ and politics is fought nationally, 
with party fortunes behaving roughly the same throughout Britain, but statewide 
pattern deteriorated, and by 1987 reached a peak with the Doomsday Scenario 
(Denver et al. 2000:32-3).  
Much like the 1979 referendum in Scotland, the Quebec referendum of 1980 
was both a positive and negative event for the secessionist movement in Quebec.  It 
was positive in that the referendum on Quebec’s independence displayed Quebec’s 
sovereignty.  The Canadian state was willing to participate in a referendum crafted by 
the (secessionist) Government of Quebec, on a question chosen by them, on their 
timetable and under their rules.  It was negative in that the secessionists were 
thoroughly defeated, receiving only 40% of the popular vote, leaving the secessionist 
movement dead for the time (Dion 1993: 38).  After this defeat, nationalist leaders 
realized that they would have to extend a hand to Quebec’s new immigrant groups in 
order to achieve independence democratically (Salée 2002: 168).  This reinforced the 
territorial conception of the Quebec nation over an ethno-linguistic one.  
While nationalist (autonomist and secessionist) elites may have seen the 
1980s as a low point for Quebec, both with the failure of the referendum and Meech 
Lake, as well as the imposition of the new constitutional order, this may not have 
been such a low point for the secessionist movement in Quebec.  Not only did the 
referendum demonstrate the sovereignty of the people of Quebec, but by forcing a 
new constitutional order on Quebec against its wishes, the Canadian government 
played into nationalist hands.  Dufour (2002/2003: 8) argues that if Quebec was given 
the constitutional recognition it desired during these stages of constitutional change, it 
would have been willing to “play the game” with the rest of Canada.  As the 
Canadian state was unwilling to grant this recognition, the nationalist movement 
found itself in a political environment friendly to its cause. 
Much like Britain under Thatcher had an extremely strong willed executive, 
so too did Canada under Trudeau (albeit from a different ideological starting point). 
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Just as Thatcher created the Doomsday Scenario in Scotland, Trudeau created a 
Quebecois version of it—the patriation of the Canadian constitution without the 
consent of the Quebec government.  It can be argued that Trudeau made Quebec’s 
version even worse as it followed on the heels of the 1981 referendum in which 
Trudeau promised a new constitutional order for Canada—the 1982 Constitution was 
not what Quebeckers had in mind.  When Prime Minister Trudeau patriated the 
Constitution, he did so with the support all provinces but Quebec.  The new 
Constitution was presented as a “coup de force” to Quebec (Boismenu 1996: 100), 
and completely broke from Quebec’s understanding of the nature of Canada; a bi-
national state in which Quebec, as representative of French-Canada, had a 
constitutional veto (Russell 1993).  By instituting a Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
whose final arbitrator was the Supreme Court of Canada, the new Constitution 
created a system in which provincial jurisdiction and actions would be held 
accountable to a federally appointed institution.  The Supreme Court would judge 
Quebec’s actions against standards Quebec never agreed to (Gagnon and Iacovino 
2007).  Chapter Two argued that ‘liberal-individualistic’ norms are interpreted 
through cultural understandings; liberal states practice their liberalism through the 
culturally shaped understandings of its citizens.  Accordingly, the Constitution Act of 
1982 caused great concern to Quebecois elites.  In addition, one can see how 
Quebecois elites could frame what happened to be seen as the federal government and 
the ‘English Canadian’ provinces ‘ganging up’ on Quebec.  The ‘separatist’ 
movement was resurrected; the Trudeau legacy was a Canada more deeply divided 
than ever (McRoberts 1997: 245).
Following in the neo-liberal footsteps of other western democracies Brian 
Mulroney led the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada to power in 1984. 
Leading a coalition of westerners and soft-nationalists from Quebec, one of 
Mulroney’s goals throughout his premiership was to bring Quebec into the 
constitutional fold.  His failure emphasized the distance between the people of 
Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec) in their understanding of the Canadian state 
(see McRoberts 1997).  The most important feature of Mulroney’s constitutional 
packages, for this discussion, was the distinct society clause.  These interpretive 
clauses would be inserted in the Constitution to recognize Quebec as distinct within 
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Canada, giving constitutional recognition to Quebec’s national status (Breton 1988: 
8).  To many in Canada (outside Quebec), distinct society was seen as a concession 
against the rights enshrined in the Charter (Watts 1992: 796), rights due to all 
Canadians regardless of province of residence.  Yet if the clause was about 
recognition of difference (worded so as to provide protection for Quebecois 
interpretation of ‘good’ and ‘just’), it had the ability to protect Quebec by alleviating 
its concerns about the majority nationalism of Canada (outside Quebec), at the same 
time ensuring protection for all under the Charter.  As Tierney (2007) notes with 
regard to human rights in Scotland, all European states are subject to the European 
Human Rights Act but interpret it slightly differently.  This lack of uniformity in 
human rights regimes does not mean that human rights are protected any less in 
different states, merely that there are slight differences in how they are protected. 
Bringing this argument to the Canadian context, recognition of Quebecois 
distinctiveness did not necessarily mean a weakening of human rights but it did 
require an acceptance of difference.
Due to political manoeuvring in Canada (outside Quebec), the Meech Lake 
Accord failed and the Government of Quebec started to look for new options, 
declaring that it would henceforth only deal with ‘English Canada’ (a political non-
entity) on a one-to-one basis (Tuohy 1992: 85).  While Quebec may have thought of 
Ottawa as the representative of ‘English Canada’, Stairs (1996) makes a valid point in 
stating that Ottawa always has to look after the interest of all members of the 
Canadian federation. Accordingly, the federal government cannot negotiate with 
Quebec on a one to one basis as the Canadian government also has responsibilities to 
Quebec as a component of Canada.  In this sense, Quebecois elites put both the 
Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada (as well as the other 
provinces) in an impossible situation; Quebecois elites were only willing to talk to an 
entity that had no capacity for voice.
By the end of the 1980s, the ‘fault lines’ between the majority and minority 
sub-state nations in Canada and Britain were beginning to crack.  The possible 
problems identified in Chapter Two were beginning to manifest themselves.  The 
nature of the state, always ambiguous in both Canada and Britain, was politicized.  
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By the end of this decade Quebec was pulling away from constitutional negotiations 
and looking for other options.  Even the notionally federalist Liberal Party of Quebec 
became hard nationalist, although not secessionist.  Scotland was politically 
marginalized with the majority of the Scottish population having no representation in 
government, and the British (Conservative) government appeared unresponsive to 
Scottish concerns.  Of the two major parties in Scotland, Scottish Labour became 
soft-nationalist, seeking devolution while the Scottish National Party, was 
secessionist.30
In Scotland, the 1980s ended with the creation of a Constitutional Convention 
in 1989 (Denver et al. 2000: 33).  The Convention ran until 1995 and included the 
Labour Party, The Liberal Democrats, the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), 
local authorities and a range of civic organizations (Lynch 2001: 8).  By the time the 
Conservatives realized that nationalism in Scotland was a serious political force, 
symbolic actions such as the repatriation of the Stone of Destiny in 1996 were not 
enough to stop the Labour landslide in Scotland the next year.  The referendum in 
1997 came during the “honeymoon period” of the Labour government that had taken 
over after 18 years of Conservative rule.  While the referendum was a reversal of 
Labour policy of unilateral devolution, it was nonetheless supported by Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats, and after July 1997, the SNP.  It was a resounding victory for 
devolution; 74.3% voted in favour of devolution and 63.3% in favour of the new 
parliament having tax varying powers (Lynch 2001: 6).  If Dion (1996: 272) was 
correct in stating that voters in referendums tend to behave conservatively, then this 
was an overwhelming victory for devolution in Scotland.
In 1991 the Quebec Liberal Party (already nationalist while remaining 
federalist) adopted the Allaire Report, which called for the wholesale transfer of 
powers from Ottawa to Quebec (Dion 1993: 39, Liberal Party of Quebec 1991).  Both 
of Quebec’s main parties were now hard nationalist, one overtly separatist, and the 
other strongly devolutionist.  The 1993 Canadian federal election was indeed what 
Alan Cairns (1994) called “an election to be remembered.”  This election saw the 
annihilation of the governing Progressive Conservative Party, which returned only 
30 Of the two second-tier parties in Scotland, the Liberal Democrats have always been 
a federalist party while the Conservatives saw Home Rule as a threat to the Union. 
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two MPs.  It also saw the rise of the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois as major 
forces within the House of Commons.  The Bloc Québecois, a party dedicated to the 
break-up of Canada, became the Loyal Opposition, winning 54 of the 75 seats in 
Quebec (Nevitte et al. 1996: 583).  The 1993 election produced a Parliament that was 
reflective of the divisions that Trudeau created (McRoberts 1997: 220), centred on 
what Rotstein (1995: 372) identifies as the two major undercurrents in Canadian 
politics: Quebecois nationalism and ‘English Canadian’ populism.  This election 
ushered in a period of relative stability for the governing Liberals, as the Reform-
Progressive Conservative battle for the centre right, combined with the rise of the 
Bloc Québécois in Quebec, ensured that the Liberals did not face a serious challenge 
to their rule.  
In Quebec, the PQ returned to power and in 1995 held another referendum. 
Polling was extremely close and the night of the referendum Parizeau expected to 
give a victory speech.  Instead, the federalist forces managed to re-muster and launch 
a last ditch effort.  With less than 51% of the popular vote in the referendum, 
federalist forces went on an offensive.  As outlined in the sub-section ‘Plan B,’ the 
federal government responded in the House of Commons with the Clarity Act and 
Regional Veto Act, and at the Supreme Court with the Reference re Quebec 
Secession.  While none of these attempted to generate a greater sense of being 
Canadian, they were designed to pose procedural roadblocks to the success of any 
future referendum.
This brief overview has explored Quebecois and Scottish nationalism as part 
of the dialectical relationship between the minority nations and the majority nations 
of Canada (outside Quebec) and England.  It has shown that since the 1960s, 
nationalism in Quebec and Scotland has had an important impact on the political 
environments of Canada and Britain, gaining momentum in the 1960s and peaking in 
both states in the 1990s.  Both minority nations managed to make their concerns 
heard at the centre and forced regional and national political actors to expend time, 
energy and resources in dealing with issues focused on Quebec and Scotland. 
However, it should be noted that these two sub-state nations introduced the 
challenges to the dominant interpretation of the state not because of changes within 
Quebec and Scotland, but partly in reaction to changes in Canada (outside Quebec) 
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and England.  This is reflective of the dialectical relationship between majority and 
minority nations, but due to Quebec and Scotland’s minority positions, they are seen 
as challenging the status quo.  With regard to regional actors, this discussion created 
discursive ‘space’ to articulate their interpretations of the state.  
4.4 Regions in Canada and Britain
In Chapter Two, the theoretical argument began with the state, moved to the 
sub-state nations and finished with the regions to provide clarity on ‘states’ and 
‘nations’ to help understand the place of region within the majority nation.  Likewise, 
this chapter began by exploring the states of Canada and Britain, before examining 
how the interaction between the majority and minority sub-state nations has altered 
the political environment in Canada and Britain.  This section examines Nova Scotia 
and the North East, as individual regions and within larger patterns of regionalism 
within Canada and Britain.   This furthers the argument advanced in Chapter Three 
that they are excellent choices for comparison, as well as contextualizing the debate 
examined in later chapters.
While England may not have a history of powerful regional movements, 
regionalism is a fact of Canadian political life (Henderson 2004: 595).  Canada may 
be seen as a case study in regionalized politics, with provincial politics so divorced 
from the federal that parties sharing the same name at both levels often have no 
substantive relationship with each other.  While Hough and Jeffery (2003: 250) 
describe Canada as having a “very strongly decoupled” party system between the 
federal and provincial orders of government, they may overstate their point when they 
say that “national and regional election processes are uncoupled everywhere.”  In 
some provinces this phenomenon is evident (most notably the four Western provinces 
and Quebec), yet this may not hold true in Atlantic Canada or Ontario where the 
federal and provincial parties appear to be more closely intertwined, although in a 
manner different than that of a traditional second order government.  While lacking 
Canada’s history of regionalized politics, what is important in England is that 
regional identities exist, that some regions can claim distinctiveness which in turn 
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may act as a trigger for regionalism (Lanigan 2001: 104-5, Fowler, Robinson and 
Boniface 2001: 121).  
In Canada, regions have political voices in their respective provincial 
governments and possess distinct political cultures due to distinct political institutions 
(Henderson 2004: 596).  At the present time the regions of England lack substantive 
political voice (Royle 1998: 9) and possess weak institutions.  This should not be 
interpreted to mean that because regions lack the capacity for voice, that regionalism 
or regional identities do not exist.  On the contrary, the situation in the English 
regions is in some ways similar to Scotland before 1997; devolution and 
decentralization existed in the form of the Scottish Office (although the English 
regional framework lacks the power of the Scottish Office).  Even before the 
Conservatives created the GORs, it was argued that the English regions were 
decentralized through the operation and importance of quangos (Harvie 1991).  The 
rebirth of the regional movement in England in the 1990s coincided with an increase 
of sub-national quangos and a desire to democratize their decision making (Sharpe 
1997: 135).  While John Musson and Tickel (2002: 734) state that experience from 
France indicates that regional administration can turn into political regionalism, 
Sharpe (1997: 121) argues there has been relatively little agreement over the political 
role of regions in England, or even their boundaries.  
In England the lack of regional ‘pedigree’ has meant that the concept of 
‘region’ is contested.  What sub-national regions are, where their boundaries are 
located, and the usefulness and need for a sub-national level of governance is all 
disputed.  There is a great deal of variation between the regions, and the relationship 
between local, regional and national remains contested (Herrschel and Newman  2000 
1186-7).  Currently English regions fall into an administrative category of regions, as 
they are products of the central state created for the purposes of administration.  Yet 
the boundaries of some coincide with older boundaries, making it debatable as to 
whether regions are simply administrative.  Returning to the theories of the state 
presented by Mann (1993, 1996) and Deutsch (1966a), the central government in 
Britain has created bounded networks at the regional level in England.  Civil society 
began organizing around these units (for example, chambers of commerce), 
reinforcing regional levels of identity.  While an elected regional assembly was 
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defeated in the North East Referendum, this did not mean that these bounded 
networks were weakened.  Indeed, the referendum itself was part and parcel of the 
creation of these bounded networks, engaging the people of the North East in a 
common activity.  
Using Canada as an example, one notices that strong political loyalties, even 
national sentiment, were built without a popular base.  ‘Canada’ as it is known today 
was built from a collection of diverse colonies, which for the most part had little to do 
with each other.  Nova Scotia was much more closely aligned socially and 
economically with the New England states and British Columbia was on the other 
side of a largely impassable continent.  Likewise, Alberta was created from the top 
down in 1905 and quickly developed a strong sense of provincial identity (see 
Macpherson 1962, Cooper 1985: 205).  Yet no one would deny the strength of 
attachment to Canada felt in these provinces.  
While Scottish, Welsh and Irish national agitation has overshadowed English 
regions (Sharpe 1997: 121), all Canadian provinces are guaranteed a voice due to 
their constitutional nature within the federal system.  In Canada many of the regions 
predate the state and the nation.  The four Atlantic Canadian provinces are older than 
Canada, with four capital cities, four economies, and four sets of political and social 
elites (Smith 2002: 143); and not all of these provinces entered confederation of their 
own free will.  In the first provincial and federal election in Nova Scotia after 
confederation, 17 out of 18 seats in the House of Commons and 36 of the 38 seats in 
the provincial legislature went to anti-confederationists.  One of the first things the 
new government of Nova Scotia did was to lobby the Imperial Parliament in London 
to repeal the BNA Act (1867) (Hardy 1959: 189-190).  Nova Scotia even passed a 
secessionist motion in its House of Assembly in 1887, although Finbow (1995: 64) 
argues that this motion was to secure a better deal from Ottawa.
Regionalism in Canada and Britain appear different on the surface, but this is 
because the institutions and histories of the two states are so markedly different. 
While manifesting itself differently, the underlying concepts of regionalism are 
extremely similar.  As Sartori (1970) notes with regard to cross-cultural comparisons, 
meaningful comparisons cannot simply “stretch” the concepts to fit the cases.  Great 
care needs to be taken to ensure both concepts and indicators are clear.  In both states, 
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peripheral regions appear to lack voice or efficacy; as such, when presented with the 
opportunity, regional and national elites advocate change.  While structural variables 
may guide them along different routes in Canada and Britain, it needs to be 
emphasized that the underlying sources of regionalism appear to be very similar. 
This will be made clear in the following section dealing explicitly with Nova Scotia 
and the North East of England.
Nova Scotia and the North East
Nova Scotia and the North East are two peripheral regions, peripheral for 
similar reasons: both are small relative to their nations and states, both are 
geographically distant from central decision making in Ottawa and London, and both 
are overshadowed by much larger and much more vocal sub-state nations to which 
they are geographically very proximate.  They even possess similar economic 
histories of coal mining, shipbuilding and heavy industry which went into decline 
after the Second World War.  As a function of this situation, they can be thought of as 
‘frontier’ regions of Canada (outside Quebec) and England.  In addition, they are 
organic communities that pass on cultural attributes from generation to generation. 
While Henderson (2004: 607) argues that regionalism in Canada overlaps and cross-
cuts provincial boundaries, both Nova Scotia and the North East are places of “social 
and habitual conditions” (Terkenli 1996 325-6).  The people in these regions do not 
exist in isolation; they have families and friends who live alongside them.  They 
belong to social, economic and political networks located in the regions.  Both Nova 
Scotia and the North East are places people live, not merely reside, and the evidence 
points to strong cultural cohesion within the two regions.  In saying this, identity and 
cultural cohesion are not triggers for regionalism; rather they are tools that regional 
actors can use to mobilize territorial identity (Lanigan 2001: 104).  
While regionalism in England has historically been marginalized (Bond and 
McCrone 2004: 2), during the 1990s lobby groups were formed to speak for the 
regions of England.  While ‘region’ was often code for declining regions (John, 
Musson and Tickel 2002: 740), organizations from civil society were building up 
regional interests during the Conservative years.  This was explicitly evident in the 
North East with the North East Councils Association (NECA), the first Regional 
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Chamber of Commerce in England, the Northern TUC and so forth (Parks and Elcock 
2006: 6-7).  The success of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in paving the way 
for the Scottish Parliament encouraged the creation of similar organizations in 
England.  The Campaign for a Northern Assembly was created in 1992 and played a 
role in establishing the North East Constitutional Convention after the 1997 
referendums, while the Campaign for English Regions developed in 1999 as an 
umbrella organization to deal with the Government (Parks and Elcock 2006: 8, 
Tomaney 2000: 138-9).  Even though Tony Blair represented a North East 
constituency, he personally was not keen on regional devolution (Parks and Elcock 
2006: 9), yet after 1995 a strong regional policy appeared in Labour’s manifesto in all 
years leading up to the 2004 referendum (Wood 1998: 5).
The North East is perceived as enjoying a comparatively strong regional 
identity based on institutional and cultural distinctiveness (Bond and McCrone 2004: 
5).  Institutionally, the region is generally the poorest performing of the English 
regions (Parks and Elcock 2006: 5), at the same time its geographic and industrial 
history has helped shape its sense of identity (Tomaney and Ward 2001: 13, McCord 
1998:109), leading to a strong regional coherence and the development of an identity 
that is urban and industrial, as viewed by people both inside and outside the region 
(Colls 1992: 2, Ward and Lowe 2001: 181).  This may best be seen through the 
processes of intergenerational cultural learning which has led many in the North East 
to adopt traditional expectations of their lives and futures.  For example, many male 
youths expect that they will work in the coalfields, even though they no longer exist 
(Nayak 2003 21-3).  
This kind of traditionalism is found in Nova Scotia as well.  In both cases, it is 
important to distinguish between traditional and conservative.  ‘Conservative’ implies 
a set of beliefs, whereas ‘traditional’ in many ways refers to the socialized aspects of 
political support, for example family links (Stewart 1994: 51-55).  In Nova Scotia it 
has been argued traditional politics are geared towards patronage and short term gain, 
but in the long run they are a major factor in the stability of the party system as the 
division of spoils has historically kept intergenerational loyalty high (Clancy et al 
2000: 16).  After the 1993 election and the collapse of the Progressive Conservative 
Party of Canada in the rest of Canada, Atlantic Canada became the party’s last 
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holdout.  The non-traditional New Democratic Party of Nova Scotia has its 
stronghold in Halifax.  With people moving there from outside of the province (either 
other parts of the country or immigrants), a high concentration of students, and a high 
population turnover means weakened political family ties and opportunity for the 
NDP.  
Carbert (2006) illustrates the strength of these social ties in Nova Scotian 
politics in her study on women’s political leadership in Atlantic Canada, where the 
small town nature of politics means that no vote is truly secret.  In Nova Scotia, this 
traditional style of government was valued for its stability, predictability, cautious 
approach to change and respect for personal, rural and small town approaches 
(Clancy et al. 2000: 2).  However, the Nova Scotian state can be seen as weak 
because of its lack of ability to implement policy due to entrenched interests (Clancy 
et al. 2000: 14-15).  It was also seemingly rife with patronage.  A recent biography of 
Angus L. Macdonald, arguably one of the most popular Premiers of Nova Scotia, 
describes in detail how, after defeating the governing Conservatives and winning the 
1933 election, he immediately set up patronage committees in each provincial 
constituency in order to allocate jobs for the party faithful.  According to Stephen 
Henderson (2007), almost a quarter of provincial government employees were hired 
and fired in this manner.  While this system of government predated the 
professionalization of the civil service, it nevertheless suggests that in the Nova 
Scotian political system these attitudes and memories may last longer due to the 
traditional nature of politics and a stable population.  While the North East does not 
have a level of government to compare it to directly, the deeply embedded support for 
the Labour Party there, coupled with the traditional outlook noted above, suggests 
similar levels of intergenerational political traditionalism.
It is important to note that a model of layering between the state/nation, region 
and locality is actually more complex than this three tier model presents (see also 
Mann’s 1996 five tier model in which only one level is identified below the state). 
While intellectually appealing, in that it divides the multi-level nature of identity into 
neat compartments, the situation on the ground is more complex for two reasons; 1) 
Nova Scotia and the North East are complex societies with internal cleavages, from 
competing interpretations of the ‘region’ and in the form of local allegiances, be they 
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city, town or sub-regional regions; and 2) They belong to other, larger, sub-state 
regions, namely Atlantic Canada and Northern England respectively.   
Nova Scotia’s main cleavage exists between Cape Breton and the mainland 
(Stewart 1994: 137),31 while in the North East, the lower Tyne, Wier and Tees have 
long been dominant.  In addition, the urban-rural divide is present in both regions. 
Because of Labour’s dominance in the North East this does not manifest politically, 
but in Nova Scotia this has led to a sharp divide in representation between rural and 
urban areas.  The last election, 2006, saw the Government of Nova Scotia based out 
of rural areas and the Official Opposition based out of the capital, Halifax.  Moving 
above the regional level, but still below the national, both Nova Scotia and the North 
East are embedded in what may be termed ‘mega-regions.’  In Canada the Maritimes 
or Atlantic Canada are often used to describe a mega-region of which Nova Scotia is 
part, while in Britain the North East is a part of a larger area known as the North. 
Nova Scotia is even a part of a trans-national region known as Atlantica (Gittell and 
Colgan 2004: 136, see Tomblin and Colgan 2004 and www.atlantica.org), which is 
made up of Atlantic Canada and the New England states. 
Although sub-regional and mega-regional identities and cleavages exist, they 
are contested.  While the North does not appear to be a contested concept 
academically, according to Scott Lynch et al. (1997: 8) there is no basis for 
aggregating all Atlantic Canadian provinces into a single entity known as Atlantic 
Canada.  Tomblin (1995: 77-8) argues that Nova Scotia has a unique political culture 
and history in which politics and the economy revolve around provincial and federal, 
not regional (Atlantic/Maritime), identities.  Finbow (1995: 75-6) argues that while 
each of the Atlantic Provinces has unique cultures and histories, he is comfortable 
using the aggregate term Atlantic Canada to describe the region.  Savoie (2006) notes 
that while Atlantic Canada is a myth created by policy makers, the Maritimes is real. 
The fact that the Atlantic provinces each have their own power structures has meant 
that they have a political capacity for voice that is lacking at the regional level in 
England, but while Canadian provinces can work together for some goals, most 
31 A Cape Breton secessionist was elected to the Nova Scotia legislature in the 1981, 
1984 and 1988 provincial elections.
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notably ensuring equalization payments in the Constitution (section 36), such gains 
are rare as regional division inhibits closer integration (Finbow 1995: 69-70).  In 
essence, it is the crystallized and formalized political and social networks (Deutsch 
1966a) that exist at the provincial level in Canada and within the English GORs, 
especially the North East, that allow these regions to be socially meaningful, as 
opposed to mere administrative conveniences or coordinating bodies.
Both Nova Scotia and the North East are complex entities for which a full 
discussion is outside the scope of this thesis.  Instead they have been introduced to 
demonstrate how the regions are best suited for comparison vis-à-vis the MSSD. 
Chapter Three highlighted Deutsch’s (1996) four key areas that networks crystallize 
around as being especially important for this work; 1) the economy, 2) population, 3) 
geography, and 4) language.  The similarities between Nova Scotia and the North 
East in all four areas make them excellent choices for comparison.  Both are 
peripheral, marginalized, and overshadowed by powerful and vocal sub-state nations. 
While regional cultures exist within each, so do cleavages below and above the 
regional level.  Returning to the discussion on variables from Chapter Three, these are 
the control variables that have been identified in the process of case selection to 
ensure they do not contribute to the differences being examined in this project 
(Przeworski and Teune 1979).  While they may appear to make the comparison of 
these two regions more complex, they support the choice of comparison as these 
provide a variety of avenues for the exploration of regional and national identities, as 
will be shown in Chapters Five through Seven. 
4.5 Conclusion
The above has demonstrated that the problematization of identity and the 
corresponding politicization of the nature of the state is part of the dialectical 
relationship between the majority and minority nations in Canada and Britain. While 
on the surface it may appear that the ability of minority sub-state nations to influence 
national discourse is great, the role of the staatsvolk may be just as important to 
understanding territorial identity mobilization.  Through the examination of the 
relationship between the majority and minority nations, as well as the regions within 
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them, this chapter suggests that the political environment changed in such a manner 
as to provide opportunity and context for regional elites to advance their 
interpretation of the state and their region’s place within it.
By highlighting the relevant background in two complex and dynamic 
multinational states, this chapter suggested that the ongoing (re)interpretation of the 
nation is a complex dynamic between the state, nation and region.  This complex 
dynamic introduces questions regarding the legitimacy of the constitutional order and 
questions of ‘who we are’ into political debates.  This chapter has also demonstrated 
that the question of the place of ‘region’ within the state framework was much more 
salient in Britain than in Canada.  Yet because the role and question of regions was 
much more visible in England, should not be interpreted to mean that in Canada 
‘region’ did not have a place in the debate.  In fact, the opposite may be true.  In 
Canada the role of the provinces was much more ‘banal’ (in the language of Billig) 
than region in Britain.  Provinces are established political actors, and Canada is an 
established federation.  As such, the role of the province is much more entwined 
throughout the debates than in Britain, where they were the focus of debates.
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Chapter Five: Top Down Regionalization: Creating the Political Environment
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins the empirical investigation of this study by analysing 
state-level elite debate; parliamentary debate in the Canadian and British Houses of 
Commons between 1990 and 2004, as well as the election platforms/manifestos of the 
major parties.  This chapter is divided in three sections.  The first examines 
institutional factors framing elite debate in Canada and Britain.  It focuses on debates 
surrounding the place of Quebec and Scotland, as debates on the place of these two 
minority nations drew out how central elites saw their respective states.  The second 
section explores how elites framed the nature of the state by examining the cases and 
outlining how state elites responded to secessionist and nationalist elites in Quebec 
and Scotland, which resulted in majority nationalism.  The final section addresses 
how the sub-state nations were framed within the majority/state-led nationalist 
framing of the state.  Here it is shown that Quebec and Scotland become ‘internal 
others;’ paradoxically both one of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the discourse of central elites. 
The comparison details the Canadian case first, and then compares the British one to 
it.  
As Angus notes, discourse is not an argument, position or theory, it is “a 
space for discussion and debate in which many (often competing) positions are 
possible” (1997: 28, italics in original).  By highlighting elite discourse, this chapter 
illustrates how concepts of balance and issues of fundamental fairness are introduced 
to statewide debate on basic constitutional frameworks in Canada and Britain.  The 
exchange between majority state-led nationalism and minority nationalism creates 
opportunity for regional actors within the majority nation to mobilize territorial based 
identities as well as frame issues which regional actors can mobilize around.  Before 
beginning the in-depth exploration, this chapter briefly revisits the problematization 
of identity in multinational states.
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Problematization of Identity: Unionism and Pan-nationalism Revisited
By appearing to challenge the state order, Quebecois and Scottish nationalists 
appear to “problematize” identity in Canada and Britain in three significant ways.
1.  Tyranny of the Majority.  Democracies are not solely defined by majority rule, as 
the consent of the loser is key to a functioning democracy.  In order to be interpreted 
by national minorities and majorities to be fair and equitable, democracies must 
ensure that the state is not merely the expression of the majority community—a 
Tyranny of the Majority.  
2. Divergence of Aims.  States comprising multiple nations need to manage the 
different outlooks held by actors within the various nations.  States must find balance 
between competing nationally based interpretations of the state, the objectives of the 
state, and how the state should achieve those objectives. 
3. Assumed Homogeneity.  Canada (outside Quebec) and England are diverse 
societies and regional differences exist within both.  While generalizing attitudes in 
both is a worthwhile exercise, giving researchers an understanding of general trends, 
sub-groups within these societies may have views that diverge from the ‘norm.’  The 
existence of these sub-groups, regions, within Canada (outside Quebec) and England 
allows for Quebec and Scotland to be ‘consumed’ in Canadian or British discourse: 
Quebec and Scotland become regions within a homogeneous nation-state marked by 
regional diversity, not nations in their own right.  If state structures do not adequately 
allow minority nations to flourish, then the state itself may become a source of 
political conflict, leading to competition between ‘state’ and ‘nation,’ based around 
two competing interpretations of the state: unionist and pan-nationalist.
As outlined in Chapter Two, unionist and pan-nationalist interpretations are poles 
along an axis upon which different interpretations of the multinational state are based. 
Unionist interpretations of the state favour the constituent elements while pan-
national interpretations favour the statewide identity.  
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5.2 Institutional Constraints on Discourse 
Two structural factors are key to understanding the boundaries and constraints 
placed upon elite debate at the centre and in the regions.  The first is the relative 
population size of Quebec and Scotland, which had an impact on the potential 
strength of their ‘voice’ within central institutions, notably the Houses of Commons. 
The second is the electoral geography of the two states, where the First Past the Post 
(FPTP) electoral system encouraged parties to ignore large swathes of the state in the 
competition for power.  These two factors are shown to territorialize politics 
independently of territorial cleavages although these cleavages do exacerbate them. 
This section addresses majority nationalism in Canada and Britain and, by 
establishing how state-led nationalism frames the state, begins to outline the 
constraints which are placed on regional actors.  
Canada (outside Quebec) and England are diverse societies, and regional and 
sub-national differences exist within both.  Some of the sub-groups within the 
dominant nation were just as large, if not larger, than the minority sub-state nations. 
In the 2001 census London had a population of 7,172,000, while Scotland and Wales 
combined had a population of approximately eight million.  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
illustrate the comparable size of the minority nations to regions within the wider state. 
In Canada, while Quebec commanded a much greater percentage of the population 
than the minority nations in the UK (almost 25%), it is still notably smaller than 
Ontario.
These size differences are important for they enabled Quebec and Scotland to 
be consumed within the wider Canadian and British discourses.  Additionally, neither 
minority sub-state nation was in a position to veto the majority nation, whereas if elite 
consensus is found in the majority nation, it could have overridden the concerns 
expressed by the minority’s elites.  This was especially true with regard to Scotland, 
which made up less than 10% of parliament (although as will be discussed below, 
Labour has traditionally been over-reliant on the Scottish vote helping increase the 
voice of Scotland vis-à-vis Labour).
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Figure 5.1 Population of the Canadian Provinces, 2005 
Province   Population 2005 (1000s)
Newfoundland and Labrador 516,000












Canada (outside Quebec) 24,672,400
Canada    32,270,500  
Source: www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo02.htm
Figure 5.2 Population of English Regions/ Minority Nations, 2001











East of England 5,400,000
London 7,172,000
Yorkshire & Humber 5,000,000*
The United Kingdom  59,793,702  
*Approximate numbers due to website limitations
(Source: www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/regions.asp)
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The work of O’Leary is especially useful with regard to the importance of the 
relative size of national communities within multinational states.  To synthesize his 
argument, he notes two important points; 1), in a stable majority federation an 
ethnonational group with a decisive majority has no reason to fear federalism as it has 
the ability to dominate due to its size, or be generous due to the fact that the minority 
cannot challenge its position.  O’Leary has developed an index, the Effective Number 
of Ethnonational Groups (ENENg), designed to easily demonstrate how many 
influential ethnonational groups exist within a state and the relative power of each.  2) 
The staatsvolk can be seen to be dominant when the index indicates a score of two or 
less (2001: 285-288).  This is what he refers to as “an iron law of nationalism and 
federation” and though he refers to multinational federations, the logic applies 
equally to multinational unitary states.
Without embarking on a detailed explanation of O’Leary’s equation, to find 
the ENENg in Canada and Britain one first applies the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHi) of effective parties in a political system to ethnonational groups and the 
ENENg is the reciprical of the total HHi (ENENg = 1/HHi).  The HHi is determined 
by multiplying an ethnonational group’s share of the population by itself (for 
example, Wales has 4.8% of the population, so .048 multiplied by .048 gives an HHi 
of .002).  As seen in Figure 5.3 below, following this logic Canada  (outside Quebec) 
and England are clearly dominant in the political system.  Paraphrasing O’Leary, who 
makes the same point about the German speaking population in Belgium; this index 
allows Northern Ireland to be discarded for the purposes of this research without 
assigning arbitrary cut-offs, as the ENENg in the United Kingdom is the same with or 
without Northern Ireland (unless one takes it to the third decimal place).  
As outlined in Chapter One, defining the dominant group in Canada is 
difficult.  O’Leary identifies Anglophones as the dominant ethnonational group in 
Canada, giving Canada an ENENg of 1.96, effective parity between the two groups. 
This author does not agree that Anglophones alone make up the dominant group.  As 
will be seen, French-speaking communities outside Quebec see themselves as being 
part of a larger Canadian nation with Canada being the defender of their language.  
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Claiming that the Quebecois, Acadians and Franco-Manitobans belong to the same 
ethnonational group runs counter to the history of these groups.  Accordingly, as 
stated in Chapter One, the staatsvolk in Canada are Canadians (outside Quebec), the 
minority is the population of the province of Quebec.  This is not only more 
consistent with the definition of Canada as articulated by elites in Quebec (both 
federalist and secessionist), but it is also consistent with the territorialization of 
identity in Canada.  While this challenges O’Leary’s point that Canada needed 
consociational elements to survive as a stable democratic multinational federation 
because the ENENg approaches 2, it reinforces the argument that the majority can be 
generous with the minority, as it has no reason to fear it.  This is especially true as in 
Canada the staatsvolk are not only dominant, they see the French language as being 
an integral part of their identity as well (McRoberts 1997, Kymlicka 2001).
Figure 5.3: HHi and ENENg in Canada and Britain
Ethnonational Groups in Canada (2005) and Britain (2001)
   Size (%) HHi
Wales 4.8 0.002
Scotland 8.5 0.007
Northern Ireland 2 0.0008
England 83.8 0.7
Quebec 23.5 0.05
Canada (Outside Quebec) 76.5 0.585
ENENg Index
Britain 1.41
Canada   1.57  
Source: population figures taken from Figures 5.1 and 5.2, calculations author’s own.
This adaptation of O’Leary’s ‘iron law’ shows that elites from Canada 
(outside Quebec) and England may have incorporated the minority nation within their 
understanding of the wider state as neither Quebec nor Scotland was in a position to 
challenge the hegemony of the staatsvolk.  As Tierny notes (2007), a key component 
of multinational states are multiple demos.  Yet as the majority of the population 
resided in one nation, and neither minority nation had a veto, the majority nation 
could frame the state with the interpretation held within the majority nation.  
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With regard to the way the electoral system shapes territorial mobilization, on 
the surface it would appear that Proportional Representation (PR) would have the 
same problems with regard to the territorialization of politics as FPTP.  This is due to 
the fact that in all PR systems, except for rare ones that use a statewide list, the state 
is still divided into electoral districts; they are merely larger than the single member 
districts found in FPTP.  Yet unless the PR system has a very high threshold 
(reducing its proportionality), or all parties are regionalized (as in Belgium) there are 
strong incentives to campaign across the entirety of the state.  The FPTP system 
employed in Canada and Britain meant vast swathes of the state were overlooked in 
the competition for power.  For example, in Canada the province of Alberta 
historically votes Conservative, and in Britain the North East is a Labour stronghold. 
As Byrne states (1992), due to the fact that Labour cannot lose in the North East and 
the Conservatives cannot win, electoral and political attention by-passes the region. 
FPTP encourages parties to ignore both their own and other parties’ strongholds.  As 
parties have limited resources, it makes no sense to divert resources to constituencies 
that cannot be won or lost.  In a PR system parties are encouraged to conduct a truly 
statewide campaign, as votes in all regions of the state will have an impact upon its 
final representation in the legislature.
The territorial nature of electoral competition strengthens the dominant 
position of the staatsvolk.  During general elections in Britain the two major parties 
produced ‘British’ election manifestos that appeared, at face value, to be for all 
British people.  While the Conservatives have a notional base in Northern Ireland, 
Labour does not contest seats there and both produce separate Welsh and Scottish 
manifestos.  The ‘British’ manifestos were, in fact, targeted at the English voter. 
However, they were not ‘English’ manifestos in the same way that the Scottish 
manifesto was targeted explicitly at Scotland, rather the British manifesto was the 
English manifesto.  
By not differentiating between the British and English manifestos, the parties 
blurred the line between England and Britain with the governance of England 
expressed as the governance of Britain.  The position of the sub-state nations within 
the state are treated as exceptions to the implied ‘norm’ that is England.  This is not 
only suggestive of a discourse which equates England with Britain, but by treating 
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England as the British standard, and Scotland and Wales as deviations, it left very 
little room for ‘England.’  This, however, may not be problematic if the English 
conceived of themselves as British.  As David Davis32 stated that the “people of 
England value the Union extremely highly—so much so that they are prepared to 
subsume their Englishness for the Union’s greater good…” (HC 16 Jan 1998 C626). 
While this may seem altruistic, according to Kumar (2006), the reason English people 
subsume their identities into Britain is that Britain is a source of pride for the English; 
it is their creation and an expression of their Englishness.  Kumar argues Britain is an 
extension of England (the “European English Empire”); requiring the English to 
“suppress the ordinary manifestations of nationalism” to hold this Empire together 
(2006: 6).
While the FPTP system in Britain encouraged British politics to be fought in 
England, in Canada it encouraged statewide parties to adopt and cater to regional 
strongholds, creating de-facto regional parties.  This was especially true after the 
1993 election; the national parliament could hardly be called ‘national’ as all of the 
parties were regionalized.  The governing Liberal Party, which claimed to be the only 
national party because they were the only party to have representation in every 
province (at least until 1997), were in reality an Ontario based party with 
representation in other provinces.  Figure 5.4 uses the 2000 election to demonstrate 
how the electoral system exacerbates regional differences.  This figure recreates the 
election results from 2000 assuming that a PR system using province wide lists was 
employed.
32 Former Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Chairman of 
the Conservative Party and Conservative leadership contender in 2005.
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Liberals 27.7 5 9 -4
Quebec
(75)
Liberals 44.2 36 33 +3
Alliance 49.4 23 17 +6 Alliance 6.2 5 -5
PC Party 7.3 / 3 -3 PC Party 5.6 1 4 -3
NDP 11.3 2 4 -2 NDP 1.8 1 -1
BQ BQ 39.9 38 30 +8
Alberta
(26)





Liberals 44.2 6 4 +2
Alliance 58.9 23 15 +8 Alliance 6.2 1 -1
PC Party 13.5 1 4 -3 PC Party 30.5 3 3 =









Liberals 36.5 4 4 =
Alliance 47.7 10 7 +3 Alliance 9.6 1 -1
PC Party 4.8 1 -1 PC Party 29.1 4 3 +1









Liberals 47.0 4 2 +2
Alliance 30.4 4 4 = Alliance 5
PC Party 14.5 1 2 -1 PC Party 38.4 2 -2









Liberals 44.9 5 3 +2
Alliance 23.6 2 24 -22 Alliance 3.9
PC Party 14.4 15 -15 PC Party 34.5 2 2 =





Liberals 40.8 172 121 +51
Alliance 25.5 66 74 -8
PC Party 12.2 12 39 -27
NDP 8.5 13 27 -14
BQ 10.7 38 30 +8
Source: Elections Canada.  Calculations are the author’s own, based on the province-wide 
electoral list system.  The numbers are rounded, so the numbers in the PR column may not 
equal the number of seats in the province.
This figure demonstrates how the electoral system skewed party support, 
exacerbating regional voting patterns.  What is not shown is how the misproportion of 
seats altered the popular perceptions of the parties, exacerbating the need for parties 
to appeal to their core regionally based supporters and increasing the difficulty in 
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breaking out of their regional strongholds.  As one can see from the actual results in 
Figure 5.4, while the Alliance was not far off its proportional number (a difference of 
8 seats), it only had two seats in Ontario and none east of the province.  But as can be 
seen from the provincial breakdown in Figure 5.4, the difference in a proportional 
system would not simply have been the number of seats the Alliance received, the 
fundamental difference would have been where the seats came from.  Rather than 
only 3% of its seats coming from outside the West, the provincial breakdown would 
have had over 42% of its seats coming from outside the West.  Similarly, 72% of the 
Liberal seats came from Ontario, but under a provincial system this is reduced to 42% 
in Ontario.  This indicates that under a PR system Canada would be much less 
regionalized as parties would expect to gain seats in all regions, directing resources 
(both financial and political) to all regions. 
The problems of government and balance associated with multinational states 
are exacerbated in Canada and Britain due to their highly territorialized electoral 
system, which focused parties on territorial, as opposed to statewide, competitions for 
power.  However, this aspect of territorialized politics is independent of the territorial 
identity divisions within the state.  Though the multinational nature of Canada and 
Britain increased the territorialized competition for power, it is the state that created 
the geographical boundaries and the electoral system encouraged parties to target 
resources at key constituencies, ignoring wide swathes of the state.  In both states, the 
basic functioning of democracy was directed along a territorial path by the electoral 
system, yet this was outside of the dynamics of identity politics, but in both cases 
parties were encouraged to focus electoral attention on the majority nation.
5.3 Opposing Interpretations of the State: Unionism and Pan-Nationalism in 
Canada and Britain
Canada and Britain are multi-national in two senses; 1) horizontally between 
the constituent nations, and 2) vertically between the constituent nations and the 
overarching statewide identity.  Individuals in the majority and minority nations hold 
attachment to their sub-state nations and the wider Canadian and British states (see 
Henderson 2007, Moreno 2006, Kennedy 2007, and Chapter Seven).  Often tensions 
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exist between these overlapping identities.  Chapter Two suggested that, by and large, 
people within Quebec and Scotland held the minority nation as their primary political 
loyalty, whereas members of the majority saw the state as the focus of theirs.  This 
has led actors within the minority sub-state nations to challenge state norms and 
institutions, engaging elites from the wider state.  Political actors determined that the 
best way to accommodate Quebec and Scotland was through a change in institutions. 
Yet the change in institutions, while designed to accommodate the sub-state nations, 
had to balance the interpretations of the state held in the staatsvolk.  As such the 
changes were reflective of the limits of accommodation within the majority nations.33 
Examining debate surrounding the nature of the state revealed how the 
discourse at the centre bounded and framed the debate for regional actors.  Below, 
Canadian and British statewide discourse is analyzed. The fundamentally different 
constitutional natures of Canada and Britain demand that they be analyzed separately 
to uncover commonalities.  To contextualize the discourse and highlight the 
dialectical relationship between the minority and majority nations both sections begin 
with an analysis of the secessionist challenge during the period under study, followed 
by an analysis of elite responses, showing how elites in the majority nation framed 
the state.  The final sub-section synthesizes the analysis, illustrating how the state was 
framed using the language of dominant nationalism. 
State-level Interpretations of Canada and Britain
It is not the sub-state nation as a whole that challenged the state but 
secessionist actors within the minority nation who spearheaded the challenge.  Indeed, 
in both sub-state nations prominent actors were extremely supportive of the Canadian 
and British states.  No one would question the ‘Canadian-ness’ of Prime Minister 
Jean Chrétien or the ‘Britishness’ of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, even though they 
are respectively Quebecois and Scottish.  The secessionist challenge came from 
actors within Quebec and Scotland who sought national independence.  By 
challenging the state they contributed to the political environment, which allowed 
elites to articulate their interpretation of the state.  It must be further noted that while 
33 While in Canada the proposed changes were not successful, it is the debates 
surrounding them that are analyzed.
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the wording used here may imply that the challenge originated with the minority 
nation, this chapter presents the views held within the majority nation by actors who 
may not realize the role they play in politicizing national and regional identities 
within the state.
It should be noted that not only secessionists challenge the state.  The LPQ 
may have been a ‘hard nationalist’ party, but it was federalist.   It called for a 
fundamental reordering of the Canadian constitution, devolving the vast majority of 
state power to Quebec.  It must be emphasized that it is not the provincial wing of the 
Liberal Party of Canada, and does not run in federal elections.  Similarly, Scottish 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats supported devolution in part as a means of 
defending the Union (Denver et al 1997, Lynch 2002). Although the Liberal 
Democrats have a history of advocating for the federalization of Britain, determining 
whether they should be classified as a nationalist party is problematic (Bogdanor 
1999).  This is not the case with regard to Scottish Labour.  Although they are not 
‘hard nationalist’ like the LPQ, Scottish Labour did advocate a distinctly Scottish 
interpretation of the British state. While the British Labour Party may have 
interpreted devolution in Scotland as part of a larger constitutional package, it does 
not appear that Scottish Labour did.  This was especially clear with regard to A Claim 
of Right for Scotland: the declaration of intent of the cross-party Scottish 
Constitutional Convention.34  The Claim was solely concerned with the relationship 
between Scotland and the British State—it did not mention the rest of Britain (see 
Greer 2007: 82).  In both Canada and Britain, the strongest and most fundamental 
challenge to the status quo, and to the legitimacy of the state, came from secessionist 
parties. Accordingly, central elites directed their responses at the secessionists.  
Interpretations of the Canadian State
McRoberts (1997) argues that Trudeau, in his reformation of identity in Canada 
(outside Quebec), attempted to create a post-national identity with loyalty to the state 
centred around a set of political ideals; a non-national constitutional patriotism.  Yet 
it is impossible to escape culturally (and nationally) defined interpretations of ‘good’ 
34 The Claim, in part, reads: "We acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish 
people to determine the form of Government best suited to their needs."
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and ‘just,’ and as a result patriotism becomes another term for civic nationalism 
(Yack 1999).  Trudeau’s conception of the Canadian state became the foundation of 
the interpretation of Canada held by the majority of Canadians (outside Quebec), and 
a minority in Quebec, known as ‘pan-Canadian nationalism.’  
As noted above, there are non-secessionist challenges to pan-Canadian 
nationalism in Quebec, but this section focuses on the secessionist challenge made by 
the Bloc Québécois because while the LPQ took a strongly Quebecois nationalist 
position, it did not make its voice heard within the House of Commons.  At the 
statewide level, it was only the secessionist Bloc Québécois that advocated an 
alternative view of the federation.  As such, this section begins by analysing the 
attitudes of Bloc Québécois members of parliament and their challenge to the 
Canadian state. 
Quebecois Challenges to the Canadian State
Figure 5.5 shows the support for the BQ in Canadian elections from 1993 to 
2004 (the BQ only runs in Quebec), and as can be seen they were the dominant force 
federally in Quebec.  They outstripped all other parties in seat totals in all years and 
votes in all but one year.  During this period the BQ was a powerful force, forming 
Canada’s Official Opposition from 1993 to 1997.  Using this capacity for voice, BQ 
MPs appeared to use strategies in dealing with federalists.  The first was to frame 
Canada (outside Quebec) as ‘English Canada,’ the second was to de-legitimize 
federalist French-Canadians (from inside and outside Quebec) by making it seem as if 
they had turned their backs on the Quebecois.
Quebecois minority nationalism is framed in reference to the majority 
nationalism of ‘English Canada.  According to former BQ House Leader Suzanne 
Tremblay,
Because English Canada still does not understand Québec, the constitutional 
future is doomed and we will never be recognized as a people.  According to 
the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, an essential requirement for Canada’s 
survival is a real association that can only exist between partners. (HC (Can) 
Dep 6 Dec 1995 c17290)
The threat of a homogenized state under ‘English Canada’ was clearly articulated by 
one Bloc Québécois Member who argued: “Quebec is sick … of being a society at the 
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mercy of Ottawa’s and English Canada’s whims…” (Jean-Guy Chrétien (BQ) HC 
(Can) Deb 6 Dec 1995 c17310).  
By using the term ‘English Canada’ to describe Quebec’s ‘other,’ these two MPs 
frame Quebec as the homeland of the French language to deny the Canadian state 
legitimacy over the French language.  In framing Quebec’s other as ‘English Canada’ 
they explicitly evoked the language spoken by the majority in Canada (outside 
Quebec) implicitly identifying this as different from Quebec while denying other 
provinces and the federal government a role in protecting or advancing the French 
language.  
Figure 5.5 Federal Election Results, Quebec 1993-2004
*  The PC Party numbers are only for 1993-2000
**  The Reform Party did not run candidates in Quebec in 1993, and its numbers include the 
Canadian Alliance in 2000 and the Conservative Party of Canada in 2004.  


























The BQ attempted to build upon this framing of Canada (outside Quebec) as 
‘English Canada’ to challenge the legitimacy of the federal government in Quebec.  
This was done first by portraying Quebecois politicians who were not secessionist as 
traitors to the Quebec nation.  They tried to delegitimize both individual federalist 
Quebecois Members of Parliament (also an electoral strategy), as well as the 
federation as a whole, by attacking the legitimacy of the ‘Canadian’ demos in 
Quebec.  When reading the Hansard transcripts, one can almost sense the anger 
directed towards those within Quebec who held both a pro-federal and pan-national 
view.  As a former BQ Finance critic stated:
It is unfortunate because, throughout history, officials, members of conquered 
people, hastened to do the dirty work of the conquerors or their descendants. 
Here in the House of Commons, we have 26 Liberal members from Québec, 
two of whom, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Intergovernmental 
Affairs, are doing the dirty work of the majority of English Canada against 
Québec.  (Mr Yvan Loubier (Sant-Hyacinthe – Bagot, BQ) HC (Can) 10 Feb 
2000 c1255)
The dirty work referred to here is the federal Clarity Act, and the language 
used strongly suggests that the perceived ‘collaboration’ was viewed as being 
traitorous.  Colley’s (1992) comments on wartime imagery and the threat of the 
‘other’ are extremely enlightening.  She argues that being confronted with the ‘other’ 
can be a powerful way of building shared identities;  “In the presence of an alien and 
contemptuous culture, they felt all of a sudden intensely British, brought together, 
almost despite themselves, by confrontation with the Other.” (p 311).  She argues that 
Britain was brought together by a series of massive wars between 1689 and 1815, 
(p316) and that the second Hundred Years’ War helped craft the machinery of the 
British state (p321-22).  Threat of invasion existed between 1743 and 1746, 1778 and 
1780, 1797 and 1805 and again during the Second World War.  Warfare and a 
threatening ‘other’ were powerful tools for building the British nation.  The Bloc 
seemed to employ tactics utilizing this logic, framing ‘English Canada’ as a 
threatening, conquering, and occupying other.  
Not only were Quebecois federalists framed as traitors, non-Quebecois 
Franco-Canadians who interpreted Canada as a whole as their primary political 
loyalty were framed as turning their backs on Quebec.  This is seen in the following 
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quote from Don Boudria;35
We, the francophones outside Quebec, the Acadians, the Ontarians and all the 
others, have been called all kinds of names, but are used to it.  We do not like 
it, but we are used to it.  We know those people.  [Interruption: Hon. Member 
‘Turncoat’] According to the Bloc members across the way, francophones 
outside Quebec are turncoats.  (HC (Can) Deb 17 Feb 2000 c1115)
It has been noted that Canada (outside Quebec) has a sense of ownership over the 
French language (McRoberts 1997, Kymlicka 2001) and Canadians (outside Quebec) 
see the French language as a defining part of the pan-Canadian identity.  When Bloc 
Québécois politicians attempted to frame non-Quebecois Franco-Canadians as 
“turncoats,” they alluded to the fact that these Franco-Canadians should be looking to 
Quebec, not Canada, as the homeland of the French language in North America. 
Moreover, referring to a non-Quebecois French speaker as a “turncoat”  suggests that 
BQ MPs may have seen both the federal government and non-Quebecois federalist 
Franco-Canadians as agents of ‘English Canada.’  This may also imply that the 
conception of the Quebecois nation held by this (unknown) BQ MP may not have 
been purely territorial.  Boudria was born in Quebec, but raised in Ontario and was a 
politician at the local and provincial level in Ontario before becoming a federal MP 
representing an Ontario constituency.  That he was considered a turncoat suggests the 
unknown BQ member felt Boudria should be loyal to Quebec based upon territory of 
birth, even though he was raised and politically socialized outside of Quebec. 
Quebecois identity, at least in the mind of this BQ Member, would seem not to have 
been purely civic.
In claiming sole ownership of the French language in North America, the BQ 
forced the Canadian state to respond.  Stairs (1996) notes that secessionist politicians 
in Quebec do not pay attention to the spillover their demands have on the rest of 
Canada; but by challenging the legitimacy of the Canadian government to promote 
and defend the French language, they challenged the legitimacy of the Canadian 
government to protect and promote the language of nearly a million Franco-
Canadians outside Quebec as well as the staatsvolk’s interpretations of the state.  The 
BQ frames had an important impact on Canada (outside Quebec), as part of the 
35 Then Government House Leader and onetime Minister responsible for La 
Francophonie.
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dialectical relationship between Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec), elites in 
Canada (outside Quebec) articulated their interpretations of the state in response.  The 
following sub-section addresses how Canadian (outside Quebec) elites framed the 
nature of the Canadian state in light of Quebecois nationalism.
Canadian (outside Quebec) Interpretations of the Canadian State
While Quebecois elites have historically interpreted Canada as a compact of 
peoples, the view in Canada (outside Quebec) was different.  Federalists, especially 
the federal government (the LPC) responded to secessionists by emphasizing a pan-
national vision of Canada.   While there were five parties in the Canadian House of 
Commons during this period, for the reasons outlined in Chapter Three this analysis 
centres on the Liberal and Reform Party of Canada (and its successors), as these are 
the only federalist parties that are relevant based on Sartori’s use of the term (1976).36
Chapter Four outlined the endeavours of the federal government in challenging 
Quebec nationalists.  Here parliamentary debates on the referendum of 1995 and 
‘Plan B’ are examined to highlight how pan-national appeals were made, creating the 
boundaries of debate at the centre and in the regions.  This sub-section begins by 
exploring the emphasis on Canada belonging equally to all Canadian citizens 
regardless of province or language.  Next, it examines how elites appeal to people’s 
pride in their nation and attempt to harness this pride to their particular policies. 
Finally, it shows how the nature of Canada is debated outside Quebec on a state-
province axis as opposed to a state-nation axis.  Analysing these themes allows this 
research to explore how majority state-led nationalism manifested in Canada and 
created the parameters for debate within Nova Scotia.
We Are All Canadian
The importance of a state appearing to embodying a nation was highlighted in 
Chapter Two (see Poggi 1990, Mann 1995).  Elites interpret the state as being 
representative of a single Canadian nation and demos, framing it as home to both the 
French and English languages.  They directly challenged secessionist framing of the 
36 A relevant party has either coalition or blackmail potential.
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Canadian state as ‘English’ and lacking legitimacy vis-à-vis the French language. 
This was seen, for example, when Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of the 
Environment and former government Chief Whip, Karen Redman, stated:
Those critics claim that we, the members of parliament representing all 
Canadians, are subject to unilateralism of the secessionist leaders and have no 
choice to but stand idly by should our federation break up. (Lib) HC (Can) 10 
Feb 2000 Col 1655)
One even detects a certain Burkean understanding of the role of Members of 
Parliament.  Much like Burke, she sees MPs as representing their constituencies as 
well as the (Canadian) nation as a whole (Burke 1774).  While Burke does not 
address the issues of multinationalism directly, his argument strongly indicates that a 
sense of national solidarity is required in order for MPs to adopt the dual role of 
looking after the greater interests of the state/nation as well as the interests of the 
electors.  Reform also argued ‘we are all Canadian,’ but in keeping with their roots in 
Western Alienation (Tomblin 1995, Flanagan 1995, Melnyck 1993, Manning 1992), 
they felt the Canadian state was failing in its duty to the Canadian nation spending far 
too much time on Quebec instead of other parts of the federation. 
Due to Canada’s massive size and sparse population, Quebec’s nationalist 
movement and issues of Quebec separatism were not seen as being important by all. 
As Cohen (1996) and Hearn (2007) note, people’s interpretations of the nation stem 
from how they experience the nation as individuals.  People in Western Canada do 
not have the same relationship with Quebec as Ontario or the Atlantic Provinces, 
which would have to deal with Quebec independence in a more real and immediate 
manner.  Some Westerners felt the state focused on Quebec to the exclusion of ‘real’ 
problems facing them and their communities.  As one Reform MP noted:
[P]eople from western Canada, particularly my area, look upon this more as a 
debate down east that does not make reference to them… As Westerners are 
looking at this debate this afternoon, many of the people in my constituency 
are asking what we are arguing about.  They are losing their farms.  To them 
this is not an important issue over their individual issues…  (Roy Bialey (Ref) 
HC (Can) 13 Mar 2000 c1745)
This quote emphasizes not only the highly regionalized nature of the Canadian state, 
but the political ability Quebecois elites had to make their ‘voice’ heard at the centre 
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in competition with other parts of the federation (an ability that is of particular 
concern to Nova Scotia elites, see Chapter Six).
While the Bloc Québécois framed Quebec as the only French speaking 
jurisdiction in North America, in response other Francophone Canadians accepted the 
pan-national identity as a way of protecting their own distinct heritage (Cardinal 
2007, Foucher 2007).  As Cardinal (2004) notes, bilingualism in Canada has been 
used by Canadian elites as a tool to foster national unity since the 1960s, but the 
federal language policy is in tension with Quebec’s. The federal government viewed 
language as individual and personal, while Quebec viewed it as territorial and 
collective.  According to Foucher (2007) this has led to two different language 
policies in Quebec; one for the federal government and one for the provincial.  This 
competition between the two orders of government claiming to be the defender of the 
French language had non-Quebecois franco-Canadians aligning themselves with the 
federal government.  As a Franco-Ontarian Liberal, and former Minister for 
International Co-operation and Minister for La Francophonie (amongst other 
portfolios) stated:
I cannot accept the breakup of my country, of our country.  We are all 
Canadians.  We are part of a large family, and it is our ancestors, mine and 
those of the members over there who are trying to break up our country, who 
helped to build this great country.  As a francophone member from Northern 
Ontario, I am proud of my language and I am proud of my beautiful country… 
(Hon Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib) HC (Can) 14 Dec 1999 Col 1510) 
While the two main parties broadly interpreted the state in a manner which 
recognized everyone as being equally Canadian, political actors were not the only 
actors who got a decisive say at the centre in Canada.  As a federation, Canada has a 
constitutional court, the Supreme Court of Canada, to offer an impartial view of the 
nature of the state in disputes between the different orders of government.
To determine what view of the Canadian state was advanced by the Court, one 
need look no further than the Reference re Quebec Secession.  Above, it was 
emphasized that Canada belongs to all Canadians, a position also adopted by the 
Supreme Court as the Court saw French and English speaking Canadians being 
equally citizens.  Being a citizen of Canada was not mediated through membership in 
a language community, and Quebecois could not claim to be disadvantaged;
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For close to 40 of the last 50 years, the Prime Minister of Canada has been a 
Quebecer.  During this period, Quebecers have held from time to time all the 
most important positions in the federal Cabinet.  During the 8 years prior to 
June 1997, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Official Opposition in the 
House of Commons were both Quebecers.  At present, the Prime Minister of 
Canada, the Right Honourable Chief Justice and two other members of the 
Court, the Chief of Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian 
ambassador to the United States, not to mention the Deputy Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, are all Quebecers.  (Supreme Court of Canada 1998: 
135(16))
In focusing on individuals, the Court indicated national sentiment was not an 
impediment to success in the Canadian federation.  Yet while constitutional 
patriotism may be read in the Court’s decision, Kymlicka notes that Quebecois 
confidence, and in turn success, in the system is not related to their attachment to 
Canada.  He states that over time, as confidence in Canadian institutions has 
increased in Quebec, Quebecois attachment to Canada has decreased (2003: 38).  As 
such, the argument advanced by the Court above, that Quebecois are extremely 
successful, may not have been relevant to the Quebecois.  Secessionists knew the 
state did not discriminate against them as Quebecois nationalism is fundamentally 
about the legitimacy to govern Quebec.  Counter-intuitively it was the pan-national 
interpretation of Canada that became the foundation of Quebec (or any other 
province) suceeding the federation.  While the Supreme Court ruled Canada was 
divisible, Quebec did not have the right to secede as a nation, rather; 
The constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the people of Canada. 
It lies within the power of the people, acting through their various 
governments duly elected and recognized under the constitution, to effect 
whatever constitutional arrangements are desired in Canadian territory, 
including, should it be so desired, the secession of Quebec from Canada. 
(Supreme Court of Canada 1998: para 85)
Canada is divisible because it is sovereign as a whole and can do whatever it chooses, 
even sever itself in two.
Canada the Great
As can be seen, the main federalist parties in the House of Commons and the 
Supreme Court advanced a pan-nationalist interpretation of the state.  However, 
interpreting the state is a passive act; nationalism and regionalism require action.  The 
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active component of majority nationalism comes from appeals to a pan-national sense 
of Canadian solidarity stemming from Canada’s national ‘greatness’ and the shared 
endeavours which crafted this ‘great’ state.  Appeals to greatness are identified within 
broader nationalism literature, but has generally been examined with regard to 
minority nationalism.  Hutchinson (2000) argues that nationalists hark to a ‘golden 
age.’  While he presents this as occurring in the past, for pan-Canadian nationalists 
the golden age may be in the present (see Kymlicka 2003: 360).
 This appeal to Canada’s ‘golden age,’ its current (and self-ascribed) 
‘greatness,’ functions to combat Quebecois nationalism by attempting to unite 
Canadians across language and regional divides.  It differs from merely emphasizing 
commonalities as it appealed to a sense of ownership and belonging within the 
Canadian national project.  As one Nova Scotian stated:
Over the last 128 years Canadians have built a country that is the envy of the 
world.  We have built a land that is prosperous and a country based on shared 
values such as peace, compassion and tolerance.  (John Murphy (Lib) HC (Can) 
Deb 30 Oct 1995 c15963)
According to this discourse, Canadian greatness is not just something Canadians can 
be proud of, it is something that others around the world can look to.  Kymlicka 
argues that greatness on the world stage is a self-ascribed identity marker in Canada; 
“Canadians nurture and cherish an identity of good citizens of the world, and view 
their flag and passport as internationally recognized symbols of that goodness” 
(p360).  During the period under study, two particular aspects of Canada’s self 
ascribed contribution to the world were emphasized by elites: multiculturalism and 
equality.  
The fundamental overriding principle of being Canadian is equality for 
everyone.  If we do not have equality for all of us then we have equality for no 
one.  It is something that Canadians have fought for in two world wars, which 
the brave men and women in our armed forces fight for today, peace and 
equality in far off lands.  (Mr. Keith Martin (Ref) HC (Can) 1 Dec 1995 Col 
17095)
While the values identified as being ‘Canadian’ are of a universal-liberal nature, they 
were appealed to by calling upon Canadian frames and common memories, most 
notably with reference to overcoming a hostile environment in building Canada.
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In general, when nationalists appeal to common sacrifice they allude to war or 
similar encounters with a clear and dangerous ‘other.’ The common sacrifice frame 
utilized in Canada appears to reference ‘wilderness’ and geography as the enemy that 
was defeated by the shared efforts of Canadians.  Indeed, terms like ‘wilderness’ and 
‘north’ are often used as Canada is so large that no single geographic marker fits 
(Marshall 2008).  Kaufmann (1998) notes that images of ‘The North’ have had a 
major impact upon Canadian identity.  This could be of particular importance to a 
settler society in which the official state-led nationalism may be wary of offending 
any immigrant groups (Granatstein 1998: 115).  
When warfare is invoked, as it was by then Reform MP Keith Martin,37 it is 
tied to values advanced within Canadian nationalism.  Martin linked Canada’s 
greatness and place in the world with a sense of common cause and sacrifice, and 
while using a militaristic frame, he did not identify any single group as the enemy, 
focusing on concepts of peace and equality for which Canadians struggle.  This 
accords with Canadians’ self perception of their country as a peacekeeper as opposed 
to a war-fighter (Granatstein 1998, 1995 Bothwell 1998).  Yet, as Granatstein notes 
(1998), this self perception is at odds with Canadian history.  In this sense, ‘official’ 
Canadian nationalism supports Renan’s observation that nationalists often get history 
wrong (1882).
Equal Citizens, Equal Provinces: the Unionist Interpretation of Canada  
The above sub-sections have highlighted consensus within the Liberal and 
Reform interpretations of the Canadian state.  However, consensus regarding 
everyone being equally Canadian does not mean that both parties are in agreement on 
all aspects of equal citizenship.  This is especially true with regard to the role of the 
provinces held by Reform. The Reform Party, in advocating for a uniform sense of 
citizenship across Canada exhibited a unionist streak, interpreting Canada as a union 
of equal provinces, not equal nations.  
37 Martin did not join the new Conservative Party of Canada when it was formed, 
although he was a contender for the Leadership of the Canadian Alliance.  He sat as 
an Independent after the merger and ran, and was re-elected, as a Liberal in 2004.
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The Reform Party expanded outwards from the West, appealing to a common 
sense of alienation across the federation.  The founder and leader of the Reform 
Party, Preston Manning, argued that Canada needed:
… a fundamental rebalancing of the federal and provincial powers that 
focuses Ottawa on national and international matters, and gives every 
province the tools it needs, including jurisdiction over language and culture, to 
develop the unique and distinctive features of their economies and societies. 
(Manning Speech 25 Nov 1996) 
The rebalancing that Manning called for was not just in relation to Quebec.  Although 
Manning believed there was a universal desire amongst all Canadians (regardless of 
province) to jettison what he refers to as ‘The Old Canada’ (Manning 1992), this 
alienation seemed to exhibit two apparently contradictory aspects.  The first was a 
call for greater provincial autonomy, that the federal government should respect the 
constitutionally enshrined spheres of the provincial governments.  At the same time, 
the Reform party was advocating for greater participation in central decision making 
for Western Canada, epitomized by its first slogan—“The West Wants In.” 
Returning to Choudhry (2007), this would appear to have been an attempt to both 
integrate and accommodate; the Reform party advocated a position that granted 
autonomy to the provinces while integrating provincial elites at the statewide level.  
Reform’s interpretation of the Canadian state seemed to inhibit it from a) 
accepting official recognition of Quebec distinctiveness that would enable Quebec 
citizens to enjoy a different relationship with the state than other citizens, and b) 
giving Quebec special powers to protect its unique culture.  This is not to say that 
Reformers did not accept Quebec’s uniqueness, rather Reform’s interpretation of 
Canada did not allow for asymmetrical arrangements.  Diane Ablonczy, then Reform 
Party whip (and current Secretary of State for Small Business and Tourism), stated:
All Canadians recognize Quebec’s cultural, social and historic distinctiveness 
but they do not want one province given special powers and status in the 
federation. (HC (Can) 1 Nov 1995 c16061)
Reformers advocated a position, which viewed each province as being unique, with 
Canada not only being founded by French and English speaking peoples.  This was 
seen when Ablonczy noted, in the same speech as the quote above:  
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New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island are 
equally proud of their social, historical, and cultural distinctiveness.  In fact, 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were two of the four original founders of 
our country, along with Ontario and Québec. (HC (Can) 1 Nov 1995 c16061)
The appeal to equality of citizenry was clearly articulated by then Reform MP Keith 
Martin; “The fundamental overriding principal of being Canadian is equality for 
everyone.  If we do not have equality for all of us then we have equality for no one” 
(HC (Can) 1 Dec 1995 c17095).  Equality of citizens was equated with equality of 
provinces, as seen when fellow Reform MP John Williams (MP for St Albert, 
Alberta) stated: 
I cannot support distinct society for any province.  I cannot support elevating 
one province over another...  I believe in equality and fairness for every man, 
woman, and child in this country regardless of their race, colour, creed, origin, 
or abilities. (HC (Can) 6 Dec 1995 c17329)
The issue being debated may have been distinct society status for Quebec, but the 
underlying issue for these members was the equality of people.  While the Liberal 
party appeared unwilling to mitigate Canadian citizenship through belonging to any 
group other than a Canadian one, this was not so in the case of the Reform Party.  The 
position advanced by Reformers recognized the legitimacy of the provinces, but also 
provincial equality.  This is a trend that has been commented on before; Canadians 
recognize Quebec’s distinctiveness but are unwilling to grant it constitutional 
recognition (Mendelssohn 2002: 76).  In this sense, Reformers appeared to be 
advancing an interpretation of Canada articulated by former Progressive Conservative 
Party of Canada Prime Minister, Joe Clarke,38 who claimed Canada was a 
“community of communities.”
Reform’s unionist oriented discourse identified ‘culture’ as being something 
separate from the state.  Returning to the pure-type definition of unionism advanced 
in Chapter Two, this appears to support an interpretation of Reform being unionist in 
their outlook as it is the constituent members who should be advancing culture.  Yet 
one cannot escape the founding of Reform in Western Alienation.  Their stance 
38 While Clarke was a Progressive Conservative, he did not join the Conservative 
Party of Canada after the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive 
Conservative Party of Canada.
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against the federal government wielding power over culture could also be seen as a 
way of protecting, at the provincial level, their interpretation of Canada against state-
led interpretations favoured in central Canada.  This sense of alienation stemmed 
from the fact that other regions were left out of the official discourse, which 
concentrated on the dualism inherited from the legacy of the United Province of 
Canada, now Ontario and Quebec.  This alienation was explicitly expressed by 
another Reformer, Val Meredith (MP for South Surrey-White Rock-Langley in 
British Columbia), who stated:
Alienation from the rest of Canada is not unique to Quebec.  The hon. 
member should try living in British Columbia on the other side of the Rockies 
to know what real alienation is all about. (HC (Can) 14 Dec 1999 c1600)
Taken together, the comments by Meredith and Ablonczy appear to advance an 
agenda that saw alienation on the one hand and a drive to universalism on the other as 
a product of the political system unrelated to national identity in Quebec.  Note, 
however, that while these MPs may have been appealing to a province oriented 
conception of the Canadian state, they were, in fact, crafting a pan-national sense of 
alienation, highlighting that people from every part of Canada feel alienated in the 
political system (Manning 1992).
Reform was willing to give all provinces the tools to advance culture because 
they felt that all provinces were unique.  As a strong defender of provincial rights, 
Reform was by no means a centralist party, interpreting the federation as a federation 
of equal provinces and citizens, not a union of two peoples, nor a state in which the 
federal government was paramount.  This interpretation of the Canadian state was 
unionist, but also pan-national; citizenship was defined on a statewide basis and 
mitigated through the provinces, not nations.  The constitutional changes championed 
by Reform during this period, while pro-province, may have acted to strengthen the 
centre over the provinces.  For example, the Triple E Senate (Elected, Equal and 
Effective) would have increased the legitimacy of federal decision making by 
fulfilling Choudhry’s condition that a successful constitution simultaneously 
accommodates and integrates (2007). 
173
Conclusion on Canada Debates
The analysis of elite debate in Canada has shown that while there were 
competing views amongst federalists as to the nature of the state, there appeared to be 
near universal support for the ‘Canada as nation’ interpretation of the Canadian state. 
The Liberal and the Reform Party of Canada (and Reform’s successors) articulated 
different views of how Canada should be organized.  Neither party interpreted 
Quebec’s national identity and legitimacy as being co-equal to that of either Canada 
(outside Quebec) or Canada as a whole.  Elite debate during this period manifested 
itself along the lines of state-building nationalism and denied Quebec national 
legitimacy.  Elites appealed to commonalities shared by all Canadians, epitomized by 
common cause, sacrifice and a sense of greatness.  This interpretation was given the 
backing of the Supreme Court of Canada which interpreted the relationship between 
citizen and state as being direct.  It has been noted that post 1982, citizenship in 
Canada (outside Quebec) was conceived as based upon an equality of citizens and 
provinces (Cairns 1995, 1993, 1991 Nevitte 1996, Brodie and Nevitte 1993).  This re-
conceptualization of Canada appears to have ensured that unionist interpretations 
from outside of Quebec were based upon a provincial, not a national, compact.  With 
regard to regional debates, this suggests regional elites would be constrained in their 
ability to advocate a position that fundamentally differed from the state-led 
nationalism of the centre, yet ensured provinces a role in defining the nature of the 
Canadian state.
British Debates
The investigation of the British state begins with an exploration of how 
Scottish nationalists managed to indirectly challenge the state and leads to an 
examination of central responses to this challenge.  The exploration is conducted in 
the same manner as in Canada, through an analysis of the debates themselves. 




Prior to 1999 and the creation of the devolved administrations, the only place 
official (and democratic) debate on both the future and nature of the British state 
could take place was in the House of Commons.  While serious debate did take place 
outside of Westminster (the Scottish Constitutional Convention), this was outside the 
state’s constitutional framework, and needed political parties (Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats) to champion it inside the House of Commons.  As such, while the SNP 
challenged the British state, it did so indirectly as the SNP never had meaningful 
representation in the House of Commons; the only time they became a ‘relevant 
party’ having an influence in the House was during a minority government in the 
1970s. 
The SNP’s lack of relevance, however, was inside the legislature; instead, it 
conducted its challenge from outside, challenging Labour’s hegemony in Scotland. 
The FPTP electoral system punished the SNP in Scotland due to the SNP lacking a 
strong regional base unlike the less popular Liberal Democrats who had a strong base 
in the Highlands and Islands enabling them to receive more seats with less popular 
support.39  As the SNPs popularity was spread throughout Scotland, it was in the 
interest of Labour MPs to keep the SNP at bay to maintain Labour’s hegemony in 
Scotland. Labour elites felt that this could be achieved through devolution, which 
would simultaneously accomplish two goals; 1) it would confront the SNP at the 
polls, and 2) it would buttress the Union in Scotland (Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 
2002: 123).  Bogdanor (1999: 138) notes that only twice, prior to 1997, had Labour 
won a majority of seats in England; the Scottish secessionist challenge created the 
prospect of Labour becoming a permanent party of opposition.  Accordingly, 
Scotland was disproportionately important to Labour’s success.  Though the SNP 
challenged Labour in Scotland, its lack of relevance to the British state as a whole 
needs to be addressed.  Given the small number of MPs that the SNP sends to 
Westminster (six at the time of writing, less than 1% of total MPs), they lack the 
ability to challenge the state.  As such, efforts to confront the SNP have little 
39 For example in the 2001 election, the SNP received 20.1% of the popular vote 
compared to 16.3 for the Liberal Democrats but the SNP only received five seats 
compared to 10.
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resonance in England.  This was best illustrated in the 1997 election vis-à-vis 
devolution.
As the 1997 general election ushered in both Labour and devolution, it may 
come as some surprise that the issue of devolution, which fundamentally changed the 
relationship between citizen and state in Scotland did not matter in England.  This 
was seen not only in polling, but also in how little mention was made of it in 
academic studies of the 1997 election.  The term ‘devolution’ has just three pages 
listed in the index in Butler and Kavanagh’s (1997) ‘The British General Election of 
1997,’ two pages in Jones’s (1997) ‘Campaign 1997,’ and it is not even listed as a 
separate category in the index of Norris and Gavin’s (1997) ‘Britain Votes 1997.’  In 
Geddes and Tonge’s (1997) ‘Labour’s Landslide’ the category ‘devolution and 
devolved Parliament/assembly’ has a total of 25 pages listed in the index.  These, 
however, are all found in three chapters that specifically dealt with constitutional 
issues; Fisher’s (1997) chapter on third and minor parties, Mitchell’s (1997) chapter 
on constitutional reform, and Tonge’s (1997) chapter on Northern Ireland.  It did not 
appear in chapters dealing with more general, statewide issues.
During the campaign itself, Deacon, Golding and Billig (1997) show that the 
broad category of ‘constitutional issues’ received scant media attention, not even 
registering as a concern in public opinion polling in England (Whitely 1997: 44). 
Devolution had overwhelming support amongst the Scottish electorate but was not an 
issue for the English.  In his examinations of public attitudes since devolution, 
Curtice (2006, 2005) has noted that the English people by and large do not care about 
the issue.  When Conservative Prime Minister John Major attempted to use 
devolution to warn the English of dangers to the Union, it had no resonance, though 
he argued it was “teenage madness” that would destroy the Union (Brown 1997: 
152).  Major was convinced that his passionate defence of the Union in 1992 saved 
the Conservatives from defeat then, and during the 1997 election he attempted to 
“revive the spirit of Union in Scotland” (Taylor 2002: 84).  That Major saved the 
Union was a myth that permeated the Conservative Party (Mitchell 1997: 140); it was 
the only major party to campaign for a constitutional status quo (Norris 1997: 9). 
This is not to say that supporting the status quo was merely an electoral strategy, 
176
Major was truly concerned about the fate of the minority nations under a Labour 
government (Butler and Kavanagh 1997). 
The Scottish National Party challenged the British state indirectly by 
challenging the Labour dominance of Scotland.  While only resonating at an elite 
level in England elites are able to act as agenda setters.  While devolution and the 
place of Scotland in the Union may not have been a mass issue, it did have a great 
impact on the two major parties.  For Labour it was part of an (aborted) plan for 
regional devolution in England in addition to the minority nations.  Much 
parliamentary time from 1997 to 2004 was spent discussing constitutional issues that 
were a direct result of the Scottish nationalist challenge to Labour in Scotland.  While 
the nationalist challenge in Scotland was not nearly as powerful and visible in the 
majority nation as the Quebec challenge was in Canada (outside Quebec), it had a 
substantial impact on the British constitution.
Central Interpretations of the British State
To analyze how elites framed the British State, this sub-section is divided into 
three parts.  Firstly, it shows how elites appealed to a sense of pan-national solidarity. 
Secondly, it explores the two ways the state is understood, as Britain or the United 
Kingdom.  Finally, it tackles the apparent contradiction that Labour, the most pan-
national party, advanced devolution in Scotland.  Overall this section demonstrates 
that the dominant discourse in Britain was pan-national and how this discourse 
framed elite debate at the regional level.
British Solidarity
Both Labour and the Conservatives used appeals to a sense of British 
‘greatness,’ yet emphasized this ‘greatness’ in different ways, demonstrating not only 
their divide on a left-right axis, but their fundamentally different conceptions of the 
nature of Britain.  The Conservative appeal centred on a traditional concept of Britain 
and the Union.  In their 1992 manifesto they stated: “Britain is far greater than the 
sum of its parts.  Over many centuries its nations have worked, and frequently fought, 
side by side” (Conservative 1992: 66).  This quote exemplifies the way in which the 
Conservatives framed the British state during the period under study.  First, it 
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describes Britain as a Union of nations working in concert.  Second, it states that the 
Union produces a synergy allowing all the Union nations to be more successful 
within the Union than without, justifying the Union without eroding the national 
sentiment of its nations.  Third, it appeals to moments of past British greatness when 
member nations worked together in the face of an aggressive ‘other.’  While this 
quote explicitly brings to mind the common cause and sacrifice from the First and 
Second World Wars, Conservatives also used the Empire and Imperial imagery in 
describing the British state, as seen in the following example from Peter Brooke40 
after the Labour victory of 1997;
The people have spoken.  The battle of Isandlwana is over and the defence of 
the mission station at Rorke’s Drift is about to begin.  At the heart of that 
defence will be the adherence to the principle that has been at the heart of the 
Conservative party for the past 300 years, not least on the constitution. (Peter 
Brooke HC 16 May1997 c309-310) 
Here Kumar’s (2006) point that Empire is seen as a ‘good thing’ in the construction 
of national identity in England is supported.  As Hutchinson (2000: 653-5) contends, 
the past and the memory of it are powerful ways of influencing the present. 
Nationalist movements tend to look back to moments of historic national greatness. 
Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that these unifying national images were 
used by state level elites in advancing the national identity of the state, appealing to 
people’s solidarity with the state while subtly reminding them of the ‘other.’
Whereas the Conservatives emphasized historic greatness and common 
sacrifice in their pan-British appeals to solidarity, Labour approached identity 
differently, appealing to the future and British potential.  In his forward in the 1997 
Labour manifesto, Tony Blair stated:  
New Labour is the political arm of none other than the British people as a 
whole.  Our values are the same: the equal worth of all, with no one cast 
aside; fairness and justice within strong communities. (Labour 1997: 2)
This quote epitomizes New Labour’s understanding of the British state.  Firstly, it 
emphasizes the British, not constituent, nation.  Secondly, while the norms and values 
40 Chairman of the Conservative Party 1987-1989, Paymaster General 1987-1989, 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1989-1992, Secretary of State for National 
Heritage 1992-1994 and currently The Rt Hon The Lord Brooke of Sutton 
Mandeville.
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are liberal-universal they are presented as the norms and values of the British people 
“as a whole.”  In this sense, appealing to the common cultural values of all Britons 
acted to deny the political legitimacy of the individual Union nations.  Thirdly, there 
is no appeal to the groups that make up Britain.  Blair only mentions ‘communities,’ 
an ill-defined concept.  This is in sharp contrast to the Conservatives who emphasized 
the Union nature of the state.  Note also that Blair introduced the term ‘fairness,’ 
which is particularly important to regional elites, as will be seen in Chapter Six.  
Great Britain or a United Kingdom?
The above indicates that the Conservative interpretation of Britain was 
unionist and Labour’s pan-national.  However, both appealed to the British people as 
a whole; the key difference was whether the appeal was to Great Britain or the 
United Kingdom.  In the vernacular these two terms seem interchangeable, yet they 
indicate two different interpretations of the British state while appealing to a greater 
whole.  This signifies a convergence between the Conservatives and Labour who both 
see a single pan-national people.  This convergence was seen when Conservative MP 
Stephen Day41 stated;
I belong to a nation that has barely been mentioned by any hon. Members in 
the debate, because I am not English, Scots, Welsh or Irish – I am British, and 
very proud of it… We should remember that this is the British parliament. 
We already have a Scottish Parliament and this is it.  There is already an 
English Parliament and this is it.” (HC 31 July 1997 c513)
Day did not claim that the Scots and the English should not have a voice or be 
represented; rather he argued that they were both already represented in the British 
parliament.  While recognizing the existence of the constituent nations, he felt the 
British nation should take precedence; one cannot be 
English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish without being British.  This brings to mind 
Cohen (1996) and Hearn’s (2007) interpretations of personal nationalism.  British 
identity may be interpreted and lived through membership in one of the Union nations
—the Scottish experience of Britain is Scottish and the English experience of Britain 
is English.  
41 MP for Cheadle 1987-2001 and Secretary of the Association of Conservative Clubs.
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As Britishness may be more closely aligned with Englishness than other 
national identities (Crick 1991, Kumar 2006, 2003, Aughey 2001, Colls 2002), when 
Day emphasized his ‘Britishness,’ it may actually have been a factor of his 
‘Englishness.’  Indeed, Colls argues that Britain was the result of England 
incorporating Scotland and Wales into itself and re-branding itself ‘Britain’ (Colls 
2002: 377).  This notion of England-as-Britain was seen when English Members of 
Parliament slipped between England and Britain, as Bernard Jenkins appears to;42
England is the mother of Parliaments… Our Parliament here at Westminster has 
established countless constitutions for new nations around the world... (HC 30 
June 2004 c318)
According to former North East Conservative MP Tim Devlin,43 “Scotland has a 
separate, national identity...  Many Scots refer to their country as a nation.” (HC Deb 
25 Nov 91 c526)  Devlin did not suggest that England had a separate national 
identity; rather that Scotland had a separate identity from the British (i.e. English) 
norm.  The Englishness of Britain was, according to Bogdanor (1999), recognized by 
Prime Minister Thatcher, who acknowledged that Britain was indeed English as 
England is the majority.
That concepts of ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ were often conflated within England is 
extremely important in understanding how elites interpreted the state, creating a 
homogenized sense of the British state in the minds of the English.  This confused not 
only the place of England within Britain, but also of Scotland.  This was exacerbated 
within wider devolution debates when Scotland and Wales were presented alongside 
English regions.  In the 1992 Labour manifesto, Scotland and Wales were co-opted 
into England-as-Britain and presented alongside the English regions;
We will establish new Regional Development Agencies in England, 
strengthen Scottish Enterprise and the Welsh Development Agency and 
modernise regional incentives.  Regional agencies will become powerhouses 
for industrial development, encouraging investment, technology and skills. 
(Labour 1992: 6)
42 Former Shadow Secretary of State for Defence and Vice Chairman of the 
Conservative Party.
43 Notable for being a Conservative from the North East of England.
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Scotland and Wales were initially presented as separate nations alongside England, 
but as the paragraph progresses it becomes clear that Scottish Enterprise and the 
Welsh Development Agency are on par with English RDAs.  Scotland and Wales are 
part of Labour’s pan-national plan for the regions of Britain; they are British regions. 
This discussion suggests that while the parties were influenced by unionist 
and pan-nationalist interpretations of the British state, they broadly converged in a 
pan-national interpretation that saw the British demos as being the only source of 
democratic legitimacy.  The Conservatives leaned more towards a unionist 
interpretation of the British state than Labour, but nevertheless displayed pan-national 
tendencies alongside their unionism.  With regard to identity appeals, the 
Conservatives, not surprisingly, took a ‘conservative’ approach, appealing to the 
historical successes of the Union.  Labour took a future focused approach,44 
presenting what the British nation and people could achieve (Kavanagh 1997: 30).  In 
the end, both parties expressed pan-national interpretations of the state.  
Devolution without Recognition
As the Conservatives based their understanding of the British state upon 
unionist interpretations, it may appear contradictory that Labour gave democratic 
institutional recognition to Scottish and Welsh distinctiveness through devolution. 
Counter-intuitively, closer inspection indicates Labour’s pan-national view was better 
placed to implement devolution.  Blair was sceptical of devolution (Taylor 2002: 101-
104, Parks and Elcock: 9), but supported it because it was a settled issue within the 
Scottish wing of the party.45  Historically Labour has had a very ambiguous 
relationship with Home Rule.  In Scotland some of the leading figures in the early 
Labour Party were extremely supportive. Thomas Johnston, for example, helped 
found the Scottish Home Rule Council (Fraser 2000: 145).  Yet Johnston personally 
embodied Labour’s shift with regard to Home Rule.  As Labour Secretary of State for 
44 This should not be read either in a pejorative manner with regard to the 
Conservatives, or a normative judgement with regard to Labour, it merely identifies 
the differing strategies employed in advocating differing interpretations of the British 
state.
45 This is not to say that no one from Scottish Labour was opposed to devolution; Tam 
Dalyell remained opposed to it, for example.
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Scotland in Churchill’s wartime coalition, he experienced the power of this position 
in advancing the interests of Scotland within the British state (Bogdanor 1999:113). 
By the end of the war he was a staunch unionist, warning that a Scottish Parliament 
would have nothing to administer but “an emigration system, a glorified Poor Law 
and a graveyard” (Johnston 1952 in Bogdanor 1999: 138).  This coincided with a 
desire in the Scottish trade union movement for national (statewide) bargaining to 
increase its power.  Since then, Scottish Labour has had a very difficult relationship 
with Home Rule.   It was not until the 1970s that Home Rule was once again on the 
agenda in the Labour Party, but many in the party remained sceptical of it (Denver et 
al. 2000: 7).  This is not surprising as Labour played a more significant role than the 
Conservatives in integrating Scotland into Britain (Denver et al. 2000: 13).  Indeed, 
while a successful policy in its own right devolution may represent Labour’s failure 
to craft a common statewide narrative of Britishness or even a unified concept of 
social citizenship—although given that Scotland has always had its own autonomous 
institutions, it is not surprising that a statewide British narrative did not penetrate as 
deeply in Scotland as it did in England.  
To understand how Labour was able to grant devolution to Scotland one must 
examine Labour’s constitutional reform package and its discourse on the nature of 
Britain.  This not only reveals how devolution was granted to Scotland, but 
contextualizes the place of English regions within Labour’s conception of the British 
state.  If Scotland is regarded as a region of Britain rather than a Union nation (with 
corresponding political legitimacy), devolution does not pose as much of a challenge 
to the state as it would if one held a unionist interpretation of the state, especially if 
devolution is seen as part of a larger constitutional settlement involving the English 
regions.  In this regard Hazell’s work on the English Question is most enlightening. 
Hazell argues the English Question differs depending on one’s interpretation of the 
Question, the problems it addresses, and the nature of the British state.  The unionist 
answer to the English Question is all-England devolution, creating an English 
Parliament.  Yet an English Parliament within the British state would be very 
lopsided, and in turn would completely unbalance the state (Hazell 2006a and b, 
Tomaney 2005: 117).  Those who hold unionist interpretations cannot support 
devolution, as it would tear the union apart.  Conversely, pan-national answers are 
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regional, and posing little threat to the integrity of the British state allow for rolling 
devolution along the lines of the Spanish model (see Giordino and Roller 2004).
Labour’s ability to advance devolution is a direct consequence of the 
dominance of the English staatsvolk, which is such that even Scottish Members of 
Parliament used English markers to articulate their demands.  A prominent example 
was Gordon Brown who, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, appeared anxious to defend 
his ‘Britishness,’ but used English markers to express his understanding of 
Britishness.  This was most apparent in his speech to the Fabian Society entitled ‘The 
Future of Britishness.’  When discussing the constitutional problems facing the 
British, he did not mention devolution.  Rather, he argued:
…for fear of losing our British identity, Britain did not face up to some of the 
great constitutional questions, whether it be the second chamber, the 
relationship of the legislative to the executive, or the future of local 
government.  (Brown 2006)
He cited Britishwide concerns, but made no mention of issues that have an impact on 
the minority nations, most importantly Home Rule: a constitutional question from the 
19th Century, which sundered Ireland in two at the beginning of the 20th Century and 
created the Scottish Parliament at the end of it.  In the historical examples Brown 
cited, British history is in fact English history;
…a golden thread which runs through British history, that runs from that long 
ago day in Runneymede in 1215; on to the Bill of Rights in 1689 where 
Britain became the first country to successfully assert the power of the 
Parliament over the King.  (Brown 2006)
Not only did he confuse Britain and England prior to the creation of Britain in 1707, 
but he may have surprised his Scottish countrymen, who would likely have argued 
that the Declaration of Arbroath is a much earlier example of limits placed upon the 
monarch.46  
While the values Brown conveyed in his speech are clearly of a universalistic 
liberal norm, the examples used to convey them are English; Brown uses English 
history to craft Britishness, normalizing the Englishness of Britain.  Indeed, Renan’s 




(1882) observation that nationalists not only forget certain historical events, but often 
get them wrong, is worthy of note here, not because Brown is getting history wrong 
(a common occurrence in the debates), but by framing British history in this manner, 
he appeared to be appealing to the conception of the British state held by the English 
staatsvolk, saying ‘we are all the same.’
This narrative used by Brown was a necessary component of the devolution 
process, as devolution to Scotland and Wales proceeded not because they are nations 
deserving recognition (if so there may have been a stronger case for all-England 
devolution), rather Scotland and Wales had the strongest demand for devolution out 
of all the regions of Britain.  Following devolution to Scotland and Wales came the 
creation of the Greater London Assembly as part of the first stage of devolution at the 
regional level in England; this was followed by an abortive attempt to devolve in all 
Northern regions and a failed attempt in the North East.  The logic of the Supreme 
Court of Canada discussed earlier can be found in this process of differentiated 
devolution, namely that asymmetrical devolution proceeded because British people as 
a whole are sovereign and as such can organize the administration of Britain as they 
choose.
Dominant Interpretations and Majority Nationalism 
The above sub-sections demonstrated that when nationalists in Quebec and 
Scotland challenged dominant interpretations of Canada and Britain, central elites 
responded with state-led nationalism.  Elites in both states appealed to a pan-national 
conception of the state across the entirety of the state.  How the appeal was made 
depended on the party’s interpretation of the state.  The major statewide parties held 
different conceptions of the state, but their appeals focused on solidarity and equal 
citizenship for all.  In Canada, the Liberals appealed to a pan-national (explicitly 
termed pan-Canadian) identity, while Reform and their successors appealed to 
federal, or unionist, conceptions of the Canadian state.  In Britain, Labour used a 
strong pan-nationalist discourse focusing on Britain, while the Conservative rhetoric 
focused on the Union.  Both unionist interpretations, federalism in Canada and the 
Union in Britain, were presented in a manner that framed every citizen as being 
equal.  
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This section appears to ignore the issues of regionalism as a component of 
majority nationalism, but this is not the case.  It is by establishing how central elites 
framed the state that this section outlined the parameters of the debate surrounding 
the nation in which regional actors find themselves.  The pan-national and unionist 
frames allowed regional actors to ‘place’ their regions within discourses of equality 
and fairness.  These are further explained by examining how central actors framed 
Quebec and Scotland within majority nationalism.
5.4 The Framing of Quebec and Scotland 
Exploring how elites at the centre interpreted the nature of their states was the 
first step in exposing how majority nationalism created the parameters in which 
regional elites articulated their positions.  Central elites, while advancing a nation-
state interpretation of the state, still had to deal with the place of Quebec and 
Scotland.  This section examines how Quebec and Scotland are framed in elite 
debate, setting the stage for the next chapter which explores the place of the region 
within the majority nation.  As the staatsvolk interpret the state as a state of equal 
citizens, how Quebec and Scotland are treated in this discourse of equal citizenship 
provides regional actors with the boundaries of discussion.  This section demonstrates 
how majority nationalism dealt with minority nations by; 1) exploring the concept of 
‘fairness;’ 2) examining how the sub-state nations can be seen as worthy of emulation 
by central actors; and, 3) by discussing how sub-state nations paradoxically become 
‘internal others.’
Fairness 
Elites within Canada and Britain who felt that citizenship should be 
undifferentiated were confronted by actors in Quebec and Scotland who advocated 
for what was seen as ‘special treatment.’  In response, a discourse of ‘fairness’ 
developed.  ‘Fair’ is a very subjective concept, and when analyzing elite debate, this 
author was struck by its ambiguity.  In the vernacular it is often interpreted to mean 
the same or equal.  One Nova Scotia MLA noted during an interview that debates 
surrounding what is ‘fair’ can quickly lead to everyone being treated identically 
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regardless of circumstance.  Fairness as a concept seems to be bounded on the one 
side by uniformity and on the other by recognizing needs and differences.  In both 
Canada and Britain, debates on fairness appeared to be centred around discussions on 
political power and economic redistribution.  At their core, both addressed issues of 
equality of citizenship, but they manifested themselves differently.  Note that this 
section will not attempt to judge ‘fairness,’ instead analyzing elite interpretations of 
‘fair.’
In Canada the threat of Quebec secession was extremely high during the 
period under study, with debate in Canada focused primarily on Quebec’s place 
within the federation rather than fiscal relationships.  These debates highlighted an 
overarching consensus on equality in Canadian political discourse.  Building upon the 
equality frame discussed earlier, it was seen as ‘unfair’ to treat groups of Canadians 
differently, especially within Reform’s interpretation of the state.  One of the 
complaints raised by Reform was not only that Quebec was setting the national 
agenda, but that Canada (outside Quebec) was being denied a ‘voice’ in the debates. 
As Preston Manning stated:
Here we have a debate on the future of federalism and the country itself, but 
where has it occurred?  Not directly, not forcefully, not thoroughly on the 
floor of the Chamber, but everywhere else.  While the number one priority of 
the agenda of the people has been the future of their country… the Chamber 
has focussed on manganese as an additive to gasoline and the national horse 
act.  (HC (Can) Deb 27 Oct 1995 c15934)
The objection to Quebec setting the national agenda outside the House of Commons 
was not limited to where the debate was taking place, but what was being debated. 
Manning, speaking just days prior to the 1995 referendum, was making reference to 
the Chrétien government’s ‘do nothing, say nothing’ approach (Walters 1999: 372, 
Clark and Kronberg 1996: 677).  However, Manning’s desire for the nature of Canada 
to be publicly debated came true as the federal government launched a series of 
initiatives aimed at keeping Quebec in Canada.  This allowed Manning to clearly set 
out his interpretation of the Canadian state;
…the biggest single objection to the inclusion of any distinct society clause 
for Quebec was that it would confer on the Government of Quebec powers not 
conferred on the other provinces. In other words, the concern was and is that 
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the distinct society clause would violate the concept of equality of the 
provinces (HC (Can) 29 Nov 1995 c16983).
While Manning did not reveal how he felt Quebec would get more powers (the 
clauses dealt with interpretation of power), ‘distinct society’ was seen as a challenge 
to the equality of the provinces.  When read in light of Manning’s first quote, it 
appears the underlying concern is that Quebec would gain a more disproportionate 
voice and ability to drive the statewide agenda.  This, as opposed to constitutional 
asymmetry (which already existed in Canada), appears to be the underlying concern 
vis-à-vis unfair treatment.  To Reform, fairness means treating everyone equally—an 
interpretation that seems to have guided the Supreme Court (see above) as well as the 
LPC.  This analysis suggests there is a convergence between the parties with regards 
to ‘fairness.’  Both parties linked equality of citizen to fairness, which was seen above 
in the way Liberals framed their interpretations of the state in debates on the Regional 
Veto Act.  They were willing to give Quebec the veto it had historically demanded by 
also giving vetoes to five mega-regions (BC, the West, Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic 
Canada).  Quebec would get its veto, but only because it is no different than the 
others.
In the 1970s, during the lead up to the first devolution referenda, Tam Dalyell, 
MP for West Lothian, raised a question in the Commons which introduced the 
concept of political fairness and has since become known as the West Lothian 
Question.  He questioned the fairness of a Scottish MP voting on legislation which 
would have an impact on an English constituency, when that same Scottish MP 
would have no power to vote for the same legislation in his own constituency as it 
would be devolved to the Scottish Parliament (then termed Assembly).  While this 
argument has its intellectual problems (most importantly that devolution simply does  
not change how legislation that affects England is created, Taylor 2002),47 it appealed 
to an innate sense of fairness, questioning a system in which not everyone is treated 
47 Prior to devolution Scottish MPs were over-represented in the British House of 
Commons while after devolution the number of Scottish MPs was reduced to a level 
proportionally equal to their population vis-à-vis England.  If one is to count this as a 
change, then it has to be noted that this change increases the say that the English have 
over English laws.
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in the same way while speaking to a uniform sense of political citizenship across the 
breadth of Britain.
The above logic allowed English Members to highlight England’s perceived 
unfair treatment post-devolution by questioning the asymmetrical nature of 
devolution.  The claim was that England was unfairly treated because Scottish MPs 
continued to vote on all matters.  This is an all-English interpretation of the English 
Question; Scotland receives recognition, and England requires equal recognition. 
This led to resentment amongst some elites, as seen when Conservative Shadow 
Transport Secretary Eric Forth stated:
For as long as we can remember, there has been within Britain a pampered 
and privileged minority that has received every possible political advantage 
and yet has proved to be ungrateful.  I refer, of course, to the people of 
Scotland. (HC 16 Jan 1998 c607)
The defence of fairness is seen in Conservative manifestos, which promise “only 
English and Welsh MPs will be entitled to vote on Government Bills relating to 
England and Wales.  And English MPs alone will vote on remaining laws which 
apply exclusively to England” (Conservative 2001: 34).  This would give England the 
recognition it lacked, with Westminster functioning simultaneously as an English and 
British parliament.  Fairness would be achieved by rebalancing the Union, repairing 
the ‘damage’ caused by Labour.  Accordingly, unionist interpretations may have 
viewed asymmetry as an immediate and pressing concern in the short term, but it was 
a long-term problem for pan-nationalists.  As seen above, Labour’s long-term policy 
was to achieve symmetry through regional devolution throughout Britain.
While it may have been difficult to engage the electorate in debates around the 
constitutional issues discussed above, a simple way of appealing to concepts of 
fairness was through differences in government expenditure.  This was easily 
achieved in Britain with the Barnett Formula, the funding formula which determines 
funding for Scotland and the English regions.  Conversely, the Canadian system is 
very complex with a variety of federal-provincial and federal-individual payments 
(Clemens and Veldhuis 2007, Savoie 2006), which are coupled with the ability of 
provinces to generate their own revenue.  For the purpose of identity mobilization and 
giving voice to political or economic grievance, that Quebec is not the most ‘have 
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not’ province may have helped mediate some resentment towards it.  As will be seen 
in Chapter Seven, while the vast majority of people in Canada and Nova Scotia felt 
that Quebec was favoured within the federation, other provinces received more in per 
capita transfers from the federal government than Quebec.  While Quebec may have 
been favoured, financial discussions vis-à-vis government expenditure did not factor 
that highly in Canada.  In Britain though, the perceived unfairness of funding was 
brought to life politically through the Barnett Formula.  The problems of this formula 
were addressed by a former Conservative Cabinet Minister and current life peer;
Given that Scotland will now have its own Parliament and Wales will have its 
own Assembly, does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that one of the 
greatest concerns for the English regions, and cause of great unfairness to 
them, is the Barnett formula? (John MacGregor Norfolk South HC 3 Dec 
1997 c363)
The Barnett Formula was seen as providing unfair advantage to Scotland.  Its 
problems are not described; it is simply presented as being unfair.  This is not 
surprising as the Formula; “has attained totemic status with a variety of assumed 
meanings” (Mitchell 2003: 9-10).  Two common assumed meanings are that it is 1) a 
mechanism designed to erode or equalize devolved nations’ spending, and 2) a 
mechanism to protect the devolved nation’s share of spending.  It appears the 
Member quoted above held the second interpretation to be true and assumed everyone 
else did as well.
This identification of unfair funding saw the English as being disadvantaged. 
This was expressed when backbench Conservative MP Andrew Hargreaves, 
Conservative MP for Birmingham Hall Green, dramatically stated:
Every time a patient dies unexpectedly or while awaiting treatment in an 
English hospital – every day, every week; drip, drip, drip – we shall remind 
the public in England that the Labour party is holding power because of a 
surfeit of Scottish Members of Parliament who are spending two and a half 
times as much English taxpayers’ money on someone in Scotland as on a 
patient in Birmingham. (HC Feb c1120) 
There are two important points to note here.  The first is that it is almost implicit in 
the argument Hargreaves puts forward that Scotland and England are equal within the 
British union.  By not taking into account the difference in size between the two 
nations, he made it seem that if funding were evenly distributed per capita across the 
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breadth of Britain that the English would have a huge influx of resources, which was 
simply not the case—large decreases of expenditure in Scotland would only equate to 
marginal increases in England at an approximate rate of 10:1 (the approximate ratio 
of English to Scottish population).  The next point is that the fact money is spent 
unevenly across England did not seem to be taken into account as England was the 
frame of reference used and it was the English as a whole who were being appealed 
to.  Table 5.6 examines identifiable territorial public expenditure across Britain.
Figure 5.6 Identifiable Expenditure per capita by Territory and Region, 1999-2000
Territory
United Kingdom Scotland Wales Northern Ireland England


















100 109 104 95 90 94 92 88 113 84
Source: HM Treasury, taken from Heald and Short 2002: 748
If English regions as opposed to England had been examined it would have 
been hard to escape the fact that the differences between the English region that 
receives the highest per capita funding, London, and the lowest, the South East, is 29, 
which is actually greater than the difference between England and Scotland, 22. 
Chapter Seven will show that in the North East the majority viewed the South of 
England as being most favourably treated and advantaged (although many believed 
Scotland was favoured as well), which seems to be contradictory to what one would 
expect given the differences in identifiable public expenditure.  Elites at the regional 
level may have seen regional devolution as a way of compensating and competing 
against English co-nationals and allowing the region to set its priorities.  As can be 
seen in the following from the Chair of the Northern Group of Labour MPs, the 
demand is for regions to be able to identify what they need in their regions;
Labour Members have a dream for an assembly in the north-east. A regional 
assembly would give the people of the north-east the power to set their own 
priorities, and the ability to take decisions to solve the problems that they 
want solved. (Dr. Ashok Kumar (Middlesbrough, South and Cleveland, East) 
HC 12 Nov 2003 : c109WH)
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This discussion on fairness as part of the discourse used by statewide elites in 
Canada and Britain suggests that while elites appealed to innate senses of fairness, 
‘fair’ was a subjective term and linked to elite agendas.  In both states the balance of 
power between the nations, as well as fiscal relationships, were targeted by elites 
using the fairness frame.  Elites from all parties agreed that being ‘fair’ was an 
appropriate objective, but there did not appear to be agreement on how to meet this 
objective.  This allowed elites to frame the minority nations as receiving special 
treatment and in turn created discursive space for regional actors to enter the debate 
vis-à-vis the place of their regions within the state.
‘Us Too’: Emulation and Alliance
As Canadian provinces possess powerful political and administrative tools, 
the desire to emulate Quebec manifested itself not as a desire for greater power, but 
for recognition of the distinctiveness of other parts of Canada and a greater 
willingness to use provincial voice.  When Val Meredith (above) noted that alienation 
was not unique to Quebec, she reinforced the pan-Canadian while drawing attention 
to alienation in other provinces.48  She argued that essentially Quebec’s position was 
not that different from British Columbia’s.  This is significant with regard to the point 
made by Reform MP Roy Bialy above, who indicated that national unity issues were 
not relevant to the lived experiences of people in his region, indicating that he 
believed Quebec had too much voice within the federation and other parts of Canada 
needed to be able to make their voices and concerns heard also.  
Not every province has a history of French-English duality.  The recognition 
of Canada’s diversity beyond the French and English languages was something 
advocated by both major parties.  Liberals MPs also used this logic, claiming there 
48 For a discussion on Western alienation, see Lawson 2005, Henry 2000, Tomblin 
1995,  Conway  1993,  Elton  and  McCormick  1986,  Milne  1986,  Cooper  1985, 
Macpherson 1962.
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were other groupings in Canada apart from the French and English (however 
defined).  As noted by Liberal MP John Findlay49 during debates on the Clarity Act;
[H]e appears to have forgotten that although we talk about two founding 
nations, there are others, we also have aboriginal peoples… many 
Newfoundlanders consider themselves to be part of a fairly unique group.  We 
have Acadians in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.  (HC (Can) 13 Mar 2000 
c1645-1650)  
Here it appears that Quebec’s demands were consumed within wider debates on 
accommodation and diversity within Canada.  O’Leary (2001) argues a staatsvolk’s 
position of dominance can grant it room to accommodate as it need not fear the 
minority.  In this sense granting distinction to all cultural groups was less of a 
challenge to the staatsvolk’s hegemony than granting it to a select few, and allowed a 
discourse of equality throughout the state to be dominant with people associating the 
protection of their individual distinctiveness with a broader sense of citizenship 
within the pan-national community. While Kymlicka (1995) makes a very strong case 
for the distinction between “homeland” minorities and diasporas, to the individual 
citizen, this distinction may seem academic.  
Usher (1995) argues that many cultures within Canada have been forced to 
sacrifice their historical legacies to protect the bilingual nature of the country.  In this 
sense, the success of the Quebecois was emulated by others using the logic of fairness 
and equality.  ‘Third force’ Canadians and other French speaking communities were 
able to look to Quebec defending its position.  Yet because they interpreted 
citizenship in a pan-national sense, it allowed them to emulate Quebec’s tactics as 
they did not see fundamental differences between their particular community and the 
Quebecois, as they are all Canadian.  In this sense, Quebec can be seen as a potential 
ally to members of the other groupings.  As Acadian MP Francis LeBlanc (Lib) 
stated:
Protecting our language and culture has never been easy.  We have had to 
fight, and we still do, to get our share of recognition.  But we realized a long 
time ago that our chances of survival as a cultural community were much 
better if we joined forces with the francophones of Quebec, Manitoba and 
elsewhere in Canada.  (HC (Can) 6 Dec 1995)  
49 MP for Oxford, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, born in the Dominican Republic
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LeBlanc makes reference not to ‘we’ in a provincial sense of the term, but to ‘we’ the 
Acadians.  He spoke of joining “forces with the francophones of Quebec” as an allied 
French speaking community, indeed it is not Quebec, but rather Quebec’s 
francophones he mentions.  Quebec was presented not as a ‘homeland’ for the French 
language in North America, but as a fellow French speaking jurisdiction (albeit a 
much more powerful one).  Additionally, recognition was framed as a commodity or 
resource of which the Acadians required a fair share.  In this sense because French is 
seen by Canada (outside Quebec) as a defining element of Canada (McRoberts 1997, 
Kymlicka 2001), defending the French language was not seen as privileging one part 
of the state over the other, but as protecting something that belongs to all Canadians.  
Similarly, when Durham MP Derek Foster50 (Bishop Auckland) informed his 
parliamentary colleagues that as Chairman of the North of England development 
council he had to compete against the Scots and Welsh, and that as a young MP in 
1974 he saw that Scotland had many institutions that the English regions lacked (HC 
1 Apr 1998 c1329), he was not merely stating a fact, he was exemplifying the process 
of diffusion by which policies and procedures are transmitted across borders (see 
O’Loughlin et al. 1998, Starr 1991, or Eyestone 1977).  Scotland’s experience 
provided useful lessons for all parts of Britain.  People may have seen it as 
advantaged, but this was acceptable as it benefited the entire British nation, 
reinforcing the Union in Scotland while providing an example for other British 
regions.  The acceptance of the minority nation’s demands without the adoption of its 
interpretation of the state was discussed earlier with regional devolution being 
advanced as one of the possible responses to the English Question (Hazell 2006a and 
b).  
Building upon the ‘fairness’ frame and the pursuit of regional voice, Richard 
Cabon, Minister for the Regions, Regeneration and Planning stated, “For far too long, 
the English regions have been disadvantaged compared with Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland” (HC 14 Jan 1998 c372), “Our vision is for the English regions to 
grow and prosper alongside Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and within the 
50 Now Baron Foster of Bishop Auckland.
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European Union” (HC 14 Jan 1998 c381).  His argument did not attack Scotland, 
rather it showed how the English regions, and Britain as a whole, could learn from the 
Scots.  The advantageous position of the sub-state nations was seen, by some, as 
something to emulate.  As North East MP Joyce Quin MP51 stated in the early 1990s:
The regions of England, unlike the nations of Scotland and Wales, do not have 
their own Cabinet Minister, separate structures or, indeed, such elements as a 
separate Question Time in the House (HC 6 Dec 91 c513).  
This desire to emulate Scotland’s capacity for voice was echoed over a decade later 
by Austin Mitchell MP, in the run-up to the devolution referendum in the North East. 
Demonstrating a desire for his region to be more like Scotland, he stated: “We have 
seen what synergy has produced in Scotland” (HC 11 Feb 2004 c1504).  
In England, the desire for recognition amongst representatives of sub-state 
groupings did not appear as powerful, nor factor as highly, as in Canada.  In some 
ways the complaint against special treatment (or the demand for ‘fairness’), could be 
seen as a demand for equality, yet the desire for recognition was much less 
pronounced.  This is not surprising if regional actors saw Scotland as being a fellow 
British region.  They may instead have focused on emulating Scotland’s institutional 
capacities, as seen when Austin Mitchell MP stated: 
Our case is strong, and it will become stronger when we see the effects of 
devolution in Scotland and Wales.  We must be there in queue and our place 
must be guaranteed (HC 16 May 1997 c306).  
The ‘effects’ mentioned are the ability to advance economic concerns as opposed to 
cultural distinctiveness.  He expected devolution in Scotland to succeed, and for this 
success to spill over the border, with Scotland leading the way for devolution for all 
of Britain.  
Emulation in Canada and Britain appears to have been advanced not through a 
discourse of multinationalism, but rather through a discourse of equal citizenship for 
all.  The equality frame, explained in the previous section, was used vis-à-vis Quebec 
and Scotland by the staatsvolk, and groups within the staatsvolk, to advance their 
individual and group agendas because in the end, everyone was viewed as being 
equally Canadian and equally British.
51 Member of European Parliament for the North East 1979-1989, Member of 




Emulation and fairness highlighted attitudes towards the (perceived) 
privileged position of the sub-state nations.  The above suggests that unionist 
interpretations of the state appeared to have the most difficulty accepting 
asymmetrical arrangements, but in the long-term the pan-national frame advanced a 
discourse of equality of regions and citizens.  In many ways, a pan-nationalist view 
can be more accommodating of asymmetrical arrangements, when there is a) at least 
a possibility of other parts of the state achieving similar powers, and/or b) it will not 
have an impact on, or threaten the integrity of, the state.  The second criterion is 
especially important to understanding devolution in Scotland and Wales, and support 
for distinct society for Quebec, devolution in Scotland was in part designed to limit 
nationalist ambitions (Bradbury and Mitchell 2001, Denver et al. 2000, Lynch 2002), 
and the proposed constitutional amendments granting Quebec distinct society status 
were made for similar reasons (Dufour 2002/2003).
Common throughout the above discussion was the ‘othering’ of Quebec and 
Scotland, which was used in very different ways for similar reasons—to reinforce the 
different interpretations of the state presented by the various parties and actors.  In 
parliamentary debates MPs from all parties made reference to Quebec and Scotland 
using the language of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ either explicitly or implicitly.  This framed the 
sub-state nation as something that is not ‘here,’ but rather ‘there.’  ‘Here’ we have the 
status quo; ‘there’ they have, or are trying to get, something different.  Because their 
is a difference between what ‘we’ and ‘they’ have, it needs to be rectified as 
difference is inherently problematic.  What was done to rectify the situation was 
irrelevant, as was whether the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was fair or not.  By 
defining ‘us’ and ‘them’ the discourses above accomplished the same thing; they 
presented the sub-state nation as an internal other: one of ‘us’ yet different.  The 
seemingly privileged position of Quebec and Scotland forced elites to address the 
nature of the state and the place of the minority sub-state nation, and in turn the place 
of the majority nation within it.  As state-led majority nationalism left no room for a 
separate Quebecois or Scottish demos, it created a situation in which sub-national 
actors in Canada (outside Quebec) and England were presented with examples of 
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regions that were able to advance their interests in a very successful manner.  This 
discourse not only exemplified majority nationalism, ‘internal othering’ helped create 
the boundaries of debate in the regions of Canada (outside Quebec) and England, 
showing regional elites how to use voice to garner change in the system.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter explored the perspective of political elites at the statewide level, 
examining the confusion surrounding the question “Who are we?” in the majority 
nations.  It suggested that elite debate focusing on the place of Quebec and Scotland 
spilled over into statewide political discourse, politicizing identity within the nations 
and the regions.  While demonstrating consensus on what it meant to be Canadian or 
British, these debates highlight trends in both nations.  These trends saw broad 
agreement in the majority nation that saw the state in broadly pan-national lines, 
emphasizing the commonalities of all citizens of Canada and Britain, regardless of 
geography.
In Chapter Two, unionist and pan-nationalist interpretations of the state were 
presented as ‘pure types,’ but in this chapter it was shown that they exist as two poles 
along a spectrum of interpretations of the state in Canada and Britain. While neither 
of these poles was met within statewide parties, in both states the two major parties 
competing for power at the centre leaned towards one of the two, converging at the 
pan-national end of the continuum.  The evidence presented in this chapter strongly 
suggests that statewide elites viewed the state as the embodiment of a single nation. 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, there is a dialectical relationship between the 
majority and minority nations, but from the point of view of elites within the 
staatsvolk, the minority nation initiated the discussion.  This chapter indicates that 
elites within the staatsvolk did not recognize the multinational character of the state, 
limiting their ability to understand their role within minority nationalist mobilization. 
This chapter has shown that in response to the demands of Quebec and 
Scotland, discursive space opened up in both Canada and Britain, allowing questions 
of identity and the nature of the state to be brought forward.  This provided the 
political space necessary for regional elites to advance their interpretations of the 
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state while placing political constraints upon them.  As the dominant view in the 
hegemonic nation was pan-national, encouraging a conception of equal citizenship 
throughout, there was little room for regional elites to advocate along a different line. 
The next chapter demonstrates how debate at the centre framed regional elite 
interpretations of the Canadian and British states, setting the parameters of regional 
debate.
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Chapter 6: Bottom Up Regionalization
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed that discussions surrounding the nature of the 
state allowed different conceptions of the state to surface while providing the 
boundaries of debate for regional actors.  This chapter explores how regional elites 
framed their interpretation of the state when the nature of the state became 
problematized.  As regions within Canada (outside Quebec) and England, Nova 
Scotia and the North East may have lacked the national character of the sub-state 
nations, most notably a distinctive demos, but this did not mean they were not distinct 
in their own right, merely that they belonged to larger national groups which were the 
focus of primary political loyalty.  
In both regions discussions on the nature of the state highlighted the 
peripheral nature of the regions, though not only in a geographic sense.  Both regions 
possess cultural distinctiveness mapped onto administrative state capacity, the 
difference being the North East lacks regional democracy.  The goal of this chapter is 
to gain a broader understanding of how the changing political environment at the 
centre, created by the dialectical relationship between majority and minority 
nationalism, allowed regional actors to articulate a regional viewpoint.  
The first section investigates how regional elites perceived their region’s 
relationship with the state, examining discourse surrounding centre-region relations. 
As the relationship between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ is more complex than a simple 
bi-lateral relationship between the centre and the region, the second section explores 
the impact the minority nations had on this discourse, By examining how the sub-
state nations were framed in regional discourse, this section accomplishes two 
objectives; 1) it highlights the spill-over of statewide –debate into the regions, and 2) 
it teases out regional interpretations of the nature of the state.  Overall this chapter 
demonstrates that during the period under study, elites at the regional level mobilized 
in a manner similar to the sub-state nations.  However, the range of options available 
to the minority nation were not available to regional political elites, while actors from 
minority nations needed to protect the institutions of social solidarity that are bearers 
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of national identity.  Before beginning this discussion, the chapter will turn to a quick 
overview of Nova Scotia and the North East of England as regions in Canada and 
Britain.
Regions in Canada and Britain
The basis of territorial mobilization is grievance (Hutchinson 1999: 399), but 
grievances are not necessarily objective; they are based on the subjective concept of 
legitimate rule (Chaterjee 1993: 203, Fidler 1991: 6-7).  Neither Ottawa nor London 
were seen as “illegitimate” in Nova Scotia or the North East, as both were firmly 
embedded in the larger nations, but this did not mean that regional elites were 
satisfied with the status quo.  Regionalism is a process of reform that seeks change 
inside the state as opposed to outside whereby regional actors attempt to link political 
objectives with regional identity.  In Canada, there are clearly defined sub-state 
institutions, yet in England it is difficult to identify regions between the national and 
the local level (Herrschell and Newman 2000: 1199).  The difficulty stems from a 
weakness of identity and lack of institutional capacity as English regions do not enjoy 
a long pedigree of institutions or regional networks (Bond and McCrone 2004: 2). 
When the Conservatives developed the GORs it was a departure from the centralized 
and compartmentalized nature of the civil service in Britain (Mawson and Spencer 
1997: 174), bringing focus to government activity in the regions (Tomaney 2002: 
228), and providing the framework for Labour’s regional reforms.
The changes brought about by the Conservatives gave England a type of 
devolution similar to that enjoyed by Scotland and Wales prior to 1997.  The 
institutional changes that took place in the North East after 1997 continued the long 
history of regional institutional building in England (Benneworth and Tomaney 2002: 
140).  Royle (1998) points out that regional identity in England has never had a 
platform for expression; however, by the turn of the 21st Century, the English regions 
had become political actors in their own right.  As Payne and Bennert (2003) note, 
creating RDAs required a substantial shift in responsibility away from a range of 
central government departments, even though RDAs lacked flexibility and authority. 
This led to two important shifts in the governance of England.  The first is that RDAs, 
along with the GOs and RAs broke from traditional departmental government and 
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moved towards regional governance.  The second is that while RDAs are talking 
shops, this talking is a part of the process of creating bounded regional networks.  
English regions lacked the institutional voice of Canadian provinces. 
Canadian provinces have dedicated ‘champions’ whose job it is to voice provincial 
concerns.  As discussed earlier, regional representation in the federal cabinet has 
always been important in Canada, but regionally based Cabinet Ministers have been 
replaced at the federal level with first ministers’ conferences (Bakvis 1991).  Indeed, 
the democratic processes of government and opposition ensure that Premiers are 
defenders of the provincial interest and that the interaction between the federal and 
provincial government determines the national interest (Simeon 2006b).  
Gaining voice was partly what the campaign for regional devolution was 
about.  The devolution campaign (more accurately the collection of different 
campaigns) took what appears to be a two-pronged approach.  One was a top down 
approach, focusing on formal constitutional issues culminating with the 2004 
referendum.  The other was a bottom up approach in which regional actors attempted 
to strengthen pre-existing regional networks and build new ones.  Indeed, prior to 
devolution, many regions were already beginning to create their own regional 
organizations; 
In the north, we created the North of England Assembly of Local Authorities 
which was the first regional representative organization, and we created our 
own regional development organization – the Northern Development 
Company.  (David Clelland HC 20 Feb 1997 Col 1116)
This was not the only example of regionwide institutions being created organically. 
Cllr Ian Mearns, Deputy Leader of Gateshead Council, highlighted Newcastle 
Airport, which is owned by six local authorities in cooperation with the private sector, 
as an excellent example of cooperation in the region (Interview 2006).  Labour hoped 
to build upon this organic, bottom up process once in power (Labour 1997: 13-14). 
In this sense, the North East provides an excellent study of the creation of bounded 
networks as one witnesses the creation of bounded networks from both a top down 
state-led and bottom up organic process.
Though Nova Scotian elites did not need to create organizations, they did find 
themselves involved in a dialogue with the federal government around fundamental 
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questions of the Canadian state, although the role of the provinces was never 
challenged.  Given the history of many provinces, including Nova Scotia, pre-dates 
confederation (Smith 2002), their democratic legitimacy would be next to impossible 
to remove even if it were not constitutionally enshrined.  That regions in England do 
not have the pedigrees of Canadian provinces is not the only issue that regional 
devolution advocates faced; there were also questions as to the boundaries of the 
English regions.  Even in the North East, which appeared to have the strongest 
regional identity, the borders of the North East were still not perfectly clear by the 
time the devolution debate began.  In Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, for 
example, they debated whether or not they considered themselves part of the North 
East or Yorkshire and the Humber.  As reported in the Northern Echo:
A new council regime agreed to stay in the North East Assembly despite 
protestation that the area had closer connection with Yorkshire.  Councillors 
at Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council had considered leaving the North 
East Assembly, which aims to help to create Home Rule for the region.  But 
on Tuesday, after a lengthy debate on the district’s cultural history, they 
decided to maintain membership.  (Northern Echo “Council stays in 
assembly” 6 June 2003)
While voting to remain with the North East, this appears to have been driven by 
rational choice as opposed to having a sense of belonging vis-à-vis North East.  While 
in the short term this may have indicated that the identity of the North East was 
‘fuzzy’ at the borders, all identities evolve continually, and this may be a part of the 
process of regional network building.  Keating , Cairney and Hepburn (2008: 3, 9-10) 
indicate that “territorial policy communities,” either territorially confined sectoral 
communities or cross-sectoral communities organized around regional interests, are 
able to ‘grow’ in newly devolved jurisdictions, They argue that in the North East the 
institutional changes there were met with some organization change at the regional 
level.  That the solidification of the North East was relatively recent is important to 
this discussion for two reasons; 1) While Nova Scotia is a clear political entity, the 
North East was not, and 2) that while the North East was only determined recently, 
Nova Scotia is ancient—the First General Assembly of Nova Scotia started sitting in 
October 1758.  Yet in saying this, some Cape Breton Islanders challenged Nova 
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Scotian identity in their part of the province, even electing a Cape Breton secessionist 
to the provincial legislature in the 1980s.  
The idea of ‘region’ in Canada and Britain have two very different starting 
points.  Exploring the institutional natures of ‘region’ in the two states allows one to 
understand how regional identity manifests itself politically and contextualize how 
territorial identities were mobilized.  
6.2 Centre and Periphery 
The relationship between the centre and the regions may best be revealed 
through examining debates on the topic of how state power should be organized in 
the state.  This research is not an inquiry into the legal and financial relationship 
between the regions and their capitals, rather an examination of how regional actors 
interpreted these relationships.  During the 1990s, constitutional debates, along with a 
restructuring of the fiscal relations of the Canadian state, forced Nova Scotian elites 
to re-conceptualize the relationship between the federal government and the province. 
This re-conceptualization penetrated Nova Scotian society, from a House of 
Assembly Special Committee criss-crossing the province to local community groups 
trying to address questions of national unity.  Similarly, discussions on devolution in 
the North East demonstrated the hopes and expectations for change in the relationship 
between the North East and the centre.  Over time, many leading figures in the North 
East came on side to the idea of devolution, and the main newspapers in the region 
took an editorial stance in favour of some sort of home rule for the North East; the 
Newcastle Journal even launched a Case for the North, becoming a political actor in 
its own right. 
In both states there was a political environment allowing actors from all parts 
of the state to articulate their views.  That much of the change was unsuccessful is not 
relevant here; it is the views on the nature of the state that are important.  This section 
explores centre-regional relations through 1) the division of power; 2) regional 
disparities as identified by the regional actors; and, 3) how regional actors viewed 
these relationships and how regional voice was expressed. 
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Regional Elites and the Division of Power
Perceptions of intergovernmental relations in the North East and Nova Scotia 
are investigated by first examining interpretations of how power was divided and 
whether regional elites felt the region had an effective voice.  This was followed by 
an exploration of regional disparities showing that regional actors generally felt their 
regions were disadvantaged vis-à-vis other parts of the state.
Nova Scotian elites saw the federation along the pan-national conceptions of 
citizenship outlined in the previous chapter.  They appeared to believe in the equality 
of provinces and were relatively opposed to any restructuring of the federation that 
could change the relationship between citizen and state and weaken their position 
within the federation.  As stated in Canada: A Country for All; the Report of the 
Nova Scotia Working Committee on the Constitution:
What we found was that the most acceptable of the options was a 
constitutional recognition of Quebec’s distinct society, provided that a) it be 
defined in terms similar to those of the federal position paper (i.e. language, 
culture and civil law); and b) the provinces remain as equal partners within 
Canada, recognizing that this requires that accommodation of differences. 
(Nova Scotia 1991: 20)
That Nova Scotian elites were adamant about ensuring equality of citizens and 
provinces is not surprising; as a ‘have not’ province it is in their interest to maintain 
strong federal commitments to ensure that all Canadians receive the same basic level 
of services (Tomblin 1995, Bakvis 1991: 299, MacDonald 2000: 393).  According to 
former MLA Jerry Pye (2006), “the purpose of the federation is for people to look 
after each other.”  
Attempts were made to defend Nova Scotia’s place from changes in the 
federal structure, but these changes did not just emanate from Quebecois nationalism, 
they were also found in the neo-liberal approach of the federal government. One of 
the prime economic focuses of the government was to eliminate the deficit, which 
some interpreted as threatening the role of the federal government in Nova Scotia. 
The failed New Democratic Party (NDP) Bill to Protect Provincial Sovereignty52 
52 Here sovereignty refers to Nova Scotia not being dictated to by the federal 
government in provincial jurisdiction, especially though international treaty 
obligations.
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provides an interesting example of how Nova Scotian elites viewed the place of their 
province in Canada.  Though this bill was put forward by an opposition party and 
opposed by the other two parties, the underlying concepts and views expressed by 
both supporters and opponents of the bill were very similar.  As one NDP MLA 
stated:  
Why don’t we think about protecting provincial sovereignty right now and let 
the federal government know that the Province of Nova Scotia does not want 
it to negotiate with respect to essential public services like health and 
education.  (Epstein HA 9 May 2001 p2959-60)
This statement touches upon two important points.  Firstly, it noted that health and 
education are both constitutionally provincial responsibilities.  Secondly, the bill was 
designed to protect Nova Scotia’s voice within the federation.
Part of the reason the bill failed was that those opposing it recognized the 
importance of the federal government within spheres of provincial jurisdiction.  As 
such, they were adamant about protecting the federal government’s role in the 
province:
I am sure that our government would not want Ottawa to be allowed to 
download its responsibilities to the provinces and territories over having no 
federal role in health care.  This bill opens the door to the destruction of 
Medicare in Canada and here at home. (Gaudet HA 9 May 2001 p2967-9)
Provincial actors were fully aware of the need for the federal government’s 
penetration into Nova Scotia, and were loath to challenge the federal government’s 
spending power. 53  This returns to the point raised earlier by the Supreme Court with 
regard to the Constitution being the start point, not the end point, in understanding the 
division of power in Canada.  This debate did not demonstrate fundamental 
disagreements about the nature of the Canadian state and Nova Scotia’s place within 
it, rather it highlighted broad elite consensus as to the type of society they thought 
Canada and Nova Scotia should be.  The bill did not fail due to principles but due to 
53 The ability of the federal government to spend as it chooses, coupled with the weak 
taxing powers of the provinces, means that to maintain decent standards in provincial 
policy spheres (such as education and health care), the federal government must fund 
them.
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disagreement on how to achieve the principles, ensuring high standards of service 
provision within the province.  
That two governments were involved in service provision had some 
interesting consequences, especially given that only one of those governments was 
constitutionally empowered to legislate in the fields in which both governments 
operated.  Clearly neither side in the debate wanted to create walls between the 
different orders of government.  Instead they focused on a cooperative model of 
federalism in which neither actor/level of government is able to act unilaterally.  The 
points made by McEwen (2002) with regard to loyalty and identity being focused on 
the government that provides services are important here, as one can understand how 
the cooperative model evolved into a competitive model, with competition vis-à-vis 
being the visible provider of services. As one newspaper report stated:
Since 1989 Ottawa has seized more control of development spending in 
Atlantic Canada – buying TV and radio ads to increase its visibility – causing 
deep frictions with provincial officials.  (Beeby 1994) 
The fundamental difference between the way state power is divided between 
the state and the region in Canada and Britain is the sovereign nature of the Nova 
Scotia parliament.  The powers of the Canadian provinces are not devolved from the 
centre; both the federal government and the provinces derive their power from the 
Constitution.  Yet in functional terms, in both Nova Scotia and the North East the 
division of power is in constant flux.  In Canada, the Constitution outlines the 
division of powers, but provinces continually enter into negotiations with the federal 
government and each other on service provision (Simeon 2007, Choudhry et al. 
2007).  In England the central government delegated much of its responsibility to 
regional quangos (Harvie 1999), yet unlike Canada, English regional administration 
lacked any bargaining power with the centre.  In both regions there was substantial 
interplay between the region and the centre that regional actors could politicize. 
While Nova Scotia has formal mechanisms to express regional voice, in the North 
East elites had to first seek acknowledgement that a regional level existed.  As Joyce 
Quin, a prominent former North Eastern MP wrote in the Northern Echo:
[T]he objectors to regional government often say that they don’t want yet 
another bureaucratic tier.  However we already have a Government office for 
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the region, and the administration of many central government policies at 
regional level… We want to add democracy not bureaucracy (Quin 2001)
Whereas regionalism (even federalism) has a long pedigree amongst some 
segments of the English population (notably the Liberal Democrats), it only became 
embedded in elements of North East civil society during the Thatcher years.  The 
resentment towards Thatcher and the Conservatives was evident still in the North 
East.  Much like the Thatcher legacy propelled devolution in Scotland, it appeared to 
propel it in the North East as well.  Regional autonomy was seen as the best way to 
protect against perceived harmful central policies and objectives which differed from 
regional ones; 
It is important that local people are able to take robust, focused and principled 
decisions, because they know best what is needed. I never want a Westminster 
Tory Government to have that influence on my region again.  We have a level 
of unemployment that was second to none…  Our history is bitter, and we will 
never forget it.  We will never trust a Westminster Tory Government again 
ever. (Dari Taylor (Lab) HC 21 July 2004 C419)
Shortly after the referendums in Scotland and Wales Jim Cousins, MP for Newcastle 
Central, responded to proposals for an all English parliament by arguing that the 
needs of the North East would be swallowed up by the concerns of the South East and 
London (Tomaney 1999: 81), an argument echoed by North Eastern interviewees. 
This logic led Northern MPs to insert the 40% clause in the 1979 referendum in 
Scotland, and created fear of an English parliament amongst North East regional 
elites.  It epitomized the political position of the North East, overlooked between the 
South of England and Scotland.  The frustration expressed by Dari Tayler above 
exemplifies the North East’s peripheral nature.  This sense of difference from the 
South of England was highlighted by Newcastle Council Leader Peter Arnold who 
argued that it was due to the fact that Northumberland used to be a kingdom in its 
own right which has left a lasting impression on the region (Interview 2006).  
In the North East there was a demand for greater local control by both 
supporters and opponents of devolution.54  Indeed, grouping people as ‘supporters’ or 
54 The difference being how ‘local’ was interpreted; devolution supporters wanted 
regional powers, anti-devolution supporters wanted increased powers for local 
councils.
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‘opponents’ of regional devolution in the North East is difficult.  As Bond and 
McCrone (2004) note, the ‘Yes’ campaign had a difficult time getting those 
supporting regional devolution in theory to support the proposals in practice.  This is 
exemplified by Liberal Democrat Councillor Jerry Keating (interview 2006), a long-
time devolution supporter in the North East who maintained that the proposed 
Assembly lacked any real powers and, against the directions of his party, sided with 
Neil Herron’s unofficial ‘No’ campaign.  Yet in the North East, regardless of how 
elites were classified, the fact remains that the demand for power was not new, as this 
1986 excerpt from the Journal indicates;
Labour MEP Joyce Quin and Roland Boyes MP for Houghton and 
Washington wrote in the Labour Weekly newspaper that there is a feeling of 
powerlessness in the North. “Most Britons feel a loyalty to their own areas as 
well as to Britain as a whole and there is a strong feeling that many political 
decision taken at national level could be taken closer to home.” (Craig 1986)
While the results of the 2004 referendum may be presented as a defeat of regional 
devolution in principle, in reality the electors voted for the specific proposals on 
offer.  What the ‘no’ vote meant was not clear.  While polling indicated that regional 
devolution in the North East was not supported by the majority of North Easterners 
(see Figure 7.16 in Chapter Seven), support for the status quo was not as 
overwhelming as the final vote tally in the referendum would have indicated.  The 
confusion surrounding the ‘no’ vote was expressed by George Cowcher, chief 
executive of the North East Chamber of Commerce: 
Week after week we were told by the nation’s most senior politicians that 
change was needed in the North East.  The electorate was unconvinced by the 
under-strength proposals for an elected assembly, which appears to sell the 
region short.  The Government must now formulate a new strategy to provide 
a real difference. (Young 2004)
Alan Hall, Regional Director of the manufacturers’ organization EEF Northern,55 
said, “It was not going to be a regional powerhouse with the ability to make its own 
decisions and to be fair, this is probably why it didn’t want the yes vote.” (Young 
2004).  Both these representatives of prominent regional business organizations 
55 EEF is formally the Engineering Employer’s Federation, an advocacy organization 
for engineering, manufacturing and technology industries 
(http://www.eef.org.uk/northern/whoweare/default.htm). 
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identified the weakness of the proposals as being a fundamental component of the 
‘no’ vote, indicating the proposals were not addressing regional concerns.  
This indicates support for regional accountability, and occurred against a 
backdrop of widespread administrative devolution in England.  According to Orban 
(1984: 38), there is an inverse relationship between domination and demands for 
power, demands increase as domination decreases (also Dion 1996).   Accordingly, 
the rise of English nationalism (in its British or English manifestation) occurred as the 
English had an even greater say in governing England, as devolution meant Scotland 
received fewer Members of Parliament and less dedicated time in parliament, 
increasing the prominence and domination of England within Westminster.   
Cllr. Mearns highlighted the paradox facing devolution supporters when he 
discussed the success his council had in the twenty years previous (Interview 2006). 
The improved quality of life in the North East seems to have had the effect of 
decreasing regional alienation.  According to Neil Herron, North Easterners’ major 
concerns were not political, rather “who won the game last night” (Interview 2006). 
This is not unique to the North East; research in Canada clearly indicated that citizens 
do not understand multi-level government very well being concerned with the end 
product of government activity—policy and service provision, not how policy is 
formulated (Cutler and Mendelsohn 2001, Simeon 2006).  
Many interviewees in Nova Scotia indicated that their constituents did not 
care about the intricacies of federalism.  Nova Scotians were not concerned about 
who helped them or delivered services (Whalen interview 2006).  Paris stated that 
when he was campaigning one of the biggest issues he encountered was a federal 
issue, the national gun registry (interview 2006).  It was felt that the average citizen 
did not fully understand government, nor how to access it (Colwell interview 2006), 
and that the MLA was expected to be “the guy with the answers” (Estabrooks 
interview 2006).  Indeed, this is a point highlighted by Simeon (2006: 4, originally 
1971) that “demands from citizens do not necessarily respect constitutional lines of 
authority.”  By looking at issues surrounding neglect and representation this section 
explores how regional elites feel their region is treated by the centre.  
The problems created by success in the region pre-devolution were 
highlighted by devolution sceptic Steve Rankin, Regional Director of the 
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Confederation of British Industry (CBI), who in an open letter to John 
Tomaney in the Journal, claimed that these problems put the ‘Yes’ campaign in the 
position of having to “talk down” the region (Journal Feb 6, 2004).  The ‘Yes’ 
campaign sidestepped this problem by focusing attention on the lack of accountability 
of regional institutions, but in the end they were in a difficult position; they wanted 
greater democratic control, but how could they articulate this demand in a positive 
manner?  To do this, the ‘Yes’ campaign looked outside the North East, to Scotland. 
Adopting this strategy meant that instead of highlighting regional concerns in 
isolation, they could highlight the positive outcomes of Scottish devolution as 
something to emulate and learn from.
Of note in Nova Scotia and the North East with regard to the division of power, 
is that dissimilar approaches indicated similar concepts. In the North East regional 
devolution supporters wanted to increase regional power to ensure people had the 
kind of relationship with the state that balanced regional autonomy with adequate 
service provision.  This was the same in Nova Scotia where the division of power was 
less of an immediate concern than service provision.
Division of Resources
Building upon how regional elites believed the division of power should be 
organized, this section examines alienation and resentment in the regions by 
exploring how Nova Scotian and North Eastern elites interpreted the division of 
resources in Canada and Britain.  In both regions there was a perception that neither 
received a fair share of central government expenditure, yet ‘fairness’ was never 
defined.  It is beyond the scope of this project to assess ‘fairness,’ (instead see Savoie 
2006 or Klosko 1992); rather it explores how regional elites interpreted ‘fair.’ 
Chapter Five established that ‘fair’ was a key frame used by central elites in Nova 
Scotia and the North East actors attempted to ensure their region received its ‘fair 
share.’ While institutional arrangements in both regions shaped how this perception 
was articulated, the theme of ‘voice’ was prominent.  
As the North East lacked institutional voice, ‘fairness’ directed debate towards 
ensuring the region gained ‘voice.’  Its lack of ‘voice’ was seen as 
contributing to inequalities;
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Government figures show the region losing out compared with nations and 
regions have already have a strong political voice of their own.  For instance, 
under the controversial Barnett Formula, Scotland is awarded 1.1 billion 
pounds more in public spending than the North East to pay for services such 
as schools, hospitals and transport.  (The Journal Nov 20 2002)
As noted earlier, the Barnett Formula had totemic status amongst elites in Britain, and 
it could not be avoided when discussions of ‘fair’ allocations of state resources were 
had;
Liberal Democrat leader Cllr Nigel Martin said, “the North East is not getting 
its fair share as far as things like the Barnett Formula are concerned.  It is only 
by binding together that we will get a fairer deal.” (Northern Echo 2005)
Of interest in the above two quotes is that they had the same end-state in mind, 
levelling the playing field between the North East and Scotland.  In both, differences 
in per capita spending were seen as simply wrong, leaving little room in the debate 
for factors that might justify or indicate a greater need.  Some actors opposing 
regional devolution did not so much see the need to increase the North East’s 
abilities, as to reduce Scotland’s abilities vis-à-vis the region;
Said Martin Callanan, Tory euro candidate for North East “I agree with the 
point that something should be done to stop the Scottish poaching jobs, but 
they should simply be restrained.  There should be a level playing field, not 
more players.” (Armstrong Jan 14, 1999)
In the North East the complicated issues surrounding resource allocation were never 
discussed in detail; instead differences were highlighted and presented as being 
wrong because they were different;
Health Secretary Alan Milburn publicly called into question funding rules 
which ensure public spending in Scotland is higher than in the North, which is 
one of the key issues in The Journal’s Case for the North (The Journal Home 
rule hopes rise after signal Apr 17 2002)
It appears the ‘Barnett Formula’ was used in the above quotes as code or shorthand 
for special treatment, with no explanation as to why Scotland should or should not 
receive more funding per capita (for example the geographical impact on costs), or 
how service delivery north of the Border could be more efficient, resulting in greater 
services for the same cost.  With devolution, there was greater scrutiny of money 
spent in Scotland than in the North East as there was no North East equivalent to 
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Audit Scotland or the Scottish Parliament Audit Committee.  According to one North 
East respondent, their has never been a proper needs assessment of the North East 
(Schmuecker interview 2005), which makes it striking that devolution campaigners 
never seemed to equate efficiency benefits with accountability in Scotland,56 
suggesting money evokes an emotive response.   
North Eastern discussions on the division of resources were not fundamentally 
different than the perceived challenges Nova Scotia faced.  In Nova Scotia the 
concept of fairness was coupled with federal spending and transfers by provincial 
elites:  
“We want to make sure that federal transfers are fair to the province of Nova 
Scotia” said provincial finance minister Bill Gillis, whose government just 
called an election.  “We have challenges especially in health care and 
education” (Morris: 1998).  
Former Nova Scotia Premier John Hamm explicitly invoked the concept in his 
“Campaign for Fairness” which demonstrated near universal elite consensus, 
receiving endorsement from all three parties in the provincial legislature (Nova Scotia 
2001).  The purpose of the Campaign is as follows;
The Campaign for Fairness is a campaign launched by Premier John Hamm in 
January 2001 to ensure that Nova Scotia receives its rightful share of the 
revenues generated through its offshore oil and gas development. These 
revenues are needed to develop long-term economic sustainability and 
reduced dependence on federal transfers for Nova Scotia. 
(http://www.gov.ns.ca/fairness/)
Within the interview sample in Nova Scotia, the majority of respondents did not feel 
Nova Scotia was treated fairly, yet noted by one MLA above, ‘fairness’ can turn into 
a discourse in which all provinces are treated the same, ignoring circumstance (Paris 
interview 2006).  
The Atlantic Provinces in general, including Nova Scotia, are termed ‘have 
not’ provinces as they are net beneficiaries of federal transfer payments.  
56 Between 2005 and 2007 this author worked in the Scottish Parliament as the 
Parliamentary researcher for the Deputy Convenor of the Scottish Parliament Audit 
Committee and personally witnessed both the Audit Committee and Audit Scotland 
hold public spending to account in Scotland.
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Accordingly, Nova Scotian economic success is likened to economic independence. 
As local political observer Karen Janigan stated in the Sunday Daily News:
Economic independence would make us less vulnerable to Ottawa’s financial 
(mis) management.  Our fortunes tend to ebb and flow with the whims of the 
governing party.  (Janigan 1997) 
Her point about being controlled by the centre was also expressed by the provincial 
Minister of Finance Neil LeBlanc with regard to the position of Nova Scotia in 
relation to the rest of Canada;
Comparisons to other provinces is not my main focus.  My focus is how I run 
Nova Scotia and how we can make ourselves more independent from the 
federal government by governing our economy. (Brewster 2001) 
This suggests that there are two (apparently) contradictory threads running through 
Nova Scotian discourse.  On one hand, provincial elites did not want to chase the 
federal government out of province, welcoming the federal government’s ability to 
spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction.  On the other hand, they appeared to want to 
lessen federal intrusion into the province by lessening Nova Scotia’s dependence on 
federal transfers.
Zero Sum Games
Discussions in both regions appeared to be centred on the premise that for one 
part of the country to benefit, another had to lose out; that there were no win-win 
situations and a zero sum game was being played.  Many MLAs interviewed felt that 
much of the government finance structure encouraged competition between the 
provinces.  One likened the system to giving the provinces a pot of gold and saying 
“you divvy it up” (Paris interview 2006).  Others felt that funding through programs 
like ACOA was dependant upon whether or not the relevant Federal Minister came 
from your province (Estabrooks interview 2006).  
Cody (1994), in his examination of Atlantic Canada during the Mulroney era, 
notes that powerful regional ministers in the federal government resulted in the 
perception that resources were diverted to their political strongholds.  Bakvis (1991) 
brings the validity of this perception into question, noting that provincial premiers at 
First Ministers Conferences have eclipsed regionally based cabinet ministers as the 
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voice of the provinces at the federal level. Yet if Nova Scotian MLAs still perceive 
regionally based ministers as being the voice of their province at the federal level, 
they would act accordingly.  The perception of interprovincial competition was 
exemplified when Premier Cameron stated: “we will very clearly be wanting the 
federal government to redirect some of the existing funding in Atlantic Canada to a 
more positive outcome” (in McLaughlin (1991) authors italics).  It appears that the 
Premier felt there were limited funds for Atlantic Canada, that for Nova Scotia to 
benefit, another province had to lose out.  
This concern about the fairness of resource allocation was seen in many 
aspects of Nova Scotian politics.  For example, with regard to the Atlantic Innovation 
Fund, Jane Purves, the Nova Scotian Minister of Education, was 
… concerned that the board overseeing the money has members connected to 
Newfoundland’s Memorial University, while there are no members from a 
Nova Scotia university.  “Potentially… the point of view would be tilted 
towards Newfoundland as opposed to Nova Scotia or even New Brunswick or 
P.E.I.” (Jackson 2001)
The zero sum mentality appears to have existed in the North East as well, but as the 
region lacked institutional voice, the zero sum game is played out locally, 
undermining regional solidarity.  Competition within the North East is strong, and 
was evident in discussion with regional elites and in the manner in which debates 
were presented in the regional media.  For example, in the build up to the 
government’s White Paper Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English 
Regions, which set out the government’s plans for devolution, there was much 
discussion in the regional press as to the location of the Assembly headquarters.  It 
was feared Newcastle would dominate the Assembly, and when it came to the actual 
referendum, Liberal Democrat and ‘Yes’ campaigner Cllr Ron Beadle, stated that the 
yes side found this very difficult to overcome (interview 2005).  As stated in The 
Journal:
The choice of Durham as regional capital will be seen as an attempt to avert 
rivalry between the major population centres of Tyneside, Wearside and 
Teeside over the location of the new body.  (The Journal Sep 23 2003)
As Britain is a part of the European Union, factors external to the state forced 
the region to compete for regional funding grants as proposals for regional funding 
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needed to be made in a regional context (Stewart 1997: 140-1).  As Sir Jeremy 
Beecham, leader of Newcastle Council from 1977 to 1994 and Chair of the Labour 
Party in 2005-6, stated:
 It is high time we moved towards a less centralized system of government 
and one in which the regions have a proper role.  This is especially important 
in applying for funds from Europe, which places great emphasis on the 
regions. (in Young 1990)
Regional devolution campaigners recognized that with devolution there would 
be no corresponding increase in funds, but they felt this was not necessary to increase 
the economic performance of the region.  According to Brian Hall of the Campaign 
for a North East Assembly: 
Of course, we need funding, but our whole history is littered with innovation 
and adaptation.  An assembly would help realise that energy in terms of, for 
example, encouraging small business centres and firms with North East roots, 
taking away some of the headaches we see every month when firms with no 
headquarters move away” (Northern Echo 16 Dec 2002)
Hall believed there was more to an elected regional assembly than merely a 
voice asking for money.  Yet these types of arguments, because they dealt with 
complex issues of strategy and growth, were countered by the anti-devolution 
campaign’s simple “there will be no new money” argument, reinforcing the zero sum 
game mentality (www.northeastnocampaign.co.uk/10reasons)
Chapter Two demonstrated that in the continued re-creation of identity, 
territorial identities are constantly debated and redefined, demonstrating the fluidity 
of the concept amongst its members.  As Mann (1996) notes, territorial identity exists 
at many levels, and while he only explicitly mentions one level below the state in his 
five level analysis, in reality there can be many with the local level playing an 
important role in shaping people’s identities.  Identities in the North East were based 
upon many different axes, with the urban-rural divide, and to a lesser extent, inter city 
rivalry, playing key roles.  
Regional actors may not have felt that it was impossible to create wealth, but 
this was difficult to communicate to the electorate.  This was best explained by the 
president of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS), who highlighted this 
communication problem in relation to the debates surrounding natural gas in Nova 
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Scotia (Crowley Interview 2006).  When Nova Scotia sells its natural gas, the overall 
net worth of the province does not change, it is merely transformed from oil wealth 
into currency.  Yet if federal transfer payments are reduced by the same amount to 
Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia’s net worth decreases as a result.  This is a complex issue 
which is difficult to explain to voters, who simply perceive Nova Scotia as becoming 
materially better off.
While the zero-sum logic was used by Nova Scotian actors to demand more 
resources, the logic could be turned on them.  Building upon the competition model 
of intergovernmental relations mentioned earlier, central elites used the zero-sum 
logic against the province, arguing that the province was trying to deflect blame;
ACOA should not be used as the scapegoat for the Nova Scotia government’s 
inability to attract inward investment to the province, says Cape Breton the 
Sydney’s MP Russell MacLellan (Liberal) “MP Alarmed as ACOA used as 
scapegoat” Cape Breton Post (1992) Nov 2
From this discussion on the relationship between the regions and the centre, 
one sees that regional actors in the North East and Nova Scotia felt the need to gain 
greater control over their regions.  This control focused on government accountability 
in the North East and on financial independence in Nova Scotia.  Yet it must be noted 
that in Nova Scotia there are two levels of government which can point fingers at 
each other, whereas in the North East while the RDA could take some responsibility 
for regional failure in theory, in practice its lack of power and undemocratic nature 
meant that only the central government could be held accountable.  Actors in the 
North East did not appear to realize that regional levels of democracy can be used 
against the region by actors outside of it.  Elites did not think that the average Nova 
Scotian cared what level of government delivered public services, as long as they 
were delivered, but it was important to Nova Scotian elites that they work towards 
lessening the federal government’s role in the delivery of services in the province. 
Accordingly, their discourse focused on what was good for the region, not what was 
good for the state.  In both regions actors felt they lacked the power to chart their own 
course within the nation, and the central government lacked either the will or the 
capacity to properly manage the affairs of the region.  While regional elites were not 
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always in favour of more power for the region, they focused on doing what was best 
for the region, highlighting the elite nature of these concerns.  
Neglect and Representation: Perceptions of Regional Elites
In their submission to the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, the 
leaders of the three parties in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly noted that “the 
principle concern of most Nova Scotians and most Canadians is without any doubt 
the economy” (Cameron et al. 1992: 2).  Nearly a decade later, the economy was still 
seen as the major concern of Nova Scotia, with Premier Hamm stating “Linguistic 
and cultural issues are not the greatest threat to the Canadian federation right now; it 
is the inability of the country to share the wealth from coast to coast” (in Simpson 
2000).
Similarly, what drew the most attention (and ire) in the North East was the 
funding formula for Scotland: the Barnett Formula.  In elite discourse The Barnett 
Formula existed on two levels; 1) administratively where the funding of certain 
territorial functions of state administration (i.e. health care, education, transport, etc.) 
is divided between the constituent nations of Britain, and 2) symbolizing the unequal 
treatment of the different parts of Britain.  In England, and the North East in 
particular, it was seen as a way for Scotland to receive more funding than its per 
capita population allegedly deserved;  
Campaign for the English Regions against unfair funding formula that 
benefits Scotland against the North East, and the post of Scottish Secretary. 
They claim funding should be based on need, not nationality. (The Journal Jan 
14 2002) 
In essence, while constitutional issues may have been at the forefront in both regions, 
political actors did not appear to believe that constitutional issues were what mattered 
most to the electorate.  Rather, a theme that ran throughout the debates, was how 
political discussions inevitably had an impact on the regional economies.  
Peripheries are outside of the daily lived experiences of elites at the centre. 
Using the same logic as Hearn (2007) and Cohen (1996), which demonstrated how 
regional actors interpret their regions through a regional lens, as central elites in 
Canada and Britain go about their daily business they experience the Canada and 
Britain of the centre.  This leads to feelings of neglect amongst segments of the 
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population in the North East and Nova Scotia as their experiences are not reflected in 
central decision making.  In Nova Scotia, provincial elites expressed views that the 
centre treats them as second class citizens:
[I]t suggests the richer members of our Canadian family are out of touch with 
their poorer relations” (Premier Savage in Whyte 1996) 
…Nova Scotians believe that one of the rights of Canadian citizenship is the 
ability to expect that generally, there will be a common level of services from 
coast to coast.  Otherwise, we are threatened with becoming several different 
countries – in fact, if not in name. (Premier MacLellan HA 1998 p1062) 
The principle of equality of citizens and provinces advanced in Chapter Five is 
prominent within this discourse, embodying the belief that every Canadian should 
receive the same level of care regardless of address.  This avoids what is known in 
Britain as a ‘post-code lottery;’ that the standard of service one receives is different 
depending on where one lives.  These examples indicate the concept of 
undifferentiated citizenship expressed by elites in the centre was used by Nova 
Scotian elites to advance regional interests.
Due to its relative poverty, Nova Scotia has traditionally been thought of as an 
ally of the federal government in inter-governmental negotiations (Finbow 1994: 
465), yet after the 1997 federal election the Liberal Party of Canada went from having 
all but one of Atlantic Canada’s seats to having no seats in Nova Scotia.  Under Prime 
Minister Chrétien, the federal government imposed substantial cuts to provincial 
transfer and equalization payments, increasing the tension between the federal 
government and the provinces (James and Lusztig 2002: 94), leading to the poor 
electoral performance of the governing Liberals (Cutler 2002: 348).  Nova Scotians 
felt particularly hard hit by federal reforms of transfer payments and the Canadian 
Health and Social Transfer (CHST) after 1995.  According to Alexa McDonough 
(interview 2006), former leader of both the Nova Scotia and federal New Democratic 
Party, these budgets were especially hard on the province.  As one columnist put it:
The voter backlash against the government came in the wake of the severe 
spending cuts imposed by a deficit driven agenda that resulted in military base 
closures, drastic changes to the unemployment insurance system and the 
implementation of extensive user fees.  (Underhill 2000)
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This suggests that MPs in Nova Scotia needed to be concerned with the 
electorate, with the high turnover of MPs in Nova Scotia markedly different from the 
state of democracy in the North East.  Yet while democracy in Nova Scotia and the 
North East is different, both are embedded within democratic states, the regions are 
represented in central institutions—Members of Parliament come from both regions. 
Literature from Canada shows that regional differences were historically managed by 
ensuring regional representation in the federal cabinet.  According to Bakvis (1991), 
this tradition died away as the focus moved away from the cabinet and towards 
federal-provincial bargaining; yet as noted above, some MLAs still felt that regional 
ministers acted as provincial representatives in the cabinet.   
Provincial governments appeared to provide voice to regional concerns.  The 
centre was seen as something that could be called upon or lobbied by regional actors, 
and party competition attempted to demonstrate who could most effectively use 
provincial voice;
During its first mandate, a PC Government will enhance employment 
opportunities by … aggressively pursuing a federal commitment to upgrade 
the Port of Halifax to accommodate “Post-Panamax”57 shipping, modernize 
the Halifax International Airport and ensure year-round commercial ferry 
links are available to move our products to market.  (Nova Scotia PC 1998: 5)
Once again, the federal government was seen as playing an important role in service 
provision in the region, and it was argued that the federal government should not cut 
back on this role.  Indeed, not only did the Nova Scotia PCP encourage federal action 
within the province, it was willing to use provincial ‘voice’ to encourage it.  This 
situation was not unique, as argued by Nova Scotia Liberals leader Wayne Gaudet:
I am sure that our government would not want Ottawa to be allowed to 
download its responsibilities to the provinces and territories over having no 
federal role in health care…  I believe that Nova Scotians need better 
networking and co-operation between the provinces and between the 
provinces and the federal government.  Our challenge as a nation and as a 
province is to develop the ability to rapidly respond to a constantly changing 
world and country.  This has become the first condition for growth and 
progress.  (HA Deb 9 May 2001 p2969)
57 Panamax shipping refers to the maximum size of ship that could pass through the 
Panama Canal; post-Panamax shipping refers to the increase in ship size after the 
planned expansion of the Panama Canal. 
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While theoretically providing Nova Scotia with two sets of political elites to advance 
its interests, this also allowed actors at different levels to point fingers at each other, 
as indicated above.  In the North East, it was a different case.  
The role of MPs from Scotland and England differed slightly due to the nature 
of the state.  English MPs represented their constituencies, but also their class and 
party.  Scottish MPs were also able to represent Scotland in a way which English 
MPs could not represent England or English regions (Harvie 1991).  MPs in English 
regions do not have institutions they can appeal to or work with, in the way the 
Scottish MPs had the Scottish Office (Harvie 1991: 107).  
Accordingly, North East elites felt that their region was neglected and lacking 
voice.  The point made by Byrne (1992) resonates throughout the discussion on the 
North East, namely that neglect of the region is due to the way that electoral and party 
competition evolved, creating a situation where Labour could not lose and the 
Conservatives could not win.  As stated by North East Conservative MP Peter Aitken 
(Hexham):
I don’t think the Prime Minister wants to lose an election in those two areas 
which have so many marginal seats so close to a General Election.  It 
probably doesn’t matter to him so much what happens in the North East where 
there are not that many marginal seats.  It’s a case of political opportunism 
(Jacobs 2004)
Neil Herron, leader of the unofficial ‘no’ campaign, wondered why, given a great 
number of Ministers come from the region, it is not more prominent in central 
decision –making; displaying regret over the lack of regional voice even though he 
opposed regional level devolution (interview 2006).  Given that parties were able to 
bypass the region suggests minister’s constituencies may be irrelevant if it is a safe 
seat.  Ministers from the North East were not expected to adopt a regional mandate in 
the manner of Canadian Cabinet ministers.  
The low priority given to regional representation in England was most notable 
in the resignations of Joyce Quin,58 MP for Gateshead East and Washington West and 
Chris Mullin, the international development minister and MP for Sunderland South.  
58 Now Baroness Quin.  She announced her intention to stand for the regional 
assembly upon stepping down from Westminster.
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Both resigned from government positions to better campaign for the interests of the 
region from the back benches:  
I am hoping to speak up on issues affecting the region and basically adding my 
support for the cause. I think that would be more valuable than doing another 
ministerial job. (Quin in Journal Jun 12 2001)
At the time of writing, no Labour MP had responded to requests for an 
interview,59 but from what the regional media portrayed, regional MPs who did act in 
the region’s interests were not able to make inroads.  Amongst devolution supporters 
the ability to express regional voice through the Cabinet and devolved institutions 
was something they aspired to;
Scotland and Wales not only have their own democratic governments but their 
own Cabinet ministers to make the case for continued preferential funding 
arrangements and public investment.  The fact that the North East has neither 
is one of the main reasons why, under the iniquitous Barnett Formula, public 
spending per head is still higher in Scotland than in this region (The Journal 
Nov 13 2002)
In both regions actors expected ‘fair’ treatment from the central government, 
and this section illustrated the sense of neglect felt in the regions and the frustration 
of regional representatives at the weakness of their regional voice.  However, elites in 
both Nova Scotia and the North East did not appeal to a separate regional identity in 
central-regional relations, but to a sense of fairness that would ensure that all citizens 
were treated equally.  While elites in Nova Scotia were more explicit in outlining a 
pan-national view of citizenship and the state, the discussion on regional devolution 
with regard to Scotland indicated a similar concept of equal citizenship on both sides 
of the border.  The pan-national identity advanced by provincial elites in Nova Scotia 
appears to have had two key points: 1) all citizens are equal and deserving of equality 
of state services regardless of residence; 2) as Canada is a federation, equality of 
citizenry was expressed alongside equality of provinces; all provinces should have 
equal access to resources to ensure that they could treat their citizens in the same 
manner.  In quasi-federal Britain, this was expressed in a quasi-equality of regions 
and nations.  This is very much in keeping within the boundaries of debate 
59 One Labour activist and member of the ‘Yes’ campaign explained that this was 
understandable; given that devolution was a Labour manifesto promise that was 
decisively defeated in the region, Labour MPs would be unwilling to discuss it.
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established in Chapter Five.  In both regions actors stated economic issues mattered 
most, yet it is important to note that it was constitutional debates, ostensibly initiated 
in reaction to sub-state nationalism (as part of larger debates between the majority 
and minority nations), which allowed these issues to be brought forward. 
Accordingly, the next section deals with how Quebec and Scotland are framed in 
Nova Scotia and the North East.
6.3 The Sub-State Nation as Other
A simple relationship does not exist between the centre and the region, 
determining the way Nova Scotian and North Eastern elites articulated their demands; 
Quebec and Scotland also have important roles to play.  In both states questions of 
accommodation of the minority brought the nature of the state into focus.  In Chapter 
Five it was suggested that Quebec and Scotland had a major impact on how national 
identity amongst political actors at the centre was mobilized.  This section 
investigates the role played by the minority nations in shaping regional discussion, 
becoming ‘others’ within the regions as well as providing examples for regional elites 
to emulate.
‘Othering’ is the process whereby a territory outside one’s own becomes a 
reference used in defining ‘us.’  Quebec and Scotland can be seen as ‘others’ to Nova 
Scotia and the North East, although neither Quebecois nor Scottish elites attempt to 
influence their neighbours.  Nevertheless, Quebec and Scotland influenced their 
neighbours in two major ways; 1) forcing their agendas on the central government, 
and 2) providing a discursive tool-kit for other regions.  The argument against special 
treatment was prevalent in debates in Nova Scotia vis-à-vis Quebec’s constitutional 
place; it was argued that constitutional recognition of Quebec’s distinctiveness was 
acceptable as long as provinces remained equal and it was recognized that French and 
English languages existed throughout Canada (Nova Scotia 1991: 20-22).  A 
willingness to accept Quebec’s uniqueness without letting that uniqueness become a 
basis for granting Quebec additional powers is a view common throughout Canada 
(Mendelssohn 2002: 76).  Nova Scotian elites often looked at ways to ensure that 
Quebec did not receive a disproportionate amount of power.  Quebecois demands to 
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radically change the Canadian federation could be seen as a direct challenge to the 
equality of citizens argument advanced in Nova Scotia.
The importance to Nova Scotia of Quebec remaining in Canada cannot be 
emphasized enough; the geographic position of Quebec between Atlantic Canada and 
the rest of Canada means that if Quebec separated from Canada “geography alone 
will cause us to be isolated and cut off” according to former PC Leader Terry 
Donahoe (Smith 1995).  The economic ramifications would be 
an economic disaster for Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada.  Our concerns 
about the economy now would be nothing compared to our concerns about an 
economy destabilized by Quebec separating from Canada” (Cameron et al. 
1992: 5).  
Finbow (1995: 71) refers to this as the “Bangledeshization” of Canada.  In this sense, 
Quebec was a threat to the region, and as indicated by Colley (1992), a threatening 
other is extremely useful in engendering a sense of ‘us.’
Although Quebec separatism posed an implicit challenge to the region, with 
Quebec acting as an internal other (MacKay 1999), Quebec could also be seen as a 
powerful ally to Nova Scotia in dealing with the central government.  As noted in an 
editorial in the Chronicle Herald;
While Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty is insisting that any new transfers to 
the provinces be done on a strictly per capita basis; Quebec Premier Jean 
Charest will be looking for an expansion in equalization, because Quebec 
would then get a bigger share of the pie.  And for Mr Harper, the key to 
winning a majority in the next election is winning seats the Bloc Quebecois 
now hold.  So he will be keen to make Mr Charest happy.  Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland must hope Mr Charest is successful in insisting that some of 
the new money goes into equalization, and keep our throats clear so we are 
ready to scream like banshees if the Ontario boys try to monkey with our 
offshore deals.  (“Election changed the water on the equalization beans” May 
6, 2006)
As the boundary between Scotland and England is ancient, there is little 
cultural spill-over from Scotland in the North East, except perhaps for the interesting 
case of Berwick upon Tweed (see Kiely et al. 2000).  Nova Scotia, however, is home 
to a small community of French Canadians, Acadians, who may have seen Quebec as 
a possible ally in the preservation of their cultural distinctiveness.  While making up a 
small percentage of the population, about 4%, the Acadians had a large impact on 
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how Nova Scotians perceived themselves.  Within Nova Scotia, Acadian 
communities struggle for recognition to keep their culture vibrant, resulting in a great 
deal of accommodation within the province.  This was seen in the vast number of 
Acadian submissions to the Nova Scotia Select Committee on National Unity.  Even 
in communities with no French Canadians, it was recognized that the Acadians are 
part of their cultural legacy.  Even though Acadians no longer live there Bill Casey 
MP highlighted the Acadian legacy of his constituency (Cumberland-Colchester-
Musquodoboit Valley) (Interview 2006).  The importance of the Acadian community 
to Nova Scotia was further emphasized by the joint submission, mentioned 
previously, made by all three party leaders;
The coexistence of two great linguistic communities, the French-speaking and 
the English-speaking communities, is a fundamental characteristic of Canada. 
Nova Scotians are particularly aware of how interconnected the two 
communities have been throughout our long history, from the time the 
Acadians first settled on these shores in 1605 (Cameron et al. 1992: 4).
According to Paul Comea, Executive Director of Fédération Acadienne de la 
Nouvelle-Ecosse, Acadian elites were, “concerned that the rights we have earned in 
this country with a lot of hard work over the last 25 years will be affected.  We are 
concerned about language policies” (Mellor 1995).  This concern was echoed by 
Frank Sutherland, president of the Richmond PC Association who stated: 
there are few illusions in this neck of the woods about long-term survival of 
bilingualism if Quebec withdraws from the federation.  So Nova Scotian 
Acadians who live under perpetual threat of assimilation have a high stake in 
the latest round of unity discussions (1998).  
Not only was it felt that Acadians needed Quebec for their survival, there 
appeared to be broad elite consensus that the small Acadian community was integral 
to the identity of Nova Scotia.  According to Diana Whalen (Interview 2006) 
Acadians “are a part of Nova Scotia” (interview 2006), while the Minister for the 
Environment and Labour, Mark Parent, (interview 2006) made a point of mentioning 
special ridings were created to ensure Acadian representation in the House of 
Assembly.  Former Speaker of the House of Assembly, Arthur Donahoe (interview 
2006) stated that Acadians were an important part of the province’s makeup.  In this 
sense, Quebec as an ally to the Acadians and their culture is important to Nova 
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Scotian elites in general, who see French Canadian culture as part and parcel of a 
bilingual and multicultural Nova Scotia, which is similar to broader Canadian views 
of the place of French in Canada (Kymlicka 2001: 263).  Quebec was framed as a 
fellow French speaking jurisdiction without using hierarchical language, contributing 
to the conceptualization of a bi-lingual pan-national Canadian state.  While elites 
attempted to protect French in Nova Scotia, it was not in isolation from larger debates 
on the protection of language in the rest of the federation.  
As noted earlier, ‘in’ groups require ‘out’ groups.  Labour created the 
institutions in the North East that helped create ‘us’ and reinforced the institutions of 
an easily accessible ‘them:’ Scotland.  As indicated in Chapter Five, if Scotland is 
part of Britain in a similar way to the North East, then the logic indicates that the 
North East should be treated in the same manner as Scotland.  This is not to say that 
there is an outcry of public support either for a repeal of the Scottish Parliament or 
further devolution in England, as public opinion in England accepts asymmetrical 
devolution (Trench 2005: 7).   However, complaints, mostly within the Conservative 
ranks, ranged from Scottish devolution being unfair to the English, to asymmetrical 
devolution being an inherently bad constitutional framework. Yet there appears to be 
little evidence of antagonism towards Scottish and Welsh devolution in England 
(Curtice 2005 133), instead the antagonism is targeted towards special treatment or 
favour.  North Eastern elites were aware of the different institutional arrangements 
that existed in Scotland influencing North Eastern discourse in at least two distinct 
ways; 1) Labour created an institution in the Scottish Parliament that was far from the 
thoughts of the majority of the English, but which was visible in the North East; and, 
2) The Scottish Parliament’s legislative powers allowed policy divergence north and 
south of the Border.  
In the North East there was a fear of Southern domination, which they felt 
Scotland could help offset.  As such, regional elites saw Scotland as an ally, and 
wanted to avoid conflict with it.  As stated by Robin Beveridge, principal policy 
officer at the North East Assembly with regards to a regional blueprint known as 
Bridging the Gap:
Bridging the Gap started life as a potential attack on the Barnett Formula but 
we realised that wasn't what we wanted to do… Attacking Barnett would get 
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us into a fight with potential colleagues in Scotland and Wales. And just 
asking for more money is not a positive message. (The Journal Assembly 
under fire on formula Jan 17 2002). 
 
Scotland was both a positive and a negative example, used rhetorically by regional 
actors in the North East to forward their agenda.  Anti-devolution campaigners 
portrayed devolution as having failed in Scotland, with the costs of the Scottish 
Parliament building playing a prominent role in referendum literature.  Even positive 
media coverage presented the costs of the Parliament building negatively;
An elected North East regional assembly would use existing municipal 
buildings in a bid to avoid a repeat of the 400 million pound Scottish 
Parliament “fiasco”.  According to Brian Hall of the Campaign for a North 
East Assembly (No plans to build costly assembly headquarters The Journal 
Sep 24 2003)
Sub-state nations could be portrayed in both a positive and negative light, as 
different actors choose to highlight different aspects of the sub-state nation.  This is 
not surprising; as identities are both multi-faceted and constantly changing, there will 
be different aspects of the ‘other’s’ perceived identity for ‘us’ to focus on.  In this 
sense, the Newcastle Journal was prophetic in its prediction of how the ‘Yes’ and 
‘No’ campaigns would pick out both the positive and negative aspects of devolution 
during the referendum;
If the Welsh Assembly is regarded by the “yes” camp as something to aspire 
to, the Scottish Parliament is seen by the “no” camp as proof of its drawbacks. 
(Lindford and Higgerson The Journal Feb 27 2004)
It appears that in the minds of many, the Scottish Parliament as a political institution 
became synonymous with the Scottish Parliament building.  The conclusion drawn by 
those opposed to devolution in the North East was not that the North East did not 
have enough power, but that Scotland had too much.  This was seen when 
Conservative Martin Callanan above argued that the Scots should be restrained.  The 
concern about restraining the Scots is not new; keeping the institutional power of 
Scotland in check would ensure that the Scottish would not have the capacity to 
drown out the North East.  But North Eastern pro-devolution elites abandoned this 
tactic in the 1990s.  Instead elites adopted a strategy of emulating devolution in 
Scotland and Wales, what one observer comparing the Spanish and British cases 
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termed “Tea for All” (Giordano and Roller 2004): in Spain the term “Café para 
todas” is used to describe the asymmetrical constitutional arrangements in which the 
historic nationalities lead the way but devolution is available to all—coffee for 
everyone.
Although the issues presented in the North East and Nova Scotia were 
different, the underlying complaints were similar, the economic relationships between 
the sub-state nations and the regions were unbalanced, as such regional elites 
attempted to rebalance them.  In both cases there appeared to be a sense of competing 
for limited resources, which adds more weight to the zero-sum game mentioned 
previously.
Not all negative discussion on the sub-state nations revolved around economic 
issues.  Returning to the Acadians of Nova Scotia, they felt themselves “to be distinct 
from the French Canadians in Quebec”  (Muise 1998), that Quebec did not offer them 
support to maintain their language (Rioux 1998).  This lack of support extended to a 
lack of recognition of the unique Acadian culture, as former Progressive Conservative 
MLA Guy Leblanc stated: 
We are different from many other francophones outside Quebec.  We are an 
isolated French community and we have survived with our culture, our 
language, our joie de vivre and our sense of nationalism…  We don’t want, 
and it is not the Acadian way, to shun the Anglophone community.  This is 
what we have often seen in Quebec and Acadians do not want to see this 
happen in their communities.  (HA 13 Jan 1998 p13)
This lack of recognition strengthened the sense of Acadian distinctiveness within the 
larger French Canadian communities, as Suzanne Dugas, president of the Clare60 
Citizens’ Group told the Nova Scotia Special Select Committee on National Unity:
In Clare, the Acadians are being branded as francophones outside Quebec and 
this is not true representation of the Acadian heritage…  [T]he Quebec people 
are trying to instil their values on the Acadians.  The Quebec people have their 
values and the Acadians have their values.  Some of them may be the same 
but some of them are not. (Dugas HA 13 Jan 1998 p13)
According to Resnick (1990:5), recognition is a two way street and, accordingly, 
Quebec’s lack of recognition of the uniqueness of other French speaking communities 
was perceived to be problematic.  As competition existed between different levels of 
60 Clare is an Acadian community in Nova Scotia.
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government (Simeon 2006b), this lack of recognition may have been a spill-over from 
intergovernmental competition between Canada and Quebec vis-à-vis the French 
language.  Some representatives of the Acadian community in Nova Scotia felt as if 
the Quebecois were abandoning them and their distinct heritage.  According to Henri-
Dominique Paratte of the Conseil consultatif de l'École R.C. Gordon:
[T]he rhetoric of people like Jacques Parizeau has convinced people in 
Canada that there is indeed such a thing as English Canada as a total bloc. 
There isn’t.  There are in Canada [outside Quebec] about 1 million 
francophones, that is more than the francophone number in Switzerland.  So 
even if Quebec separated tomorrow, Canada as such has a number of French-
speaking people that is probably larger than some of Canada’s provinces. 
This is an important element.  (Paratte HA SSCNU 12 Jan 1998 Pg54-5)
This emphasizes the pan-national outlook of the Acadians with regard to the French 
language, whereas Quebec was “turning its back” on fellow French speakers.  This 
challenges Quebec’s claim for distinctiveness, as the Acadians themselves are 
included in a pan-national French speaking population.
While there is no parallel to the Acadians in the North East, there are some 
key similarities in both regions.  There appears to be the perception that the sub-state 
nations were acting with little or no regard for their neighbours.  In both cases the 
sub-state nation was presented as an ‘other’ and a threat to ‘us.’  One can see how the 
actions of the sub-state nations were interpreted as having a negative impact on their 
neighbouring regions.  Yet even though Quebec and Scotland’s actions were not 
always viewed as favourable in Nova Scotia and the North East, they were seen as 
being effective at getting their ‘voice’ heard.  As a result, it is not surprising that 
some regional actors believe that the region should emulate the sub-state nations.  
Emulation
As discussed in Chapter Two, diffusion is a process whereby ideas from one 
jurisdiction permeate borders (both intellectual and physical) and are taken up by 
other jurisdictions (O’Loughlin et al. 1998, Starr 1991, or Eyestone 1977).  Elites in 
Nova Scotia and the North East saw in Quebec and Scotland examples of successful 
sub-state territorial agitation.  If regional actors interpreted the sub-state nations as 
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being advantaged, they may have attempted to employ the strategies put forward by 
these two nations.
In the North East regional elites could model their movement on a successful 
Scottish one, but there were no substantive institutional differences for Nova Scotia to 
aspire to.  Nova Scotia already had the same (constitutional) powers as Quebec; yet 
there was a desire to emulate Quebec’s ability to project its voice.  This was explicitly 
stated by former Liberal Premier of Nova Scotia, Vince MacLean (1991) who, as 
Leader of the Opposition, stated “[I]t was impressive to see, hear and feel how 
committed Quebec is about what it wants for its future.  Nova Scotia must begin to 
articulate its desires for the future with the same conviction.”  Former Conservative 
Premier John Hamm stated nearly the same thing when he was Leader of the 
Opposition:
The premier has got to be encouraged to stand up and speak for Nova Scotians 
– because if he doesn’t, who does? … I hear other premiers making 
statements across the country which are putting forth provincial interest. 
Somebody has to give the provincial interest for Nova Scotia (in Hays 1995)
It became apparent that it was not the capacity for voice but the will to use 
voice that Nova Scotian elites felt should be emulated.  As Nova Scotia has the same 
institutional capacity as Quebec, the above quotes indicate that premiers (appear) to 
lack the will to use it.  This is particularly interesting as it is the democratic 
competition between Premiers and Leaders of the Opposition that encouraged them to 
act in this way, but while the premiers are encouraged to ‘speak up’ for Nova Scotia, 
this discourse is noticeably bounded within a loyalty to the Canadian state and nation. 
This limit on voice was clearly demonstrated in 1990, when the threat of Quebecois 
separatism was high.  Premier John Buchanan pondered the future of Nova Scotia if 
Quebec seceded the federation:  “There are only three alternatives… one, that the 
Atlantic Provinces form our own country; two, that we continue in a geographically 
fractured country; or three, join the United States.” (Underhill 1990)  Within days the 
Premier was in front of the House of Assembly, reaffirming his loyalty to Queen and 
Country;
I am and always have been a fervent Nova Scotian and an ardent Canadian.  I 
have always been and continue to be a supporter of the great federal system 
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and parliamentary democracy under the Queen, known as Canada. (in 
Fenduck and Morrison 1990) 
Intellectually, one can understand why he broached the issue of Nova Scotia outside 
Canada, but the response emphasized the embedded nature of the region is so strong 
that challenges to it are simply not tolerated.
While Nova Scotia has the ability to use its voice, voice is aspired to in the 
North East.  Upon joining the North East Development Agency Bill Midgley, a senior 
North East business figure, stated:
Next year the Scots will have their own elected parliament fighting for their 
interests.  We have no elected body to champion the interest of the North East, 
yet that is precisely what we have needed over the past year… (Linford 1998)
Again Scotland was being used as an example to follow.  As it was felt that the 
Scottish Parliament would give voice to Scotland, regional actors looked to Scotland 
and saw that ‘they’ had something that ‘we’ did not.  In turn, these actors attempted 
to emulate Scotland in the hopes of creating a greater capacity for regional voice.  
For regional devolution supporters, the example of Scotland became a tool 
that could be used to fight for devolution while avoiding talking down the region; 
they could turn the debate into one about fairness and the ability to compete with 
Scotland.  In this sense, the experiences of the devolution lobby in Scotland became a 
blueprint for the devolution lobby in the North East.  As noted by Don Price, the 
North East Constitutional Convention’ joint co-ordinator (Tighe 1999), the 
Convention was explicitly modelled on the Scottish one, complete with a clergyman 
(the Bishop of Durham) to lead it.   Devolution supporters in the North East expected 
devolution in Scotland and Wales to quickly produce results.  According to Gill Hale, 
member of the (unelected) North East Assembly:
I am convinced that once the benefits start rolling in for Scotland and Wales, 
the pressure will increase further in the North East for the people here to take 
much more control over our own lives (The Journal 1999)  
Not only was Scotland seen in a positive light economically, but it was seen as a 
progressive example for the region to follow.  For example Jane Thomas, secretary of 
the Campaign for the English regions stated: 
We are very encouraged by the lead shown in Scotland, Wales and London. 
Their experience demonstrates that where power is devolved down to 
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inclusive democratically elected institutions, the position of women is 
transformed (The Journal 2002)
Although Curtice (2006, 2005) and Trench (2005) argue that devolution in Scotland 
was not something that the English paid attention to, this was not the case, at least at 
an elite level, in the North East.
Building upon the sense of neglect felt in the regions this section examined 
how debates centred on the division of power in the two states coupled with 
discussions on how to ‘fairly’ divide power between the centre and the sub-state 
nations, as well as the regions.  This section demonstrated that Quebec and Scotland 
had a relationship with Nova Scotia and the North East, although as Stairs (1996) 
indicates, this relationship was inadvertent from the perspective of the sub-state 
nations.  From the perspective of the sub-state nations these discussion took place 
between themselves and the centre, but there was a spill-over to their neighbouring 
regions and regional elites became involved in discussions about organizing the state 
in a way that was fair to all citizens.  This allowed the sub-state nations to be seen as 
internal others, acting as allies for actors within the regions as well as competitors to 
be emulated.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined debates within the North East of England and Nova 
Scotia to determine how regional identity was politicized during periods of 
heightened nationalist agitation.  The evidence presented indicates a complex 
relationship between the centre and the peripheries, the region and the sub-state 
nation, and within the regions themselves.  By looking at how regional elites 
interpreted the structure of these relationships, a better understanding of the interplay 
between institutions and identity in the North East and Nova Scotia was achieved.
Institutions played a key role in the articulation of regionalism in a number of 
ways.  The first section demonstrated how the institutional arrangements of the 
British and Canadian states exacerbated the peripheral nature of the two regions. 
While geography ensured that both regions remained peripheral, regional actors felt 
their regions lacked the institutional framework to advance regional interest.  In both 
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cases regional elites demanded change and examples were provided by the minority 
nations.  Quebec and Scotland became ‘internal others’ to Nova Scotia and the North 
East, not only challenging the conception of the state held by regional actors, but 
presenting economic threats through secessionist demands.  The theme of ‘voice’ was 
prominent in the discourse in both Nova Scotia and the North East.  While the North 
East did not have the institutional capacity for ‘voice’ that Nova Scotia did, it did not 
change the fact that in both regions actors felt there was not an effective use of 
regional voice.  In the North East there was a demand for new institutions modelled 
after ones in Scotland (a dedicated Minister, an elected Assembly, etc.); in Nova 
Scotia actors looked to Quebec and saw a louder voice.  Although Nova Scotia’s 
capacity for voice is just as great (in a legal-constitutional sense) as Quebec’s, the 
highest ranking politicians in Nova Scotia still felt that Nova Scotia was not making 
its voice heard.
This suggests that institutional capacity is not the sole requirement for 
effective voice; capacity has to be combined with the willingness to use it.  Given that 
both the North East and Nova Scotia are firmly embedded in their respective nations, 
the political ability to use this voice may be constrained.  This was most clearly 
demonstrated when the Premier of Nova Scotia publicly pondered the future of Nova 
Scotia, and presented the options of leaving Canada or joining the United States.  
The role of sub-regional communities was threaded throughout these 
discussions, indicating that sub-regional inter-community conflict and loyalties were 
powerful political forces in Nova Scotia and the North East.  This suggests that while 
there was a definite sense of ‘us’ in both Nova Scotia and the North East, there was a 
great deal of debate internal to the regions as to the nature of ‘us.’
It appears that a sense of ‘peripheralness’ was an important component of 
regional identity mobilization, and that the existence of vocal sub-state nationalism 
within the state structure provided an encouraging political environment for 
mobilization, as sub-state nationalism challenged the status quo and opened up debate 
on fundamental questions on the nature of the state.  Due to internal debates within 
the regions, which are not a primary focus of loyalty, the regions were unable to 
effectively use their capacity for voice.
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This chapter substantiates the argument that nationalist agitation helps shape 
the political environment in a favourable way for regional identity mobilization. 
During the period of heightened agitation from Quebec and Scotland, regional actors 
in both Canada and Britain also campaigned vigorously for their regional viewpoints. 
While these two events may be unrelated, this chapter has shown how the relationship 
between the majority and minority nations within Canada and Britain has influenced 
regional discourses.  In the North East, regional actors were explicit in their 
emulation of Scottish devolution, both the end result and the manner in which it came 
about.  In Nova Scotia, elites were also clear about emulating the ability of Quebecois 
elites to make their voice heard.  The fact that Nova Scotia’s ability to use its voice is 
immense compared to the North East did not stop elites there from attempting to 
increase it.  It is clear that the changed political environment provided by nationalist 
agitation shaped the manner in which regional elites articulated their views and 
regionalism manifested itself.   Yet due to the fact Nova Scotia and the North East are 
embedded in Canada (outside Quebec) and England, the opportunities were clearly 
bounded within the national discourse of these two majority nations, constraining the 
ability of regional elites and the direction regionalism could take.
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Chapter Seven: Survey Analysis in Canada and Britain
7.1 Introduction
During British parliamentary debates regarding regional devolution in 
England, Eric Pickles, anti-regional devolution Conservative Member of Parliament 
for Brentwood and Ongar, argued that the people of England do not live in regions, 
they “live in counties, towns, and villages” (HC 26 Nov 2002 C268).  This is a key 
argument made by those who oppose regional devolution.  On the one hand it is 
factually incorrect as every citizen of England does, in fact, live in a GOR.  Yet on 
the other hand, Pickles seems to imply that living in a region needs to be something 
more than a mere geographical fact, living also implies a meaningful experience of 
the region as well identifying with it.  If the people of England lack these, then the 
argument made by Pickles, and other opposed to regional devolution, would be true. 
The last two chapters examined how regional and national elites in Nova Scotia and 
the North East attempted to appeal to people’s sense of regional identity in advancing 
their policy objectives.  Yet regionalism must be more than an elite phenomenon for 
it to be a meaningful expression of identity.  Accordingly, this chapter examines 
public opinion in North East England and Nova Scotia to determine how citizens 
conceive of their region, nation, and state to confirm whether the elite debate 
examined in Chapters Five and Six resonated with the masses.  This chapter uses data 
collected from the British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSA) from 1991 to 2005, the 
North East portion of the Regional Referendum Study 2004 (completed between 
November 2004 and February 2005), Environics Focus Canada (EFC) surveys from 
1990 to 2005, and the Canadian Election Studies (CES) of 1993 to 2005.61  
The first section examines identity in Nova Scotia and the North East to 
establish if there was a) a strong sense of regional identity, b) a variation between the 
regions and their co-nationals vis-à-vis regional identity, and c) a relationship 
between regional and national identities.  Finding evidence of regionalism at a mass 
level requires first that the masses hold a sense of regional identity.  The second 
section considers whether people in the North East and Nova Scotia had a sense of 
61 Including the 1992 Referendum, which is embedded within the 1993 election study.
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regional political efficacy by examining the political context and environment of 
Nova Scotia and the North East of England.  It utilizes Hirschman’s (1970) concepts 
of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ to determine if a) respondents felt their voice was heard in the 
political system; and, b) whether they withdrew from the political process if they felt 
that it was not.  The final section explores how people in Nova Scotia and the North 
East interpret the place of Quebec and Scotland within Canada and Britain, to gain an 
understanding of how the ongoing dialectical relationship between the majority and 
minority nation is perceived within these two peripheral regions of the staatsvolk.  
A quick methodological note is required concerning the use of survey data 
here.  Not all questions were asked in each survey set, and as the states under study 
administer their regions in fundamentally different ways—one is a federal system and 
the other is unitary—certain questions only pertain to one of the regions.  As such, the 
majority of the comparisons in this chapter are made with similar questions in an 
attempt to reveal underlying attitudes and behaviours.  An unfortunate limitation is 
that although a variety of survey sets were used in order to examine as many 
questions as possible (indeed, this chapter merely highlights a few of the key 
questions), not all the data sets had matching identity questions to enable correlations 
between respondents’ indicators of regionalism.  Where possible, though, such 
comparisons have been conducted.  In addition, where available (and where it is both 
useful and does not clutter the presentation of the data), the results from Quebec and 
Scotland are shown, allowing the reader to gain a sense of the different attitudes held 
by members of majority and minority sub-state nations.
An important point to address at the beginning of this chapter is in regard to 
the ‘n’ values, the number of respondents.  Figure 7.1 displays sample years to show 
the total size of each survey, as well as the sample size in the regions analyzed.  The 
data sets used similar numbers for all years, so only one year is shown here.  With 
regard to the Regional Referendum Study, 2005 is the default year as this was the 
only year the survey was conducted.  With regards to the sample from the other three 
data sets, they reflect a ‘typical’ year in the survey.  As can be seen, some of the 
numbers in the North East in the BSA and especially Nova Scotia in both the CES 
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and EFC surveys are low.  When subdivided into different identity categories, the 
numbers are reduced even further creating a challenge to analyzing the data.  











CES 3651 1251 138 2262 2000









BSA 3287 324 217 2746 2001
Referendum 
Study
NA NA 699 NA 2005
Source: CES 2000, EFC 1999-1, BSA 2001 and Referendum Study
The challenge posed by the low ‘n’ value, namely the high probability of 
sampling error, was met and overcome by using three complimentary methods.  First 
the years were combined to create a ‘snapshot’, not of a single year as surveys 
normally produce, but of longer periods of time.  This is most notable in Figure 7.18, 
below, in which the four EFC surveys in each year between 1990 and 1998 were 
added together, then each year was weighted equally and added together to produce 
the figure.  This produced an approximate ‘n’ value in Nova Scotia of 4000—a 
sizable number of respondents by any means.   Second the answers are displayed over 
time.  While each of the responses in each year would be as statistically significant as 
one would expect for such low ‘n’ values, if the numbers are consistent, or show clear 
patterns at the regional level which are consistent with national ones, it suggests that 
the survey question is a reflection of regional opinion.  This is seen in the right hand 
graph in Figure 7.11 below; Nova Scotia and Canada (outside Quebec) followed the 
same pattern over time, the key difference being the starting point.  By showing both 
regional and national data following a similar pattern, this not only suggests that 
regional opinion changed in a manner consistent with the rest of Canada, it also 
indicates that opinion in the region was different than the rest of Canada (outside 
Quebec).  The change over time was the same, yet the starting points were different. 
Third these two strategies are combined.  Figure 7.13 not only allows the reader to 
see the changing patterns in Nova Scotia and the rest of Canada (outside Quebec), it 
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also gives all year averages for 1990 through to 1997.  This provides the reader with a 
sense of change over time, while increasing the accuracy of the all year average. 
While none of the above measures completely overcome the challenges of the low ‘n’ 
values, they provide a framework for analyzing the data to address the hypothesis and 
research questions.
7.2 Citizenship and Identity in Nova Scotia and the North East
This section examines questions of citizens’ affinity to their region and 
locality, to determine if people in these regions have a stronger sense of ‘belonging’ 
to their regions than those in other parts of Britain and Canada, and to explore the 
relationship between regional and national identity.  With regard to the North East, 
this sub-section utilizes three types of questions to assess how people perceive of 
their national and regional identities: 1) data taken from a question which asked 
people to indicate identities they felt applied to them (British, English, Scottish, 
Asian, European and so forth), focusing on the British and English responses; 2) the 
‘Moreno’ five point scale, 62 which allowed individuals to have varying degrees of 
overlapping English and British identity; and 3) questions that dealt with their 
regional and local communities.  In the case of Nova Scotia, two methods were used 
to assess the strength of regional identity: 1) the three point citizenship question asked 
by Environics Focus Canada, which asked whether respondents felt more a citizen of 
Canada, their province, or both equally; and 2) by adopting Henderson’s (2007) 
method in recreating a Moreno style five point question by cross referencing two 100 
point scales in which respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards Canada 
and their province.  It should be noted that the wording and key identity terms were 
different in all the surveys, suggesting that they were testing different concepts.  For 
example, the difference between ‘attachment’ and ‘belonging’; attachment implies a 
one-way relationship between the individual and the region, while belonging may 
imply a sense of reciprocity between the individual and the identity group.63  In 
62 For more information on the “Moreno Question” see Moreno 2006.
63 This researcher would like to thank Prof Keith Banting of Queen’s University for 
pointing out this important distinction (2008, private conversation)
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saying this, all survey research is limited by the questions available, and while not 
perfect comparisons, these questions as a whole allow for testing the strength and 
direction of the relationship between individuals, regional and national identities.
National Identities
Both Nova Scotia and the North East are part of larger nations; Nova Scotia is 
in Canada, and the North East belongs to two larger nations; England and Britain. 
This section examines attachment/belonging in each of the two regions vis-à-vis their 
larger nations to determine a) the strength of their national identity compared to that 
of their co-nationals, and b) in the case of the North East, which national identity is 
stronger.  The theoretical outline presented in Chapter Two suggested that regional 
identities are both embedded within, and indivisible from, larger nations; they do not 
compete with national identities and one would not expect national identities to be 
weaker in regions with strong regional identities.  Beginning with the North East, the 
graph on the left hand side of Figure 7.2 is the percentage of respondents who self 
identified as British; as can be seen, feelings of Britishness in the North East are 
similar to those found in the rest of England, and much higher than in Scotland.
Figure 7.2: Thinks of self as…

























































Source: BSA 1996 - 2005
In Figure 7.2 English identity appears weaker than British identity in two 
senses.  Firstly, fewer people subscribed to an English, as compared to British, 
identity in both England and the North East.  Secondly, English identity was much 
more fluid than British identity, implying a weaker affinity with it.  This is in sharp 
contrast to the relative stability of British identity.  This suggests that Britishness was 
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more embedded within England than Englishness, and that Englishness may have 
required a greater stimulus, such as devolution in Scotland and Wales, to bring it to 
the surface.  This may not be as odd as it first seems as Scotland has historically 
maintained distinctly Scottish institutions and has been governed though the Scottish 
Office and autonomous Scottish institutions, whereas the historical confusion of 
Britain and England is exacerbated by the fact that institutions of state in England 
were and are British (Greer 2007).  As Bond et al. suggest, even institutions which do 
not consciously attempt to harness identities can do so (2003).  As seen in Figure 7.2, 
it was after 1997, when identity was politicized by Labour’s plans for devolution, that 
English identity grew in strength and then tapered off.  While this may make sense 
for England overall, in the North East it is counter-intuitive.  One would imagine a 
region bordering Scotland would have a greater appreciation of difference between 
England and Scotland.  People in the North East may have been more aware of 
differences between England and Scotland and emphasized their similarities through 
a British identity.
The data in Figure 7.3, in which the two national identities are examined in 
the context of a Moreno question (Moreno 2006), appears to contradict Figure 7.2. 
While noting that the years covered by Figure 7.3 are years in which English identity 
is strongest in Figure 7.2; Figure 7.3 indicates that when offered the opportunity to 
express the strength of their English and British identities in relation to each other, a 
majority of people in both the North East and England leaned towards English rather 
than British, although the vast majority felt both to some degree.  An interesting point 
to note is that while the difference between North East and rest of England responses 
on either end of the table were not substantial, North Eastern respondents were more 
likely in all years to see themselves as being equally English and British (although if 
and how respondents conceptualize the difference between English and British is 
difficult to say, see for example Condor 2000).
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NE 19.2 11.8 31 39.2 26.8 8.8 18.1
ROE 17.1 14.7 31.8 36.6 24.4 11.3 13.2
2000
NE 11.7 15.1 26.8 43.9 23.9 11.7 12.2
ROE 19.3 13.5 32.9 34.7 25.1 14.3 10.8
2001
NE 19.1 9.7 28.8 50.9 19.4 10 9.4
ROE 16.9 12.8 29.7 41.2 20.2 9.3 10.9
2003
NE 14.4 22.1 36.5 36.9 24.3 17.1 7.2
ROE 16.9 18.9 35.8 30.6 23.7 13.1 10.6
Source BSA 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003
In Canada the majority nation is much less clearly defined than England in 
Britain.  While this thesis uses the term ‘Canada (outside Quebec)’ to identify this 
group, Canadians from outside Quebec self identify simply as Canadian (Resnick 
1995: 85), and lack competing or overlapping national loyalties in the manner found 
in Quebec and Britain.  In one sense, Canadian identity is similar to British in that 
both are statewide identities that remained relatively stable over time.  When asked in 
the 1993, 1997 and 2000 CES to rate “how they feel about Canada” on a scale of 0-
100, with 0 meaning that they “really dislike” Canada and 100 meaning that they 
“really like” Canada, the responses were extremely constant over time.  In Nova 
Scotia the answer was 88 +/- 0.4 in all years.  In the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) 
it was 88 +/- 4.0 in all years.64  The notable difference was Quebec, which was 67 +/- 
3 in all years.  Yet even though the response in Quebec was lower than that found in 
the rest of Canada, it was stable (and arguably positive towards Canada).  The 
variance in Nova Scotia was much less than found in the rest of Canada (outside 
Quebec) with the overall mean feeling about Canada being very high and very 
constant.
Regarding national identity in both the regions and their majority nations, 
attachment to the overarching statewide national identity was extremely high and 
64 Each year was weighted equally as the sample sizes were so similar.  The ‘+/-‘ 
represents change over time.  The same applies for the provincial attachment 
questions below.
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stable over time.  While a clear majority-national identity, such as the English one, 
has no obvious parallel in Canada, the fluidity of Englishness (even with its 
comparable levels of support to British in Figure 7.3 ) suggest that England and the 
North East were more British than English whereas strong feelings towards Canada 
existed throughout Canada (outside Quebec).
Regional Identities
The argument put forward at the beginning of this chapter by Conservative 
Eric Pickles is very relevant to the debate in England where the role of ‘region’ was 
highly contested.  This is in sharp contrast to Canada where the pedigrees of many of 
the provinces are longer than that of Canada as a whole (see Smith 2002).  While it 
may be generally given that provinces in Canada have strong identities, as Canadian 
constitutional debates focus on Quebec’s place within Canada and create a Canada-
Quebec dichotomy, one may wonder whether this had an impact upon the identities 
of other provinces and the strength of provincial identity vis-à-vis Canadian.  With 
political debate so heavily focused on the Canadian state and nation as a whole, it 
would be imprudent to assume that strong provincial identities existed without testing 
for them.
































Not at all proud




Figure 7.4 is particularly interesting as it demonstrates that people in the 
North East were very attached to their GOR, more so than the English average—even 
more than to their historic counties (although they still felt closer to their counties 
than people in other parts of England).  This is especially interesting as opposition to 
regional government rested upon the key argument that people in England thought of 
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themselves as citizens of counties, cities and shires, not regions.  The attachment to 
regions demonstrated in Figure 7.4 felt by the English in general, and North 
Easterners in particular, completely contradicts the assertion made by Eric Pickles at 
the beginning of this chapter.  
It should be noted that discussion about an ‘English average’ with regard to 
attachment to region can be very misleading as this territorial identity is in and of 
itself highly territorialized.  This is important for two reasons.  Firstly, while the 
statistical average for England showed that the English do have regional identities, 
they are not evenly dispersed.  Secondly, lack of regional identity seems to be based 
upon region of residence with people in the South having lower attachment to 
regional identities than people in the Northern regions.  Those in the South East of 
England had the lowest attachment to their region (Bond and McCrone 2004).  
While the majority of English people indicated some sort of regional 
attachment at a level comparable to their historic counties, the response given in 
regards to pride in the region, found on the right side of Figure 7.4, paints a slightly 
different picture.  The “don’t think of self in that way” response was much greater 
than the “not at all close” response.  While still indicating that a sizable number of 
people in England viewed themselves as having some level of pride in their region, it 
suggests a problem with the wording of the regional attachment question on the left. 
With regard to pride (the right hand table), respondents were given an easy way ‘out’ 
of being forced to identify with something that they did not identify with, unlike the 
questions dealing with attachment.  Throughout the remainder of this chapter data is 
correlated against both regional attachment and regional pride as they have a strong 
correlation within the North East (.667 p < .005).
Moving from the North East to Nova Scotia, one sees in Figure 7.5 that the 
levels of attachment to provinces were remarkably high throughout Canada (and 
counter-intuitively, lowest in Quebec).  Nova Scotians were shown to display a 
similar level of support to Canada as their fellow Canadians (outside Quebec).  In 
Nova Scotia the feelings averaged at 86.7 +/- 1.2 while in the rest of Canada (outside 
Quebec) they averaged at 82.5 +/- 2.0.  This indicates that while provincial 
attachment in Canada was very high, it was slightly lower than feelings towards 
Canada shown above (and only by the slightest of margins in Nova Scotia).  A 
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surprising result was that Quebecois had the lowest overall level of attachment to 
their province.  As this thesis deals with territorial, as opposed to linguistic identities, 
these figures are not controlled for language in Quebec.  Accordingly, it is 
conceivable that the sizable English speaking minority in Quebec pulled the numbers 
down.
Figure 7.5 How Respondent Feels towards Province
Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000
Relationship between Regional and National Identities
Now that it has been established that strong regional and national identities 
exist in both Canada (outside Quebec) and England, these must be examined in 
relationship to each other to address the hypothesis and research questions and 
determine whether or not regional identities are embedded in national ones, as is 
suggested in Chapter Two.  In the North East and Nova Scotia regional affinity was 
essential for elite regional discourse to resonate with the masses.  As stated in Chapter 
Two, the logic of ‘personal nationalism’ as outlined by Hearn (2007) and Cohen 
(1996) suggests that individuals’ regional identities shape their outlook on 
national/statewide issues.  It is not important that the attachment to the region be 
higher than in the rest of the majority nation, merely that it be strong, as it is the 
strength of regional identity that provides the basis for regionalism.  
In examining relative attachment in Canada, two sources of data were used. 
The EFC surveys, which use a three scale relative attachment question in 1990, 1991, 
242















1994, 1996, and 1997 asking people if they were a citizen of Canada, their province, 
or both (one was also asked in 2000 but the format was slightly different, making 
comparisons impossible).  These are compiled for all years in Figure 7.6 to 
compensate for the low ‘n’ values in Nova Scotia as outlined above.  Henderson 
(2007), in her analysis of Quebecois identity, developed a method for turning the 0-
100 scales discussed above in the 1993, 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Surveys 
into a reconstructed Moreno Question by cross referencing feelings towards Canada 
and the respondents’ province (Figure 7.7).  
Figure 7.6 Citizen of Canada, Province or Both, 1990-1997
















Source: Environics Focus Canada 1990, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997 
Figure 7.6 indicates that Nova Scotians were less likely than those in Canada 
(outside Quebec) to indicate the “Canada only” position and more likely to indicate 
both a “citizen of province not Canada” and a “both equally” answer.  What is not 
shown is the changing loyalties over time.  In Nova Scotia, between 1990 and 1997, 
the response “Nova Scotia not Canada” dropped by 16.4 and “citizen of Canada” 
dropped by 10 while “citizen of both” increased by 20 points, resulting in a net gain 
in Nova Scotian citizenship of 3.6 and a net gain in Canadian citizenship of 10. 
While the ‘n’ values in each year were too small to allow any meaningful conclusion 
to be drawn (hence the aggregate figure), it suggests an increased sense of Canadian 
citizenship during this period, but not at the expense of Nova Scotia citizenship.  
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NS 0 26.32 45.61 26.32 1.75
COQ 0.07 35.03 44.94 19.89 0.07
Quebec Data NA
1997
NS 0 14.29 67.26 18.45 0
COQ 0.1 27.47 56.91 15.52 0
Quebec 0.58 21.89 32.71 43.39 1.42
2000
NS 0 25.66 50.44 23.89 0
COQ 0.06 33.71 48.94 17.25 0.06
Quebec 0.21 24.87 38.37 36.23 0.32
Source: CES 1993, 1997 and 2000
Figure 7.7 is a reconstructed ‘Moreno Question’ using Henderson’s (2007) 
approach.65  This data is striking in that it clearly demonstrates that an overwhelming 
number of Canadians held attachment to both their province and the federation as a 
whole, strongly suggesting that they are not exclusive identities.  This provides a 
different picture than the responses to the EFC questions, but when examined 
carefully, similar patterns emerge; people in Nova Scotia had a greater attachment to 
their province than their co-nationals in Canada (outside Quebec).  The usefulness of 
Henderson’s method can be extended from comparing the foci of allegiance across 
provinces and national groupings in Canada, to testing the strength of these 
allegiances.  In this sense, one is struck by the sheer number of responses which listed 
‘100’ in both the provincial and Canadian attachment category; 24/90 in Nova Scotia 
and 239/2806 in Canada (outside Quebec).  In Nova Scotia, the relationship between 
attachment to province and Canada in 1997 was .762 (p < .005) indicating that there 
was a very strong correlation between provincial and national identity in Nova Scotia. 
This is substantially higher than the (still strong) correlation of .515 (p < .005) in the 
65 Respondents who indicated no feeling to Canada but any feeling to their province 
were placed in the ‘province not Canada’ category.  Those who indicated a stronger 
feeling towards the province were placed in the ‘province greater than Canada’ 
category.  Those who responded the same to Canada and province were placed in the 
Canada and province equally category.  The inverse was done with regard to the other 
side of the Moreno scale
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rest of Canada (outside Quebec).  The scores Canadians gave to both their provinces 
and Canada as a whole demonstrates two important details: 1) that Canadians were 
extremely loyal to both Canada and their province, and 2) that a sense of 
Canadianness did not detract from a sense of provincial identity, and vice versa.
In England, while recreating a regional Moreno Figure was not possible, 
correlating attachment to region and closeness to region with whether or not people 
identified themselves as British and English was.  Questions from the 2005 
Referendum Study allow for a correlation between attachment to the North East, 
England and Britain.  Here there was a stronger correlation between attachment to the 
region and England (.670 ) than Britain (.555, both p < .005), though both are high.
Regional and National Identities in Nova Scotia and the North East 
Where respondents in the North East had two national identities (British and 
English) as well as their regional identity, in Nova Scotia there were only two 
identities to be tested, the national (Canadian) and regional (Nova Scotian).  While 
other researchers have discussed in depth the unique political cultures of Nova Scotia 
and the Maritimes/Atlantic Canada (See Carbert 2006, Stewart 1994, Harper and 
Vance 1992, Forbes 1979, and Chapter Four) and demonstrated that identities exist 
outside the federal/provincial formalized structure, this section has provided a 
framework to examine Nova Scotia as a stand alone region.66  
Three key points can be deduced from the exploration of identities in the 
North East.  First, in both the North East and England, there appeared to be a stronger 
and more consistent attachment to Britain than England, and this was more 
pronounced in the North East.  Second, regional identity in the North East was much 
stronger than in the rest of England overall.  Additionally, while regional attachment 
varies substantially across England, the majority of the English do possess a regional 
identity.  Third, while the English identity appeared more strongly correlated with a 
regional one in the North East, this was only marginally more than with a British 
66 Due to the relatively small size of the Atlantic Canadian provinces, they are often 
researched as a whole instead of their constituent parts.  Researchers examining 
individual provinces have to ‘tease out’ province specific information or rely on 
generalities applicable to all Maritime/Atlantic Canada.
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identity.  Much like the North East and England, in Nova Scotia and Canada (outside 
Quebec) the overarching statewide national identity was strong and constant during 
this period (1990-2004).  Nova Scotia, like the North East, had a higher level of 
attachment to the province-region than was found in the rest of Canada (outside 
Quebec), which correlated very strongly with attachment to Canada.  Being Nova 
Scotian and Canadian and being North Eastern and English/British were not mutually 
exclusive, substantiating the argument that strong regional identities within Nova 
Scotia and the North East do not compete with national ones.  
7.3 Efficacy and Alienation
While attachment and belonging are important to this study, studying 
regionalism (the mobilization of regional identities) demands an exploration of the 
relationship between political attitudes and regional identity.  This will help gauge the 
impact of democratic institutions on regional identity mobilization, as well as 
determine whether regional identity is politicized at a mass level.  A lack of efficacy, 
the perceived ability to make change, is perhaps the key building block of identity 
mobilization.  Indeed, returning to the hypothesis, while it may be the dialectic 
between majority and minority nationalism that creates the political environment, for 
regional elites to advance a ‘regional agenda,’ it must, in some way, resonate with the 
masses.  As defined in Chapter One, a ‘regional agenda’ is “the mobilization of 
regional identity by political elites as a vehicle for their desired political outcomes.” 
As noted in earlier chapters, nationalism stems from grievance; this logic applies to 
most political mobilizations.  It is difficult to conceptualize a regionalism lacking a 
core belief that the region somehow lacks power, voice, or both.  It seems unlikely 
that mobilization would occur when the people are satisfied with the status quo and 
there is no threat to it.  As such, the framework provided by Hirschman (1970) in 
Exit, Voice and Loyalty is instructive.  Regions such as Nova Scotia and the North 
East were ‘loyal’ to their states and therefore lacked the ‘exit’ option that was 
available to minority nations. ‘Voice’ is interpreted to mean citizens’ sense of having 
political efficacy within the political process.  While the regions could not exit 
Canada or Britain (the fact that these regions were firmly embedded within their 
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larger nations was demonstrated in the previous section), individual citizens could 
exit through a lack of participation and alienation within the system.  If low levels of 
efficacy or high levels of alienation are correlated with regional identity it suggests a 
politicized sense of regional identity.














































Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, BSA 1991, 1994, 1996, 200-2002, 2004, 2005
Earlier chapters indicated that regional elites in the North East and Nova 
Scotia claimed their regions lacked ‘voice,’ that they were ignored in the political 
process.  In the North East this resulted in a long running (and unsuccessful) attempt 
to establish some sort of elected regional assembly.  In Nova Scotia it resulted in 
‘standing up for Nova Scotia’ being a key political theme in the contestation for 
power in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly.  Figure 7.8 examines people’s 
perception of how much voice they have within the system by asking respondents in 
both Canada and Britain if they felt that they had a say in government.67  It is logical 
to assume that a higher sense of efficacy would equate with an increase in people 
feeling they had a say in government.  Accordingly, the higher the numbers in Figure 
7.8, the lower the efficacy.  The left hand graph in Figure 7.8 suggests a common lack 
of efficacy throughout Canada (outside Quebec), even though it did improve 
marginally during this period.  It does not, however, provide a sense of Nova Scotian 
distinctiveness.  What is distinctive are the comparably high levels of political 
67 It is important to note that in the Canadian data the level of government is not 
specified, leaving this as an overall indicator of political efficacy.  However, given 
that the polling context is a federal election survey strongly suggests that the 
respondents were referring to the federal level.
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efficacy in Quebec—hypothesized as the result of Quebec’s ability to make its 
concerns heard within the statewide arena.   In the North East, the pattern was similar. 
Apart from a drop in 2004, the numbers were consistently high, with people in the 
North East and England generally not displaying a strong sense that they had a say in 
what government did. The difference between Canada and Britain was in relation to 
the views in the minority, not the majority, nation.  The Scots displayed a similar 
attitude to the English: they lacked an overall sense of efficacy
 even though they managed to gain substantial concessions from the British 
state, most notably the devolved Scottish Parliament.
While efficacy was low throughout Canada (outside Quebec) and England this 
did not present an immediate problem to this study.  If low efficacy correlated with 
regional identities, it would suggest a regional dissatisfaction that elites could attempt 
to mobilize around.  However, this was not the case.  In Canada, evidence does exist 
that shows that efficacy was weakly tied to province.  In Nova Scotia, “attachment to 
province” correlated with “no say in government” at .375 (P=.075).  A probability of 
7.5% that the correlation is false between provincial attachment and no say in 
government is generally outside of a statistically acceptable band, but here it is 
presented as it does suggest a weak relationship.  In the North East, however, no 
statistically significant correlations were discovered.
As efficacy was interpreted as people’s perception of how much influence 
they have over the political process, alienation shall be interpreted as how much 
interest or how involved people are.  While the regions lacked the ‘exit’ option, 
analyzing alienation allows for an examination of political disengagement, enabling a 
testing of the correlation between political alienation and regional identity.  
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Figure 7.9: Interest in…
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The right hand graph in Figure 7.9 examines levels of interest in politics in Britain, 
showing the total responses of those who answered that they had “a great deal of 
interest” or “quite a lot of interest” in politics.  The Canadian Election Study asked 
people to rate their interest in politics on a scale of 0-10.  A similar question was 
asked about the election for which the study was conducted.  Looking at the Canadian 
figure, interest in politics was by and large the same in Nova Scotia as the rest of 
Canada (outside Quebec) and was only slightly less in Quebec.  A similar pattern is 
shown with regard to interest in the election in Nova Scotia and the rest of Canada 
(outside Quebec), although here Quebec generally displayed lower interest in the 
election.  What is striking in Figure 7.9 is that while the rate of interest in politics in 
the North East was similar to that found in the rest of England prior to 1997, after this 
time interest was markedly lower in most years.  This is especially significant given 
the temporal parameter of this study.  It was during the period in which the North 
East was relatively less interested in politics than the rest of England that regional 
institutions were created and an elected regional assembly entered the realm of 
possibility.  This suggests not only a lack of connection between elites and the masses 
in the North East, but that they were moving in opposite directions.  While between 
2003 and 2005 there was a slow increase in interest so that by 2005 the North East 
had almost returned to pre 1997 levels, in 2004, the year of the referendum, overall 
interest in politics in the region was still below the English average.  This suggests 
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that the post-1997 period may have been an aberration, but one which coincided with 
a high level of elite regional identity mobilization in the North East.  
As noted, evidence of alienation alone is not evidence of a politicized regional 
identity, unless it can be correlated with regional identities, yet as with efficacy, no 
statistically significant correlation was discovered in either Nova Scotia or the North 
East.  If a regional agenda requires a grievance framework to mobilize the masses 
along identity lines, this section has indicated that while political efficacy may have 
been low and alienation high in Nova Scotia and the North East (as well as their 
larger nations), there was little evidence linking regional identity with either.  
This section suggests that the issue of voice, prevalent in elite discourse, may 
not have resonated with the masses.  In turn, this seems to indicate regional elites 
would have had difficulty mobilizing the masses around a regional agenda.  The 
findings are particularly interesting with regard to this thesis’ interest in the role of 
regional democracy as citizens of the region with democratic institutions, Nova 
Scotia, appear to feel just as alienated as citizens from the region lacking democratic 
institutions; the North East.  However, just because regional identity did not appear to 
be correlated to withdrawal or alienation from the political system does not mean that 
there were no political issues upon which to build regionalism in Nova Scotia and the 
North East.  If people in the regions felt that Quebec and Scotland were treated 
favourably by the state, this could have had a spill over effect in the form of 
constitutional ‘me-tooism’ in the regions.  
7.4 The Sub-state Nations: Quebec and Scotland as ‘Others’
As this thesis explores regionalism as a component of majority nationalism 
during periods of in-depth constitutional (re)negotiation, it demands that the 
perceptions of the minority nations be examined.  This final section explores 
interpretations of the nature of the Canadian and British states as expressed by the 
masses in Nova Scotia and the North East by placing particular emphasis on how 
Quebec and Scotland are perceived.  Identities are often mobilized in relation to an 
‘other,’ and in this sense Quebec and Scotland may have provided the ‘other’ 
necessary to overcome the low levels of efficacy and high levels of alienation 
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discussed above.  The examination of the minority nations takes two forms.  First, it 
examines how people felt the state (re)distributed resources to determine if citizens of 
the region felt the state acted in an equitable manner, and if not, if these views 
correlated with regional identities.  Second, it investigates constitutional preferences 
in the regions to provide insight into how respondents interpreted the nature of their 
state and their place in it.
Preferential Treatment
If citizens feel state resources are fairly distributed, advancing the interests of 
all regions, regional actors will not have the opportunity to mobilize identity around 
an economic unfairness frame (recalling the appeals to fairness highlighted in earlier 
chapters).  In both Canada and Britain, the (re)distribution of state resources was 
highly politicized.  In Britain it was mythologized around the Barnett formula 
(Mitchell 2003) while in Canada equalization was mandated by the constitution.  In 
Canada, transfer payments have always been politicized, but in Britain the Barnett 
Formula managed to de-politicize resource (re)distribution, at least until devolution to 
the minority nations of Britain.  As noted in earlier chapters, economic interests and 
constitutional demands were strongly linked.  (Re)distribution of state resources is a 
particularly visible aspect of a state’s the economic activities, and examining 
perceptions of redistribution will help determine whether the feelings of economic 
disparity expressed by elites in earlier chapters resonates with the masses.
In Canada the (re)distribution of resources by the Canadian state takes a 
variety of forms: equalization payments, transfer payments and direct state to citizen 
payments.  The merits of these payments are highly debated (see Clemens and 
Veldhuis (eds) 2007, Savoie 2006); what is not debated is that Nova Scotia receives a 
sizable portion of its provincial revenue from the federal government (upwards of 
45%, one of the highest percentages in Canada).  Yet just because Nova Scotia was a 
net beneficiary of equalization did not mean that its citizens felt central government 
policy favoured them.  Nova Scotians, for example, may have interpreted their 
government’s dependency upon transfers as a negative by-product of historical 
development policies of the federal government that favoured other parts of Canada. 
Interviews conducted with Nova Scotia elites substantiated this view.  Nova Scotia 
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elites appeared to have a very long memory, often referring to Ontario by its pre-
Confederation name of ‘Upper Canada.’














1990 63.9 78 88.4 86.4 92.3 90.4
1992 62.3 75.7 83.6 Na 0 Na
1994 55.7 73 80.9 58.3 73.7 87.8
1996 45.8 69.1 72.4 68.6 69.6 79.3
1997 57.4 71 77.2 76.9 74.3 81.8
All year 
average
57 73.3 80.6 72.5 77.5 85.8
Source: EFC 1990-1, 1992-1, 1994-1, 1996-1, 1997-1.
Figure 7.10 indicates that Canadians felt some regions of the country were 
better treated than others, with Nova Scotians more strongly believing this than other 
Canadians.  Figure 7.10 also demonstrates that while people of all three citizenship 
categories  (Nova Scotians, Canadian and both) had a high rate of feeling that the 
federal government favoured one part of the country over the other, that the stronger 
one’s Nova Scotian citizenship, the greater one’s sense that the centre favoured other 
regions.  While in each individual year the responses are not statistically significant, 
the total  all  year  average (with each year  weighted equally)  is,  indicating that the 
stronger one’s Nova Scotian identity, the more likely it was that that person felt other 
provinces were being favoured.  Given the data presented in earlier chapters, it may 
come as no surprise that the overwhelming response in all citizenship categories was 
that the federal government favoured Quebec and, to a lesser extent, Ontario.68  This 
is not surprising as much of the federal government’s energies during this period were 
concentrated  on  solidifying  Quebec’s  place  within  the  Canadian  federation,  and 
Ontario, was in many ways during this period the economic engine of Canada.
68 It is interesting to note that Quebec consistently had the highest rates of people 
feeling that all regions of the country were treated equally and respondents not having 
an answer to this question.  In 2004, 54% of Quebecois felt Quebec was treated the 
same as other provinces, compared to 38.4% in Nova Scotia and 37.5% in the rest of 
Canada (outside Quebec).  Additionally, 30.1% of Quebec respondents felt their 
province was treated worse, compared to 52.7% in Nova Scotia and 37.8% in the rest 
of Canada (outside Quebec).
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Figure 7.11
Does the federal government treat 
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Figure 7.11 expands upon the data from Figure 7.10.  Here, while in all years 
respondents throughout Canada felt their province was treated more or less the same 
as other provinces, this feeling steadily decreased between 1997 and 2004, while 
belief that their province was treated worse steadily increased.  This same pattern was 
also found in Nova Scotia with the notable difference being the starting point – at the 
beginning of the decline a substantial minority of Nova Scotians already felt their 
province was not treated fairly, and by the end of the data examined, the majority of 
Nova Scotians felt the federal government treated their province worse, while in the 
rest of Canada (outside Quebec) only a slim plurality thought this.
In Nova Scotia, however, the belief that the province was treated unfairly did 
not correlate strongly with provincial identity.  No statistically significant correlation 
was found between attachment to province and provincial treatment, although the 
cross tabulation in Figure 7.11 gives a visual indication that the feelings were fairly 
consistent across identity categories with one notable exception—those who had a 
higher provincial than Canadian attachment were less likely to think their province 
was badly treated.  One would expect that citizens who felt their province was treated 
better than others would be those with a less Canadian outlook.  This, however, was 
not the case, suggesting elites were unable to politicize the Nova Scotian identity of 
this segment of the population.
In Britain the distribution of resources is examined first by exploring how 
respondents viewed the distribution of resources territorially to gauge whether 
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respondents felt Scotland was favoured over England.  Next, studying responses to a 
series of questions in the Regional Referendum Study will determine whether people 
in the North East saw other parts of England as receiving preferential treatment.
As indicated in Figure 7.12, the four year average of people feeling that 
Scotland received its fair share or less of government spending was just over 50% in 
the rest of England, and marginally higher in the North East.  This indicates that the 
majority of the English population did not feel that Scotland was treated favourably—
although a sizable minority did feel that way.  The North East referendum study 
allows for an examination of how citizens of that region perceived the government 
treated other parts of England (Figure 7.13).  Of the respondents, 68.5% felt that the 
government did not look after the long term interests of the region.  More people felt 
that the North East was not being looked after by the government than thought 
Scotland was favoured, suggesting that it was not a grievance against the place of 
Scotland that was the driving force within the minds of people in the North East. 
When asked if the government looked after the interests of all parts of England more 
or less equally, 77.2% said that the government looked after some parts more than 
others, with the South of England overwhelmingly seen in the North East as being 
advantaged.  Overall, people in the North East felt two locations were treated better 
by the central state: a substantial minority of people looked to Scotland, while an 
overwhelming majority felt that the South of England was better treated.
Figure 7.12: Belief that Scotland receives its Fair Share of Government Spending
Question Answer %
Correlations to regional attachment 
(2003), p<.05
Belief that Scotland receives its 









Figure: 7.13: Perceptions of Government Treatment in the North East
Question Answer %
How much do you trust the UK government to work in 
the best long-term interests of the North East region?
Only some of time 
and almost never
68.5
And how much would you trust an elected regional 
assembly for the North East to work in the best long-
term interests of  the North East?
Only some of time 
and almost never
50.3
Would you say the government looks after the 
interests of all parts of England more or less 
equally...?
Looks after some 
parts more than 
others
77.2
Would you say that compared with other parts of the 
United Kingdom, the North East region gets pretty 
much its fair share of gov spending..?
A little less and much 
less than its fair 
share of government 
spending
66
What part of England do you think government looks 
after more than others?
London 44.7
The South of 




Source: Referendum Study 2005
Though the majority opinion in Nova Scotia and North East was that other 
regions were being favoured, an important difference between the two regions came 
to light.  In Nova Scotia, Quebec, and to a lesser extent Ontario, were seen as 
receiving an unfair amount of state resources.  In the North East negative public 
opinion was more strongly directed to the South of England than Scotland.  In Canada 
the key ‘other’ was Quebec, a minority nation and ‘internal other,’ the minor ‘other’ 
was Ontario, the dominant region within the Canadian federation.  In Britain, the 
South of England, analogous to Ontario, was primary, with the sub-state nation of 
Scotland being secondary.  This suggests that in Nova Scotia there was a much 
stronger base for using the sub-state nation as a reference point for regional identity 
mobilization than there was in the North East.
Constitutional Preferences 
Constitutional issues were salient in Nova Scotia and the North East for 
similar reasons, allowing for comparisons of how people felt the state should be 
structured.  This information provides a strong indication of how citizens interpreted 
the nature of the state and valuable insight into how people think the state should, and 
just as importantly, should not, be organized.  
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Devolution to Scotland was arguably the largest constitutional change in 
Britain during the period under study (although, as argued in Chapter Four, academic 
debate indicates that this may not have had as strong an impact south of the border). 
The Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 and given primary legislative 
responsibility across a wide variety of policy areas, and the ability to change taxation 
rates marginally.  Post-devolution the differentiation of citizens on either side of the 
border may have become more obvious to people in England as the fundamental 
governing order of Scotland changed.  In Canada, although the formal constitutional 
order was not altered during this period, as Chapter Four indicated, debate as to the 
nature of the constitutional order flourished.  
Figure 7.14 examines two ways in which people expressed dissatisfaction 
with the system of government in Britain.  On the left are the negative responses to 
the question “Which of these statements best describes your opinion on the present 
system of governing in Britain?”  On the right is a specific component of this, namely 
whether the voting system should change.  As can be seen, in most years the majority 
of people in both the North East and the rest of England felt that the “system of 
government in Britain could be improved a lot/needs a great deal of improvement”. 
Even when this was not the majority held opinion, it hardly shows overwhelming 
support for the status quo.  This strongly suggests an overall dissatisfaction with the 
government system and, by and large, the North East did not deviate significantly 
from the rest of England.  As it had become clear by the mid-1990s that the 
Conservatives were headed towards the opposition benches, Figure 7.14 seems to 
indicate that the feeling that the system needs to be improved is related to whichever 
party is in power.  This is especially true as one saw a decline in believing that the 
system needs to be improved leading into the change of government in 1997, but then 
a steady rise after 1999, after Labour’s ‘honeymoon’ period.  However, no 
statistically significant correlations were discovered in the North East between either 
regional pride or attachment to the region, and within the rest of England, what 
statistically significant correlations found indicated no relationship.  
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Figure 7.14
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With regard to changing the voting system, if one argues that the system of 
government in Britain needed to change, as the left hand graph indicates, then part of 
that desire for change may have been a desire to change the voting system, which 
determines who is represented in parliament and who will form government.  Yet 
support for changing the voting system was much lower than belief that the system of 
government could be improved upon.  In the North East a similar pattern was 
observed between the two questions: support for change dropped as the Conservatives 
approached electoral defeat, then began to rise again under Labour until it returned to 
the all English average.  As noted in previous chapters, politics mostly bypasses the 
region as the Conservatives cannot win and Labour cannot loose there, yet Figure 
7.14 indicates that at people in the North East did not see the voting system, which 
led to the region being bypassed, as being problematic.  The rest of England samples 
appeared very consistent during this period, hovering around the 35% mark, but in the 
North East it dropped to below 20% in 1996.  The low level of support immediately 
after Labour’s victory may have been related to the region’s position as a Labour 
stronghold, yet the North East data adds additional weight to the interpretation that 
demands for change within the system did not stem from a belief in fundamental 
structural problems, but from transient problems related to the governing party.  The 
consistency across the rest of England in the face of government turnover implies that 
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belief that the voting system should change, regardless of outcomes, was held by only 
a (sizable) minority of the population.
Figure 7.15: Best method to govern England69 
 As it is now Regional Assemblies English Parliament
 NE ROE NE ROE NE ROE
1999 56.4 62.8 20 14.8 18.1 17.9
2000 46.3 54.8 24.9 17.9 21.5 19.5
2001 57.6 56.7 28.8 22.4 10 16.2
2002 50.8 56.5 30.4 19 13 17.3
2003 56.9 54.5 25 23.7 12.9 16.5
2004 42.8 53.5 23.6 21.3 24.6 20.2
2005 53.5 54.4 20.9 20 14.3 17.9
Source: BSA 1999, 2000.2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
While Figure 7.14 indicates that people in both the North East and the rest of 
England felt the system was in need of change, it was not clear that it was major 
constitutional change that people sought.  As indicated in Figure 7.15, the majority of 
people in the North East and England as a whole felt that England should be governed 
as it was, through the British parliament in Westminster.  This number only dropped 
below 50% during two years in the North East, and even then the status quo was 
clearly the dominant choice.
Yet while the status quo was the dominant constitutional option in both the 
North East and the rest of England, analyzing support for the options for change is 
revealing.  Support for elected regional assemblies was higher in the North East than 
in the rest of England until 2003, when they appeared to fall in line with each other. 
This was particularly interesting as the data for the 2004 survey was conducted 
between June and September 2004 (BSA 2004 User Notes: 1) prior to the referendum 
defeat, meaning that the survey was not influenced by the referendum results.  
So while in total a sizable minority wanted some sort of sub-state level of 
government in England, opposition to the status quo was divided by the two options 
69 The exact wording of the question was:
“With all the changes going on in the way the different parts of Great Britain are run, 
which of the following do you think would be best for England 
1 for England to be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament,
2 for each region of England to have its own assembly that runs services like health,
3 or, for England as a whole to have its own new parliament with lawmaking 
powers?” 
4 (None of these) (BSA 2003)
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for change, regional and all English devolution, having the effect of reinforcing the 
status quo.  This meant that support for the status quo, while not overwhelming, 
easily outstripped the other two options.  While opposition to the status quo was 
never marshalled in a single direction, Figure 7.15 suggests that a credible challenge 
could have been mounted in the North East, where in some years support for an 
elected regional assembly outstripped support for all-English devolution.  In saying 
this, the 2004 referendum results indicated that they were not able to move beyond 
this core level of support (even taking into account that voters in referenda tend to 
behave conservatively, Dion 1996).
Figure 7.16















Source: BSA 2000, 2001, 2003
The only constitutional change since devolution that appeared to have 
majority support was the Conservative’s response to the West Lothian Question, 
which would inhibit Scottish MPs in the House of Commons from voting on issues 
which were devolved in Scotland (Conservative 2001: 34).  While Hazell (2006a and 
b) indicates that due to the problems this would create, it would not be implemented 
by any party, Figure 7.16 shows that in the North East, the rest of England and even 
in Scotland, people felt Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English issues 
in the House of Commons.  There are two important points to note with regard to this. 
First, though a majority of people may have felt that allowing Scottish Members of 
Parliament to vote on all issues was unfair, it was not an overwhelming majority. 
Second, the three-year average (each year weighted equally) indicates people in the 
North East were the most supportive of Scottish voting rights in the House of 
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Commons, even more supportive than the Scots.  Attitudes in the North East appeared 
to deviate from the rest of England with regard to the rights of Scottish MPs in the 
House of Commons, yet this researcher was unable to discover any statistically 
significant correlations indicating that this belief was related to regional identities.
The above discussion on constitutional preferences and the system of 
government in the North East and the rest of England indicate a high level of 
dissatisfaction with the system.  This dissatisfaction, though, was not found to be 
coupled with regional identity, suggesting that the demands articulated by regional 
elites in the North East did not resonate with the masses and that regional identity was 
not politicized in relation to these issues.  This makes it difficult to address what role, 
if any, Scotland had in mobilizing identity in the North East or the rest of England.  
In a context similar to that in Britain, Canadian constitutional questions during 
the period under study (1990-2004) centred upon the place of Quebec in the 
federation.  Accordingly, this section turns to an examination of public opinion 
towards the 1992 referendum and the place of Quebec in Canada.  Noting that the ‘n’ 
values are such that the numbers are not very statistically significant, Figure 7.17 
suggests that Nova Scotians were less interested in the referendum than their fellow 
Canadians.  When asked if they were ”very”, “fairly”, “not very” or “not at all” 
“interested in the referendum campaign?”  Nova Scotians appeared slightly less likely 
to be interested.  This is surprising, as Nova Scotia’s geographic position in relation 
to Quebec would suggest that issues surrounding Quebec would have a much greater 
impact there.  
Figure 7.17

































When correlating interest in the referendum with attachment to Nova Scotia, 
the results were not statistically significant, and Canada wide the correlation is .185 
(p < .005).  The end result of the referendum was that the overall vote in Nova Scotia 
was 51.1% against the proposals with a turnout of 67.8%.  This level was below both 
the national vote, which was 54.2% against, and the 71.8% Canada (outside Quebec) 
turnout numbers (Elections Canada 2007).  While opposition to the proposals was 
marginally greater than in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec), the lower voter 
turnout rate supports overall interest in the referendum being lower in Nova Scotia. 
However, these differences were only marginally lower than the Canadian (outside 
Quebec) average, and as such it is fair to say that Nova Scotia was by and large an 
‘average’ province with regard to behaviour in the 1992 referendum.
While Nova Scotians were split with regard to the provisions of the 
Charlottetown Accord, near unanimous agreement could be found with regard to the 
place of Quebec within the Canadian federation.  Figure 7.18 shows that the preferred 
option throughout Canada was the status quo. Between 1990 and 1998 almost every 
quarterly EFC survey asked respondents what they felt the constitutional future of 
Quebec should be.  Each of these surveys and years were weighted equally to make 
the results shown in figure 7.18 very statistically significant.  Between 1990 and 1998 
the status quo had approximately 30% support in Quebec and 70% and higher in the 
rest of Canada (outside Quebec) and Nova Scotia.  It is worthy of note that the 
number two option in Canada (outside Quebec) and Nova Scotia was Quebec 
independence.  Special status or sovereignty-association was supported by only a 
negligible number of respondents, strongly indicating that the vast majority of people 
in Canada (outside Quebec) saw the Canadian federation as a federation of equal 
provinces.  This attitude appears to have hardened over time in Nova Scotia.  In 1991 
the yearly average supporting the status quo for Quebec in Nova Scotia was 60%, by 
1994 this had risen to 81.5% support (chart not shown) with the average support 
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As the threat of Quebecois secession grew, apparently so too did support in 
Nova Scotia for Quebec maintaining the constitutional status quo.  This suggests that 
Nova Scotians overwhelmingly viewed each province as being equal within the 
federation while simultaneously supporting the thesis that a dialectical relationship 
exists between the majority and majority nation—an increase in support inside 
Quebec for independence (or some other fundamental change to the constitutional 
order) was met with a hardening of opinion towards Quebec and the strengthening of 
a pan-national interpretation of the Canadian state.  The numbers from Quebec 
indicate there is a fundamental difference of opinion between Canada (outside 
Quebec) and Quebec as to the nature of the Canadian federation.  While the majority 
of Quebec respondents chose a Canada option (the status quo, special status or 
sovereignty-association), the majority of Quebec respondents chose an option that 
saw Quebec as being more than just one province amongst ten.
While the above discussion indicates that Nova Scotians saw Canada as being 
a country of equal provinces, Figure 7.19 illustrates whether respondents saw 
sovereignty as resting at the provincial or federal level.  Here it is seen that Nova 
Scotians and the rest of Canadians (outside Quebec) agree that Quebec did not have 
the right to separate from Canada unilaterally.  Where Nova Scotians and Canadians 
(outside Quebec) differ was not in disagreeing that Quebec had the unilateral right to 
secede, but with the strength of that opinion.  In Nova Scotia the approximate average 
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that strongly disagreed was 65%, but in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) it was 
only 55%.  As Nova Scotia and the rest of Atlantic Canada would be physically cut 
off from the rest of Canada should Quebec separate, it was not surprising that the 
feeling that the Canadian state was indivisible was more strongly felt there.  
Figure 7.19
Quebec has right to separate no matter what the rest 













Source: CES 1997, 2000, 2004 
Regarding the constitutional issues facing Nova Scotia and the North East, it 
may be fair to suggest that both regions had a better idea of what they did not want 
than what they did.  While in both regions the constitutional status quo was supported 
by the majority of the population, the only sizable majority was in Nova Scotia in 
terms of support for the status quo for Quebec.  Yet opposition to the status quo did 
not evolve into support for any particular option for change, nor was a relationship 
found to exist between regional identities and any opinion, further evidence that 
regional identity was not politicized. Though the data presented indicates the North 
East and Nova Scotia wished their states to remain intact, no clear preferences were 
displayed as to how the system should change.  This was especially true in England 
where the choice presented was two forms of devolution: an English parliament or 
regional assemblies.  Support for the 1992 Charlottetown Accord in Nova Scotia was 
nearly evenly split on the issue. Yet the problems faced by those who advocated 
change may not have been the result of a lack of support for their proposals or even 
the cautiousness of voters (see Dion 1996).  Rather it could simply stem from the fact 
that the average person did not engage in politics in a sophisticated manner.  As noted 
in Chapter Six, many MPs and MLAs stated their constituents did not understand or 
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care about the complexities of the federal system—they merely wanted results, a 
point consistent with wider academic research.  This may help explain why people 
find it easier to express what they do not like, as opposed to articulating what they do, 
which often leads to reinforcing the status quo.
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed survey data in Canada and Britain along three separate, 
yet intersecting axes to determine whether, during a time of constitutional 
negotiations in Britain and Canada, a politicization of regional identity could be 
found in the North East of England and Nova Scotia.  It began by analyzing regional 
and national identities to determine if regional identities existed and what relationship 
they had to national ones.  While largely reinforcing other studies, it established that 
regional identities exist, are strong and did not compete with national identity.  This 
supports the argument made in Chapter Two that regional identities are embedded in 
larger national ones.  
Once this foundation was established, the chapter examined political efficacy 
and alienation using the logic of Hirschman’s Exit, Loyalty and Voice (1970).  This 
logic indicates that if people lack an exit option, they will strive for greater voice.  As 
grievance is a key building block of political mobilization, a lack of voice in a system 
may indicate a very solid foundation for regional identity mobilization amongst the 
masses if it correlates to regional identity.  It was shown that while perceived efficacy 
is low and alienation is high in both regions, efficacy is at best weakly correlated with 
regional identity.  
If Canada and Britain did not house powerful nationalist movements, the 
information above would suggest that the foundation for a regionalist movement with 
a popular base was weak.  Yet nationalist agitation within Quebec and Scotland 
provided a ‘fairness’ frame for elites to use regarding the redistribution of wealth 
within the state and issues of citizenship equality across sub-national groups.  Here a 
major divergence was discovered between public opinion in Nova Scotia and the 
North East.  While Nova Scotia saw its neighbouring sub-state nation, Quebec, as 
being favoured within the federation, in the North East, though Scotland was seen as 
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advantaged, the South of England was seen as being more so.  This meant that while 
people in Nova Scotia saw another nation as being the province’s primary source of 
frustration, in the North East it was their English co-nationals who caused frustration. 
In turn, this suggests the ability of North East elites to mobilize identity against an 
‘other’ from a different nation was weaker than that found in Nova Scotia.  Regarding 
constitutional preference and system of governance, Nova Scotians and North 
Easterners favoured the status quo, although it must be noted that support was not 
resounding in either region, rather the status quo was a default option due to lack of 
an agreed upon alternative.
Overall, regionalism in both Nova Scotia and the North East was strong at an 
elite level (Chapters Five and Six), but this did not appear to resonate with the 
masses.  Both regions have a strong sense of their regional identity, yet they did not 
mobilize them around issues of identity.  This was most prominent in the failed 2004 
referendum in the North East in which the option for change was resoundingly 
defeated.  Although the North East was extremely poorly placed for regionalism, 
Nova Scotia was better placed as its identity was positively correlated with political 





Nova Scotia and North East England are regions within the majority nations 
of Canada (outside Quebec) and England in the multinational states of Canada and 
Britain.  In both states the underlying constitutional norms are based upon 
understandings of the state dominant in the staatsvolk but contested by the minority. 
This caused elites in Quebec and Scotland to agitate for reform of the constitutional 
order in Canada and Britain, which in turn ‘spilt over’ in Canada (outside Quebec) 
and England at the statewide and regional level.  Nova Scotia and the North East as 
part of Canada and Britain were involved in discussions about the nature of the nation 
and the state.  Though possessing distinctive bounded networks of their own, regional 
networks are part of the system of bounded networks that make up the state (Deutsch 
1966a, Mann 1995, 1993), which intertwine in such a way that nations are part of the 
region as much as the region is part of the nation.  This is fundamentally different 
than a minority nation, as it is the nation, not the region, which is the locus of primary 
political loyalty.  The relationship between majority and minority nations in 
multinational state is dialectical; changes in one nation are met with changes in the 
other.  In turn, this has an impact on regions internal to the staatsvolk.  This thesis 
examined two of these regions, Nova Scotia the North East of England, to address the 
following hypothesis;
Hypothesis: Within multinational democracies which have experienced a 
recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the 
majority nation which allows regional elites to promote political agendas that 
mobilize regional and national identity, and in so doing the presence or 
absence of regional democratic institutions will shape the demands and the 
manner in which they are made.
To address the hypothesis the following six research questions guided this work;
RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of 
regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?
RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as 
a single unified people?  Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre 
and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?
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RQc.     Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the 
majority nation or the regions?  If so, what role do the minority nations play?
RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it 
politicized?  How it is politicized?  What do regional elites demand?
RQe. What role do regional levels of democracy play in regional identity 
mobalization?
RQf. Does elite debate resonate with the masses?
Returning to the issue of case selection, the reasons Canada and Britain were 
chosen for this comparative study were two fold.  Firstly, this examination is, at its 
heart, an attempt to better understand the Canadian federation.  Using the logic of 
Lipset (1991), gaining insight into Canada is best accomplished through the adoption 
of comparative methodology, in particular the Most Similar Systems Design as 
outlined by Przeworski and Teune (1979).  As such, another multinational state was 
needed for comparison; Britain was the logical choice as both Canada and Britain are 
multinational and share a number of similar characteristics.  They are both first world 
democracies, have (comparatively) ancient constitutional regimes, utilize the same 
voting system and have the similar Westminster style parliaments.  English is the 
lingua franca of the majority nation in both, and both are predominantly Christian 
nations, although they have been undergoing a process of multiculturalization.  In 
Canada and Britain between 1990 and 2004, the minority sub-state nations of Quebec 
and Scotland experienced peaks in nationalist agitation resulting in a referendum on 
independence in Quebec and devolution in Scotland.  In neither state was the upsurge 
of nationalism the result of processes entirely internal to Quebec and Scotland. 
Powerful and ideological executives controlled by Thatcher and Trudeau orchestrated 
major changes in the basic constitutional frameworks of Canada and Britain, 
challenging the consensus that these multinational states were built upon.
The initial survey of the literature on regional and nationalist mobilization in 
general, combined with the literature on the British and Canadian cases in particular, 
indicated that there were at least three ways in which identity could become 
problematized in multinational states, through: 1) Tyranny of the Majority, 2) 
Divergence of Aims, 3) and Assumed Homogeneity.  The above three ‘problems’ 
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found in multinational states indicated that not only were the states open to different 
interpretations between and within the different linguistic groups, and that two 
interpretive ‘poles’ were found in Canada and Britain: a unionist interpretation of the 
state, and a pan-nationalist one.  Unionism interprets the state by focusing on the 
state’s constituent units, whereas pan-nationalist interpretations focus on statewide 
identity and structures.  
Unionist interpretations of Britain looked to the Union of England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, but in Canada unionism encountered two interpretations 
of the state: a union of French and English speaking peoples, or a union of ten 
provinces.  Both of these interpretations viewed Canada as the construct of its 
constituent units, the difference being in how the units were defined.  The pan-
nationalist understanding of the state saw the state as the expression of the citizenry 
of the entire state, Canada and Britain.  While neither of these two interpretations of 
the state seemed to be inherently tied to particular ideological trends, it should be 
noted that in both states the Conservative parties leaned towards a unionist 
interpretation of the state, while the Liberals in Canada and Labour in Britain leaned 
towards the pan-nationalist. In both states there was a convergence between the 
parties as unionist leaning parties focused on the equality of citizens and member 
units, which equated to equal citizenship for all.  This interpretation of the state 
dominated at the national, regional, and mass level in both Canada (outside Quebec) 
and England.  
In both states the staatsvolk appeared unable to recognize that 
multinationalism by definition means multiple demos and sovereignties within the 
state.  This was most obvious in Canada where recognition of Quebec’s status as a 
nation was not affirmed until after the period of study—it was even shown earlier 
how the Supreme Court of Canada was able to recognize the right of Quebec to 
secede based on a single sovereign Canadian demos.  In Britain, while it is difficult to 
ignore its multinational makeup, nearly 300 years of Union under the English 
constitutional tradition of parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty meant 
conceptualizing any sort of power-splitting/sharing was difficult for English elites 
and masses.  Yet these dominant positions in both states were challenged and it was 
by exploring the challenges of the sub-state nation as part of the dialectical 
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relationship with the staatsvolk, as well as the response within the staatsvolk, that the 
hypothesis and research questions were investigated.  
8.2 The Nation in the Region and the Region in the Nation: 
Chapters Five through Seven Analyzed
In investigating the hypothesis and research questions the chapters in this 
project were structured to examine debates at the centre, in the regions, and public 
opinion.  This section synthesizes the findings from the empirical chapters to present 
a holistic picture of political events during the period under study, examining; 1) The 
place of Quebec and Scotland within Canada and Britain, 2) Citizenship and Identity 
in the Regions, 3) Concepts of Fairness, Equality and the Constitutional Order, and 4) 
Centre-Periphery Relations, Regional Alienation and Political Efficacy.
1) The place of Quebec and Scotland within Canada and Britain
As Quebec and Scotland were dominant throughout this thesis, they will be 
prominent in this concluding chapter.  The question of the place of these minority 
nations within the constitutional framework of the state was fundamental to Canada 
and Britain during this period.  Chapters Five and Six demonstrated how the political 
environment allowed differing views of the nation to surface within elite discourse; it 
allowed an examination of the differing strategies and tactics used by elites and 
indicated that an ‘internal othering’ of Quebec and Scotland took place.  These two 
sub-state nations were presented as being both one of ‘us’ and one of ‘them’ at the 
same time.  Quebec is part of Canada, and Scotland is part of Britain, yet the 
discourse allowed conflicting, perhaps even paradoxical, views to be held—a part of 
us yet separate.
This process of othering occurred through the use of both positive and 
negative descriptions of the sub-state nations.  Elites who felt favourably towards the 
minority nations used them as examples of what could be achieved, while those who 
felt unfavourably towards them used them as examples of what needed to be avoided. 
In doing this, both those favourable and unfavourable to the minority nations were 
engaging in the process of othering as both descriptions are based on a difference 
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between the ‘us’ of the majority and the ‘them’ of the minority.  As Quebec and 
Scotland are different from the norm but also one of ‘us,’ these differences were 
problematic, and balance needed to be maintained.  Discourses of equality of 
citizenship were dominant in the staatsvolk, which in Canada meant curbing 
Quebec’s constitutional demands and in Britain meant attempts to either emulate or 
‘reign in’ Scotland’s institutional changes. 
Although Scottish and Quebecois distinctiveness was recognized by elites, 
elites in Canada (outside Quebec) and England appeared uncomfortable with 
asymmetrical constitutional arrangements.  In Canada this ensured that Quebec 
remained a province like the others, and in Britain devolution to Scotland created a 
problem in England, the English Question, which resulted in numerous attempts to 
rebalance the British state, both at an all England and regional level.  Yet while 
asymmetry on the one hand appeared problematic, on the other, when asymmetrical 
arrangements were advocated, it was because they were seen as good for the state as a 
whole.  Asymmetry, though, has two important components; 1) as the sub-state 
nations are both ‘us’ and ‘them’, protecting the minority nation protected something 
that belongs to ‘us;’ and 2) asymmetry was to be temporary.  In Canada when elites 
were willing to grant specific powers to Quebec, it was usually with the caveat that 
all provinces could acquire them if desired.  While most accounts of devolution in 
Scotland look at it as a stand alone event, it was part of a larger all-Britain devolution 
package.  This not only emphasized the dominant singe-demos pan-nationalist 
interpretation of the state, it emphasized the dialectical nature of the relationship 
between minority and majority in Canada and in Britain as changes in one component 
part were met with changes in another.
With regard to the multinational nature of the state, little recognition of the 
place of the majority nation was found in debates, particularly in Canada.  Rather the 
state was presented as neutral and the sub-state nation as aberrant to the norms of 
Canada (outside Quebec) and England.  This was most clearly seen in Canada with 
statements like “I think we are all Canadians” and appeals to Britishness in Britain 
(especially given, as noted in Chapter Seven, that Britishness appears to be the 
dominant identity in England).
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2) Citizenship and Identity in the Regions
While in Canada (outside Quebec) it never seemed to be contested that 
provinces possessed distinctive identities, in England this was not the case.  As fairly 
recent constructs, whether or not English regions possessed distinctive identities was 
highly debated at the centre, but in the North East it appeared to be taken for granted. 
This was notable even within the unofficial ‘no’ campaign, as it was framed around 
the region, not other forms of identity.  Yet while regional identity existed in both 
Nova Scotia and the North East, it was stronger than the average regional identities 
held by their co-nationals; this was important as it meant that the potential existed for 
regional elites to harness regional identities.  Yet while regional identities did exist, it 
was not clear they were politicized in a meaningful way.
The relationship between regional and national identity appeared to be 
reinforcing, as regional identity did not compete with the national one.  In Nova 
Scotia, Canadian identity was also very strong; in the North East, regional identity 
existed alongside both an English and British identity.  While difficult to measure, it 
did appear that English identity was less strong and more fluid than British identity in 
the North East and England.  In both states, regional identity was articulated as being 
part of the national one.  One could not be Nova Scotian without being Canadian; 
North Eastern identity was embedded in England, which was in turn embedded in 
Britain.  This is not surprising as it was not only predicted in the theoretical 
construction but, as will be seen below, this is how regionalism manifests itself. 
While elites in both regions attempted to harness regional identity to achieve their 
particular political goals, it was not clear if the masses were politicized in the same 
way.  This suggests that regional elites were disconnected from the people they 
represented.  Yet because there was a disconnect does not mean that a regional 
movement or regionalism cannot exist as the power of elites to control the discourse 
and the political agenda is great and elites, by their nature, have the ability to 
influence debate and public opinion as well as frame the debate.
3) Fairness, Equality and the Constitutional Order
In both states, fairness was a prevalent theme.  Balance was desired between 
all elements within both states, but it was difficult to accomplish due to the 
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overarching pan-nationalist discourse, dominant in the majority nations of Canada 
(outside Quebec) and England, which grounded interpretations of ‘fairness’ in 
‘sameness.’  Elites did not appear able to move beyond concepts of undifferentiated 
citizenship.  As noted above, they were only willing to adopt asymmetrical 
arrangements if they were part of larger changes that would apply to all 
regions/provinces if so desired.  
Simeon (2006a) uses the term ‘federal culture’ to describe the reasons that 
federations take so many forms.  He argues that people’s basic understanding of how 
a state should work influences how it does work.  The concept of a federal culture can 
be expanded to address a ‘state culture;’ norms and understandings that inform 
people’s understandings of the relationship between citizen and state70.  As the 
dominant pan-national interpretations of the state found in Canada (outside Quebec) 
and England see Canada and Britain as states in which equal citizenship is shared by 
all, citizenship (the set of obligations and responsibilities between the citizen and 
state) was seen as uniform.  This limited the ability of the staatsvolk to accommodate 
Quebec and Scotland asymmetrically in the long-term.  The equality and fairness 
discourses outlined in this work did not appear to be easily decoupled from 
‘sameness’, although the failure of Labour to implement its regional reforms in 
England may result in a highly asymmetrical arrangement in Britain in the 
foreseeable future. 
Issues of fairness and balance articulated by elites resonated with the masses; 
people in both regions seemed to view their region as being treated unfairly, 
especially with regard to state expenditure.  A difference, though, was that people in 
Nova Scotia saw the ‘internal other’ as being favoured while in the North East it was 
their co-nationals in the South of England.  The difference between the two regions 
extended to the constituent order of the state.  Polling data in Nova Scotia indicated 
an ‘in’ or ‘out’ attitude regarding Quebec, with an overwhelming majority of those 
polled supporting the status quo for Quebec within the Canadian federation.  This 
differed from the North East where people were mainly indifferent to devolution in 
Scotland, appearing less likely to want to limit Scottish voting rights in the House of 
70 In accordance with the three broad categories of citizenship outlined by Faulks 
(1998: 2): legal, philosophical and socio-political.
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Commons than either their English co-nationals or even the Scots (although this was 
a matter of degree, as limiting voting rights for the Scots was still majority opinion). 
Nova Scotians thought Quebec was most favoured within the federation, with Ontario 
a distant second.  With regard to issues of fairness in the North East, Scotland did not 
generate the kind of negative feelings that Quebec did in Nova Scotia.  Though a 
substantial minority of people in the North East did think Scotland was favoured, this 
was dwarfed by those who felt the same with regard to the South of England.  In 
Nova Scotia, Quebec was seen as receiving preferential treatment, but the evidence 
indicates that people by and large felt Scotland did not receive an unfair amount of 
government expenditure.  While this does not directly demonstrate how North 
Easterners felt about the position of their region, it indicates that there was little 
negative spill over from Scotland, in turn appearing to deny regional elites a source of 
grievance and a clear ‘other’ in a minority nation around which to build a regional 
movement.  
4) Centre Periphery Relations, Regional Alienation and Political Efficacy
Any movement that attempts to mobilize around territorial identity is going to 
have to deal with questions of the relationship between the centre and the region.  As 
Hutchinson (1999: 399) indicates, territorial mobilization is about grievance, and in 
both Nova Scotia and the North East elites attempted to link problems they 
interpreted with regard to the centre to regional identity.  In Nova Scotia and the 
North East, elite calls for change were highly influenced by their sub-state 
neighbours.  To elites at the centre and the regions, they acted as examples (both 
positive and negative), and a theme of voice dominated the regional discourse vis-à-
vis the relationship with the centre state.  
While elite discourse at the centre was focused on the place of Quebec and 
Scotland, by default this meant that it was a discussion on the nature of Canada and 
Britain as a whole.  Both Nova Scotia and the North East are embedded in democratic 
states, yet neither state has a formal mechanism by which regional interests are taken 
into account at the national level.  Some respondents in Nova Scotia felt regionally 
based Cabinet ministers offered voice to Nova Scotia at the federal level, yet this 
contradicts the research into regionally based ministers which indicates they do not 
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act as regional spokespeople or give regions voice.  Instead they have been replaced 
by first ministers conferences.  These answers, though, help substantiate research that 
indicates the Atlantic Provinces have a more traditional political outlook and strong 
familial socializations (See Carbert 2006, Clancy et al. 2000).  In Canada, the real 
voice for the regions is now found with the premiers, who, due to the rise in the 
importance of first minister’s conferences, are now the spokespeople for the regions 
at the federal level (Bakvis 1991).  Yet while Nova Scotia had this type of 
representation and North East did not, elites in both complained of a lack of voice and 
political efficacy.
8.3 Identity and Democracy: the Research Questions and Hypothesis Revisited
The last section brought together the common themes from the empirical 
chapters; this section advances one step further, applying the lessons learned to each 
of the Research Questions to address the hypothesis directly.
RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of 
regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?
It was apparent that strong regional identities existed in both Nova Scotia and 
the North East.  This was true at an elite and a mass level.  Regional identity was 
found to be strong in absolute terms, but also in comparison to other regions in 
Canada (outside Quebec) and England.  Chapter Two argued that regional identities 
are not in competition with national ones as regions are embedded within and 
indivisible from larger nations.  The evidence presented supports that claim.  With 
regard to Nova Scotia and the North East, regional and national identity did not 
compete with each other, and the evidence suggests that they may actually have 
reinforced each other.  Alienation was integrationist in character, with regional 
identity being mobilized for the regions to have a greater say in the administration of 
the state, not to pull away from it.
RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as 
a single unified people?  Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre 
and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?
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In Nova Scotia and the North East, as well as in Canada (outside Quebec) and 
England, elites saw the state as embodying a single nation.  While some elites did 
recognize the compact/union nature of the state, the pan-national interpretation was 
dominant in elite discourse in both the regions and the centre.  It appeared as if the 
framing of the state at the centre placed boundaries upon regional actors, as regional 
actors were partaking in the same debates as central elites.  Although these debates 
were part of the nations’ continual reconceptualization of self, the conception 
forwarded by regional actors is based on their experience of the nation from a 
regional perspective.
RQc.     Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the 
majority nation or the regions?  If so, what role do the minority nations play?
It appears that the minority sub-state nations of Quebec and Scotland played a 
key role in identity articulation in the staatsvolk as a whole as well as in the regions. 
It was shown that the dialectical relationship between the minority nations and the 
staatsvolk mobilized identity in both majority and minority as change in one was met 
with change in the other.  Yet it was noted that elites in the majority nation did not 
necessarily recognize their role in this process.  They saw the state as liberal and 
culturally neutral while minority sub-state national actors saw it as a challenge to 
their interpretation of the state and possibly their interpretation of ‘good’ and ‘just.’ 
This meant that actors in the minority nation were seen as being ‘at fault’ for 
initiating a challenge to the status quo.
RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it 
politicized?  How it is politicized?  What do regional elites demand?
The politicization of identity appeared to operate at two levels, elite and mass. 
Chapter Seven indicated that while regional identity was strong, there was a very 
weak politicization of regional identity at the mass level.  Mobilization, however, is 
also an elite phenomenon and elites in both regions mobilized along identity lines. 
This may have been most obvious in the North East as the region was the focus of 
constitutional change, but it was no less prevalent in Nova Scotia where elites 
attempted to harness provincial identity to their political agendas.  It is important to 
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note that regional identity may have been mobilized against perceived 
structural/constitutional problems, but it was never mobilized against the nation as the 
regions were firmly embedded within their nations.  This was exemplified by a Nova 
Scotian premier being forced to declare his loyalty to Canada in front of the Nova 
Scotia legislature due to his suggestion, (within a hypothetical context of Quebec 
independence) that Nova Scotia would become independent of Canada in some 
manner.  It was shown that while the demands articulated by elites differed, it was 
due to differences in institutional arrangements channelling the manner in which 
demands were articulated rather than the complaints the demands were addressing.
RQe What role does regional levels of democracy play in regional identity 
mobalization?
Out of all the research questions, it is the answer to this one that is perhaps the 
most surprising.  Regional levels of democracy and the corresponding legislative 
competencies found in Nova Scotia by default ensured that the vast majority of issues 
being debated within the province were fundamentally different from those in the 
North East; indeed, as Nova Scotia already has an elected regional government its 
elites did not need to advocate for one.  In saying this, as Chapter Three noted there is 
a difference between indicators and concepts, and in this sense while the indicators of 
regional discontent in Nova Scotia and the North East were different, they indicated 
very similar concepts.  In both regions, regional elites expressed a desire to increase 
regional voice as well as expressing a corresponding lack of regional efficacy.  While 
the institutions of Nova Scotia and the North East channelled these in different 
directions, they did not appear to lessen the sense of either.  While it was not possible 
to gauge comparative levels of efficacy and lack of voice between Nova Scotia and 
the North East, there was no indication that regional democracy in Nova Scotia 
lessoned either.
RQf. Does elite debate resonate with the masses?
The answer to this question is quintessentially Canadian.  The answer is yes… 
and no.  Yes, in that the frames outlined in Chapter Five appeared to be accepted by 
the masses in Nova Scotia and the North East, as well as their respective majority 
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nations.  No, in that elite debate at the regional level, which attempted to harness 
regional identity with political agendas, did not appear successful.  This reinforced 
the argument that regions are embedded in the nation as the nation is their primary 
political loyalty.  It suggests that statewide elites had a greater capacity to influence 
individuals in the region, reinforcing the primacy of the nation.  Additionally, as 
regional identity did not compete with national ones, it appeared that regional identity 
could not challenge national identity for primacy.  
This thesis undertook a theoretically and empirically detailed study of national 
and regional identity mobilization in Nova Scotia and the North East to investigate 
the role of regional level democracy in regional identity mobilzation addressing the 
following;
Hypothesis: Within multinational democracies, which have experienced a 
recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the 
majority nation which allows political elites to couple their political agendas 
with regional and national identity, and in doing so the existence of regional 
democratic institutions will shape both the demands linked to identity and the 
manner in which they are made.
To conduct this investigation, it was necessary to understand theoretically the 
difference between minority sub-state nations and regions within the staatsvolk. 
While at one level it may be intuitive that Quebec or Scotland could become 
functioning independent states but not Nova Scotia or the North East of England, 
many aspects of social and political life are counterintuitive.  As such, this thesis first 
explained theoretically why Quebec could become independent while Nova Scotia 
could not.  This theoretical model focused on the embedded nature of bounded 
regional networks within national ones, demonstrating that the nation, not the region, 
is the bearer of primary political loyalty.  This was seen in contrast to minority sub-
state nations which are themselves the bearer of primary political loyalty with 
corresponding sovereignty and political legitimacy.  
In outlining the difference between region and sub-state nation, this thesis 
produced a theory of the state, nation and region.  This indicated that there is a 
dialectical relationship between the majority and minority nations within the confines 
of the state; actors within both attempted to achieve their political objectives by 
appealing to the solidarity inherent in the national community.  It was through 
277
developing this understanding of the nature of state, nation and region and the manner 
in which identity is politicized that one can understand the constraints that regional 
actors find themselves in.  While it may have been possible to create an 
understanding of region divorced from the dynamics of majority and minority 
nationalism, this would have ignored the fundamental constitutional questions faced 
by elites in Nova Scotia and the North East and their respective states as they dealt 
with the place of Quebec and Scotland within the constitutional order.
The above hypothesis, as noted in Chapter Three, suggests certain 
expectations;
1. Minority nationalism will politicise regional and national identity in the 
majority nation,
2. Politicised identity in the majority nation will create a political environment 
favourable to regional identity mobilization
3. Regional democratic institutions will provide greater voice for both the 
regions themselves as well as actors within the regions
The answers to the above research questions have demonstrated that the first 
two expectations were met.  Minority nationalism did politicize regional and national 
identities in the staatsvolk, although it must be again emphasized that the staatsvolk 
also had a role in initiating this mobilization, although not realizing it.  In turn, it was 
demonstrated how the reaction in the staatsvolk to minority nationalism enabled a 
political environment favourable to regional identity mobilization.  The real surprise 
was found vis-à-vis the third expectation, the role of regional levels of democracy.
In both Nova Scotia and the North East, the relationship between regional 
level democracy and regional identity mobilization was complex.  Firstly, regional 
elites in both appeared to have fundamentally the same complaint, a lack of regional 
voice.  It would no doubt shock regional devolution activists in the North East that a 
sub-state level of government as powerful as a Canadian province would have similar 
complaints with regard to regional voice and efficacy.  This suggests that if the role 
of regional democracy is to increase efficacy and voice for the region, democracy 
alone is insufficient to accomplish this goal.   Democrats, though, may take heart that 
there is an important caveat to this; regional democracy appeared to increase voice in 
conjunction with democratic central institutions.  Regional democracy had the 
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capability to present a regional voice if and when broad elite consensus could be 
found.  This was most notable in Nova Scotia as actors from all parties broadly 
agreed that the place of Nova Scotia was within the Canadian nation and actors from 
all three parties appealed to Canadian national solidarity. Regional democracy gave 
voice to appeals to national solidarity and acted as a reminder to the rest of the nation 
that the region, as part of the nation, was deserving of the responsibilities and benefits 
of membership within the national community.  In this sense, though regional 
democracy in Nova Scotia may not have provided a greater ‘voice’ for the region in 
the manner in which regional devolution supporters in the North East appeared to 
suspect it would, it may have acted to integrate the region.  Additionally, regional 
level democracy in Nova Scotia created elites, the Nova Scotia cabinet, who were 
able to engage federal and provincial ministers as equals.  Barry (1975a) identifies 
federalism as a component of consociationalism and in this regard the ability of Nova 
Scotian elites to mobilize regional voice meant they could, as the representatives of 
Nova Scotia, help craft Canadian national interest.  In this sense, regional level 
democracy can almost be seen as providing the check and balance against the House 
of Commons that the Canadian Senate, due to its democratically illegitimate selection 
process, simply cannot.  Nova Scotian ‘voice’ acted to integrate the region into 
central decision making.
Secondly, while the arguments presented above, and even the way it is 
phrased in this thesis, makes it appear as if regions possess voice, they do not.  Full 
stop.  This needs to be emphasized, as in both Nova Scotia and the North East it is 
regional actors who possess voice.  Regions may possess institutions that enable 
actors to speak for the region, and there may be dominant views within the regions, 
but like any identity community, regions are arenas of identity contestation where 
individual visions of the region compete with each other to gain favour with members 
of the region.  In both Nova Scotia and the North East there was vigorous debate 
about how to move the region forward and what it meant to be Nova Scotian and 
North Eastern.  Regional level democracy in Nova Scotia, rather than focusing and 
harnessing regional voice, ensured that differing actors with differing opinions had a 
platform to present them.
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While in Canada democratic institutions created a forum for debate, the North 
East lacked this.  As such, debates in the North East could only happen at 
Westminster or a sub-regional level (the only time that a clear regional debate took 
place was the 2004 referendum).  While elites in the North East tried to model their 
movement upon the extremely successful Scottish Constitutional Convention, they 
appeared unable to generate the legitimacy of the Scottish one.  Debates in Nova 
Scotia were about the use of voice, while debates in the North East were about 
gaining voice.  It is interesting to note that while the voice of Nova Scotia is immense 
compared to the North East, Nova Scotian actors and the masses did not appear to 
think voice was effectively used.  This strongly suggests that capacity for voice must 
be coupled with the will to use it.  As both Nova Scotia and the North East are 
embedded in larger primary political loyalties, voice and the debates surrounding it 
acted to direct debate away from a secessionist/autonomist route, and towards an 
integrationist route.  This was apparent in Nova Scotia, but in the North East ‘voice’ 
was also about integrating the interests of the North East into the decision making 
processes of the state.  
It should be further noted that regional level democracy in Nova Scotia also 
appeared to create competition between the different orders of government.  As 
Simeon notes (2006b), competition is good as it helps determine the national will. 
This in turn helps overcome the inherent deficiencies in the electoral system, ensuring 
that it is not only the needs of key constituencies that the central government takes 
into account.  Yet through comparison with Nova Scotia this indicates that there may 
have been two consequences that regional devolution campaigners in the North East 
may not have anticipated.  Firstly, regional level democracy deprived Nova Scotia of 
the ability to simply blame the central government for the region’s problems. 
Accountability in the region means just that, that accountability rested within Nova 
Scotia.  As was seen in Nova Scotian debates, the central government competed with 
the provincial government and elites at the centre were able to point their proverbial 
fingers at the provincial level of government, much as regional elites in Nova Scotia 
and the North East are able to point their fingers at the centre.  In addition, because 
democracy is about the competition for power, it institutionally enshrined a 
competition for power that encouraged regional actors to finger point at each other.  
280
For example, the official opposition in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly provided 
a platform to attack the Nova Scotia government for failing the people of Nova 
Scotia.  The House of Assembly, at the time of writing, houses three different 
political parties, which each attack each other, and between levels parties that would 
appear to be in alliance with each other can point fingers at each other as well.  While 
in the North East the devolution campaign may have attempted to frame itself as 
representing a broad consensus favouring regional devolution, in reality this was not 
the case.  The polling data presented in Chapter Seven demonstrated that the status 
quo was dominant in the electorate and all-England devolution had sizable support as 
well.  Intercity rivalry was shown to be rife in the region, and while one cannot say 
with 100% certainty, it would seem that the evidence from both the North East and 
Nova Scotia suggests regional devolution in the North East may have highlighted 
regional differences which Labour hegemony in the region masked.
Building upon the idea of accountability, although regional devolution 
campaigners in the North East advocated for an elected regional assembly that would 
work on behalf of the region, evidence from Nova Scotia indicated that people within 
the province did not understand the complex dynamics of multilevel governance. 
This means that while regional elites in the North East thought they could create a 
system in which there were clearly demarcated lines of accountability and 
responsibility, in practice this may be impossible to achieve within any system of 
multilevel government.  This is regardless of the fact that actors are power 
maximizers who will always try to increase their power resulting in competition 
between the different orders of government.  The Nova Scotia electors, to whom 
regional actors in Nova Scotia are accountable, did not appear to understand what to 
hold the Nova Scotia legislature accountable for.  This is not unique to Nova Scotia, 
but given Nova Scotia is a comparably ancient system of multilevel government, one 
can only imagine the problems that would be faced in a new system.71  Instead of 
creating clear lines of responsibility, the evidence suggests regional level democracy 
dispersed accountability within the system, making it more difficult for electors to 
hold political elites to account.
71 Indeed, this author is painfully aware of these problems after working as a 
Parliamentary researcher for a Member of the Scottish Parliament.
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8.4 Conclusion: Limitations of Research, and the Way Forward
Chapter Three discussed a major limitation of comparative research: that one 
cannot draw universal conclusions from comparison due to the limited number of 
cases.  This case study was limited to two regions: Nova Scotia and the North East of 
England.  While the logic of the selection of these two cases under the MSSD was 
such that one could not have asked for better cases, the states that the regions are 
embedded in are so similar that in many ways it is difficult to apply the lessons 
learned to other cases, especially with regard to exploring regionalism in other 
multinational states that have dissimilar variables or regions within single nation-
states, such as Germany.
This, however, is the direction this project suggests the research should take. 
The lessons learned here would be of particular interest to the study of nation-states 
as they lack the politicization of identity based around the constitutional struggles of a 
minority sub-state nations such as Quebec or Scotland.  As such, they lack the 
‘internal other’ that was prevalent in Canada (outside Quebec) and England.  Or do 
they?  Germany, for example, may have an internal other with regards to the former 
East Germany or Bavaria.  Other states like Spain, where violent nationalist 
movements exist, would provide another interesting avenue of approach.  This project 
demonstrated that regionalism was inherently integrationist; how, then, would it 
manifest itself not only in a context of heightened nationalist discourse, but in a 
militarized and violent environment as well?  Would regions in the staatsvolk still 
look to the sub-state nation as something to emulate if they feared elements of it? 
Would the process be the same if the minority nation was not seen as something to 
emulate or ally with?  How would regional level democracy work in states outside of 
the first world?  These are just some of the larger questions as to the relationship 
between democracy, regionalism, and nationalism that have been left unanswered by 
this research.  Yet it is hoped, that by exploring the understudied relationship between 
regionalism and nationalism on the one hand, and regionalism and mid-level 
democratic institutions on the other, that this thesis has made its own small 
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